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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation attends to the ways in which the deployment of technological devices in twenty-
first-century intermedial performance might influence the audience members’ perception of the 
relationship between humans and technology. Drawing upon the work of scholars in the fields of 
new media, performance studies, and the philosophy of technology, I argue that intermedial 
performance artists reinvigorate the role of the human body in performance by mobilizing 
embodiment as a techno-dramaturgical strategy for shaping the audience members’ perception of 
human-machine interaction. Chapter One surveys the history of performance and technology 
from the ancient Greek theatre to twentieth-century performance, with particular emphasis on the 
conceptual significance of techne and poiesis in dramatic theatre. Chapter Two examines the 
theories of intermediality in performance as well as the co-evolutionary relationship between 
human beings and technicity in order to delineate the analytical and dramaturgical potential of an 
original conceptual framework known as critical techno-dramaturgy. Chapter Three explores the 
interplay between embodiment, technology, and space in intermedial performance and its effects 
on the audience members’ awareness of their embodied existence as they navigate the cityscape 
with bicycles, handheld computers, and mobile phones. Chapter Four investigates the intersection 
of performance and techno-anxiety by looking at how intelligent machines that appear to perform 
autonomously might affect the audience members’ perception of these anthropomorphic 
technological agents in relation to their own bodies. Chapter Five examines how the construction 
of the “cyborg” as both a conceptual metaphor for and a material instantiation of human-machine 
“fusion” could impact the prosthetic relations between persons with disabilities and the 
technological devices that they employ in intermedial performance. Finally, Chapter Six looks at 
my involvement in the production of an original creative project that uses critical techno-
dramaturgy as a strategy for shaping the audience members’ perception of the complicity 
between digital media (particularly video technology) and the mediation of death.  
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Introduction 
 
“There is nothing more illusory in performance than the illusion of the unmediated.” 
- Herbert Blau, The Eye of Prey, 1987, p.164. 
 
“To be a body, is to be tied to a certain world […]; our body is not primarily in space: it is of it.” 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 2002, p.171. 
 
On a cool autumn day in October 2007, a group of cyclists rode across the city of London 
on bicycles that were outfitted with mobile computing devices. These cyclists were not preparing 
for a triathlon. Instead, they were the player-participants of Rider Spoke, a public performance 
event organized by the British theatre company, Blast Theory. In this intermedial performance, 
the cyclists rode across the busy city streets and dark alleyways of London in search of a number 
of chosen locations. At each location, they were asked to record personal and reflective audio 
messages in response to a set of predefined questions that appeared on the mobile devices. 
Moving out of the structural confines of the theatre and into the hustle and bustle of the urban 
landscape, Rider Spoke embodied what the creators call “a pervasive game,” in which the 
participating cyclists played the roles of performers and audience members.  
By travelling from location to location within the city in order to listen to and record 
personal messages, the cyclists were engaging in a generative performance that affected their 
perception of space through the coupling of their bodies with such technological implements as 
the bicycle and the mobile device. Navigating the London cityscape as part of an intermedial 
performance that amalgamates the physical act of cycling, the use of mobile devices with locative 
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capabilities, and the poetic art of oral storytelling, this was an embodied experience that 
foregrounded the role of the body in the perception of physical and imaginative worlds. Such 
bodily self-awareness is predicated on the habit of movement (cycling in this case), which is 
especially salient in a public performance that involves a substantial amount of physical toil.   
Habit involves the repeated performance of actions on a regular basis. More importantly, 
it is an embodied experience. The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty believes that 
“[h]abit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by 
appropriating fresh instruments” (2002: 166). Citing the example of the typist who knows exactly 
which keys to press even without looking at them, Merleau-Ponty argues that habit is not a form 
of knowledge or an involuntary action. The typist does not perform the movements on a 
typewriter by positing the keys as objective locations in her mind. The positions of the keys are 
not concepts to be memorized. Instead, the typist learns to type by incorporating “the key-bank 
space into [his or her] bodily space” (2002: 167). Similarly, the cyclists in Rider Spoke 
incorporate the rotary space of the bicycle pedals into their bodily space as they cycle through 
London. What this means is that the habits of typing and cycling occur not in thought. Instead, 
both typing and cycling are habits of movement that occur in the body, which Merleau-Ponty 
characterizes as “our general medium for having a world” (2002: 169). In its role as a mediator of 
a world, the body is capable of learning about its embodied relationship with inorganic objects, as 
it adapts to (and extends its influence in) the world through the use of technological prostheses.  
Writing in 1945, Merleau-Ponty asserts that technology affects our embodied perception 
of the world and the bodies and objects that we encounter in daily life. Almost two decades later, 
in 1964, Marshall McLuhan would argue in his monumental book, Understanding Media, that 
technology has the capacity to alter the “sense ratios or patterns of perception” in the embodied 
human (1994: 31). But how does embodiment work? And how does the body exist? “To be a 
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body,” Merleau-Ponty contends, “is to be tied to a certain world” (2002: 171). The body does not 
simply exist in space. Rather, the body modulates space, and such an embodied modulation in 
turn influences our perception of that space. In order for us to experience the world, the external 
instruments that extend our senses have to be incorporated into the body as part of its 
embodiment. In Rider Spoke, the participants’ perception of space is modulated through their 
embodiment with such technological implements as the bicycle and the mobile computing 
device. Whether it is the physical act of cycling across London or the oral recording of personal 
narratives on a digital device at different locations within the city, the human body features 
prominently in this intermedial performance.  
The interplay between embodiment, technology, and space in Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke 
foregrounds the need to interrogate the role that the body plays in the production and experience 
of intermedial performance. The aim here is to understand how the audience members perceive 
their embodiment with various forms of technology, be they digital or otherwise. As such, this 
dissertation attends to the interface between performance and technology in intermedial 
performance. Specifically, the project analyzes the ways in which intermedial performance artists 
incorporate the audience members into the creative process in order to influence their perception 
of the relationship between humans and technology. But before we set out to interrogate the 
mobilization of embodied perception in intermedial performance, let us reflect on the theoretical 
debates concerning the notion of “liveness” and how it influences our understanding of theatre 
and performance. What has been dubbed the “liveness debate” in theatre studies has influenced 
the intellectual discourse on intermedial performance in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, particularly in relation to the ways in which the theatrical medium distinguishes itself 
from other forms of media on the basis of its seemingly ephemeral qualities. Much of the tension 
surrounding the need to differentiate between the “live” and the “mediated” in performance has 
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since been defused, as such intermedial performance scholars as Maaike Bleeker, Robin Nelson, 
and Andy Lavender have moved the discussion beyond the notion of “liveness” as the definitive 
ontology of the theatrical experience. But for the benefit of readers who may not be familiar with 
the “liveness debate” of the 1990s, or with theatre and performance studies in general, the next 
section will consider the possibility of moving beyond “liveness” as we investigate the perceptual 
effects of intermedial performance. Subsequently, in the latter part of this introduction, I will 
offer an overview of the main thesis in this dissertation, as well as a summary of the key topics 
that will be examined in each of the six chapters.      
 
Beyond “Liveness” 
Over the past two decades, theatre researchers have been intrigued by the interface 
between performance and technology. From Brenda Laurel’s investigation into the relationship 
between dramatic performance and human-computer interaction to the debates between Peggy 
Phelan and Philip Auslander on the question of “liveness” in what the latter calls “mediatized 
performances,” as well as recent efforts by Sarah Bay-Cheng, Chiel Kattenbelt, Andy Lavender, 
and Robin Nelson in mapping and theorizing the phenomenon of what they term “intermediality 
in performance,” much of the scholarship on the conjunction between performance and 
technology has been focused on identifying the unique features of this evolving aesthetic 
paradigm and defining such key concepts as “embodiment” and “interactivity”. According to 
Kattenbelt, intermediality in the context of theatre and performance assumes a co-relation 
between different media that results in what he characterizes as a “mutual affect” between them. 
As a result, he purports that previously existing medium-specific conventions are challenged and 
altered during the course of intermedial performance, thus resulting in new critical dimensions of 
perception and experience of the various media that perform alongside the human actors. 
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In the edited volume, Intermediality in Theatre and Performance, Freda Chapple and 
Chiel Kattenbelt describe intermedial performance as “a space where the boundaries soften – and 
we are in-between and within a mixing of spaces, media, and realities” (2006: 12). For Chapple 
and Kattenbelt, intermedial performances hold much potential for perceptual training and 
cognitive adaptation. Such performances, they contend, can become the site where both actors 
and audiences learn to navigate new technological developments in society, albeit within the 
boundaries of a self-contained space that constitutes the theatrical milieu. But the intermedial 
performance environment, I would argue, is more than just a perceptual proving ground where 
audience members strive to familiarize themselves with the functional capabilities of new 
technologies. Instead, the intermedial stage is an interstitial space where the traditional distinction 
between performers and audience recedes, as they participate in a performative coupling with 
technological devices, an act that allows them to reflect on how the use of these devices in 
everyday life might affect the human condition. But while researchers such as Chapple and 
Kattenbelt seek to understand the perceptual effects of the interface between performance and 
technology, it might be worth exploring some of the lessons that have emerged from the 
“liveness” debates between theatre scholars, Peggy Phelan and Philip Auslander, in the 1990s.  
The debate between Phelan and Auslander converged on the notion of “liveness” and 
whether it should be considered the definitive ontological quality of theatre. Through the course 
of their dialectical exchanges, Phelan held what was arguably the traditional perspective of 
theatre as “live” performance by real, presumably human, actors. Such a view of performance is 
marked by the immediacy and ephemerality of the action on the stage or play area. For Phelan, 
the “liveness” of performance is marked by its non-reproducibility. Performance occurs in the 
immediacy of the moment. In other words, it lives only in the present. “Performance,” as Phelan 
asserts, “cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
! '!
representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance” 
(1993: 146). By emphasizing what she believes to be the non-reproducibility of the performance 
event, Phelan advances the claim that performance “becomes itself through disappearance” 
(1993: 146). In this sense, an original performance does not exist, as there can never be a copy of 
it. Following Phelan’s logic, the performance disappears once it has ended. It may continue to 
exist in the individual memories of the audience members, but in the physical sense, it is no 
longer present.  
There is an apparent privileging of presence in Phelan’s theorization of performance, 
particularly the presence of tangible objects and bodies in a physical space. The reality of the 
performance is contingent on the presence of the visible and audible entities that participate in the 
action of that performance. “Performance,” Phelan argues, “implicates the real through the 
presence of living bodies […] Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility – in a 
maniacally charged present – and disappears into memory, in the realm of invisibility where it 
eludes regulation and control” (Phelan 1993: 148). The phrase “regulation and control” is 
noteworthy, as it is indicative of a directorial view of performance, whereby the artistic vision of 
the director is expressed in the action that transpires among the actors on the stage. Through the 
deployment of dramaturgical design, the director regulates and controls the ways in which actors, 
dialogue, props, set, lighting, and sound are mobilized in the performance. In turn, what the 
audience experiences would be the regulated and controlled rendering of this performance. But if 
it is true that the disappearance of performance into memory does eschew the regime of 
“regulation and control,” a scenario that could potentially alter the director’s artistic vision, then 
how should we regard the “disappearance” of the performance into such memory devices as 
video recordings?  
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For Phelan, a performance that is mediated by technological implements no longer exists 
as “live” performance (1993: 148). Like the performance that “disappears into memory,” or what 
Phelan calls “the realm of invisibility,” mediated performance is not physically present and 
visible to a “live” audience. Philip Auslander takes issue with this dichotomy between the “live” 
and the “mediated” in the theorization of performance. Auslander believes that as theatre and 
performance artists begin to incorporate a myriad of technological devices and media into their 
work, an observable blurring of the boundaries between the “live” and the “mediated” also begins 
to emerge. As Auslander explains, “[t]he result of this implosion [of the dichotomy] is that a 
seemingly secure opposition is now a site of anxiety, the anxiety that underlies many 
performance theorists’ desires to reassert the integrity of the live and the corrupt, co-opted nature 
of the mediatized” (1999: 39). The mediated environment of the contemporary performance stage 
has become a site of contention between those performance theorists who regard “liveness” as the 
natural condition for performance and those who seek to challenge this assumption.   
Refusing to privilege “liveness” as the definitive ontological quality of theatre and 
performance, Auslander contends that the notion of “liveness” in the context of performance is “a 
cultural construct, not an ontological condition” (1999: 2). “Liveness,” he reminds us, “is 
historically conditioned” (1999: 2). For Auslander, the cultural meaning of “liveness” is 
influenced by changes in the historical conditions as well as the technological affordances of the 
period in which a particular performance occurs:  
The live is, in a sense, only the secondary effect of mediating technologies. Prior 
to the advent of those technologies, e.g. photography, telegraphy, phonography, 
there was no such thing as the ‘live,’ for that category has meaning only in relation 
to an opposing possibility. Ancient Greek theatre, for example, was not live 
because there was no possibility of recording it. (1999: 51) 
! )!
Auslander’s point about the impossibility of making records of performances in the ancient 
Greek theatre requires further explication. Besides writing down the dialogue in the play and 
making notes about the position of actors on the stage, the ancient Greeks could not record their 
theatre performances as moving images. Such a recording technology would only emerge some 
two and a half millennia later, with the invention of the first motion picture camera in the 
nineteenth century. But despite the lack of a technology for recording moving images, the 
memory of ancient Greek theatre performances would have been etched in the minds of the actors 
and audience members who participated in these productions. Outside of human memory, 
however, there was no possibility of making a direct copy of the performances that transpired on 
the stage. As such, there was no such thing as a “live” performance in ancient Greek theatre, as 
the physical dramatic action performed by the actors was the only form of performance that the 
audience members had known and witnessed. This is why Auslander is convinced that the notion 
of “liveness” appears to have emerged as a result of technological mediation, which raised the 
spectre of duplicating what was previously perceived to be a strictly temporal and ephemeral 
phenomenon – that is, the performance that happens in the here and now. In this sense, the 
existence of “live” performance is contingent on the potential existence of its mediated double 
that archives the original event for posterity. But what might happen to the notion of “liveness” 
when such mediating technologies as videography participate in the actual rendering of the 
performance, rather than simply recording it as a digital copy? How might the real-time 
projection of digital video footage – which can usually be replayed without corruption – serve to 
complement the embodied performances of human actors on the stage?  
 Perhaps the dichotomy between the “live” and the mediated would only makes sense if 
we can firmly establish that an unmediated form of performance exists. Indeed, such a 
postulation would further complicate the distinction between “liveness” and “mediation” in 
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theatre and performance. Is the presence of media technologies the sole determining factor that 
distinguishes a mediated performance from a “live” performance? Does “liveness” necessarily 
connote an unmediated form of performance? The theatre scholar Herbert Blau is wary of the 
assumption that performance can be devoid of any trace of mediation. For Blau, “[t]here is 
nothing more illusory in performance than the illusion of the unmediated” (1987: 164). Since the 
times of the ancient Greek theatre, dramatists have sought to create performances that hide the 
means of their production in order to sustain the illusion of immediacy. Nevertheless, as Blau 
reminds us, this unmediated appearance “can be a very powerful illusion in the theater, but it is 
theater, and it is theater, the truth of illusion, which haunts all performance whether or not it 
occurs in the theater, where it is more than doubled over” (1987: 165). If theatre is indeed the site 
where the truth of illusion is “more than doubled over,” especially through the deployment of 
mediating technologies that contribute to the spectacular rendering of that illusion in 
performance, then maybe we should not be obsessed with making rigid distinctions between so-
called “live” and mediated performances. Moving beyond “liveness”, I believe that we would do 
well to look at how media technologies operate in theatre performances, and how performers and 
audience members might be embodied with these technologies. In doing so, we can examine the 
ways in which the interface between these technologies and the embodied performances of the 
human actors might affect the audience members’ perception of human-machine interaction.  
A brief survey of the history of theatre and performance would reveal that the artistic 
practice is not inherently opposed to technology. Theatre has always incorporated technological 
devices into its performance in order to create new aesthetic spectacles that influence the 
perception of the audience. From the use of masks and mechanical cranes (as embodied by the 
deus-ex-machina) in ancient Greek theatre to the employment of electric lights and sophisticated 
computing technologies in contemporary performances, technology serves to condition the 
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perceptual frames that audience members adopt in their experience of intermediality – the 
interaction between different media elements – in theatre and performance. But rather than 
treating “liveness” as the definitive ontological condition of theatre, this dissertation examines 
the role that the body plays in the perception of the intermedial performance event. Specifically, 
my project aims to discover how embodiment relates to perception in the audience members’ 
experience of intermedial performance, and how such a relationship might influence their 
understanding of the interactions between humans and technology.  
 
Critical Techno-Dramaturgy: Proposing a Conceptual Framework  
In his compendious volume, Entangled: Technology and the Transformation of 
Performance, intermedial researcher and theorist Chris Salter asks what differentiates the use of 
technology in artistic creation from the same practice in everyday life? Salter’s question seeks to 
establish the purpose of artistic performance (particularly those that incorporate new technology) 
in a world where “everyday life becomes a media spectacle” that takes the form of “an ongoing 
ludic artifice, all made possible through technical beings” (2010: 352). In light of the rising 
number of online media content produced by amateurs with no professional training in art or 
videography, Salter notes a significant shift in the creative power to transform the everyday into 
the fantastic from the domain of artists to that of ordinary people:  
[T]he estrangement of daily life’s routines that long was the territory of artists is 
now in the hands of everyday people who, in their attempt to elevate the workday 
to the status of the fantastic, upload videos of their daily cooking and cleaning 
rituals, going to church and taking out the trash on YouTube, like so many home 
movies, hoping to achieve the millisecond attention of our increasingly saturated 
eyes. (2010: 352) 
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As the lives of ordinary people become increasingly entwined – or, as Salter puts it, “entangled” 
– with a myriad of advanced media technologies, it becomes possible to produce fascinating 
audio-visual spectacles with minimal effort, time, and money. Alluding to the extraordinariness 
of performance, Salter wonders if anything could counteract this pervasive cultural 
transformation of the mundane rituals of daily life into mediatized spectacles that can be rapidly 
disseminated across the world via the Internet. But rather than infusing the discourse on 
intermedial performance with yet another dichotomy that pits professional artists against 
amateurs who crave attention online, my aim is to understand how intermedial performance can 
encourage ordinary people to reflect on their relationship with technology, be it within an artistic 
context or in everyday life. For this reason, I seek to devise a conceptual framework that explores 
the ways in which intermedial performance artists employ technology in their work and how the 
audience might be affected by the creation of such an intermedial experience. In addition, this 
conceptual framework also functions as a dramaturgical method that resists the instrumentalist 
approach towards the incorporation of technology into intermedial performance. Indeed, the 
deployment of technological implements into the mise-en-scène of the performance should open 
up the possibility for critical reflection on the relationship between humans and technology. 
While theatre scholar Meike Wagner has argued for “a critical approach to the mediality 
of theatre as a performative and communicative space,” especially as it foregrounds the 
phenomenological character of intermedial performance and “the corporeality of the theatre 
spectator,” it might be tempting to situate the critic as an external observer of the performance 
event rather than an active participant within it (2006: 127). Perhaps one way to counter this 
tendency would be to incorporate the potential for critical analysis into the intermedial 
performance event. But how would such a self-reflexive critical technique work? This is a 
question that Susan Broadhurst addresses in her experimental performances by focusing on the 
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interactions between human actors and a myriad of new media technologies ranging from virtual 
reality to artificial intelligence. According to Broadhurst, new modes of perception and 
consciousness are achieved through what she calls “the imperceptible intensities” that the 
audience members experience during an intermedial performance, where “various intensities are 
at play” (2006: 148). But instead of subscribing to a disembodied view of intermedial 
performance, she believes that “technology’s most important contribution to art is the 
enhancement and reconfiguration of an aesthetic creative potential which consists of interacting 
with and reacting to a physical body, not an abandonment of that body” (2006: 149). For 
Broadhurst, the coupling of the performing body with a variety of technological devices within 
the “tension-filled liminal spaces of physical and virtual interface” presents interesting 
opportunities to develop “new experimental forms and practices” in the theatre (2006: 149). In 
light of these dramaturgical opportunities, I suggest that what we need is a conceptual and 
dramaturgical framework that not only facilitates the design of an intermedial performance event, 
but also critically analyzes how intermedial performances can affect the audience’s perception of 
human-machine relations. I call this framework “critical techno-dramaturgy”.    
In the course of developing this conceptual framework, I will examine a selection of 
seven intermedial performances that were produced in the early-twenty-first century. Appearing 
at the dawn of a new century that witnessed the rapid development of digital media and other new 
technologies that significantly altered how people work, create art, and communicate with one 
another, these intermedial performances problematized the interactions between the human body 
and such new media technologies as the Global Positioning System (GPS), digital video, 
robotics, artificial intelligence, and email. Through the creative engagements between the 
performers, the audience, and various new media devices within a single performance event, 
intermedial performance artists are able to disorient the audience members by challenging their 
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perception of how these technologies relate to their own bodies and the surrounding world. In 
order to investigate the ways in which intermedial performance affects the audience’s perception 
of the relationship between humans and technology, my analysis of the seven performance 
projects featured in this study will focus on addressing the following issues: the interplay 
between embodiment, technology, and space, the intersection of performance and techno-anxiety, 
as well as the influence of the transhumanist rhetoric of disembodiment on cyborg performance 
and the staging of disability.  
I should note that the three issues that I plan to explore are by no means an exhaustive list 
of the substantive and stylistic qualities of intermedial performance in the early-twenty-first 
century. While each issue will be thoroughly examined within a specific chapter in this 
dissertation, the factor that unifies them is the primacy of the body in the audience’s perception 
of the interactions between the human participants (which includes both performers and audience 
members) and the technological devices featured in the intermedial performance event. The body, 
as Merleau-Ponty elucidates, is the subject of perception, and thus to perceive is to render oneself 
present to the world through the body (2002: 239). Whether it is the spatial exploration of the city 
with the aid of GPS (as seen in Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke), the techno-anxiety of confronting 
machines that perform autonomously, or even the uncanny encounter with cyborg performances 
that consist of able-bodied and disabled performers, the audience members’ experience of 
intermedial performance is characterized by their embodied perception of the conjunction 
between the human body in performance and a variety of technological prostheses that may or 
may not be digital. Taken together, the three main issues explored in this study serve to inform 
the central thesis of this project, which contends that intermedial performance artists deploy what 
I call “critical techno-dramaturgy” as a strategy for influencing the audience’s perception of the 
interface between humans and technology across space and time. 
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“Working on the dramaturgy,” as the Italian director Eugenio Barba explains, “does not 
only involve the text or the story that we want to tell and make visible to the spectators” (2000: 
60). Instead, it also involves the structuring of scenic, technical, and performative elements in 
order to produce a complete dramatic spectacle. In an era where the convergence between 
performance and media culture has proliferated across theatres throughout the world, there 
appears to be a shift in the way theatre communicates with the audience. Hans-Thies Lehmann 
describes this shift as the “post-dramatic theatre,” which emphasizes the movement from the 
closed world of the traditional stage to a communicative style that directly engages with the 
audience’s thoughts and perceptions of the performance that transpires before them. Expanding 
on Lehmann’s idea of the “post-dramatic theatre,” the Dutch performance theorist Maaike 
Bleeker contends that this change in the communicative style of contemporary theatre has 
significant impacts on dramaturgy, particularly in the context of intermedial performance. 
Resisting the closed and internally coherent systems of the traditional proscenium-based 
performance, Bleeker presents her notion of “media dramaturgies” as forms of expression that 
“directly engage with the modes of perceiving and thinking of the audience” (2012: 62). Inspired 
by the work of Barba and Bleeker on dramaturgy and its effects on visuality and perception, my 
concept of critical techno-dramaturgy aims to create a spectacle that challenges the audience’s 
perception of how humans relate to technology. In other words, critical techno-dramaturgy entails 
the deliberate structuring of the interplay between the human participants and the new media 
technologies featured on the intermedial stage in ways that destabilize the audience’s relationship 
with these technologies.  
Drawing upon the theoretical perspectives espoused by scholars working in the fields of 
new media, performance studies, and the philosophy of technology, the central argument of this 
dissertation holds that intermedial performance artists reinvigorate the role of the human body by 
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deploying a critical techno-dramaturgy that mobilizes embodiment as a strategy for shaping the 
audience members’ perception of how humans relate to technology in both the theatrical context 
and the social reality of quotidian life. Given that most of the intermedial performances that I will 
be looking at in this dissertation do explicitly incorporate the audience members as participants 
who contribute to the creative process (especially through their interactions with the digital and 
analogue technologies featured in the performance event), I will further contend that the 
deployment of critical techno-dramaturgy frustrates the audience members’ familiarity with how 
they might be embodied with these technological devices. Such a de-familiarizing effect could 
serve to encourage the audience members to critically reflect on the ways in which new 
technologies, such as wireless mobile computers and artificial intelligence, might influence their 
embodied perception of the relationship between machines and the human being.     
Apart from serving as a dramaturgical strategy for mobilizing the audience as embodied 
participants in intermedial performance, the concept of critical techno-dramaturgy is also an 
analytical tool for investigating how each of the six intermedial performances examined in this 
dissertation triggers a particular experience of embodied perception among the audience 
members. These experiences of embodied perception may range from the awareness of one’s 
body through the interplay between embodiment, technology, and space to the fear of being 
supplanted by technologies that appear to perform autonomously. Moreover, the spectre of 
cyborgian fusion in the cyborg performances by such new media artists as Stelarc, whose body is 
artificially sutured to various technological prostheses and computer systems, may evoke a 
feeling of the uncanny among the audience members.  
Besides analyzing how embodied perception operates in the six intermedial performances, 
I will also examine a creative performance project that directly applies the theoretical questions 
posed in this dissertation. Directed by Andrew Houston of the University of Waterloo Drama 
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Department, the creative performance project was devised as an artistic interpretation of a real-
life incident of juvenile detention that resulted in the suicide of a young woman inside her prison 
cell. The prison guards who were monitoring the young woman by way of video surveillance 
cameras did not intervene, even as they saw her tying cloth ligatures around her neck. As an 
external collaborator on this creative performance project, I was interested in exploring the 
relationship between video technology and death through the creation of an intermedial 
performance that attempts to shed light on the circumstances that led to the tragic demise of a 
young woman in a tiny prison cell. Moreover, this performance serves as an example of how 
critical techno-dramaturgy can be applied in the production of new creative performance projects 
featuring a myriad of technological devices, both digital and non-digital. I will discuss the 
research findings from the project in the final chapter of this dissertation. My hope is that the 
analysis of this original performance in the final chapter will complement the main topic of this 
study, which focuses on the mobilization of embodied perception in intermedial performance. 
What follows is an overview of the key topics that will be examined in this dissertation. 
   
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter 1 surveys the history of, and the theoretical concerns pertaining to, 
intermediality in theatre and performance, beginning with the theoretical foundations laid down 
by Aristotle in his analysis of Greek drama. Aristotle theorized that the basis of drama is action, 
which is an imitation of life through mimesis. Drawing on Augusto Boal’s re-interpretation of the 
Aristotelian concept of mimesis, I will examine why the mimetic action in intermedial 
performance does not entail a straightforward imitation of things that exist, but rather the re-
creation of what Boal calls “the creative principle of created things” (1995: 1). Instead of 
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re-creation of the creative principle that brings things into being in the world. By rehabilitating 
the meaning of mimesis, Boal’s “generative mimesis” appears to resonate with Aristotle’s 
theorization of drama as a poiesis, a generative concept that describes how something passes 
from nonbeing into existence. This notion of poiesis also features prominently in Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Heidegger conceptualized the essence of technology as 
Gestell, or the “enframing” of the world as “standing-reserve,” which is the challenging forth of 
the human to reveal or “disconceal” the “truth” through the gathering together of things that 
would facilitate such a revelation. In elucidating the meaning of techne, the root word from which 
the modern term “technology” is derived, Heidegger explains that in ancient Greece, techne 
referred to both the skill of the craftsman and the poiesis of the fine arts. Therefore, he contends 
that art, as techne, involves the bringing-forth of the “truth”. In contrast to the dangers of 
“enframing,” poiesis does not seek to put the world on “standing reserve”. Instead, it participates 
in a process of revealing towards the true forms of the world. For this reason, Heidegger believes 
that poiesis is fundamental to the critical reflection upon technology, as it allows us (as beings for 
whom being matters) to question the instrumentality of techne through art. In light of the role of 
poiesis in Heidegger’s concept of technology, I compare his theorization of poiesis vis-à-vis 
techne with Aristotle’s characterization of dramatic performance as a poiesis that is mimetic in 
terms of its creative imitation of reality.   
Even though the Aristotelian emphasis on mimesis continues to inform contemporary 
performance practices, dramatists over the past two centuries have experimented with techniques 
that aim to either reinforce or subvert the verisimilitude of the dramatic spectacle. These 
techniques included the use of electric lighting and mechanically rotated cycloramas for the 
rendering of an immersive theatrical experience, as well as film and sound recordings that 
interrupt the audience’s willing suspension of disbelief. In exploring the history of the 
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intersection of performance and technology, I examine Richard Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, or 
“Total Artwork,” an aesthetic concept that celebrates the synthesis of different art forms to create 
a multimedia spectacle that immerses the audience in the mimetic world of the performance. I 
aim to demonstrate that while Wagner’s nineteenth-century idea was innovative in terms of its 
fusion of visual art, mechanical technology, and architecture, his idea was an extension of 
Aristotle’s theorization of the dramatic spectacle, which foregrounds the interplay between 
music, performativity, language, and the mechanical technology employed by stage machinists in 
the rendering of the dramatic spectacle. Despite Wagner’s fidelity to the Aristotelian emphasis on 
mimesis, many avant-garde theatre artists of the early-twentieth century such as the early-
Twentieth-century German dramatist Bertolt Brecht aimed to tear down the imaginary “fourth 
wall” that sustained the mimetic illusion of the dramatic phenomenon. Brecht’s development of 
the Verfremdungseffekt (“Alienation effect”) in his creation of “Epic Theatre” radically subverted 
the mimetic character of Aristotelian drama by performing the gathering of such media 
technologies as film and voice recordings for the purpose of generating critical ideas about 
society. By using technology to distance the audience members from the representational context 
of the performance, Brecht sought to compel them to take political action to improve the social 
conditions of their own lives. Building on the work of Brecht and Wagner as early exemplars of 
intermedial performance, the next chapter will define a conceptual framework and dramaturgical 
method that questions the relationship between humans and technology. I will refer to this 
framework as “critical techno-dramaturgy”.   
In delineating the analytical and dramaturgical potential of critical techno-dramaturgy, 
Chapter 2 explores the co-determining relationship between human beings and technicity, as 
well as the development of intermedial performance. I will begin with an examination of the co-
evolution of technology and humans through the thinking of such intellectual intercessors as 
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David Wills, Bernard Stiegler, and Gilbert Simondon. Upon establishing an understanding of the 
co-evolutionary relations between technics and the human, as well as Gilbert Simondon’s 
philosophy of technology and its impact on psychic and collective individuation, I proceed to 
compare the theories of intermediality in performance offered by such theatre scholars and media 
philosophers as Freda Chapple, Chiel Kattenbelt, and Henk Oosterling with new media theorist 
Brenda Laurel’s conceptualization of human-computer interactions through the framework of 
dramatic theatre. Finally, the concluding section of this chapter develops what I call “Critical 
Techno-dramaturgy,” which is a conceptual framework that analyzes the ways in which the 
dramaturgical strategies employed by intermedial performance artists might affect the audience’s 
embodied perception of human-machine interactions.  
Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 will 
explore the interplay between embodiment, technology, and space in intermedial performance 
and its effects on the audience’s awareness of their embodied existence as they navigate the 
cityscape with bicycles, handheld computers, and mobile phones. Seeking inspiration from the 
work of Guy Debord, Michel de Certeau, and Bruno Latour, I demonstrate that the interface 
between new media technologies and the embodied performance of the human participants within 
an urban landscape underscores the heterogeneous character of intermedial performance, as every 
element – be they human or nonhuman – is equally important to the operation of the intermedial 
network. Since the turn of the century, handheld computers, mobile phones, and other locative 
media technologies equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) and Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID) capabilities have transformed the way in which we perceive and interact 
with the city. As such, this chapter will examine the interplay between embodiment, technology, 
and urban space in intermedial performance and its effects on the audience’s embodied 
perception of space as they move across the cityscape with mobile phones, iPods, and mobile 
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computers. The chapter also examines how critical techno-dramaturgy can be deployed as a 
strategy for designing and analyzing the performativity of navigating and discovering the 
different facets of the cityscape. Drawing on Guy Debord’s urban theory, Michel de Certeau’s 
exposition on the embodied act of pedestrianism, and Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT), I will explore the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile computers in Blast Theory’s 
Rider Spoke (2007), as well as the production of social space through mobile text messaging in 
Dustin Harvey and Adrienne Wong’s Landline: Halifax to Vancouver (2013). 
Moving from the open spaces of the city and into the intimacy of the black-box theatre, 
Chapter 4 interrogates the intersection of performance and techno-anxiety by looking at how 
intelligent machines that appear to perform autonomously might affect the audience members’ 
perception of these anthropomorphic technological agents in relation to their own bodies. 
Situating the cultural effects of robotics within the theatrical context, this chapter explores the 
intersection of intermedial performance and techno-anxiety by looking at how intelligent 
machines that appear to perform autonomously might affect the audience members’ perception of 
these anthropomorphic technological agents in relation to their own bodies. By drawing on the 
thinking of Ernest Becker, Søren Kierkegaard, and N. Katherine Hayles on the topics of death 
and anxiety as well as the “boundary dispute” that pervades human-machine interaction, I will 
examine the techno-anxiety that impinges on the embodied encounters between the audience 
members and such performing machines as the Artificial Intelligence (AI) avatar, Jeremiah, in 
Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers (2001), and the autonomous robotic dancers in 
French-Canadian artist Louis-Philippe Demers’s Tiller Girls (2010). In light of the manifestation 
of anxiety-inducing phenomena in these intermedial performances, I argue that the audience 
members’ perception of autonomous performing machines involves a negotiation between a 
secure sense of human agency and the fear of being supplanted by machine actors. My contention 
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is that the autonomy that the performing machines in Blue Bloodshot Flowers and Tiller Girls 
exhibit serves to remind the audience members of their existential finitude, an experience that 
reinforces their feeling of techno-anxiety over the perceived threat that autonomous machines 
pose to the human condition. 
Building on the investigation of techno-anxiety in the previous chapter, Chapter 5 
examines how the construction of the “cyborg” as both a conceptual metaphor for and a material 
instantiation of human-machine “fusion” in intermedial performance could impact the prosthetic 
relations between persons with disability and the technological devices that they employ. As 
scientists and engineers such as Kevin Warwick, Hans Moravec, and Raymond Kurzweil begin to 
espouse a rhetoric of disembodiment that emphasizes the obsolescence of the biological body in 
favour of a “fusion” between the human brain and information technology (i.e., to become a 
“cyborg”), it seems easy to forget that for persons with disabilities, the integration of their bodies 
with various technological implements is not always a matter of choice. Anyone with a physical 
or cognitive disability would probably be aware that such technological extensions as close 
captioning, hearing aids, and prosthetic limbs are oftentimes a necessity rather than a choice. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that “cyborgian fusion” makes it possible to leave one’s biological 
body behind in order to exist in a disembodied union with computers tends to overlook, perhaps 
unwittingly, the struggles that persons with physical or psychological disabilities have to grapple 
with on a daily basis. In response to the rhetoric of disembodiment that informs the thinking of 
such prominent futurists as Kurzweil and Moravec, my contention is that cyborg performance is 
neither a fusion of body and technology nor a denial of the existence of the body. Instead, it 
resists – sometimes unwittingly so – the transhumanist rhetoric of bodily obsolescence and 
challenges the normative image of the ideal body (especially one without physical and cognitive 
defects). Reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy of perception 
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alongside Cary Wolfe’s interpretation of posthumanism, which opposes the neo-humanist 
fantasies of a disembodied and autonomous, even transcendental, way of being, I will investigate 
the ways in which embodied perception is mobilized in intermedial performance. Wolfe’s 
rethinking of the relations between the human and the nonhuman, a perspective that considers the 
fundamental prostheticity of the human in its co-evolution with various forms of technicity and 
materiality that are radically “not-human,” is pertinent to our understanding of embodied 
perception and the treatment of nonhuman entities in intermedial performances. In addition, the 
rejection of an anthropocentric view of human-machine relations would also open up the 
possibility of considering how “able-bodied” spectators perceive performers with disabilities in 
an intermedial performance setting. Looking closely at Stelarc’s cyborgian experiment with the 
actuation of physical performance through an virtual avatar in MOVATAR (2000) and Petra 
Kuppers’ production of Cripple Poetics: A Love Story (2010), in which two performers with 
disabilities draw upon the affordances of 3D tele-immersion technology in order to articulate 
their embodied existence as cyborgs on the intermedial stage, I will explore the ways in which 
able-bodied and disabled cyborg bodies are equally capable of frustrating the embodied 
perception of the audience members in cyborg performance.  
 Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to the discussion of a creative project that uses critical 
techno-dramaturgy as a strategy for shaping the perception of the audience members. This is my 
own project that directly applies the theoretical questions posed in this dissertation in order to 
examine the complicity between digital media (particularly video technology) and the mediation 
of death. The inspiration for the project stems from a real-life incident of juvenile detention in 
Canada that resulted in the suicide of a young woman named Ashley Smith, whose death was 
witnessed by the prison guards through the mediated gaze of video surveillance. Rendered as an 
intermedial performance directed by Andy Houston, this project entitled From Solitary to 
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Solidarity: Unravelling the Ligatures of Ashley Smith (2014) interrogates the human perception 
of incarceration and self-harm in our intensely mediated world, where even instances of death are 
captured on video. As the media specialist for this project, I was responsible for developing the 
intermedial elements of the performance. Focusing on the intermedial design of the performance, 
this chapter will examine how the conceptual framework of critical techno-dramaturgy facilitates 
the analysis of video technology as a digital memory device that archives what I call the mediated 
remains of death (i.e., the video surveillance footage that immortalizes Ashley’s demise).  
 In the original incident on which this performance project is based, the prison guards were 
instructed by their superiors to remotely monitor Ashley using video surveillance in order to 
minimize physical contact with her. At the age of fifteen, Ashley was detained for throwing 
crabapples at a mailman outside her home in New Brunswick. Living in solitary confinement 
during her detention meant that her existence in relation to the outside world was constantly 
mediated through video surveillance footage reviewed by correctional services officers. 
Moreover, during her four-year ordeal in prison, Ashley was moved seventeen times across 
Canada, until she took her own life at a detention facility in Kitchener-Waterloo. In the fall of 
2013, a public inquiry delivered a non-legally-binding homicide verdict on her case. However, 
despite the proliferation of digital and non-digital information related to Ashley’s demise during 
the inquiry process, the public can only access the story of her life in mediated form, whether 
through online news and documentary coverage on her case or the surveillance footage of her life 
in prison. The accumulation of these media content on the Internet is akin to what Jacques 
Derrida terms “archive fever”. Whereas Viktor Mayer-Schönberger argues for the “virtue of 
forgetting” in the digital age by proposing that digital media artefacts be allocated a limited “shelf 
life” that ensures their deletion after a certain period of time, there are significant judicial 
implications pertaining to the elimination of the online digital archive of video clips that attest to 
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the historicity of Ashley’s existence as a human being. Conversely, there are also ethical 
considerations pertaining to the retention of the video surveillance footage that contain the 
mediated traces of her life and death under detention.  
 By juxtaposing the live performance of Ashley’s time in solitary confinement with the 
actual archival footage depicting her struggles and eventual suicide in prison, this performance 
project addresses the ethical questions concerning the artistic use of material from the digital 
archive that contains the mediated remains of Ashley’s death. Building upon Marcel O’Gorman’s 
concept of “necromedia,” which explores the collusion between death and media, as well as 
Rebecca Schneider’s characterization of artistic re-enactment as “performing remains,” I argue 
that the intermedial performance of Ashley’s story constitutes a performance of the mediated 
remains of death. My contention is that the actual surveillance footage that are presented on the 
stage are complicit in not only the digital archiving of Ashley’s death but also the act of 
reinterpreting her predicament through the interplay between digital media (especially video 
technology) and the theatrical performance of thirteen actors who were not previously acquainted 
with the case. Given how the auditory and visual senses of the audience members might be 
challenged by the intermedial elements employed in the performance of S2S, I will also discuss 
the ways in which this embodied and multi-sensorial experience might affect their perception of 
death in the digital age. Consequently, I will conclude this dissertation by taking a brief look at 
some of the issues that have not been addressed in this dissertation due to the constraint of space. 
Additionally, I will be offering an overview of a new creative project that will apply the concept 
of critical techno-dramaturgy in order to investigate the role of embodied labour and the 
perception of time in digital communication.  
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Chapter 1: 
Performance and Technology: A History of Techne and Poiesis in Dramatic Theatre 
 
“The ‘Deus ex Machina’ should be employed only for events external to the drama, for 
antecedent or subsequent events, which lie beyond the range of human knowledge, and which 
require to be reported or foretold; for to the gods we ascribe the power of seeing all things. 
Within the action there must be nothing irrational. If the irrational cannot be excluded, it should 
be outside the scope of tragedy.” 
- Aristotle, Poetics, XV, 1454b.    
 
At the 2009 staging of Euripides’ tragedy, Medea, at the Greek Theatre at Syracuse in 
Italy,1 the audience members were treated to a spectacular event during the denouement of the 
play. Perched above the theatrical cyclorama or scenic backdrop, the sudden appearance of an 
illuminated chariot hauled by a crane marked the godly intervention in the dramatic proceedings 
known by its Latin name as the deus ex machina, which literally means “god from the machine”. 
Deus-ex-machina refers to the timely but unexpected appearance in Greek drama, of a god who is 
lowered onto the stage by a crane to provide “an artificial or contrived solution to an apparently 
insoluble difficulty” in the plot (Britannica 2007: 1). In addition to the use of phallic props and 
painted drapery depicting the scenery of a dramatic setting, the deus-ex-machina epitomizes the 
intersection of performance and technology in the ancient Greek theatre.  
The appearance of this mechanical contrivance – a chariot sent by the gods to rescue 
Medea who had murdered her children – at the denouement of Euripides’s Medea was a 
characteristic feature in his dramatic oeuvre. However, Aristotle was critical of the deployment of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!The Polish film and theatre director Krzysztof Zanussi directed this 2009 production of Medea at Syracuse. 
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the deus ex machina as a dramatic device that abruptly resolves the conflict within the play. He 
was not so much troubled by the technological character of the device (the use of a crane to lower 
down and life up an actor playing a god) than by the logical integrity of its incorporation into the 
drama. For Aristotle, the use of the deus ex machina has to fit into the logic of the dramatic 
action. What matters here is the rational connection between the device and the preceding events 
in the play rather than the obtrusive appearance of a mechanical contraption towards the end of 
the drama. But in light of Aristotle’s inclination towards the rational deployment of the deus ex 
machina in fulfilment of its role as a device imbued with the benevolent power of mercy, the 
implied tension between technology and humans – both in the theatre and in everyday life – was 
not lost on the ancient Greek audience.2  
As Chris Salter observes, “technology already revealed itself on the fifth century 
Athenian stage as machinae intimately bound up with the fate of human beings” (2010: xxii). 
Manifested in the deus ex machina is that omniscient character of the gods that Aristotle 
mentioned in his criticism of the device, as the crane-like apparatus ferrying a god is lowered into 
the scene to “solve the moral quandaries created by human mistakes” (Salter 2010: xxii). And it 
is drama as a public art form in ancient Greek society that captures this relationship between the 
transcendent power that technology appears to embody and the fallibility of human endeavours. 
Since its inception in democratic Athens in the fifth century BCE, dramatic theatre provided the 
ancient Greeks with a “civic platform” on which the “dramas between humans and machines – !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#!In reviewing the 2009 performance of Medea at Syracuse, Catarina Barone criticizes what she perceives to be an 
extravagant construction of the final scene in the play. Claiming that the finale serves to gratify “the audience’s lust 
for spectacle,” Barone contends that “projecting a light on that glossy [backdrop] to represent the shining chariot of 
the Sun” would have been a “less trite solution” compared to having Medea appear “above the palace among clouds 
of smoke, riding a chariot” (“Didaskalia” 2011). Barone’s comment appears to echo the Aristotelian suspicion of the 
deus ex machina, as evidenced by her preference for a simpler and less (technologically) sophisticated resolution to 
the intensity of the dramatic action. Nevertheless, she does not repudiate the use of technology in the play – light 
projection is indeed a technological medium. That a modern theatre critic should characterize the depiction of the 
deus ex machina in its full mechanical form as a “trite solution” serves only to foreground the interplay between 
humans and machines in the theatre – a relationship that is fraught with tension.!!!
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technology’s transcendent embodiment as the gods and, simultaneously, its immanent 
demonstration of the constructed mechanisms of the human world” could be played out in front 
of an audience of citizens (Salter 2010: xxii). We should note that theatres in ancient Greece were 
open-air structures, and they did not exist in isolation from the social, political, and religious 
functions of the local community. Theatre performances in the western tradition, as Erika 
Fischer-Lichte elucidates, were typically held in “two kinds of venues: (1) those spaces which 
were set up expressly in order to serve as theatre buildings and (2) those spaces which were 
created to serve a different practical function, but are used temporarily or repeatedly as a theater” 
(1992: 97). As we will see in Chapter 3 of this study, the venues within which theatre can be 
performed are varying in structure and purpose, and these may include the many hidden corners, 
or what I call “found spaces,” in a city. But in the context of the classical world, the theatres in 
ancient Athens and Thebes were well integrated into the wider congregation of political 
assemblies, religious temples, and marketplaces. Theatre performance, like the technologies that 
provide order and structure to the city, was not only about life; it was an important part of it.   
While the production of drama offered an intellectual avenue through which to interrogate 
the socio-political challenges faced by the inhabitants of the polis (the city), it also problematized 
the relationship between humans and technology. If technology embodied the transcendent power 
of gods who were responsible for turning the fate of beleaguered characters on the stage, the 
ancient Greek theatre audience – particularly the Athenians – might have considered how this 
power was similarly expressed in both the architectural and political structures of their city. The 
use of technology in ancient Greek performance was not simply ornamental. Rather, it served to 
remind the audience of how technology is capable of structuring the world in which they lived, in 
the same way that machines altered the dramatic action on the stage. In this sense, intermediality 
was not a supplement to ancient Greek drama but a constitutive part of it. Through the use of 
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such technologies as mechanical cranes for hoisting, rotating dais for the rapid change of scenic 
backdrops, as well as masks for the portrayal of characters, drama in ancient Greece comprised 
an assemblage of media elements that facilitated the rendering of the dramatic spectacle.  
In an attempt to understand how the relationship between humans and technology has 
developed in the theatre, this chapter will survey the history of, and the theoretical concerns 
pertaining to, the intersection of performance and technology. I begin with an investigation of the 
role of technology in ancient Greek theatre before proceeding to look at how intermedial 
performance subverts the mimetic framework proposed in Aristotle’s Poetics. Drawing on 
Augusto Boal’s re-interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of mimesis, I examine why the 
mimetic action in intermedial performance does not entail a straightforward imitation of things 
that exist, but rather the re-creation of what Boal calls “the creative principle of created things”. 
Instead of imitating an action as it is observed in reality, Boal contends that mimesis in drama 
involves the re-creation of the creative principle that brings things into being in the world. By 
rehabilitating the meaning of mimesis, Boal’s “generative mimesis” appears to resonate with 
Aristotle’s theorization of drama as a poiesis, whereby something passes from nonbeing into 
existence. In light of the generative potential of dramatic theatre as a form of poiesis, I will 
proceed to compare the Aristotelian understanding of poiesis with Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology, focusing especially on how the concept of techne relates to poiesis as a creative 
means by which to critically reflect upon technology. Having examined how dramatic theatre 
operates as poiesis, the final two sections of this chapter will explore the intermedial experiments 
of Richard Wagner and Bertolt Brecht in the theatre, as well as the interplay between 
performance and technology in the twentieth century and its concomitant effects on the audience 
members’ perception of human-machine relations.  
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1.1 Embodying Technology in Ancient Greek Theatre 
As I have suggested in the opening section of this chapter, the conjunction between 
performance and technology is certainly not a recent phenomenon. Technological innovations 
were central to the ancient Greek Theatre. This point is evidenced by the semi-circular 
architecture of the amphitheatre. The construction of the theatre upon the natural contours of a 
hill overlooking the sea resulted in a design that resembles one half of a bowl, with terraces – 
upon which the audience members took their seats – cascading down the slope towards the 
circular orchestra or performance space at the bottom of the structure. The semi-circular design 
of the ancient Greek theatre affords every spectator an opportunity to see and hear the 
performance on the stage, and to do so without straining his or her visual and auditory senses. 
Besides ensuring that everyone in the audience could access the drama without hindrance, 
technology also played a vital role in the dramaturgical strategies deployed by the producers of 
ancient Greek drama. For instance, set designers made use of wooden cranes for the hoisting and 
lowering of actors who interrupt the dramatic action on the stage as part of the deus ex machina 
device that unexpectedly resolves a crisis within the plot of the play. Despite Aristotle’s 
reservations about the use of the device in dramatic Tragedy, the integration of a mechanical 
contraption into the unfolding action on the stage represents a co-relation between technology 
and live performance. What is significant about the deus ex machina is not only its abruptness as 
a plot device, but also the act of strapping an actor onto a wooden crane operated by stagehands. 
This interaction between humans and machine is predicated upon action, and as Aristotle 
theorizes in the Poetics, it is action that makes dramatic performance possible. 
 The word “theatre” in English originates from the Greek, Theatron (!"#$%&'), which 
means “watching place” or “the place of seeing”. The Theatron, according to Chris Salter, “was 
both a physical and perceptual space ordered by technology” (2010: xxii). As a physical space, 
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the ancient Greek theatre presented the spectator with a tangible space on which to sit down and 
witness the unfolding of the dramatic action on the stage. And it is through this visual and 
acoustic relationship that each audience member shares with the stage that the theatre as theatron 
becomes a perceptual space that mediates between the realms of the drama and the audience. 
With its unique architecture designed to enhance the visual and auditory experience of the drama, 
coupled with the deployment of machinae as part of the dramatic mise-en-scène, the ancient 
Greek theatre was capable of affecting the audience’s embodied perception of technology’s role 
in structuring the world within, and outside of, the theatre. Apart from expressing its transcendent 
power through the deus ex machina, “technology in the performance arts,” as Salter succinctly 
articulates, also reveals itself “in how – through craft, skill, construction, or making (what the 
Greeks called techne) – it orders the world (logos)” (2010: xxii). Rather than referring to 
“reason” or “speech,” Salter’s use of the word logos follows the definition of the term by the pre-
sophist philosopher, Heraclitus, who sees logos as “a principle of order and knowledge” 
(Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 1999). Heraclitus maintains that this principle is not static 
but should be understood as “the law of change, or at least its expression” (Cambridge Dictionary 
of Philosophy 1999). Characterizing technology’s ordering of the world as logos would allows us 
to consider how the techne (i.e., the craft and skill required to make things) of human beings can 
change the world and the way we perceive it. At the same time, however, we should resist the 
temptation to think of the ordering system of techne in the ancient Greek theatre in strictly 
rational terms.  
 In fifth-century Athens, a festival was held annually in honour of the god of drama, 
“Dionysus,” to whom the Theatre of Dionysus was dedicated. Every year, playwrights from all 
over the ancient Greek world, including such great names as Aeschylus, Sophocles, and 
Euripides, would stage their plays at the Theatre of Dionysus during the Dionysia Festival. The 
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British professor of ancient Greek theatre, David Wiles, has researched and written on the 
archaeological evidence found at such historical sites as the Theatre of Dionysus in Athens and 
the Theatre of Epidaurus at the Gulf of Aegina. He notes that if anyone were to visit the Theatre 
of Dionysus today, he or she can only access it from the main road, and through a boundary wall 
that encloses the sanctuary. Once inside the sanctuary, the modern visitor will encounter “a 
semicircular orchestra (or “dancing floor”) and stage built in the Roman period, and the 
crumbling remains of a stone auditorium built in approximately 330 BC” (Wiles 2000: 99, 100). 
The orchestra and stage that we see today at the Theatre of Dionysus were part of the Roman 
refurbishment of the structure during the Roman rule of Athens. The symmetry implied in the 
arrangement of orchestra and stage in relation to the three-tiered theatron where the audience 
members sat may convey a sense of order and rationality. However, as Wiles cautions, it is not 
easy for us “to extrapolate from these traces some sense of the space in which the classical 
dramatists presented their plays” (2000: 100). If we look at the restored Theatre of Epidaurus 
today, for instance, its symmetrical and orderly geometric form might lead us to think of it as 
representative of the ancient Athenian conception of space. But the construction of the Odeon 
building in the fifth century BCE by the Athenian statesman, Pericles, to the right of the stage at 
the Theatre of Dionysus seems to contradict the assumption of structural symmetry.  
 Wiles believes that the Odeon, with its huge size and exotic ornamentation, shared both 
an architectural and a functional relationship with the Theatre of Dionysus, such that the 
performers could move freely from the stage to the building and back, shuttling from one space 
to another (2000: 102). Art and function seem to overlap in the ancient Greek theatre. The fact 
that the Odeon is positioned on only one side of the stage suggests that symmetry was not the 
primary concern for the ancient Athenians. “The theatre at Athens,” Wiles writes, “ was not 
planned from the outset but evolved, and a natural hollow was gradually transformed into a 
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roughly semicircular form” (2000: 102).3 Indeed, the semicircular bowl offers the advantage of 
good sightlines and acoustics for every member in the audience while conveying a general sense 
of “democratic equality” (2000: 102). However, as Wiles reminds us, we must not assume that 
perfect geometry informs the theatrical consciousness of the ancient Greeks, for the performance 
space of the Classical period was “temporary, disorderly and constantly changing” (2000: 103).4 
This “on-going experimentation with space” in the ancient Greek theatre appears to cohere with 
the experimentations with dramatic form in Greek Tragedy, as “Dionysiac disorder undermines 
the best human attempts at rational forward planning” (2000: 103). Order and disorder are 
characteristic traits of the ancient Greek theatre. The techne (that is, the craft and skill required to 
make things) involved in the production of the dramatic spectacle is embodied by the 
technological changes that occur during and between performances. These changes, which may 
range from the construction of revolving cycloramas at the back of the stage to the addition of 
convex mirrors that reflect the glare of sunlight, serve to alter the original appearance of the 
theatrical space. In this way, the architectural order of the ancient Greek amphitheatre is 
constantly undermined by the technological interventions that facilitate the creation of the 
dramatic spectacle. 
 The architecture of the ancient Greek amphitheatre and the technological devices 
employed in ancient Greek dramas play a critical role in complementing the embodied 
performances of human actors. Wooden cranes (notably the mechane used in the deus ex !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$!David Wiles remarks that the excavated remains of four small theatres that survive in the demes of Attica reinforce 
the claim that “the Athenians did not make architectural symmetry a priority” (2000: 103). He believes that it is for 
this reason that the “perfect geometric form” of the Theatre of Epidaurus seems to be “a misleading guide to the 
[architectural] practice of the classical period” (2000: 103).!!
 %!The Classical period in ancient Greece generally refers to the 200 years that span across the fifth and fourth 
centuries BCE. This period precedes the Hellenistic age that comes after the reign of Alexander the Great. The term 
“Classical Age” is what the historian of ancient Greco-Roman culture Thomas R. Martin believes to be “the modern 
designation of the period from about 500 B.C. to the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.” (1996: 94).    
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machina), rotating cycloramas, masks, and the architectural elements of the stage all serve to 
extend the performers technically. But among these technological innovations in the ancient 
Greek theatre, the Dionysiac mask offers the clearest example of the embodiment of technology 
in the dramatic arts. In Plato’s dialogue, Ion, Socrates engages in a philosophical discussion with 
Ion of Ephesus, a professional rhapsode who has just returned from the Asclepius festival at 
Epidaurus. Socrates interrogates Ion in order to find out whether the latter’s performance of 
Homer’s epic poetry is informed by skill and knowledge or by divine inspiration. Ion tells 
Socrates that the gods inspire his performance of Homer, such that whenever he performs “a tale 
of woe, [his] eyes are filled with tears; and when it is of fear or awe, [his] hair stands on end with 
terror, and [his] heart leaps” (Ion 535c). However, upon further probing by Socrates, Ion claims 
that even while he is performing, he can observe whether or not his performance has successfully 
affected the audience (Ion 535e). By suggesting that he is conscious of the audience’s reaction to 
his act, Ion complicates his earlier claim that his performance is divinely inspired. Because he did 
not perform with a mask on his face, Ion could observe the audience throughout his act. Rather 
than being inspired by the supernatural powers of divine entities, his performance is modulated 
by his interpretation of the audience members’ reaction to his actions on the stage.  
The Dionysiac mask used in ancient Greek drama was meant to “prevent the audience 
seeing actor against role,” and also to “increase the concentration of the actor by restricting his 
external vision” (Wiles 2000: 153). The mask in ancient Greek theatre was incorporated as part 
of the actor’s embodiment. Rather than focusing on the facial expressions of the actor, the 
audience concentrated on the embodied performance of the particular character that the actor is 
playing. But Plato’s belief in the separation of mind and body implies a privileging of the head as 
the seat of the human mind and soul. As such, Plato – through Socrates – regards Ion as merely 
an interpreter of the poet, Homer, who is in turn an interpreter of the gods (Ion 536a). In this 
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sense, Homer represents the mind, while Ion represents the body that performs and mediates 
between the thought of the poet and the reception of that thought by the audience. Following this 
logic, Ion’s is a lesser skill as compared to that of Homer. As a result of Platonic dualism, in 
which mind and body are separate, the mask in the western theatrical tradition “has functioned as 
a mode of concealment” (Wiles 2000: 153). But during the halcyon days of ancient Greek theatre 
in the fifth century BCE, which precedes the time of Plato, the mask was regarded more as an 
embodied technology than a mode of concealment (Wiles 2000: 153).    
As the British theatre director Peter Hall explains, the ancient Greek theatre mask 
disciplines the body, as the actor is required to control his physical gestures (only males were 
allowed to be actors in ancient Greece) while acting with a mask. In most performances, the actor 
would convey the character’s emotions through the mask, which is often supplemented by his 
bodily movements or the words that he utters on the stage (2000: 28). In this way, the mask is 
incorporated as part of the actor’s embodiment. However, Hall is quick to clarify that the mask in 
ancient Greek theatre “is not a device to enhance visibility in the large Greek amphitheatres; […] 
[n]or is the mask a megaphone to increase audibility (2000: 29). Rather than being a tool for 
visual or auditory amplification, “[the] mask is an instrument of communication” (2000: 29). Hall 
believes that it is through the mask that the ancient Greek actor is able to convey the meaning of 
the play. When combined with the embodied actions of the performer, the mask serves as a media 
technology for communicating meaning to the audience. But the mask, despite its intricate design 
and features, does not express meaning by itself. “A great mask,” as Hall elucidates, “[…] has no 
expression. It is ambiguous” (2000: 24). The meaning that the mask communicates to the 
audience members is reinforced by the embodied sounds and gestures that the actor delivers in 
the performance. As Hall notes, “[the] sound of a scream presented as part of the body language 
of hysteria makes the mask scream,” whereas the “sound of ribald laughter makes the mask 
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laugh” (2000: 24). As such, the actor’s voice and the physical gestures that he performs 
contribute to the specific meaning that the mask conveys. And it is in this way that the mask 
becomes an embodied technology. 
Prior to Plato, the classical world of ancient Greece shared the same holistic 
understanding of the human being as the eastern tradition, whereby the use of masks (kothurnoi) 
in performance functioned not as “a negative mode of concealment,” but rather “a positive mode 
of embodiment” (Wiles 2000: 153). Greek society before Plato did not regard the mask as a 
device that concealed the face, and therefore hindered thought and creativity. Instead, as David 
Wiles points out, “the mask helped the body to function as a totality” (2000: 153). The ancient 
Greeks believed that the body was “a centred space” (2000: 154). This means that actions did not 
originate from the autonomous ego of the individual but from the body itself. “The masked Greek 
actor,” as Wiles elucidates, “used the body to demonstrate a set of impulses” (2000: 155). It is 
through the totality of the performer’s body in motion on the stage that the mask becomes an 
embodied technology in the performance arts of the ancient Greeks. But having actors perform 
with masks on their faces does not preclude the interactive potential of ancient Greek drama. 
Physical interaction exists between the performers standing down at the orchestra and the 
audience members at the theatron. As the actors and the chorus members move about the 
performance space, they need to pay attention to the distance between them and the audience. If 
an actor stands too close to the edge of the orchestra, the heads of the front-row audience 
members would obscure the form of his body (Wiles 2000: 106). At the same time, by standing 
outside of the acoustic zone where the propagation of sound waves originating from his vocal 
chords would have the farthest reach, the actor’s voice might not be audible to the spectators 
seated at the upper sections of the theatron (Wiles 2000: 106).  
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Even though ancient Greek theatres traditionally contained a low wooden structure 
located at the back of the orchestra called the skene,5 this structure did not directly affect the 
action on the stage. By contrast, the proscenium arch found in modern theatres is a device that 
influences the audience’s ocular perception, as it imposes a visible frame upon the action on the 
stage. The proscenium frame of the nineteenth-century theatre sets the audience up as a voyeur 
and an eavesdropper who observes and hears the action on the stage, particularly through the 
invisible fourth wall that separates the worlds of the drama and the audience members. This 
division of space would diminish the level of embodied interaction between the performers and 
the audience in the production of dramatic performance.  
Without the presence of a proscenium arch in the ancient Greek theatre, the actors and the 
members of the chorus could calibrate their movements in order to maintain a dynamic visual and 
auditory relationship with every audience member. Such an endeavour draws upon the 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of the performer who possesses the skill to control the 
body’s motion in time and space, or to balance the body’s weight as it rides on the mechane that 
constitutes the deus ex machina. This ability of the ancient Greek performer to work with the 
architectural and technological implements that bring the dramatic spectacle into being 
exemplifies the interplay between the human and nonhuman participants in the theatre event. In 
exploring the intersection of performance and technology as a form of poiesis, we need to 
understand the structural qualities of drama as conceived by Aristotle. To this end, the next 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&!As Chris Salter clarifies, the skene was originally used for storage and costume changes. Because it was a low 
structure, the audience could see the natural landscape or the sea that extended beyond the theatre. However, in the 
later Hellenic and Roman periods, the construction of higher walls meant that the skene had become a scenic 
backdrop. With such an imposing structure looming in the background as the drama unfolded on the stage, the 
audience’s perception of the dramatic experience was thus altered from that point in history. In addition, Salter 
believes that a series of columns located above the skene called the proskenium anticipated the sixteenth-century 
Italian development of the proscenium arch, which serves to frame and limit the theatrical stage (2010: 113). !
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section will examine the ways in which Aristotle’s theory of the “Four Causes” informs his 
theorization of the elements of dramatic performance.  
 
1.2 The Causal Relations of Aristotle’s Six Elements of Drama  
 How does drama come into being? Many of us who have been to theatre performances 
would recognize such distinctive features as plot and character in any given play. In his Poetics, 
Aristotle delineates the six elements of drama in order of precedence: Plot, Character, Thought, 
Diction, Song, and Spectacle. These six elements do not exist independently of one another. 
Rather, they affect each other through a pair of causal relationships based on form and material. 
In his reading of Poetics, Sam Smiley observes that these six elements relate to one another in a 
way that corresponds to the notion of causality espoused by Aristotle in his books, Metaphysics 
and Physics. In both texts, Aristotle describes the notion of causality in procedural terms. All 
causes, he argues, are “beginnings,” which is “to be the first thing from which something either 
exists or comes into being or becomes known” (Metaphysics 1013a19). To know the cause of 
something is to understand why and how it has come into being.  
As Aristotle explains, the cause is “that as the result of whose presence something comes 
into being”  (Metaphysics 1013a21). There are four causes that set in motion the coming into 
being of things. These are the formal cause, the material cause, the efficient cause, and the end 
cause. The formal cause refers to “the form or the archetype” to which a particular thing relates 
(Physics II.3). For instance, a house has as its formal cause a certain notion of “houseness”. The 
material cause points to “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists,” in other 
words, what the thing is made of (Physics II.3). The examples that Aristotle provides include the 
bronze of a statue and the silver of a bowl. As for the efficient cause, it pertains to “the primary 
source of the change or coming to rest” (Physics II.3). The efficient cause is essentially that 
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which causes something to change, such as the artist who paints a painting or a dramaturge who 
weaves together the various elements that produce the dramatic spectacle. Consequently, the end 
cause is “that for the sake of which a thing is done” (Physics II.3). It is the telos, or the end for 
which something is done or made. In the case of dramatic performance, we could say that the end 
cause is to create an experience for the audience to both enjoy and critically reflect upon. But 
how are the six elements of drama affected by the Aristotelian notion of causality? 
According to Sam Smiley, the progression from Plot to Spectacle among the six elements 
of drama signifies a causal process that emphasizes form and structure. Each preceding element is 
therefore the formal cause of the subsequent element in the list. Understood as such, Smiley 
contends that playwriting and the production of drama involve the structuring of action in a play. 
He goes on to explain the meaning of each element and how they fit into the process of formal 
causality, beginning with Plot. The Plot, Smiley explains, “is the organization of an action, the 
arrangement of the sequence material into a whole” (1971: 8). The Plot offers the structure within 
which Character operates, while the character “provides the most important material to plot” 
(1971: 8). What we see here is a causal relation that is reciprocal in nature. The Plot is the formal 
cause of Character, which is in turn the material cause of the plot. What this means is that the 
reversed progression from Spectacle back to Plot represents a process of causality that prioritizes 
the materiality of the elements. Moving down the list of elements, we see that “Thought amounts 
to everything that goes on within a character” (1971: 8). Thought is the form of diction, which 
provides the material for thought to exist. Diction, in Smiley’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
definition, refers to the words of the play that “consists of individual sounds,” whereby diction is 
the form of sounds, and sounds are the matter of diction (1971: 8). The fifth element, Melody, 
represents “the music of the human voice,” which may also include the use of musical 
accompaniment or atmospheric sounds (1971: 8). Finally, the Spectacle refers to “the physical 
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actions of the characters that accompany the sounds and words plus all the details of the physical 
milieu – setting, lights, props, costumes, and makeup” (1971: 9). In other words, the Spectacle 
embodies the performance in its entirety as a visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic phenomenon.  
 For the playwright, the formal causality among Aristotle’s six elements of drama takes 
precedence over the material causality among them. The playwright’s concern is to ensure the 
coherent organization of the actions – and their attendant features like character and diction – in 
the performance. However, in terms of the actual making of performances, the dramaturge and 
the members of the production team would first consider the material causality among the six 
elements of drama before the formal causality. As Smiley notes, “theatre artists normally 
consider spectacle first, then the other elements in ascending order” (1971: 9). Playwriting and 
performance making may be intertwined, but they operate on somewhat different premises. The 
playwright’s purpose is to facilitate the audience’s understanding of how the actions in a play are 
organized as a logical and meaningful totality. For the dramaturges and theatre producers, their 
focus is on the ways in which the visual, auditory, kinaesthetic, and narrative elements of the 
performance are woven together in the rendering of a pleasurable, and provocative, experience. 
As such, in order for dramatic theatre to pass from nonbeing into existence, playwriting and 
performance making have to work “hand-in-hand”. “Theatre,” as Smiley reminds us, “doesn’t 
come into being unless performed live onstage. In script form, a play remains merely a potential 
work of art” (1971: 11). How that potential might be unleashed would depend on the craft and 
skill of the dramaturge and the theatre artists (including the designers, actors, stagehands, and 
technicians) who bring the performance into being on the stage.  
 Even though Aristotle appears to prioritize the formal and material causalities of 
production in the six elements of drama, theatre performance also involves the collective labour 
of both human and nonhuman agents in the creation of the dramatic spectacle. These human and 
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nonhuman entities – which comprise the mechane, stage sets, performers, and audience members 
– possess the agency to affect the presentation of the spectacle in time and space. Consider, for 
example, the deployment of the deus-ex-machina in the 2009 staging of Medea at Syracuse in 
Sicily. Had the production team decided not to use a mechanical crane to hoist the actor playing 
Medea up to the top of the scenic backdrop but shine a light on that spot instead, the audience’s 
experience of the theatrical phenomenon at the denouement of the play would have been 
remarkably different. Rather than foregrounding the material embodiment of the deus-ex-
machina in the technological form of the mechane, the transcendent power of the gods in 
changing the fate of human beings would be symbolically represented by the spot of light that 
illuminates the top of the backdrop. What this suggests is that the “efficient cause,” marked by 
the dramaturgical decisions of the production team, is capable of altering the “end cause” – that 
is, the audience’s perception of the deus-ex-machina as a physical apparatus and its dramatic 
purpose at the denouement of Euripides’s play. Following the logic of Aristotle’s “Four Causes” 
and how they relate to the six elements of drama, it seems that the human and nonhuman agents 
in action constitute the “efficient cause” of performance, whereas the “end cause” is embodied by 
the enactment of the spectacle in its totality (with actions, performers, machines, lighting, and 
music). But Aristotle is cautious about the role of spectacle in the making of drama.  
In the Poetics, Aristotle explains that since the dramatic representation of an action on the 
stage is “performed by living persons, it follows at once that one essential part of a tragedy is the 
spectacular effect, and, besides that, song-making and diction” (1449b). Spectacle, in conjunction 
with music and language, is a constituent element of dramatic production. However, Aristotle 
also clarifies that despite its effectiveness in enriching the performance of tragedy, spectacle is 
“quite foreign to the art and has nothing to do with poetry” (Poetics 1450b). At first glance, this 
claim that spectacle has nothing to do with poetry might strike us as odd, especially given that the 
! %"!
production of drama relies on poetry as a kind of Poiesis ((&)*+,+). In the Symposium, Plato 
reveals the original sense of the word poiesis as the bringing-forth from concealment into light, 
“for of anything whatsoever that passes from not being into being the whole cause is composing 
or poetry; so that the productions of all arts are kinds of poetry, and their craftsmen are all poets” 
(205b, 205c). That the words “craftsmen” and “poetry” should coincide within the same sentence 
about the production of the arts highlights the ancient Greek understanding of Techne ($"-'*) as 
the name for “both the activity of the craftsman who shapes a vase and that of the artist who 
molds a statue or writes a poem” (Agamben 1999: 60). We will return to this concept of techne as 
the dual-expression of skill and creativity later in this chapter, when we look at Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and how it relates to poiesis. Returning to the treatment of 
spectacle in the Poetics for now, we would do well to remember that Aristotle’s focus is on the 
art of the poet who creates the tragic drama through a weaving of actions, characters, thought, 
diction, and song as a textual score for the final spectacle on the stage.6 Besides, his discussion of 
spectacle is further complicated by the second claim that “the effect of tragedy does not depend 
on its performance by actors” (Poetics 1450b).  
For Aristotle, the effect of tragedy resides primarily in the plot, particularly in terms of 
how the actions in the play evoke fear and pity among the audience. While he concedes that this 
arousal of fear and pity may “sometimes result from the spectacle,” he nonetheless insists that 
what marks the “better poet” is the triggering of these emotions by “the actual arrangement of the 
incidents [i.e., the plot]” (Poetics 1453b). Spectacle may be foreign to the art of poetry, and for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'!The use of textual scores in dramatic performance throws up the question of “compliance” with the intentions of 
the playwright as poet. As the American dramatic theorist William B. Worthen points out, the score could be seen as 
a way of ensuring the textual consistency of the play as it is performed on the stage. However, he sees this imposition 
of a textual consistency as an expression of “the metaphoricity of the score itself” (2010: 11). While the presence of 
the score seems to suggest that the play exists on the page, Worthen contends that the ways in which it is actually 
used in the theatre “tend to resist the force of the score metaphor” (2010: 11). Rather than a single score, theatre 
artists divide the main score into parts that are distributed throughout the production team, and each of these parts are 
then individually annotated, rearranged, rewritten, and sometimes, discarded altogether.       
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the poet, it may be the least artistic out of the six elements of drama. However, for the dramaturge 
and other theatre artists whose principal task is to bring the performance into being on the stage, 
spectacle is the material with which they work to produce the theatre event. Then again, should 
the spectacle be seen as a straightforward material enactment of the dramatic text, or should it be 
treated as the embodiment of poiesis, in the same way that the activity of the poet constitutes a 
poiesis? “Stage performance,” as the dramatic theorist William B. Worthen argues, “is not built 
from the text [e.g., the canonical script for Euripides’s Medea], but from many texts, scripts that 
are cut, rearranged, and annotated in different ways as part of the process of making the 
performance” (2010: 11-12). Worthen believes that the dramatic text should be understood as a 
metaphor for the actual performance rather than an imposition of textual consistency that hinders 
the creativity of the theatre artists that bring the play into being on the stage. Indeed, there are 
some playwrights who insist that the performance of their work must correspond with the stage 
directions provided in the dramatic text. For this reason, Worthen sees the actual use of the 
textual score in the theatre as a resistance against “the force of the score metaphor” (2010: 11). 
While tensions may arise between the playwright and the production team, these relational strains 
do not diminish the role of theatre artists in creating an artwork that is as poetic as the poetry that 
flows from the tip of the poet’s quill.  
Aristotle, in acknowledging the importance of theatre artists in the rendering of the 
spectacle, suggests that in terms of “achieving the spectacular effects the art of the costumier is 
more authoritative than that of the poet” (Poetics 1450b). Depending on which translation of the 
Poetics we refer to,7 the artistic authority over the creation of the spectacular effects of dramatic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(!According to Samuel Henry Butcher’s 1902 English translation of the Poetics from the original version in ancient 
Greek, Aristotle accords the “machinist” with the artistic authority over the spectacular effects. In William Hamilton 
Fyfe’s 1932 translation, however, it is the “costumier” who possesses the artistic authority over the poet. This study 
draws on the translations by both Butcher and Fyfe.!!!
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performance seems to be vested in the costumier or the machinist. These are vital roles in any 
production team, as they are part of the lifeblood that keeps the performance alive. Whereas the 
poet may work independently in organizing the actions in a play, it is the collective effort among 
human and nonhuman agents that actually brings the play into being through performance. 
Having explored the six elements of drama and its causal relations, the next section aims to 
understand Aristotle’s claim that dramatic tragedy is the “imitation of an action”. In particular, 
we will look at how the Aristotelian concept of mimesis operates in dramatic performance and 
also explore the Brazilian theatre director Augusto Boal’s reinterpretation of this concept.    
 
1.3 Mimesis as Re-Creation: Igniting the “Creative Principle” in Dramatic Theatre 
The Aristotelian understanding of ancient Greek Tragedy is rooted in the concept of 
mimesis. In the Poetics, Aristotle defines Tragedy as the imitation of an action rather than the 
qualities and experiences of individual human beings (VI, 1449b). Tragedy cannot exist without 
action. But what exactly does Aristotle mean by the imitation of an action? In theorizing the 
dramatic phenomenon, the British theatre critic Martin Esslin argues that mimesis is the basis of 
action found in almost all types of drama: “what makes drama drama”, Esslin writes, “is 
precisely the element which lies outside and beyond the words and which has to be seen as 
action” (1976: 14). Esslin’s definition of drama is reminiscent of the way in which Aristotle 
described ancient Greek tragedy as the “representation of an act which is serious, complete, and 
of a certain magnitude” (qtd. in Halliwell 1987: 37). This magnitude that Aristotle mentions in 
relation to tragic drama pertains to the ancient Greek perception of size and proportion as 
indicators of beauty. But what is crucial here is not the magnitude of the drama (whether it is 
long or short). Rather, the emphasis is on the action contained within the performance of a play, 
for the Aristotelian understanding of tragedy is, as Stephen Halliwell reminds us, a form of 
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“dramatic enactment, not narrative” (1987: 37). Hence, there are significant differences between 
the communicative strategies of dramatic performance and those of fictional narrative.  
Keir Elam, in his study of the semiotics of the theatre, distinguishes between the poetics 
of drama and that of narrative fiction by referring to Aristotle’s separation of representational 
modes into diegesis (narrative description) and mimesis (direct imitation). Most fictional 
narratives, as Elam explains it, tend to point the reader towards an “imaginary ‘elsewhere’ set in 
the past [or the future in science fiction narratives] and which has to be evoked […] through 
predication and description” (1980: 67). Descriptions in fictional narratives provide the reader 
with an interpretive framework that facilitates his or her understanding of the representative 
world that the text conjures. The narrator mediates between the reader and the fictional universe. 
Dramatic worlds, however, are presented to the spectator as “hypothetically actual” constructs in 
the theatre. The spectator sees the unfolding of the dramatic action within the “here and now” of 
the performance, as there is no mediation by a narrator. “Dramatic performance, as Elam 
elucidates, “metaphorically translates conceptual access to possible worlds into ‘physical’ access, 
since the constructed world is apparently shown to the audience – that is, ostended – rather than 
being stipulated or described” (Elam 1980: 67-8). It is the ostension of constructed worlds in 
dramatic performance that distinguishes the poetics of drama from that of fictional narrative. 
Whereas the rendering of constructed worlds in fictional narrative requires the facilitation of 
diegesis or narrative description, the ostension of the represented world in drama relies on 
mimesis or the direct imitation of actions on the stage.  
As William B. Worthen notes, the instruments of theatrical performance – bodies, 
technology, and space – are dynamic vehicles of signification. Just by being present on the stage, 
Worthen explains, “they mean already, apart from their configuration in and by the performance” 
(2010: 11). In contrast to the invocation of possible worlds in narrative fiction, which comes into 
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being only when they have been partially or fully described, Keir Elam observes that the 
“dramatic world is assumed by the spectator to exist before he knows anything about it” (1980: 
68). The spectator encounters the world of the dramatic performance in medias res. Therefore, he 
or she can only make sense of the characters, the specificities of the set design, and the spatio-
temporal significance of the play during the course of the performance. There is also an element 
of self-reflexivity in drama, as dramatic worlds are “revealed through the persons, action and 
statements which make them up, and not through external commentary” (1980: 68). Elam argues 
that it is this self-reflexive quality of the dramatic world that allows it to be “‘embodied’ onstage 
by actors and set” (1980: 68). The actors and the stage, which includes all the material 
technology needed to render the dramatic spectacle, are literally ostended, as they are part of the 
physical world. As for the hypothetical world to which the drama alludes, it is ostended in the 
metaphorical sense through the actors and stage apparatuses that are involved in the presentation 
of that artificial world on the stage. In other words, the concept of mimesis is mobilized in 
dramatic theatre “through ostension of the represented world” (Elam 1980: 69). The dramatic 
world is set up as a “hypothetically actual” that is physically present. As a result, the actors in the 
performance can refer and point directly to the stage, the set, and to one another “as if they were 
the dramatic referents themselves, so as to strengthen the illusion of direct presentation of the 
constructed world” (Elam 1980: 69). It is this direct imitation of a hypothetical world in physical 
terms on the stage that seems to exemplify the mimetic quality of drama.   
In his translation and analysis of the concept of mimesis in the Poetics, Michael Davis 
discovers that for Aristotle, “Mimêsis involves a framing of reality that announces that what is 
contained within the frame is not simply real”, such that “the more ‘real’ the imitation the more 
fraudulent it becomes” (1999: 3). What Davis’s interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of mimesis 
suggests is that the imitation of reality in dramatic theatre is a conscious attempt to artificially 
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isolate events from the continuous and immeasurable human experience, and present them as re-
enactment to an embodied audience. However, it is the mimetic quality of not only drama, but 
also the arts in general, that Plato takes issue with in Book X of the Republic. Four decades prior 
to Aristotle’s Poetics, Plato already theorized that art is the imitation of life. Life, in turn, is a 
shadow of the ideal forms or eidos. For Plato, the appearances that are known to us through our 
engagement with the material world that is in a constant state of change is only a copy or 
mimicry of the ideal forms that contain the truth and are therefore real. As Plato informs us 
through Socrates, the things that we see and perceive in the world are not real, but merely 
shadows of the ideal forms, the immediate perception of which is closed to us. In the same way 
that life is only a shadow of the ideal forms, Plato believes that the “work of the artist is at a third 
remove from the essential nature of the thing” (Republic 597e).  
 Plato’s view of art is that it is an image of likeness (eikon) of an ideal original that we are 
not able to directly perceive.8 In this sense, art holds up a mirror to nature (physis). It is for this 
reason that Plato targets the arts, including the art of the tragic poet. In explicating his criticism of 
poetry, especially mimetic poetry, Plato remarks that the “tragic poet, too, is an artist who 
represents things; so this will apply to him: he and all other artists are, as it were, third in 
succession from the throne of truth” (Republic 597e). Being an imitator of the craft of, say, the 
carpenter, who is the imitator of the ideal forms, the artist is twice removed from the truth. It is 
for this reason that the artist has no place in the just city of Plato’s Republic. For Aristotle, 
however, art does not imitate things or experiences. It does not seek to mimic the ideal forms. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)!The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben remarks that the grounds for Plato’s opposition to the poets, or the arts in 
general, can be traced back to a Platonic theory of the relationship between language and violence. Agamben 
explains that Plato was not simply targeting narrative poetry, but the mimetic poetry that imitates passions in order to 
“evoke the same passions in the soul of the listeners” (1999: 119). In this sense, Plato appears to be concerned about 
the violent potential of language, particularly mimetic language. As Agamben notes, Plato realized – since the rise of 
the sophistics – that the assumption that language was devoid of any possibility of violence no longer held true, and 
instead, “the use of violence was an integral part of poetic language” (1999: 119).   
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Instead, art imitates action. But what does Aristotle mean by action? The American theater 
scholar and founder of the field of performance studies Richard Schechner claims that for 
Aristotle, art imitates the patterns, the rhythms, and the developments found in nature (physis). In 
other words, art mimics the processes of nature, in that when things are born, they “grow and 
flourish,” and then they “decline and die,” only to repeat the same cycle (2004: 37). This idea of 
art as the mimicry of natural processes seems to resonate with the Aristotelian conception of 
poetics as a kind of poiesis or the “bringing-forth” of something into being, be it in the form of a 
painting, a sculpture, or a piece of dramatic theatre.9  
 The Brazilian theatre director and performance theorist, Augusto Boal, was inspired by 
the capacity of art to imitate the processes of nature rather than simply mimicking particular 
things or experiences. Boal agrees with Aristotle that representation in the theatre happens 
through action. However, he argues that throughout the history of western theatre, there has been 
a tendency to reduce mimesis to the level of mere imitation. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, 
imitation is understood as a perfect copy of an original and ideal model, which is the formal 
cause of a created thing. Following this logic, Boal reasons that we should arrive at the following 
formula: The first assumption holds that “nature” refers to the whole of created things. The 
second assumption holds that theatre is a copy of nature. Therefore, the final claim is that theatre 
is a copy of created things. If this were the case, then stage and reality would share the same 
relationship as that between word and thing – that is, a seemingly unproblematic relationship to 
the mimetic structure that governs the interaction between the two entities. But rather than !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*!Schechner believes that the idea of “form” in Aristotle’s thinking is fluid and changing, whereas Plato believes that 
it is solid and fixed, as exemplified by the ideal forms that contain the truth (2004: 37). Such a distinction appears to 
echo the difference in philosophical positions between the Pre-Sophist philosophers Heraclitus, who claimed that the 
world is in a constant state of change, such that nothing can remain fixed, and Parmenides, who held that there is an 
underlying truth within appearances that are fixed and constant. As we shall we see in the next section, the 
contrasting ideas propounded by these Pre-Sophist philosophers did have a significant impact on Martin Heidegger’s 
thinking on the concept of poiesis in relation to metaphysics and the question of technology.  !
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accepting the traditional understanding of imitation as a copy of an original model, Boal intends 
to rescue what he sees as the proper meaning of mimesis in Aristotle’s Poetics. For this reason, he 
takes up the challenge of re-interpreting Aristotle’s concept of mimesis.  
In his analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics, Boal claims that the act of imitation (mimesis) is not 
about copying an exterior model. Instead, it entails a re-creative process that is generative in 
character. For Boal, “‘Mimesis’ means rather a ‘re-creation’” (1995: 1). As opposed to the 
assumption that nature refers to the whole of created things, he contends that it is “not the whole 
of created things but rather the creative principle itself” (1995: 1). Nature should be understood in 
terms of the natural processes that bring life into being. This is the “creative principle” that 
defines nature. It is on the basis of this revised understanding of nature that Boal sets out to re-
interpret Aristotle’s concept of mimesis. As he explains, “when Aristotle says that art imitates 
nature, we must understand that this statement, which can be found in any modern version of the 
Poetics, is due to a bad translation, which in turn stems from an isolated interpretation of that 
text. ‘Art imitates nature’ actually means: ‘Art re-creates the creative principle of created things’” 
(1995: 1). On the surface, Boal’s position on mimesis appears to be similar to that of Schechner, 
in the sense that art imitates the developing potential of nature. However, Boal takes Schechner’s 
observation further by proposing that mimesis in art is in fact a process of re-creation, as what it 
imitates is not simply the things or the processes in nature, but the creative and generative 
principle that brings things and life into being. In this sense, art becomes a form of poiesis, as it 
reproduces the “creative principle” of nature.  
In contrast to the relationship between a signifier (e.g., the representation of a cup) and a 
referent (the physical cup) in the material world, mimesis in the context of dramatic performance 
does not enjoy a fixed one-to-one relationship with its referent. Instead, the process of imitation 
in the theatre is predicated upon change. “Theatre,” as Boal understands it, “is change and not 
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simple presentation of what exists: it is becoming and not being” (1995: 28). Theatre as a form of 
becoming endows it with the capacity for poiesis, which comprises the re-creation of the creative 
principle that brings things into being on the stage. Focusing on the generative potential of 
dramatic theatre as poiesis, what follows is an examination of Martin Heidegger’s interpretation 
of poiesis as the process of “bringing forth” a world, as well as his treatment of the relationship 
between techne and poiesis as a creative means by which to critically reflect upon technology.  
 
1.4 Bringing Forth a World: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Poiesis 
In his book, Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger develops a thesis that rejects the 
mimetic quality of poiesis. Instead, he argues that a link exists between poiesis and noein,10 the 
latter of which is an ancient Greek word that holds a range of meanings that gesture towards 
thinking, perception, and awareness. Even though Heidegger insists that poetry and philosophical 
thinking are different, he does acknowledge that they are from the same order: “Poetry, like the 
thinking of the philosopher, has always so much world space to spare that in it each thing – a 
tree, a mountain, a house, the cry of a bird – loses all indifference and commonplaces” 
(Introduction to Metaphysics 1953: 26). Poetry and philosophical thinking bring forth a world of 
possibilities, as Heidegger discerns the poetic quality of philosophical thinking that is mirrored 
by the way that the poetry of the ancient Greek dramatists might be considered thoughtful. There 
appears to be a convergence of thought and poetry. To support his claim, Heidegger turns to the 
Pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The entry on noesis in A Greek-English Lexicon reveals that this ancient Greek word, which refers to “idea” and 
“understanding” in the English language, is derived from noein, which means “to see,” “to perceive,” or “to be 
aware”. The word noein is in turn derived from nous, which stands for “mind, as employed in perceiving and 
thinking”. For more on the usages of nous in ancient Greek thinking, see Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry 
Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie. A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.  
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Parmenides believed that the essence of man could be derived from the essence of being 
itself, as “Thought and Being are the same” (DK28b6 qtd. in Freeman 42). For Heidegger, the 
way to achieve this philosophical understanding of the essence of being is through the creation of 
poetry: “We do not learn who man is by learned definitions; we learn it only when man contends 
with the essent, striving to bring it into its being, i.e., into limit and form, that is to say when he 
projects something new (not yet present), when he creates original poetry, when he builds 
poetically” (1953: 144). Rather than depending on preconceived notions of the essence of being, 
the key to knowing how something comes into existence is to bring forth that thing from a state 
of nonbeing into being. To create original poetry – that is, to build poetically – is to partake in the 
productive act of poiesis. Heidegger’s use of the word “original” here does not imply the 
uniqueness of the thing. Instead, the word underscores the authenticity of the poetic creation, in 
the sense that the poetic thing created is related to the originator (the artist, for example) who 
brings it into being. But despite the chiasmic relationship between thought and poetry, where 
thinking appears to be poetic and poetry seems to be thoughtful, there remains for Heidegger a 
crucial difference between poetry and philosophy. While poets may express their concern with 
the essence of Being in their poetry, this expression tends to be subtle and implicit. For 
philosophers, however, the essence of being is a topic of significant import, and for this reason, it 
tends to be explicitly addressed in their writings (1953: 26). Nevertheless, both poets and 
philosophers partake in the productive act of poiesis, which Heidegger interprets as the disclosure 
of Being towards truth (what the ancient Greeks called alétheia).  
How then does poiesis become the site of the disclosure of being and the unconcealment 
towards truth? Heidegger addresses this question by turning, once again, to Parmenides and his 
notion that “the path to being […] is at the same time the way to unconcealment” (1953: 111). 
For Parmenides, the coming into presence of being is experienced as physis, which is the rising of 
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something from out of itself. In the writings of Parmenides and the other Pre-Socratic 
philosophers, we see that physis is the ancient Greek word for “nature” or “the nature of things”. 
The word does not only refer to the physical entities in nature but also the quest to understand 
how they exist. As Heidegger notes, Parmenides recognized that while physis constitutes the 
event of the disclosure of being, it is an event that simultaneously conceals a part of itself (1953: 
104). In this sense, the possibility for the appearance or coming into presence of an entity is not 
exhaustive, as physis is an event that discloses being and conceals an aspect of it at the same 
time. Heidegger explains that Parmenides’s understanding of physis is related to his treatment of 
thought or noein. This relationship between physis and noein is mentioned in Parmenides’s only 
surviving work On Nature, specifically in a fragment that is translated into English as such: “for 
it is the same to think and to be” (DK28b3 qtd. in Freeman 1983: 52). An early-twentieth century 
translation presents the fragment as “Being and Thought are the same” (DK28b3 qtd. in Burnet 
1920). But Heidegger is cautious in his reading of Parmenides’s fragment. Indeed, he warns us 
against what he perceives to be the German Idealist reading of it as an expression of the 
subjectivity of being, which is structured by thought, and in particular, the humanist idea of a 
self-certain thinking subject. As opposed to the reduction of being to the object of thought, 
Heidegger clarifies that Parmenides’s point in the aforementioned fragment is that being and 
thinking belong together (1953: 137). As such, Heidegger argues that being and thinking do not 
form a unity of antagonisms. Instead, being both discloses and conceals, and thinking is thus 
possible, due to the unfolding of the space of disconcealment that reveals the truth of being.  
Through Heidegger’s interpretation of Pre-Socratic philosophy, we learn that Parmenides 
held thinking as a process in which the human being enters into history as a being. In other 
words, the human is a being that comes into being. Heidegger observes that in Parmenides’s 
philosophy, thinking is not prior to being. “Thinking,” Heidegger contends, “is not a function that 
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man has as an attribute, but rather the other way around: Thinking is the happening that has man” 
(1953: 141). In other words, it is the event of being’s disclosure that calls Dasein to think. The 
term Dasein refers to what Heidegger calls the “being-there” or the “being-in-the-world” of the 
human, which allows it to question the very nature of being itself (Being and Time 2010: 10). But 
while Dasein contemplates the nature of its own being, it is simultaneously aware of its 
existential finitude in the world. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger interprets the 
limiting experience of Dasein in its “thrownness” in the world as the “disposition” 
(Befindlichkeit) or “mood” (Stimmung) in which there is the real disclosure of “being-in-the-
world” (2008: 218). What Dasein comes upon in this “disposition” or “mood,” Gadamer 
explains, “represents the extreme limit beyond which the historical self-understanding of human 
Dasein could not advance” (2008: 218). As such, Dasein is not only aware of its finitude but also 
has to accept it. The event of being’s disclosure as “being-in-the world” and “being-towards-
death” is that violence which subdues Dasein (Being and Time 2010: 169). This violent event of 
being’s disclosure that confronts Dasein is what the Pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides refers 
to as physis. In order to overcome the instability of physis, which names this powerful event of 
being’s disclosure that also conceals an aspect of it, Dasein turns to techne. 
Heidegger does not regard techne as merely skill or art. Instead, he sees techne as a mode 
of knowing, whereby “knowledge in the authentic sense of techne is the initial and persistent 
looking out beyond what is given at any time” (1953: 159). Techne as knowledge requires Dasein 
to look beyond given appearances that conceal themselves in order to reveal the essence of being. 
Heidegger observes that the ancient Greeks regarded the work of art as techne because of its 
ability to unconceal being. “It is through the work of art as essent being,” Heidegger writes, “that 
everything else that appears and is to be found is first confirmed and made accessible, explicable, 
and understandable as being or not being” (1953: 159). As such, poiesis as production does not 
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imitate an envisaged model that is stable. Rather, poiesis responds to the instability of the 
powerful and violent event of being’s disclosure (physis) by opening up a world that is 
intelligible.  
 
1.5 Of Techne and Poiesis: Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology 
 In his 1954 essay, “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger suggests that 
physis, which is “the arising of something from out of itself,” is also a bringing-forth or poiesis, 
as exemplified by “the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself” (1977: 10). Physis, as a self-
generating phenomenon, is set in contrast to the mobilization of a poetic bringing-forth that is 
“not in itself, but in another (en alloi), in the craftsman or artist” (1977: 11). Heidegger informs 
us that for the ancient Greeks, techne refers to both “the activities and skills of the craftsman” as 
well as “the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (1977: 13). But Heidegger, as the philosopher 
David Wills discerns, is not so much interested in developing a distinction between the artefact as 
techne and nature (physis) than in establishing a difference “between instrumentality and the 
‘realm of revealing’” (25). The aim here is not to distinguish between the technological and the 
non-technological. Heidegger reminds us that while instrumentality may appear to be the 
fundamental characteristic of technology, a deeper inquiry into what technology represents as a 
means of production would show that the “possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in 
revealing” (1977: 12). Instrumentality is not the driving force that steers technological 
production. Instead, technology is a way of revealing that “comes to presence in the realm where 
revealing and unconcealment take place, where alétheia, truth, happens” (1977: 13). As the word 
“technology” originates from the ancient Greek word Technikon, which stands for “that which 
belongs to techne,” it would seem logical that techne also “belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis” 
as revealing (1977: 13). However, this revelation in the poietic – and not instrumental – 
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conception of technology is, as David Wills contends, unexpected, for “[in] letting come forth as 
revealing, one does not produce whatever is foreseen by the program of that production” (25-6). 
In other words, the outcome of the production is not foreseeable. Thus, the poietic conception of 
technology is a revelation that comes as a surprise for the human who is set upon to “unconceal” 
the “truth”. For Heidegger, this process of unconcealing the truth – that is, poiesis – occurs 
through a mode of ordering that he refers to as Gestell.  
Heidegger conceptualizes the essence of technology as Gestell, or what he describes as 
the “enframing” of nature as “standing-reserve”. The ordering of nature as “standing-reserve” 
entails the “challenging-forth” of the human to reveal or “unconceal” the “truth” through the 
gathering together of things in the world that would facilitate such a revelation. We should note, 
however, that Heidegger’s use of the word Gestell denotes a mode of coming to presence rather 
than its common meaning of apparatus or simply a means to an end. He explains that:  
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, 
i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-
reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence 
of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological. (1977: 20) 
The concept of “enframing” in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is a “challenging-forth” of 
the human being to reveal the truth in nature as ever-present and to place it “on call”. It is a 
means of unconcealing the essence of the things we perceive in the world. The building of a dam 
across the River Rhine for the purpose of generating hydroelectric power, as Heidegger intimates, 
is understood as a mode of ordering nature by means of technology. Yet the lesson to be drawn 
from Heidegger’s example appears to be the following: if we do not reflect critically upon the 
instrumentality of such a technological intervention (that is, by putting nature on “standing 
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reserve”), we might be inclined to unquestionably accept the ordering and restructuring of nature 
for the sole purpose of serving human needs.  
In revealing the true forms of the world, poiesis does not seek to put the world on 
“standing reserve”. Indeed, the danger of setting upon nature as “standing reserve” resides in the 
tendency to overlook or forget the poietic quality of “enframing”. What is so dangerous about 
“enframing” is that it does not announce itself as a mode of ordering, thus lending credence to the 
assumption that “technology were a means in the hands of [hu]man [beings]” (1977: 37). 
However, as Heidegger observes in another essay, “The Turning,” Gestell or “enframing” in his 
philosophical treatment of the essence of technology also refers to the destining of the coming to 
presence of Being. Heidegger’s use of the word “destining” (Geschick in German) here points to 
a change of direction, which the translator, William Lovitt, interprets as a transformation within 
Being that opens up the self in order to turn the oblivion of Being into the coming to presence of 
Being (1977: 41). Since the essence of technology is “enframing,” which is also the 
transformation that brings forth the coming to presence of being, the essence of technology as 
“enframing” appears to partake in what David Wills terms “a chiasmic relationship” with the 
essence of being. This relationship entails a movement of diversion (a transformative destining) 
in which “Being might therefore be said to move forward as Enframing and vice versa” (2008: 
27). In light of technology’s relation to being, Heidegger suggests that the danger of “enframing” 
as the ordering of nature might also reside within being. At the same time, however, he claims 
that technology “will never allow itself to be overcome by [humans]” (1977: 38).  
For Heidegger, the human as the being within which the danger of “enframing” resides is 
not the master of technology. Instead, he asserts that being qua the essence of technology adapts 
itself into “enframing”. As a result, being and technology are imbricated in a cooperative relation, 
in which “the coming to presence of technology will be surmounted [verwunden] in a way that 
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restores it into its yet concealed truth” (1977: 39). Without affirming technology and its means, 
Heidegger believes that this restorative surmounting of “enframing” happens through a “coming-
to-pass which discloses […] an essential relationship between technology and [hu]man in respect 
to their essence” (1977: 39). In setting the tone for the overcoming of the instrumental treatment 
of technology, the philosopher of technology argues that “[all] that is merely technological never 
arrives at the essence of technology” (1977: 48). On this note, he begins to turn his focus to the 
double-edged essence of “enframing” as simultaneously the site of “saving power”: 
Enframing comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure – as yet 
inexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future – that he may be the 
one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the essence of truth. Thus the 
rising of the saving power appears. (1977: 33) 
The danger of “enframing,” which is always already in danger of turning into an instrument for 
the ordering of nature, also reveals the emergence of the “saving power” from its “concealed 
essence that is ever susceptible to turning” (1977: 42). This “saving power,” as Heidegger 
informs us, refers to the act of safekeeping or conservation that corresponds with the gathering of 
things in the world that embodies the concept of “enframing”. As such, he surmises that the 
turning of “enframing” towards its “saving power,” a turn that is always capable of turning back 
towards its dangerous end, is akin to the lightning-flash that suddenly appears. In what might be 
considered a surprising turn at the end of his essay, “The Turning,” Heidegger wonders if the 
“lightning-flash of Being,” its unexpected coming to presence, can be discerned in the essence of 
technology.  
David Wills interprets Heidegger’s invocation of the image of the lightning-flash that 
violently imposes its will on the world as a sign of nature turning against itself. In the 
catastrophic moment of the lightning stroke, nature appears out of control and becomes 
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unnatural, thus revealing what Wills calls “the otherness of nature” (2008: 29). Furthermore, the 
revelation of nature’s “own otherness,” as Wills intimates, also opens up “the possibility of its 
transformation,” which is a transformative turn in nature that gestures towards the invention of 
technics (2008: 29). Just as nature reveals its unnaturalness in the lightning stroke, the invention 
of technics could bring forth a revelation of technology’s essence that departs from the danger of 
“enframing” by turning towards its “saving power”. This “saving power” of “enframing,” 
Heidegger claims, is embodied by a “higher essence” that is poiesis (1977: 34). In contrast to the 
danger of “enframing,” poiesis, as I have mentioned earlier, does not seek to put the world on 
“standing reserve”. Instead, it participates in a process of revealing towards the true forms of the 
world. Understood as a techne, or a revealing that brings forth and belongs within poiesis, the 
work of art offers the possibility of revealing the essence of technology, which Heidegger insists 
is “nothing technological” (1977: 34-5). But how does the work of art bring forth this essential 
questioning of technology? In order to address this question, we will need to explore the essential 
character of art as poiesis.   
The notion of art as poiesis does not entail the production of something that is already in 
existence or the copying of an idea of a thing that has yet to exist in order to bring it into material 
existence. The ancient Greeks understood the work of art as making something rather than the 
doing of a task such as the copying of an idea. In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
notes the difference between “making” and “doing” by distinguishing between the rational 
qualities concerned with each of them (1140a2). Art, according to Aristotle, is a rational quality 
concerned with making: “All Art deals with bringing some thing into existence; and to pursue an 
art means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the 
efficient cause of which lies in the maker and not in the thing made” (Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 
1140a4). Heidegger, as we have seen, shares Aristotle’s understanding of the role of the artist in 
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bringing forth something into existence in the work of art. The artist is the efficient cause of 
poiesis in artistic production that stands in contrast with the self-generating poiesis (or 
autopoiesis) in nature (physis). But Heidegger, in studying the relationship between poiesis and 
techne, recognizes Aristotle’s distinction between making and doing.  
Aristotle and the ancient Greek philosophers recognized the difference between making 
and doing as an essential distinction between poiesis and praxis. According to the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the ancient Greek philosophers “made a clear distinction between 
poiesis (poiein, “to pro-duce” in the sense of bringing into being) and praxis (prattein, “to do” in 
the sense of acting)” (1999: 68). Aristotle holds that the genus of praxis or action is different 
from that of poiesis or production. Poiesis has an end other than itself. Praxis, however, is an end 
in itself. Unlike action (praxis), which brings itself into presence in the act, production (poiesis) 
does not bring itself into presence in the work. The end cause of poiesis is always already outside 
of itself. This is why Heidegger believes that poiesis, which is understood as a bringing-forth of 
something into existence, is fundamental to the critical reflection upon technology, as it 
facilitates the questioning of the instrumentality of techne through the production of art. The 
essence of poiesis, Agamben asserts, is not located in the process through which the work of art 
is produced. Rather, by bringing forth something from nonbeing into being, poiesis opens up the 
space of truth (alétheia) and builds a world for the human being’s “dwelling on earth,” which is a 
world for the projection of possibilities (1999: 70). However, Agamben detects a conflation of 
poiesis and praxis in the modern era, whereby the human being’s “doing” is “determined as an 
activity producing a real effect” (1999: 70). As a result, the freedom and creativity that inform the 
activity of the human being is valued as the expression of a will (1999: 70). Artistic production in 
the modern era (including the performing arts) thus becomes a creative activity that departs from 
poiesis and “enters into the dimension of praxis” (1999: 71).  
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As Agamben explains, the focus of artistic production as praxis is on the action of the 
artist, and the spectator’s attention is thereby directed to the particularities of the artistic process 
by which the creative genius (i.e., the artist’s will) is expressed. This conception of artistic 
production as the expression of the artist’s will or creative impetus differs significantly from the 
ancient Greek understanding of art as poiesis. Agamben contends that for the ancient Greeks, the 
essence of poiesis had nothing to do with the expression of a will. Instead, the essence is found in 
the production of truth, especially in a revealing or an unconcealment that opens up a world for 
human existence and the projection of possibilities (1999: 72). The human being is not only the 
efficient cause of poiesis in art; it is also the beneficiary of the truth revealed by the work of art. 
As I will demonstrate in the subsequent chapters of this study, the bringing-forth of dramatic 
performance into existence constitutes a poietic production that not only involves the craft and 
skill of the human performers, theatre artists, and audience members but also the potential of 
nonhuman performers to contribute as co-creators of the performance event. Through the 
intersection of performance and technology, which comprises the interplay between different 
media elements as well as the interactions between human and nonhuman actors, intermedial 
performance brings forth a possibility space in which the critical reflection upon technology and 
its relationship with the environment and different forms of beings could take place. This 
convergence between poiesis as making and the invocation of noein as perceptual awareness in 
intermedial performance gestures towards the development of a dramaturgy that mobilizes 
embodied perception among the performers and the audience members in order to investigate the 
interactions between humans and technology. But before we begin to explore the background and 
substance of this intermedial dramaturgical method and analytical framework in Chapter 2, there 
are significant insights to be drawn from the intermedial dramaturgical strategies deployed by the 
performance practitioners of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the following section, we 
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will explore the intermedial innovations of the nineteenth-century German operatic composer, 
Richard Wagner, and his compatriot, the early-twentieth-century dramatist, Bertolt Brecht.   
 
1.6 Intermediality on the Modern Stage: The Innovations of Wagner and Brecht 
As Western Europe crossed into the “Middle Ages” (the period spanning the fifth to 
fifteen century CE), the interplay between performance and technology that was characteristic of 
the ancient Greek and Roman theatres soon made way for the emergence of the mediaeval 
mystery and miracle plays. Produced by members of the religious clergy, and coupled with the 
support of artisans and craftsmen, these plays contained representations of Christian biblical 
stories and were often performed on moving carts known as “pageants”. These “pageants” 
travelled across different cities and towns, stopping at each site to perform a cycle of plays. 
Despite the religious overtones in the dramatic content, elaborate sets were constructed on the 
makeshift stages perched atop the wagons and rudimentary technological devices such as trap 
doors were deployed to enhance the audience’s experience of the miracles depicted in the plays. 
In the Renaissance era, permanent theatre buildings such as the Globe Theatre in England began 
to emerge in Western Europe. However, the Renaissance’s preference for the concept of 
separation between the different medias in the arts, whereby the “idea that a painting [should be] 
made of paint on canvas or that a sculpture should not be painted” became a social philosophy, 
gravely obscured the relevance of “inter-media” dramatic devices in the Renaissance theatre 
(Higgins 1966: 28). Nevertheless, the significance of intermediality in performance was 
rekindled after the Renaissance, when the Baroque Theatre of the seventeenth century 
rediscovered the deus-ex-machina of the ancient Greeks.  
Through the dramatic changes of scenery made possible only by mechanised technology, 
the Baroque drama initiated the evolution of the inter-media theatre and the practice of 
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scenography. In this theatrical tradition, not only did technology complement the content of a 
play by creating visual and audio effects, it also enhanced the theatrical experience by striking the 
audience with “awe and amazement at [technology’s] operation” (Baugh 2005: 1). In the middle 
of the nineteenth century, the German opera composer Richard Wagner realized the potential of 
technology and scenography (scene design) in creating Gesamtkunstwerk, or Total Artwork. 
Living in the age of the Industrial Revolution might have inspired Wagner to harness the 
potential of technology in creating Gesamtkunstwerk (Total Artwork), an aesthetic movement 
that was “driven by a vision of theater in which the audience loses itself in the veracity of the 
drama, creating an immersive experience” (Packer and Jordan 2001: xxiii). The Gesamtkunstwerk 
was an intermedia performance where a combination of scenic painting, lighting effects, and 
acoustical design, served to create a believable !virtual" world on the stage. Referring to his 
aesthetic venture as “The Artwork of the Future,” Wagner argued that the true and complete 
artwork consists of the “reciprocal agreement and cooperation of all the branches” and mediums 
of art (1849: 5). What this means is that every theatrical device in a Wagnerian opera, be it the 
scenery or the actors. gestures, is in support of the overarching theme of the drama. This 
structural concept is emblematic of Wagner.s emphasis on harmony in the creation of 
Gesamtkunstwerk (Total Artwork). As Patrick Carnegy explains, “[all] the constituent elements” 
in a Wagnerian performance “carried equal weight and had to be held in balance” (2006: 118). In 
this sense, Wagner.s employment of mechanical technology serves as a contrived solution that 
overcomes the physical constraints of a performance stage.  
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In the 1882 production of Parsifal at the Bayreuth Festival in Bavaria,11 Wagner made the 
actors pretend to walk while “the scenery, on three huge canvas rolls, moved behind them” 
(Carnegy 2006: 112). Propelled by electric motors, the canvas rolls moved continuously from left 
to right until the painting of the temple was eventually revealed on the last canvas located at the 
back of the stage. Such a configuration of the stage set allowed the scenery to change rapidly as 
the actors pretended to walk through the artificial forest. However, while technology was able to 
fulfill Wagner.s desire to construct a “stage world that was rooted in myth rather than history,” 
he could not find the “appropriate visual language” to do so, as the dream-like, illusionary world 
contained symbols that represented aspects of reality from the historical past (Carnegy 2006: 
131). Instead of aspiring towards the building of stage sets that were deemed historically 
accurate, he sought to redefine the theatrical experience by way of architecture and artificial 
lighting. As Wagner argues in his essay “The Artwork of the Future”, the highest task of 
architecture was “to frame for a fellowship of artists, who in their own persons portray the life of 
Man, the special surroundings necessary for the display of the Human Artwork” (1849: 5). For 
Wagner, his Festspielhaus theatre in the northern Bavarian town of Bayreuth embodies the 
expression of human mastery over the technological and artistic aspects of architecture. 
In their study of the origins of multimedia, Randall Packer and Ken Jordan note that 
Wagner’s purpose-built Festspielhaus employed a combination of Greek amphitheatrical seating, 
surround-sound acoustics, the darkening of the house, and the placement of musicians in an 
orchestral pit (2001: xxiii). Taken together, these theatrical innovations “focused the audience’s 
divided attention on the dramatic action” (2001: xxiv). In a radical step towards the redefinition 
of the theatrical experience, Wagner’s Festspielhaus was designed to situate the audience in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""!The Bayreuth Festival, held in the Bavarian town of Bayreuth since 1881, is an annual event where the 
performances of Wagner’s operas are staged. Wagner commissioned the festival as a venue at which to present his 
lengthy performance cycles, namely, The Ring of Nibelung and Parsifal. !
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darkened space while the dramatic action unfolded within the illuminated area of the stage. Gas 
lamps provided artificial lighting that could be turned on or switched off at the discretion of the 
director. At the start of each performance, the house lights were extinguished in order to plunge 
the auditorium into darkness. Such a radical effect altered the sensory experience of the audience 
members, as the illuminated stage became the sole focus of their gaze. Packer and Jordan observe 
that Wagner’s intention was to maximize the suspension of disbelief in his performances by 
drawing the audience into the illusionary world staged within the proscenium arch. In order to 
mobilize this effect of embodied immersion in the performance, “the spectator,” as Wagner 
elucidates, “transplants himself [or herself] upon the stage, by means of all his [or her] visual and 
aural faculties; while the performer becomes an artist only by complete absorption into the 
public” (1849: 5). As the realms of the performer and the spectators begin to fold into each other, 
the world of illusion rendered in Wagner.s opera quickly becomes a vortex that sucks the 
audience members into the immersive dreamscape of the performance.  
While Wagner’s brand of intermedial performance comprised the compounding of 
different artistic media into an immersive theatre experience, the early-twentieth-century German 
dramatist Bertolt Brecht chose to infuse the interplay between performance and technology with 
the self-reflexivity of meta-theatre. Brecht’s approach to intermedial performance consists of two 
significant features. First, his actors “refrained from going over wholly into their role, remaining 
detached from the character they were playing and clearly inviting criticism of him” (Willett 
1964: 71). Second, the use of various technological devices and media prevents the audience 
from emotionally identifying with the action in the play. Concisely, Brecht describes this second 
phenomenon as the Verfremdungseffekt, or “alienation effect”. To achieve this effect, he made 
full use of some of the most popular mechanical technologies of the early-twentieth century such 
as photographic and filmic projections. In theorizing the Verfremdungseffekt (also known as the 
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“distancing effect”), Brecht argues that the use of technological devices in performance would 
prevent the audience from emotionally identifying with the action in the play (as was the case in 
dramatic realism). He surmises that the distancing effect “prevents the audience from losing itself 
passively and completely in the character created by the actor,” thus affording them the role of “a 
consciously critical observer” (Willett 1964: 91). Unlike Wagner, Brecht did not seek to immerse 
his audience into a theatrically rendered virtual world. Instead, by harnessing the power of 
mechanical technology, he was able to distance them from the dramatic action on the stage, such 
that they may be compelled to deliberate on the pertinent issues raised in his plays. 
In Galileo, Brecht captured the cinematic qualities of “vivid visual images and its 
combination of fluidity and abruptness” in a theatrical context (Willett 1964: 122). The stage 
designer Caspar Neher supplemented the performance with such mixed media tools as the 
“projections of maps, documents and works of art of the Renaissance,” thereby reinforcing the 
artificiality of the drama (Esslin 1961: 128). Nevertheless, while this Brechtian play may be 
capable of distancing the audience from the action on the stage by self-consciously exposing the 
artificiality of the performance, it is not difficult to distinguish between the physical reality of the 
actors and the material artificiality of the technological devices employed in the drama. Rather, 
the physicality of the human actors as biological beings and the materiality of the non-human 
technological devices seem to exist in constant tension with one another on the Brechtian stage. 
As I will demonstrate in the ensuing chapters of this study, it is this tension that is especially 
pertinent to our investigation of the mobilization of embodied perception in the intermedial 
performance practices of the early-twenty-first century. 
Brechtian performances seek to expose the technicity behind the artwork by drawing 
attention to the lighting systems and other media technologies that support the production of the 
dramatic spectacle. In some productions, Brecht mechanically lowered musical symbols (e.g., a 
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treble clef) into the scene whenever the actors broke into song. The artificiality of Brecht’s drama 
provides the audience with an opportunity to put aside any emotional attachment to the play and 
to deliberate on the wider socio-political, philosophical and even ontological implications that the 
play tries to evoke. This way, each member of the audience is “no longer a consumer, but a 
producer of the [play]”, as they attempt to interpret its meaning (Barthes 1974: 4). By becoming a 
co-producer of the play, the audience members partake in a process of poiesis that reveals the 
truth that the dramatic performance is intended to convey. In an effort to mobilize the poietic 
quality of dramatic theatre, Brecht also drew inspiration from the works of Edwin Piscator, 
whose political theatre initiated the use of film and posters (mixed media) in dramatic 
performance, so as to “overcome the limitations of the ‘theatre of illusion’ [realist theatre]” 
(Esslin 1961: 123). The theatrical fraternity of the 1920s saw the realist theatre as “the only 
possible stage convention” and as such, Brecht seriously intended to pull “theatre away from the 
illusion of eavesdropping on real events” (Esslin 1961: 122). For this reason, he emphasized the 
integration of technology and various media into dramatic performance in order “to meet the 
needs of a new revolutionary, scientific age” (Esslin 1961: 121).  
An expression of this relationship between the dramaturgical strategies of Brecht’s 
approach to intermedial performance and the scientific thinking of the times can be found in 
another Brechtian play entitled Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny. In a 1931 production of 
this work in Berlin, the director challenged the audience’s epistemological and ontological 
perceptions of the performance by having a “live” actor perform in front of a large portrait 
reflecting an image of himself, thus splitting the dramatic episode in two and leaving the 
audience to ponder over the reality of the scene. Like many of Brecht’s productions, this 
performance of Mahagonny sought to distance the audience from the action on the stage by 
employing the Brechtian technique of the “alienation” effect, which allows the audience to look 
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at drama “with the ‘critical’ estranged eye of the discoverer” (Esslin 1961: 129). In contrast to the 
immersive experience rendered by Wagner’s Total Artwork, Brecht’s approach to intermedial 
performance situates the audience members as critical observers of the social and political 
undercurrents of the dramatic action. The essence of Brecht’s “Epic Theatre” is thus embodied by 
the audience’s participation in the exploration of the play’s political meaning, while the use of 
technology and various media serves an ancillary purpose, particularly as a means by which to 
prevent the audience members from identifying too closely with the action on the stage. We can 
see that Brecht’s use of technology seems to point directly to technicity, whereas Wagner seems 
to be attempting to hide the technicity for the sake of a higher form of mimesis, as evidenced by 
his production of Gesamtkunstwerk or Total Artwork. Yet despite the apparent differences 
between the theatrical innovations of Wagner and Brecht, it is difficult to dismiss the influence of 
their dramaturgical techniques on the interplay between performance and technology in 
twentieth-century theatre practice. Having explored the intermedial experiments of Wagner and 
Brecht, the final section of this chapter will examine the ways in which the dramaturgical 
strategies of some twentieth-century avant-garde theatre artists and intermedial performance 
practitioners might have influenced the audience’s perception of human-machine interaction.  
 
1.7 “Laying Bare the Device”: Intermedial Effects in Twentieth-Century Performance 
The early-twentieth century witnessed many monumental innovations in terms of science, 
technology, and the arts. Albert Einstein’s formulation of relativity theory in 1905 altered our 
perception of space-time relations, while Werner Heisenberg’s discovery in 1924 of the 
Uncertainty Principle destabilized the Newtonian understanding of the universe as governed by 
fixed, predictable laws. Writing on the interplay between technology and performance in the 
twentieth century, Christopher Baugh notes that these scientific discoveries also led to the 
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development of new technologies, which in turn “further challenged the perceptions of the world 
and the artist’s relationship with it” (2005: 39). Indeed, dramatic theatre in the twentieth century 
experienced a “paradigm shift” from the verisimilitude and realist styles of nineteenth-century 
drama to the experimental performance styles of the avant-garde theatre. As the theatre scholar 
Christopher Innes observes, early-twentieth-century artists of the avant-garde movement 
propelled a “rejection of social institutions and established artistic conventions” (1993: 1). The 
avant-garde movement, including its subsidiary in the theatre, “sought to appropriate 
technological media, to abstract them to aesthetic ends and, of course, also to exploit them 
politically” (Gruber 2010: 253). In keeping with the general artistic tendency of the avant-garde 
movement, the avant-garde theatre directly challenged the established conventions of dramatic 
theatre by taking the performance beyond the limits of the proscenium arch in a gesture that 
theatre scholars refer to as “tearing down the invisible fourth wall”. This desire to experiment 
with the combination of various artistic forms and media technologies in the theatre resulted in a 
plurality of intermedial elements on the avant-garde stage and the development of scenography 
for the design of the theatrical mise-en-scène.  
While theatre has traditionally been understood as a phenomenon in which “one or more 
human beings, isolated in time and/or space, present themselves” to an audience (Beckerman 
1970: 6), the avant-garde theatre introduced new dramaturgical strategies that disrupted the realist 
and narrative modes of representing time, space, and people. According to the theatre historian, 
Klemens Gruber, the avant-garde theatre of the early-twentieth century had an anti-illusionist and 
anti-narrative disposition, which was exemplified by how it involved the audience in the staging 
of space, light, and construction (2010: 250). This increased level of interactivity in the 
performance event reconditioned the spectators’ perception of their relationship with the 
performers and the dramatic action on the stage. “Requiring a mobile gaze and employing 
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multiple perspectives,” the presumed necessity of the invisible fourth wall in sustaining the 
theatrical illusion was questioned (Gruber 2010: 250). In fact, the avant-garde theatre movement, 
of which Brecht was a prominent member, sought to deconstruct the theatrical illusion in 
dramatic performance by revealing the machinery behind it, as Brecht did through his 
deployment of the “alienation” effect. The Russian linguist and futurist Roman Jakobson once 
described this technique of revelation in the avant-garde theatre as “laying bare the device” (qtd. 
in Gruber 2010: 252). However, as Gruber points out, the avant-garde’s “laying bare of the 
device” is not an act of pretence, especially not in the way that the “making of” explanatory 
supplements for the major Hollywood blockbuster movies might be construed as pretentious.12 
Rather, the avant-garde theatre artists believed that the revelation of the machinery behind the 
staging of the illusion in the work of art was part of the aesthetic procedure that challenged the 
spectators’ perception of artistic production. For Gruber, this exposure of the media elements 
themselves “in their multiple intermedial practices, their transgressive aesthetics and their 
analytic exuberance” produces what he calls “media self-reflexivity: a playful staging of media” 
(2010: 256). It is this playful staging of media in the avant-garde aesthetic, and especially in 
Brecht’s revelation of the technicity behind his dramatic performances, that fosters the type of 
critical thinking that is necessary for the spectators’ reflection upon technology and its impact on 
the human condition.     
As Walter Benjamin asserts in “What is Epic Theatre?”, there is a correlation in the avant-
garde theatre between the number of interruptions to which the spectators are exposed and their 
awareness of the conditions of modern life in the early-twentieth century. Benjamin is alluding to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!Such “making of” explanatory supplements have taken root in theatre practice. In 2013, the Royal Shakespeare 
Company released of a series of YouTube videos that offered the audience “an insider’s look” at the production 
process for the staging of Shakespeare’s Richard II. Framed by the semi-autobiographical title “Production Diary,” 
the videos track the evolution of the rehearsal and production season across a two-month period. 
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the technique of interruption that Bertolt Brecht introduced into his “Epic Theatre”. Facilitated by 
the incorporation of film and sound recordings as the material means by which to disrupt and 
alter the flow of the dramatic action, the interruptions were designed to stimulate the audience’s 
critical awareness of the social and political issues in the play. Interrupting the linear time-flow of 
the performance would reveal the work of art as present, thus unveiling a possibility space for 
critical reflection. The correlation between the use of media technologies and the incitement of 
critical reflection among the audience members was also evident in the Bauhaus Theatre. The 
Bauhaus Theatre was inspired by the Bauhaus artistic style of the early-twentieth century, a 
system that promotes the combination of technology with the arts. In 1924, the theatre group’s 
experiments with various media elements in their performances culminated in the development of 
the Theatre of Totality.  
The Hungarian painter and Bauhaus professor, László Moholy-Nagy, defines the Theatre 
of Totality as “the concentrated activation […] of sound, light (color), space, form, and motion” 
(1996: 60). The Theatre of Totality features a combination of the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk 
(Total Artwork) and the Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt, or “alienation” effect, as it mixes in-real-
life performances by stage actors with the concerted use of various media forms to produce a 
work of dramatic theatre. The position of the actor in the Theatre of Totality differs from the 
actor’s role in traditional forms of theatre. The human actor, Moholy-Nagy argues, “is to be 
employed ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE OTHER FORMATIVE MEDIA” ([emphasis 
in the original] 1960: 57). The emphasis on the actor having the same status as every piece of 
media found on the stage signifies the Bauhaus Theatre’s resolve in creating a kind of total 
artwork, in which all its components contribute equally to the overall performance, and hence the 
name, Theatre of Totality. It must be emphasized that the concept of total artwork invoked here is 
not the same as Wagner’s idea of Gesamtkunstwerk. In the Theatre of Totality, the devices that 
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are responsible for creating the dramatic spectacle are, to borrow Jakobson’s turn of phrase, “laid 
bare” to the audience members. As a result, the employment of technology in the Bauhaus 
Theatre further detaches the audience from the dramatic action in order to challenge their 
perception of the interactions between humans and machines.    
Both the actors and the equipment used in the Bauhaus Theatre are actively involved in 
producing, changing and criticising every action or plot sequence in the play. For instance, the 
actors in the chorus did not passively repeat the actions, words and intonation of the other actors. 
Instead, mirrors and optical equipment projected gigantic and enlarged faces and gestures of the 
actors, while their voices were amplified to correspond with the visual magnification. The 
Theatre of Totality also included the reproduction of thought through motion pictures, 
phonographs and loudspeakers. Consequently, this interplay of different media in the Bauhaus 
Theatre corresponds with Moholy-Nagy’s vision of a theatre, in which the audience will not be 
“silent spectators”, but will “take hold and participate” in deliberating on the meaning of the play 
([emphasis in the original] 1996: 68). In an effort to encourage the audience’s participation in the 
performance, the directors of the Bauhaus Theatre movement employed dramaturgical strategies 
that expose the machinery that produces and sustains the dramatic spectacle. By laying bare the 
devices in the performance, the Bauhaus Theatre accompanied the Brechtian “Epic Theatre” in 
dismantling the imaginary fourth wall that separated the worlds of the stage and the audience 
members in the realist style of dramatic production.  
While the intermedial techniques employed by Brecht and the Bauhaus Theatre were 
focused on revealing the machinery behind the performance, the Irish playwright Samuel Beckett 
saw the deployment of intermedial dramaturgical strategies as a viable means by which to 
explore the existential and ontological uncertainties that permeate his short plays. Written as one-
act plays, most of the works consist of detailed instructions on the staging of various media 
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elements in relation to the performances of human actors. Artificial lighting and analogue sound 
technologies in Beckett’s short plays (also known as the “later dramas”) comprise some of the 
media elements used to reinforce the themes of the dramatic narrative. By employing lighting and 
sound effects in conjunction with the action on the stage, the intersection of performance and 
technology in Beckett’s short dramas harbour the potential to alter the audience’s perception of 
how biological bodies and inanimate objects exist and relate with one another in the world. For 
instance, in the original productions in the 1950s, Beckett used incandescent stage lighting to 
destabilise the audience’s spatial perception of the theatrical space by designing specific areas of 
light projection, with the help of barn doors and shutters fixed on each lamp. The experience of 
any of Beckett’s plays as art thus requires “a certain affective responsiveness to sensible 
qualities”, which in turn depends on the audience’s experience of what the aesthetics theorist 
Etienne Gilson describes as the phenomenological presence of the material, the body, and the 
language of the artwork (2000: 46).  
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger emphasizes that the essence of phenomenology is 
“‘to permit that thing which of its own accord manifests itself to reveal itself as it is’” (qtd. in 
Richardson 1993: 46). This thing can be a biological body or an inanimate object. Applying 
Heidegger’s theory of phenomenology to the context of intermedial performance, we could argue 
that the phenomenological presence of media technologies, the body, and language as things in 
Beckett’s short plays reveal the ontological essence of their existence in the performance by 
“being there” – that is, by occupying space on the stage. Indeed, Beckett grounds the existential 
questions raised in his short, one-act plays in the materiality of the things that are presented to the 
audience. As such, the interplay between technology and performance in these short dramas 
proposes a negation of meaning that parodies the rationalist notions of art and meaning, as the 
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material existence of the human actors and technological objects on the stage precedes any 
attempt at establishing meaning in the dramatic performance.   
In his reading of Beckett’s full-length play, Endgame, Theodore Adorno reasons that the 
“negation of meaning becomes aesthetically meaningful when it is realized in the material with 
which the artist works”, such that “Beckett’s absurd plays are still plays” that retain artistic 
meaning (qtd. in Zuidervaart 1991: 175). In the short plays, the employment of stage lighting 
functions as a means by which to reinforce the central themes of the drama. In plays such as 
Footfalls and What Where, the actor’s actions under the influence of stage lighting is set against 
the dark spaces on the stage in order to accentuate the physicality of every move that the body 
makes. The perceptual effects resulting from this distinction between the lit and darkened spaces 
on the stage are significant. On the one hand, the bright spaces on the stage affect the audience 
members’ sense of space and their perception of physical intimacy and proximity. On the other 
hand, the dark spaces on stage heighten their suspicion of the dark spaces that surround them in 
the theatre. Consequently, the sharp contrast between the lit and darkened areas of the stage 
evokes a feeling of insecurity among the audience members, as though some unknown and 
invisible entity is watching them from a distance.  
The printed version of Beckett’s Footfalls includes drawings and detailed instructions on 
the exact size of the rectangular box on the stage created by means of stage lighting. The spatial 
rigidity implied in the drawings and instructions is underscored by Beckett’s insistence that the 
rectangular box should comprise a “strip of light, width one metre, downstage parallel with 
front”, and its position should be “a little off centre audience right” (Beckett 1986: 399). 
Throughout the performance, May, the protagonist, paces back and forth along this narrow path 
of light, “feet lit most strongly, body and head more in the dark”, a visual effect that emphasizes 
the motion of her feet, while the monotonous voice of an elderly woman emanates from the 
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darkness that drapes over the upstage area (Fischer-Seidel 1994: 78). As the drama unfolds, the 
intensity of the strip of light at the downstage area decreases with every fade-out and fade-up 
sequence. This sequence, as the theatre scholar Therese Fischer-Seidel observes, “happens three 
times, thus segmenting the play into three parts” (1994: 78). The perceptual effect of this 
experimentation with stage lighting is significant. By reducing the intensity of the strip of light at 
periodic intervals, the use of stage lighting becomes a tool for segmenting time in the 
phenomenological sense, and by extension, “the [entire] play in its succession” (Fischer-Seidel 
1994: 78). Here, Beckett’s dramaturgy plays on the audience’s imagination and experience of the 
action on the stage, causing them to not only think of what lies within the visible space, but also 
of what lies within the darkness that lurks behind it. Furthermore, this strip of light fades down 
and up a few times over, with the last fade-up revealing the strip of light on its own, this time 
without May’s presence. Consequently, May’s conspicuous disappearance from the scene 
undermines her ontological status of her existence within the performance.  
Besides the use of stage lighting to question the ontological integrity of human existence, 
Beckett also employed sound media in his short plays in order to challenge the audience’s 
perception of human-machine relations. Beckett’s What Where depicts the disconcerting 
interactions between humans and machines. A human voice emanates from a gramophone 
situated at stage right. Playing the role of an interrogator, the broadcasting of the voice through 
the gramophone accentuates the dehumanising of the human actors on the stage who behave like 
pawns controlled by an unseen figure. As the dramatic action unfolds, all the actors on the stage 
respond passively to the demands of the lead character called Bam. The lighting direction for 
What Where states that the rectangular box formed by a haunting beam of incandescent light that 
hovers from above the stage should measure three by two metres in length and breadth (Beckett 
1986: 470). Within this dimly lit performance space, the actors perform a series of mechanized 
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actions, as they march in and out of the shrilly-lit rectangular box. Whenever the actors stand 
inside the dimly lit performance area, they look as though they are unwittingly submitting to 
every demand made by Bam, who is assumed to be the character behind the voice that emanates 
from the gramophone. As the actors appear to be dehumanized and manipulated by a machine, 
Beckett seems to be hinting at the perceived dangers of ceding too much power to technology, 
which might potentially turn against its human creators.  
Having lived through the Second World War, Beckett witnessed the devastating effects of 
industrialized warfare in Europe, and the existential anxieties that plagued its aftermath. Perhaps 
it is for this reason that the subjugation of human beings at the hands of technology seems to 
feature prominently in several of Beckett’s short plays. Indeed, the technological anxiety (a topic 
that I will explore in greater depth in Chapter 4) that undergirds the performance of What Where 
is reinforced by the existential crisis in Krapp’s Last Tape, a short play about the natural 
degradation of human memory and the externalization of that memory in auditory storage media. 
The play features the character Krapp, an aging man who is seen recording the major events of 
his life into a tape recorder. Halfway through the recording, he finds a tape that has been labelled 
“Box three spool five” (Beckett 1986: 216). Playing the tape on the recorder, Krapp encounters 
the voice of his younger self. The voice is heard narrating details about Krapp’s life at a time that 
has long passed. While the dramatic action of the play is driven by the narrations that are 
recorded on and reproduced by the tapes, Krapp’s performative actions and his critical reactions 
to the content of these audio reproductions constitutes the visual stimuli of the performance. He is 
suspicious of the accuracy of the tape recordings, and refuses to accept them as a true witness of 
his past. As Krapp stops, rewinds, and plays the tape, his actions reveal that the existence of the 
in-real-life actor (playing Krapp) on the stage is in conflict with the voice on the tape, which 
supposedly belongs to Krapp’s younger self.  
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The use of sound media in the performance produces two Krapps – the old man on the 
stage and the young man on the tape. As the dramatic action ensues, the accuracy of the older 
Krapp’s memory is undermined by the details gleaned from the tape recording of the younger 
Krapp’s voice. It appears that the capabilities of the human being to remember things, people, 
and events is outstripped by the technological power of the tape recorder, which seems to be a 
more reliable and permanent witness of the past. But the juxtaposition of the older Krapp who 
exists in the flesh with the younger Krapp who exists only as a voice is not merely a suggestion 
of the competition between the abilities of humans and technology. What is significant about 
Krapp’s replaying of the tape recordings is the implication that human existence could potentially 
be cast in doubt if technology literally catches up with it. Put differently, Krapp’s Last Tape 
highlights the existential crisis that could potentially unravel itself when technological devices 
such as tape recordings appear to remember the past better than human beings are capable of 
doing so. Despite the interplay between technology and performance in many of Beckett’s short 
dramas, the principal concerns expressed in these works are decidedly human. As opposed to the 
manifesto of the Bauhaus Theatre, which attempted to place the human actor on an “equal 
footing” as the media elements employed in the performance, Beckett’s use of technology in his 
short, one-act plays foregrounds the existential anxieties that inform the anthropocentric fear of 
being manipulated or supplanted by machines.  
Taking a historical view of Beckett’s short dramas, it would seem that such existential 
anxieties might have been reinforced by the threat of nuclear annihilation during the “Cold War” 
in the mid to late-twentieth century. But they are also symptomatic of the human being’s 
propensity to assert its superior control over the technological implements that are created by its 
own hand. Such is the anthropocentric question regarding the treatment of technology, an issue 
that is as prominent in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology as it is in the works of intermedial 
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performance artists. Therefore, my objective in Chapter 2 is to develop a theory of the 
intersection of performance and technology that departs from the anthropocentric conception of 
human-machine relations in performance. I will begin with an examination of the co-evolution of 
human beings and technology through the intellectual intercession of David Wills, Bernard 
Stiegler and Gilbert Simondon. Having considered Wills and Stiegler’s ideas on the co-
evolutionary relations between technics and the human, as well as Gilbert Simondon’s 
philosophy of technology and its impact on psychic and collective individuation, I will proceed to 
examine Brenda Laurel’s conceptualization of human-computer interactions in conjunction with 
the theories of intermediality offered by such theatre scholars and media philosophers as Chiel 
Kattenbelt and Henk Oosterling. Finally, the concluding section of Chapter 2 will be given to the 
development of “Critical Techno-dramaturgy,” an original conceptual framework that analyzes 
the ways in which the dramaturgical strategies employed by intermedial performance artists 
affect the audience’s embodied perception of human-machine interactions.  
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Chapter 2: 
Embodied Perception and Intermedial Performance:  
Towards a Critical Techno-Dramaturgy 
 
“In its guise of the technological, the dorsal therefore names, in a number of ways, what comes 
from behind to inhabit us as something other, some other thing, the other; an other beyond what 
can be conceived of within the perspective of our frontal relations. Not just an enemy, a wild 
animal, an avalanche, falling rock, or speeding train, and indeed not necessarily in the form of a 
threat […] but also and even the known other to the extent that we allow it to fall back into the 
shadow, into the space of a type of faith or trust, of what is behind us.” 
- David Wills, Dorsality: Thinking Back through Technology and Politics, 2008, p.11.   
 
Wednesday evening. The boy rests on the ground with his arms and legs flushed against 
the sand. The blazing sun scorches the weary earth on which a dozen marsupials scurry past the 
eucalyptus trees towering above the desert sand. Clutching a curved piece of wood in his right 
hand, the boy begins to strike the ground with the wooden object. He tries to lift his chest off the 
glistening sand, but his trembling arms betray the pressing weight of his frame. Nevertheless, he 
manages to lift his grated knees slightly off the ground. Brandishing the curved piece of wood, 
the boy strikes the ground a few more times until his arms are no longer in contact with the earth. 
He gazes up towards the cloudless sky. Turning to the back, he swings his right arm forward and 
throws the wood into the surrounding wilderness. The curved wooden object is set aloft, lifted by 
the multitude of invisible air particles as it sweeps across the sandy terrain. Before long, the 
boomerang returns to the exact spot where it left. The boy manages to catch it just in time.    
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This vignette depicts a scene that I witnessed during a 1997 trip to an aboriginal camp 
near the city of Perth in Western Australia. The boy with the returning boomerang in his hand 
was an actor performing a hunting scene in a cultural performance about the Noongar people who 
have inhabited the coastal region of Western Australia for over sixty thousand years. The 
returning boomerang is a crescent-shaped wooden aerofoil that returns to the thrower at the end 
of its flight. Designed as a hunting tool by the aboriginal people of Australia, the returning 
boomerang, together with its non-returning counterpart, has lost its original hunting function and 
is now used for recreational purposes by hobbyists. However, for the Noongar people and other 
aboriginal clans in Australia, the boomerang is not simply a hunting tool. Adorned with intricate 
carvings, it is the object that defines the identity of a clan. At the same time, the boomerang is 
also the technical object that individuates the human being as a prosthetic creature. The 
continuing existence of both the returning and non-returning versions of the boomerang bears 
witness to the intergenerational transmission of myths and technical knowledge by way of 
speech, symbolic inscriptions, as well as the fabrication of tools. For the surviving aboriginal 
clans in Australia, the boomerang offers an artefactual touchstone to their ancestral past – a past 
that they did not live. Furthermore, the sustained transmission of the technical knowledge 
required to make and use the tool for subsistence or recreational purposes plays a significant role 
in the accumulation and sedimentation of their collective cultural memory. I believe there are 
lessons to be drawn from the performance at the aboriginal camp. Certainly, the interactions 
between the boy and the boomerang opened up the possibility for critical reflection on the 
human-technology relationship. But like the returning boomerang that returns to where it left, 
perhaps we should also think back – to borrow the philosopher David Wills’ turn of phrase – 
towards our origins as tool-bearing creatures in order to return to the question of human-machine 
relations in theatre performance, and in contemporary social life.     
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By considering the co-determining relationship between humans and technicity, this 
chapter seeks to develop a theory of the intersection of performance and technology that departs 
from an anthropocentric perspective in which the human being is perceived as the master of 
technics in human-machine interactions. I begin with an examination of the co-evolution of 
human beings and technology through the philosophical thinking of David Wills, Bernard 
Stiegler, and Gilbert Simondon. Upon establishing an understanding of Wills and Stiegler’s ideas 
on the co-evolutionary relations between technics and the human, as well as Gilbert Simondon’s 
philosophy of technology and its impact on individuation, I proceed to compare the theories of 
intermediality in performance offered by such theatre scholars and media philosophers as Chiel 
Kattenbelt and Henk Oosterling with new media theorist, Brenda Laurel’s, conceptualization of 
human-computer interactions through the framework of dramatic theatre. Subsequently, I will 
investigate the ways in which embodied perception is mobilized in intermedial performance by 
looking at N. Katherine Hayles’ theorization of embodiment as an experience that arises from 
one’s perception of, and subjectivity in, the world. And finally, the concluding section of this 
chapter develops what I call “Critical Techno-dramaturgy”. This is a conceptual framework that 
analyzes the ways in which the dramaturgical strategies employed by intermedial performance 
artists might affect the audience’s embodied perception of human-machine interaction.  
 
2.1 Turning (to the) Back 
“Do not turn your back to the audience,” the director exclaimed. It was the first day of 
actor training, and the instruction was directed at me. Being unacquainted with the rules of 
theatre performance, the director’s vehement insistence on what is considered the proper etiquette 
of performance was enough to rattle my fragile confidence. But rather than allowing myself to be 
consumed by anger, I decided to quiz the director about the “problem” with turning my back 
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towards the audience. “You don’t seem to understand the conventions of theatre,” he said to me. 
Refusing to entertain my disruption of his training regime, he went on to inform the class that 
performers are expected to face the audience at all times. “Do not turn your back to the 
audience.” That was the rule. There can be no turning back to old habits. Yet my involvement in 
theatre practice over the years engendered a deep sense of fascination with the back and its 
physiological, spatial, and cultural implications. The art of performance requires the performer to 
commit his or her body to a rigorous regime of physical conditioning. Trainee actors often 
participate in games and exercises that are designed to augment their awareness of space and the 
proximity of their body to other bodies. By interacting with one another through touch, gesture, 
and speech, each actor gets to explore the capacity of his or her body to affect other bodies across 
the axes of time and space. However, most of these interactions tend to privilege the space that is 
in front of the performer and within the frontal field of vision. What is sacrificed in return is the 
back and everything that is left behind and unseen.  
Why does the back matter in performance practice? Perhaps the same question could also 
be asked about the front and the space that makes up the field of visual possibility for the human 
being. Both questions tend towards a more general question about the mobilization of the body in 
performance, the acquisition of a performative technique that establishes – for both the performer 
and the spectator – a distinction between the back and the front, or indeed, a privileging of the 
front over the back. This performative technique entails the physical turning of the human body 
towards the back, a physiological manoeuvre that appears to resonate with what the philosopher 
David Wills terms the “technological turn”. The “technological turn,” as Wills explains it, 
“describes the turn into a technology that was always there” (2008: 3). The notion of the turn 
itself, he argues, “implies a type of technologization” that bears the capacity for transformation 
(2008: 3). In this sense, Wills’ inquiry into the nature of the “technological turn” is 
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simultaneously a study of the technological origins of the human as articulated by the physical 
act of turning. And it is this “sense of articulation” involving an inflection or a bending of limbs 
that undergirds the logic of the “technological turn” (2008: 3). Thus, Wills believes that 
technology, or more precisely the “technological turn,” happens at the moment when there is 
“any articulation at all” (2008: 3). The technologizing of the human originates in the turning that 
turns it into a technological thing, thus implying that the human is always already technological.  
The relationship between the human being and the mechanical or artificial appears to be 
characterized by the role of the limbs in the fashioning of tools that are external to the body. This 
physical connection between the human body and the tool is what Wills refers to as “a prosthetic 
articulation,” as the human becomes technologized through its interaction with the external 
implements that it creates. However, even as he acknowledges the prostheticity of the human-
mechanical relationship, Wills is careful to resist the anthropocentric tendency of treating the 
human being as the protagonist and master of the “technological turn”. Instead, he pushes beyond 
the human-mechanical relationship by thinking “developmentally upstream from the articulation 
of a limb” with the aim of conceiving a technology that is biological – a technology that grows 
and bends “outside itself deep within itself” (Wills 2008: 4). What is technological in the 
biological being is its capacity to articulate itself through the autopoietic processes of self-
generation and reproduction. In other words, the technological resides in the articulation of 
movement, as evidenced by the self-division of a cell, or in the case of the human, by walking.  
The notion of technology as mechanicity, as Wills points out, is situated in the practice of 
locomotion. Indeed, the biomechanics of walking accounts for the risk of falling and the threat of 
returning to the earth that is external to the body. This is why walking necessitates the calibration 
of the movement of the limbs and the realignment of the body’s centre of gravity in order for the 
human animal to counter the disequilibrium of each movement by turning its body from side to 
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side as it advances forward. Wills contends that with every turn made to the left or the right when 
walking, the human animal deviates from itself as a forward-looking creature by moving towards 
the back (2008: 5). What this means is that every turn, however slight, is a turning to the back 
and towards what is behind the body. For Wills, any departure from the linearity of forward 
motion opens up the question of what is behind and thus implies “a thinking of what is behind, a 
thinking of the back” (2008: 5). Thinking back as it moves forward, the human turns (its) back to 
acknowledge the technological origin. (The act of turning to the back also calls to mind the 
notions of memory and archivation, which I will be exploring in Chapter 6). Dorsality is the 
name that Wills accords to this turning from behind and in the back of the human being, a dorsal 
turning that turns it into “something technological” or “some technological thing” (2008: 5).  
 In redefining the human-mechanical relationship through the concept of dorsality, Wills 
reminds us of the importance of discerning the historic relations between bios (life) and tekhne 
(craft). There is neither a priority of one over the other nor the rigorous purity of the biological 
organic or the mechanical. Those who privilege the organic over the mechanical tend to overlook 
the originary mechanics involved in the evolution of species by disregarding the “becoming-
technological of biological self-organization or self-programmation” (2008: 5). Conversely, those 
who harbour a technocratic faith in technological progress might be inclined towards the 
endowment of the human being with the absolute power to operate and master everything that it 
produces according to its will. Such an anthropocentric perspective of technology is predicated 
upon the image of the pre-technological human as the inventor that discovers the technological 
and exercises control over the technological things that it produces. Responding to the seemingly 
unquestionable linear advance of technology, Wills argues that the dorsal turn can operate as a 
form of resistance by maintaining what he calls the “dorsal chance”. Wills sees the “dorsal 
chance” as the surprise or accident that “cannot be foreseen” (2008: 7). Therefore, it is a chance 
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that comes from behind in order to question the technocratic faith and its control over the ways in 
which the relationship between humans and technology is construed (2008: 7). In other words, 
the “dorsal chance” comes from outside the field of visual possibility, as the human being cannot 
see what is behind without making a turn that is essentially a dorsal turn towards the back.  
 Through the dorsal turn, which is the turning that originates in the back, the human sees 
the operation of the technological inside itself, and in particular, the role of the vertebral column 
in enabling the human body to adopt the upright stance. The upright stance is, as Wills describes 
it, the “pose of our fundamental technological articulation and actualization” (2008: 8). Turning 
to the French anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan’s important study of human evolution in 
relation to technicity, Wills attributes the human privileging of the frontal visual perspective to 
the adoption of the upright stance. According to Leroi-Gourhan’s theorization, the freeing of the 
hand from motor function (i.e., walking) allowed the face of the human animal to become 
forward-looking. Combining the upright stance with the newfound freedom of the hands to feel 
and grasp what is in front of it, the human is able to manipulate and control the exteriority of its 
body by making and using tools. Leroi-Gourhan describes “the concept of tools as being a 
“secretion” of the anthropoid’s body and brain,” thereby gesturing towards the co-evolution of 
the human and the technological (1993: 91). Whereas an anthropocentric perspective of the 
human-mechanical relationship would be inclined to “perceive our intelligence as being a single 
entity and our tools as the noble fruit of our thought,” Leroi-Gourhan notes that the 
Australanthropians (an early form of hominid) “seem to have possessed their tools in much the 
same way as an animal has claws […] as if their brains and their bodies had gradually exuded 
them” (1993: 106). Leroi-Gourhan believes that the techniques of the Australanthropians 
maintained a fidelity to phyletic evolution, so much so that their tools appear to be “literally 
‘incorporated’ in the living organism” (1993: 106). The incorporation of tools into the living 
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organism as part of its being is an idea that challenges any attempt to establish a firm division 
between the human and the technological.  
For Leroi-Gourhan, the tool is not the “brainchild” of a so-called intelligent human being. 
Rather, it is the adoption of the upright stance that affords the human animal the opportunity to 
reconfigure its relation to technology by acquiring the potential to make tools. But this moment 
of opportunity also marks the point where the human abandons the animal that is its past – that 
which is left behind. As David Wills reminds us, once the upright stance occurs, the anthropoid 
human turns its back on the animal and “reconfigures the knowable other within a frontal visual 
perspective, prioritizing a certain version of the fore-seen or fore-seeable” (2008: 8-9). The 
frontal visual perspective afforded by the freeing of the hands and face from locomotion endows 
the human with a foresight that emphasizes the forward-looking linearity of its existence. Wills 
argues that what is forgotten in this prioritization of the frontal perspective is “the extent to which 
technological is, to begin with, literally in the back” (2008: 9). While the upright stance 
reconfigures the relationship between the human and the technological, it also inaugurates “a 
radically new sense of how we conceive of and determine what is outside us in general and 
behind us in particular, a new definition of the dorsal” (2008: 17). The human is thus defined by 
the technologization of the body in its “becoming-prosthesis” or “becoming-dorsal” (2008: 9). 
Wills’ concept of dorsality points towards the technological origins of the human by 
emphasizing a technology that is us and in us. This technologization begins in the back – 
specifically the dorsal spine. Just as the tool aspires to control the exterior space beyond the 
confines of the body, the human is itself a technological prosthesis that affects its relation to the 
outside world. We see this “becoming-prosthesis” of the human in the Western Australian 
aboriginal performance, wherein the technological combination between the upright stance and 
the swinging of the hand is needed to set the returning boomerang aloft. Moreover, the 
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boomerang’s capacity to return to its origin upon completing its flight facilitates a quicker 
redeployment of the tool. Because a poorly executed throw or the wearing down of the wood over 
time can affect the returning capacity of the aerofoil, neither the human thrower nor the returning 
boomerang is subservient to the other. Instead, the spatial relation between the human and the 
exterior world is characterized by the co-operation between the human body and the tool in terms 
of their technological capacities. By inverting the presumption of a derived and contrived 
technology that is under human control, Wills believes that we can resist the reductive opposition 
between frontal and dorsal in order to acknowledge the co-evolutionary and co-determining 
relations of the human and the technological. Understanding the co-evolution of technics and the 
human is pertinent to the study of intermedial performance, where human actors perform with 
different technological devices in a variety of settings, ranging from the confines of a black-box 
theatre to the urban spaces of a vibrant city. Furthermore, these performers often rely on such 
artificial memory devices as written scripts and video recordings in order to articulate the words 
and gestures that cast him or her as an individual player within the performance milieu. In light of 
the interactions between human actors and technology through performance, the co-evolution of 
technics and the human across space and time deserves further inquiry.  
 
2.2 Epiphylogenesis: The Co-Evolution of Technics and the Human  
In Technics and Time I: The Fault of Epimetheus (TT1), the French philosopher Bernard 
Stiegler argues for a concept of “epiphylogenesis,” which he describes as the “conservation, 
accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses, mutually articulated” (TT1 1998: 
140). For Stiegler, this epigenetic sedimentation is “only possible when the transmission allowing 
for the sediments is of an absolutely technical, nonliving essence” (TT1 1998: 141). What this 
means is that beyond the biological evolution of the human species, the human being is also 
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affected by events that take place in his or her life (epigenetics) through inorganic means 
(technics). The concept of epiphylogenesis thus refers to the inter-generational transmission of 
epigenetic information accumulated within an individual’s lifetime by means of artificial memory 
devices (TT1 1998: 135). As a result, the memory of an individual human being is exteriorized 
and conserved in the form of technical objects.  
In articulating a philosophy of technics and time, Stiegler critiques Heidegger’s theory of 
the presence of being by locating the temporality of Dasein outside of direct experience. For 
Heidegger, “being-towards-death” forms the temporal basis of Dasein, which is the condition of 
being. As mentioned in Chapter 1, where we examined Heidegger’s theorization of being in 
relation to the concept of poiesis, the term Dasein refers to the human’s “being-there” or “being-
in-the-world”. The term is explicitly human in the sense that only human beings are able to 
question the very nature of being itself (Being and Time [BT] 1962: 12). Dasein as “being-in-the-
world” is temporal because it situates existence as “being-there,” between “already” and “not 
yet” – that is, between birth and death. For this reason, the horizon of experience that constitutes 
Dasein is the anticipation of death (BT 1962: 437). In other words, Dasein, in its existence as 
“being-towards-death,” can neither experience the past that it has not lived nor the future that 
transcends the moment of its death.  
Responding to Heidegger’s departure from the issue of technics in relation to the 
temporality of being, Stiegler advances a theory of technics that foregrounds the prosthetic 
constitution of Dasein. Experienced prosthetically, Dasein presupposes a theory of being based 
on this exteriorization by means of technics, such that the temporality of Dasein is situated 
outside of direct experience. In describing being as a technical return to the absent experience, 
Stiegler explains that “the paradox is to have to speak of an exteriorization without a preceding 
interior: the interior is constituted in exteriorization” (Stiegler TT1 1998: 141). What this means 
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is that knowledge of our being in the world does not come from what Heidegger refers to as “an 
authentic presence,” which privileges the direct experience of temporality. Rather, it is 
constituted differentially in relation to that non-origin of being (i.e., experience) through a 
supplementary process of exteriorization (i.e., the prosthesis of memory).  
In contrast to Heidegger’s treatment of technicity as an obstacle that is nonetheless an 
important question for thought, Stiegler contends that the human being’s access to the non-lived 
past is always already technical and inscriptive. Artefacts such as books, photographs, and the 
Aboriginal Australian boomerang can offer us a tangible connection to the past that belongs to 
our forebears, the past that we did not live. What is inscribed in these artefacts is not only the 
information about the events or way of life that existed at a particular moment in historical time, 
but also the trace of invention that brought forth the object into being. Heidegger would probably 
agree with this point. Yet, according to Stiegler, technical objects that are not specifically 
designed for the exteriorization of memory also bear the trace of the generative gesture of 
technical invention. For instance, the discovery of the technique of flint-knapping by early 
humans allowed them to fabricate tools and objects. Ancient knapping flints were not created for 
the purpose of storing information about the live events (i.e., the epigeneses) of individuals. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the life and behaviour of early humans by examining 
the tools and objects that they produced. We should note the importance of repetition in the 
fabrication of tools and objects, which points to the question of archivation. The discovery of the 
boomerang could not have happened without an organic being willing to attempt the throw over 
and over again. The repetitive quality of the production and usage of tools embodies the archival 
prostheticity of the human being’s relationship with technics. As such, Stiegler’s concept of 
epiphylogenesis seeks to understand the co-determining relations between humans and technics 
in time, as well as the ways in which the history of technics intersects the history of human life. 
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Stiegler’s concept of “epiphylogenesis” does not privilege the human as the powerful 
inventor of technology. Instead, technics and the human are co-constituted. Referencing André 
Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropological investigation of the relationship between humans and 
technology, Stiegler asserts that the human is invented precisely by its use of technology. In order 
to transcend the limits of the hand, the human is constantly reaching beyond himself or herself by 
way of technics. As Stiegler explains, “[p]rostheticity, here a consequence of the freedom of the 
hand, is a putting-outside-the-self that is also a putting-out-of-range-of-oneself” (TT1 1998: 146). 
Drawing on Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropological work, Stiegler contends that such a quest to reach 
beyond the physical limitations of the human is not a reflection of intelligence but a quest for 
mobility:  
The conquest of mobility, qua supernatural mobility, qua speed, is more 
significant than intelligence – or rather, intelligence is but a type of mobility, a 
singular relation of space and time, which must be thought from the standpoint of 
speed, as its decompositions, and not conversely (speed as the result of their 
conjunction). (TT1 1998: 146) 
Once the human being acquired the ability to stand upright, a phenomenon that begins in the 
back, it began to invent sophisticated tools in order to facilitate this quest for mobility. It is in this 
way that the co-evolution of technology and the human unfolds in time. In return for the 
augmentation of mobility qua speed that the tool affords, the human adapts itself to the technical 
object by reconfiguring its relation to it. But besides conceiving mobility in the capacity speed 
(mobility as speed), Stiegler believes that it is necessary to consider how speed, which is a 
singular relation of space and time, might relate to Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance, as 
“différance is itself also a conjunction of space and time more originary than their separation” 
(TT1 1998: 146). Thus, Stiegler proposes that différance has to be “thought as speed,” a notion 
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that points to the “temporalizing of space” and the “spacing of time” as articulated by the double 
movement of deferral and differentiation (TT1 1998: 146).13 
“Différance,” as Stiegler elucidates, “is the history of life in general, in which an 
articulation is produced, a stage of différance out of which emerges the possibility of making the 
grammè as such, that is, ‘consciousness,’ appear” (TT1 1998: 137-8). This does not mean that the 
grammè emerges as a consequence of human or nonhuman consciousness. Instead, as Stiegler 
points out, the notion of intentional consciousness “finds the origin of its possibility before the 
human,” such that its emergence marks the appearance of the grammè as such. In other words, 
the emergence of intentional consciousness is in fact the articulation of différance, which is 
understood as deferral and differentiation. In terms of differentiation, Derrida describes 
différance as the production of a structural difference in which different elements in a system 
become meaningful through a reciprocal determination with other elements (1981: 21). This 
synchrony of elements is indicative of the spacing of time. At the same time, Derrida notes that 
différance should also be understood as deferring, in the sense that “the very principle of 
difference which holds that an element functions and signifies, takes on or conveys meaning, 
only by referring to another past or future element in an economy of traces” (1981: 28). This 
deferral component of différance points to the genesis of elements and how the significance of 
each trace or articulation of an element as it emerges is influenced by the elements that came 
before it and the possible permutations of that element that could emerge in the future. In this 
way, the meaning of the element is constantly deferred in a process of retention that temporalizes 
the space in which the traces of the element are articulated.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"$!In “Techneology or the Discourse of Speed,” David Wills makes the point that technology “is generally related to 
either reduced labour, increased speed or both” (2006: 237). For instance, language facilitates the externalization and 
transmission of thought. But given that “language itself mutates at the speed of light by means of a whole range of 
displacement effects,” Will suggests that language cannot be a techne that operates on its own (2006: 239). Instead, 
language is susceptible to the effects of other forms of technology that could alter its configuration. !
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To think of Derrida’s concept of différance as speed, which is the singular relation of 
space and time, is to refer to life as the history of inscription and retention by genetic as well as 
technological means, whereby the history of the possibilities of the trace is understood as “the 
unity of a double movement of protention and retention” (1997: 84). For Derrida, the trace is “the 
différance which opens appearance […] and signification,” thereby “[articulating] the living upon 
the nonliving in general” as the point of “origin of all repetition” (1997: 65). Derrida’s mention 
of the articulation of the living upon the nonliving appears to gesture towards the invention of 
technics as the means by which the double movement of inscription and retention – the 
technological exteriorization of memory – is articulated. In turn, the exteriorization of memory by 
way of technics foregrounds the originary technicity of the living being (from the amoeba or the 
annelid to such vertebrates as homo sapiens) that is always already technical in terms of the 
complex internal operations that keep it alive. This originary technicity of the living being is at 
once a deferral of life against the threat of entropy (or disorder) and the differentiation of the 
living from the nonliving (TT1 1998: 139-40). Différance is thus a general history of life, which 
is a general history of the grammè (Derrida 1997: 84).   
The grammè, Stiegler observes, “structures all levels of the living and beyond, the pursuit 
of life by means other than life,” that is to say, by technics (TT1 1998: 137). Human writing, for 
instance, is just one specific expression of the general concept of the grammè, which is older than 
all forms of human writing (Derrida 1997: 84). Because the emergence of living beings marks the 
emergence of the grammè as such, Stiegler argues that the history of the grammè is “that of 
electronic files and reading machines as well – a history of technics – which is the invention of 
the human” (TT1 1998: 137). Such is the construction of Stiegler’s “technical being,” in which 
we have “[t]he technical inventing the human, [and] the human inventing the technical” by way 
of the co-determining, prosthetic relations between the technological and the human (TT1 1998: 
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137). Moreover, the co-evolution of technics and the human also opens up the possibility of 
individuation, whereby “epiphylogenesis bestows its identity upon the human individual: the 
accents of his speech, the style of his approach, the force of his gesture, the unity of his world” 
(Stiegler TT1 1998: 140). The transmission of these traits from one generation of living beings to 
another does not occur only by genetic means, but also through the invention of technics. 
Epiphylogenesis affords each successive generation of living beings the opportunity to participate 
in a process of individuation through which individuals emerge and act within a milieu that is 
mediated by technical objects. The intersection of technology and individuation is pertinent to 
theatre performances, as performers often rely on such artificial memory devices as written 
scripts and video recordings in order to articulate the words and gestures that cast him or her as 
an individual player in relation to other players and objects within the performance milieu. In the 
next two sections, I will examine Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of technology and the concept 
of individuation, as well as the role of technics in the exteriorization of memory and in what 
Simondon calls “transindividuation”. 
 
2.3 Technology and Individuation 
While Stiegler’s theorization of the co-evolution of technics and the human appears to 
reinforce Derrida’s interpretation of différance as the differentiation and deferral of life by means 
of the double movement of inscription and retention, the concept of epiphylogenesis also builds 
upon Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of technology and individuation. Simondon proposes a 
dynamic conception of individuation as a continuous process of transformation rather than an 
intrinsic feature possessed by an individual. In his critique of the Substantialist and Hylomorphic 
understandings of the individual as a fully constituted being, Simondon asserts that classes of 
individuals may posses an intrinsic essence, but the emergence of the individual does not precede 
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the classes of species.14 Substantialism holds that the principle of individuation is intrinsic to the 
individual as a substance contained within it, whereas the Hylomorphic perspective purports that 
individuation results from the imposition of a formal structure on formless matter (Simondon 
“Genesis of the Individual” 1992: 297). Both the Substantialist and Hylomorphic perspectives 
presuppose the constitution of the individual as self-evident. As such, individuation is not 
understood as an ongoing process.  
In response to the Substantialist and Hylomorphic theories of individuation, Simondon 
argues that the individual should be viewed “ontogenetically,” whereby the individual is involved 
in an ongoing process of individuating itself. Ontogenesis is not simply the genesis of the 
individual. Rather, it is that which brings forth the development (or becoming) of the 
individuated being. For this reason, Simondon seeks to understand the multivariate unfolding of 
ontogenesis by analyzing “the individual from the perspective of the process of individuation 
rather than the process of individuation by means of the individual” (“Genesis” 1992: 300). He 
notes that the process of individuation does not place too much emphasis on the individual, nor 
does it focus on the individual in isolation from the world. Instead, the individual is individuated 
within a milieu. Ontogenetic development mediates between the internal operations within the 
individual and the external forces of the milieu (“Genesis” 1992: 300). Hence, the individual 
emerges from a milieu and acts within it. Simondon calls this dynamic interaction between the 
individual and its milieu the “individual-milieu dyad,” which comes to light by way of 
individuation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"%!The term Hylomorphism is derived from the Greek word “hyle”, which means wood or matter, and “morphe,” 
which refers to the “form” of the matter. Aristotle developed the theory of Hylomorphism to explain the existence of 
being as a combination of form and matter. On the basis of such a conception of being, the Hylomorphic 
understanding of objects presupposes the imposition of form as an a priori ontology upon matter. In this sense, 
material transformation occurs whenever the form of the matter is altered (Metaphysics 1045a26-29).!For instance, 
when a lump of clay is shaped into a jar, the clay as matter is said to have changed its form from a “lump” to a “jar”. !
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The art of theatre performance appears to embody this concept of the “individual-milieu 
dyad,” as human actors are situated within a performance milieu where they deliver dialogues 
and gestures that convey meaning to the audience members. The milieu within which an actor 
performs can affect his or her performance, just as his or her performance might influence the 
way in which the audience members perceive the performance environment. As such, the 
rendering of the “individual-milieu dyad” in the context of the theatrical milieu occurs through 
what Simondon describes as “the process of individuation” from which the human actors in the 
performance are individuated (“Genesis” 1992: 300). Besides, if the actors in the performance are 
afforded the opportunity to engage with a myriad of technological devices, as is the case in 
intermedial performances, each of them will be able to individuate himself or herself as an 
individual player who performs in relation to other players and objects within a shared milieu. 
Simondon considers individuation to be a primordial process, especially in terms of how 
it “brings the individual into being and determines all the distinguishing characteristics of its 
development, organization and modalities” (“Genesis” 1992: 300). The individual is constituted 
as an individual out of a pre-individual field of potentialities. As part of the ongoing process of 
individuation, which is a process of becoming, the individual occupies “only a certain phase of 
the whole being in question – a phase that therefore carries the implication of a preceding 
preindividual state” (“Genesis” 1992: 300). This preceding pre-individual state contains all the 
potentials that can be expressed in various ways within the individual that emerges as a 
consequence of individuation. However, Simondon also emphasizes that the individual is not the 
totality of the being, as its appearance is only “the result of a phase in the being’s development 
during which it existed neither in the form of an individual nor as the principle of individuation” 
(“Genesis” 1992: 300). The individual, according to Simondon’s theory, is not the ground of 
individuation but only a phase in the ontogenetic development of the larger entity. In the same 
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way that the DNA operates as the code of potentials that can unfold in various directions in the 
production of the living being, the pre-individual “realm” is where the invention of the individual 
begins. However, he is quick to emphasize that the pre-individual is neither a state of non-
identity nor an undifferentiated mass, but rather a state of potentiality or “supersaturation” that 
endows the individual with the possibilities for transformation. The individual, in turn, is never 
complete, for it always contains untapped potential that unleashes “additional possibilities for 
metamorphosis” and further individuations (“Genesis” 1992: 301). Since the process of 
individuation can bring forth further iterations of the individuated being, how might Simondon’s 
philosophy of individuation explain the emergence of the technical being as an individual? 
Simondon approaches the question of the technical being by resisting the dualist 
distinction between nature and culture that aims to separate the natural from the artificial and vice 
versa. Instead of assuming that the difference between natural beings and technical beings is a 
difference in substance, Simondon argues that the modes of existence of what he calls “natural 
objects” and “technical objects” are not different in kind or nature but ontologically different in 
degree. What this means is that natural objects and technical objects exist differently in terms of 
the analogous relations between them (Mode of Existence of Technical Objects [METO] 1980: 
48). For this reason, Simondon believes that “the evolved technical object […] approximates the 
mode of existence of natural objects,” particularly as it tends towards internal coherence and “a 
closure of the system of causes and effects which operate in a circular fashion within its 
boundaries” (METO 1980: 46). In turn, the technical object becomes a part of this system of 
causes and effects by incorporating the part of the natural world that “intervenes as a condition of 
its functioning” (METO 1980: 46). Put differently, the technical object emerges in what 
Simondon terms “an associated milieu” and continues to interact with that milieu throughout its 
evolution. However, he is quick to caution against the assumption that technical and natural 
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objects are ontologically similar, for the similarity is not absolute but analogous. Technical 
objects, he contends, tend towards concretization in their genesis, whereas natural objects are 
concrete from the start, even though they may continue to evolve and mutate over time. As such, 
Simondon proposes the “study of the systems of functioning in concrete technical objects” that 
traces the development of the technical object throughout its evolution (METO 1980: 48). This is 
essentially a call to investigate the process of technical individuation through which the technical 
object comes into being.  
“Every technical object,” Simondon argues, “undergoes a genesis” that modifies the 
individuality of that object in the course of the genesis (METO 1980: 11). At every phase of its 
ontogenetic evolution, the technical object is re-immersed into its pre-individual reality and 
further individuated. As a result, the past evolution of a technical being remains as an essential 
part of this being in its technical form. “An individual technical object is,” as Simondon explains: 
Not such and such a thing, something given […], but something that has a genesis. 
The unity, individuality, and specificity of a technical object are those of its 
characteristics [that] are consistent and convergent with its genesis. (METO 1980: 
12) 
In becoming a specific and unified individual at a particular stage of its genesis, the technical 
object is affected by the characteristics from its past evolution as well as its pre-individual reality. 
The technical object contains the seeds of its genesis, as it is “present at every stage of its 
becoming” (METO 1980: 12). In light of its generative potential, Simondon refers to the technical 
object as “a unit of becoming” (METO 1980: 12). What this means is that the technical evolution 
does not originate from an anthropological source. Instead, as Bernard Stiegler clarifies, the 
technical evolution in Simondon’s philosophy of technology “stems completely from its own 
technical object,” as the human being “is no longer the intentional actor in this dynamic […][but] 
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its operator” (TT1 1998: 66). The human is not the intentional origin of technogenesis but the 
operator of the technical object that enacts the technical transformation. At the same time, 
Simondon observes that “[western] culture fails to take into account that in technical reality is a 
human reality,” an oversight that engenders a defensive cultural attitude against technics (METO 
1980: 1). Indeed, the isolation of the technical object from human reality serves only to 
perpetuate the opposition between the human and the technical.  
According to Simondon, twentieth-century western culture had regarded technical objects 
as either machines that only provide utility for a variety of tasks or robots that threaten to invade 
and destroy human civilization. The first attitude places the machine in the service of human 
needs in order to contain the extent of its powers. The machine is enslaved on the grounds of 
protecting human beings. The second attitude is predicated on the fear of automatism, which 
rides on the assumption that “an increase in and improvement of automatism would lead to the 
bringing into oneness and mutual interconnection of all machines – the creating of a machine 
made up of all machines” (METO 1980: 3). However, Simondon does not subscribe to the belief 
that machines would supplant human beings, for he regards the dangerous aspects of the robot, 
such as the threat of it imposing its will on the world, as more a product of human imagination 
than a menacing actuality. The level of automatism in a machine does not necessarily define its 
autonomy. Instead, the actual autonomy of the machine, as Stiegler points out in his reading of 
Simondon’s philosophy of technology, resides in its indetermination and its tendency towards 
entropy (TT1 1998: 66). For Simondon, the level of indetermination within the machine, and 
between the machine and its milieu, is affected by the recurrence of causal effects that transform 
the technical object and its relations with the world. Such is the ontogenetic development of the 
technical object that is brought about by a process of transduction that causes internal resonances 
within the object and between the object and its associated milieu. In resisting a teleological 
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resolution, the indetermination of the machine becomes that condition which allows it to be 
sensitive and responsive to the functions of other machines in a particular milieu (TT1 1998: 66). 
From the ontogenetic perspective, this is what Simondon means by “technical individuation”.  
Stiegler, following Simondon, holds that the concretization of the technical object is its 
individuation – that is, its “becoming-individual” (TT1 1998: 72). The technical object, in its 
“becoming-individual,” produces an external milieu that involves the “recurrence of causality” 
(METO 59). As noted above, this recurrence of causal relations also happens within the technical 
object. What connects the recurrent causal relations in the internal milieu of the technical object 
and the external milieu is the associated milieu. By operating in relation to this associated milieu, 
the technical object that exists in the form of a machine is able to construct an environment that is 
simultaneously technical and geographical. Simondon calls this hybrid environment the 
“technogeographic milieu”. The construction of the technogeographic milieu by way of the 
machine’s operations is not a human construction. Simondon emphasizes that the machine’s 
construction of an associated milieu is not an attempt at humanizing nature by imposing the will 
of human beings on it, which is tantamount to what Heidegger refers to as the placing of nature 
on “standing reserve”. Instead, Simondon sees in the emergence of the technogeographic milieu a 
potential for humans to work with – rather than against – the synergistic relations between 
machines and their associated environments. Even though he believes that the existence of the 
technogeographic milieu depends on a human intelligence that is capable of “an anticipatory 
functioning which is discoverable neither in nature nor in already constituted technical objects,” 
he does not seek to propound a discourse of human mastery over machine-environment or 
human-machine relations (METO 1980: 60). According to Stiegler’s interpretation of 
Simondon’s philosophy of technical individuation, the capacity of the human operator to 
anticipate the concretization of the technical object vis-à-vis its individuating dynamic 
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presupposes the technical object as an individual (TT1 1998: 81). In other words, the anticipatory 
functioning of the human being does not precede the technical object.  
As Stiegler has demonstrated through his concept of epiphylogenesis, the human being is 
not the cause of technical evolution. The freeing of the hand from locomotion brings forth a 
transformative turn towards the fabrication of tools that mediate the human’s relation with the 
external milieu. In this sense, the human is invented as a result of technical evolution. Such a 
relationship between technics and the human is also informed by what Stiegler dubs “a techno-
logical maieutic” between the technical object and the system that comprises other machines, 
natural resources, animals, and human beings (TT1 1998: 75). The human inventor, in 
anticipating the concretization of the technical object in its genesis, listens to the “cues” within 
the object and reads from the “text” of matter (TT1 1998: 75). The human being’s anticipation of 
the individuated technical object pertains to the notion of time as différance. This relationship 
with the process of technical evolution is at once a projection towards the future (a deferral) as 
well as a differentiation that individuates the human being as an individual in an ongoing process 
that unfolds over time. But just as the technical individual operates with its associated milieu, the 
human individual is individuated within a socio-cultural milieu. In turn, the co-individuation of 
the human individual with its socio-cultural milieu incorporates the process of technical evolution 
in an aggregation that points to what Simondon calls the phenomenon of “transindividuation”. 
Understanding the phenomenon of transindividuation would help to shed light on our analysis of 
human-machine interaction in intermedial performance, as the human actors are constantly 
individuating themselves in relation to the technological objects with which they share a common 
theatrical milieu. What follows is an examination of Simondon’s theory of transindividuation and 
its impact on the intersection of technics and memory in the context of intermedial performance.      
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2.4 Technics, Memory, and Transindividuation 
The transindividual unity, according to Simondon, is a relation involving two forms of 
individuation – “psychic individuation” and “collective individuation” – that are engaged in a 
“reciprocal relationship” with each other (L’Individuation Psychique et Collective [LPC] 1989: 
19). While psychic individuation may be considered an “interior individuation” that operates in 
the individual living being (LPC 1989: 19), it is, as the French philosopher Muriel Combes 
emphasizes, not an “interiority” that exists solely within the individual or in isolation from the 
external milieu (2013: 30). Combes proceeds to explain that the human psyche, as Simondon 
understands it, “is constituted at the intersection of a double polarity, between the relation to the 
world and others and the relation to the self (without us really understanding what this now 
desubstantialized ‘self’ consists in)” (2013: 30). As such, psychic individuation prefigures the 
sociality of the individual’s relationship with its milieu, and also with other individuals that 
operate within that milieu. It is for this reason that Simondon’s theory of transindividuation 
regards the process of individuation as always already social. He notes that the operation of 
individuation occurs in a group that “comes into existence when the forces of the future 
harboured within a number of living individuals lead to a collective structuration” (LPC 1989: 
184). Not only is there an individuation of the group as an individuated entity, there is at the same 
time an individuation of a group of psychic individuals as a collective. However, the turning of 
psychic individuals towards the collective does not presuppose a belonging to a community. 
Instead, the collective arises from the operation of individuation.  
 “[P]sychic individuation,” Stiegler contends, “attains social individuation by means of 
technical individuation, and by interiorizing technical individuation” (qtd. in O’Gorman 2010: 
466). Stiegler believes that the passage from psychic to collective individuation that characterizes 
transindividuation is mobilized by a process of technical individuation, which opens up the 
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question of selection in regard to memory retention. There are, as Stiegler explains, three 
different types of memory retention: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary retention refers to 
the present moment or “big now” of perception, whereas secondary retention results from the 
phenomena of cognitive reproduction and imagination. Tertiary retentions point to the prosthetic 
supports of the process of individuation. Stiegler argues that primary retention is always primary 
selection in the sense that the selection is brought about by secondary retentions that are 
determined by factical and prosthetic conditions that provide access to the past through artefacts 
that contain tertiary retentions (2009: 46). The technical mediation of memory through the use of 
prosthetic supports entails an act of construction that selects specific memories for retention. The 
construction of technical objects that contain tertiary retentions actualizes the individuation of 
pre-individual potential, which is the source of psychic and collective individuation (Stiegler 
2009: 48). Consequently, the technical mediation of pre-individual potential, in which technical 
objects provide the necessary prosthetic support for transindividuation, appears to reinforce 
Stiegler’s interpretation of the pre-individual domain as a repository of tertiary retentions.    
 In turning towards the collective, the psychic individual exceeds itself. Psychic 
individuation carries itself forward as “originally collective” by going beyond itself into a future 
that exceeds its own disappearance in death (Stiegler 2009: 49). The psychic individual 
exteriorizes its memory by means of prosthetic supports that constitute tertiary retentions. 
Stiegler contends that the technical exteriorization of memory is temporal in the sense that it 
facilitates the production of transindividual relations with future generations of psychic 
individuals. As such, he shares Simondon’s belief that transindividuation can happen only on the 
basis of a material and artefactual conservation of its trace. Transindividuality, as Simondon 
understands it, is exemplified by an “interhuman relation” effected through “the intermediary of 
the technical object,” such that the object that emerges from technical invention “carries with it 
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something of the being that produced it” (LPC 1989: 29). For instance, a tape recording 
containing information about an individual’s life at a particular point in time provides future 
generations of individuals with an access to the past that would otherwise remain inaccessible to 
them (and here we are reminded of the audience members in Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape 
encountering the protagonist, Krapp, as he listens to the tape recordings of his younger self 
speaking). In this way, an interhuman relation is invented through the facilitation of the tape 
recorder as a technical prosthesis for memory retention.  
 However, a significant point that Stiegler notices in Simondon’s theory of 
transindividuation is the treatment of information without specific regard to its supports and 
vehicles of transmission, including such media technologies as books, audiotapes, and videos 
(LPC 1989: 51; “Theatre of Individuation” 2009: 54). Stiegler takes issue with this “forgetting” 
of the supports of information, which he regards as a forgetting of technics as the “originary 
default of being” and the “originary lack” or incompleteness that accounts for the prostheticity of 
human Dasein (2009: 54). He believes that Simondon has overlooked how technicity, in 
constituting the condition of access to the past as preindividuality, unfolds a tangible sense of 
temporality and, in turn, the capacity for projecting the future (2009: 54). For Stiegler, technicity 
is the very condition that “opens up individuation to the question of death,” and thereby 
foregrounds the incompleteness of the human being (2009: 54).  
 The forgetting of technics as the “originary default of being” recognizes the temporality 
and finitude of Dasein. In light of its thrownness in the world, Dasein seeks to discover the past 
that it did not live, while anticipating its own death, which it does not know in advance. “What 
Dasein knows, and knows radically,” Stiegler observes, “is the indeterminate, what cannot be 
calculated, and what, for Dasein, cannot essentially be proved” (TT1 1998: 231). Dasein’s 
anticipation of its death signals an indeterminacy that is at once a deferring of the knowledge of 
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the end and a differing of that end from the ends of other beings. Because Dasein can only 
experience its own death, an end that it cannot know in advance, it is able to differentiate and 
individuate itself in time, as “time as Dasein is the true principle of differentiation” (TT1 1998: 
231). Hence the temporality of Dasein is the individuating process that reiterates the 
incompleteness and finitude of Dasein. Stiegler sees the temporality of Dasein in technological 
terms by claiming that “[t]he temporality of the human, which marks it off among other living 
beings, presupposes exteriorization and prostheticity” (TT1 1998: 172). What is exteriorized by 
way of prosthetic supports is the memory of the human being, which is a temporalizing of 
technology as well as a technologizing of temporality. As Stiegler asserts, “there is time only 
because memory is ‘artificial’” (TT1 1998: 172). Memory is artificial because it is placed outside 
of the human being, an exteriorization that involves the use of “technical prostheses” for the 
storage of memories that can be transmitted across generations. This technical exteriorization of 
memory as “tertiary retention” supports the process of transindividuation by unfolding the 
condition of access to the pre-individual reality – in essence, the “already-there” – of the human 
individual. The constitution of time is thus contingent on the artificiality of memory as it is 
exteriorized by technical means.  
 The role of technics in supporting the exteriorization of memory and transindividuation 
has significant implications for the art of theatre performance. Performers often rely on various 
mnemo-technics in order to learn and memorize the speeches and gestures that are integral to 
their respective performances on stage. For instance, when an actor is attempting to memorize a 
monologue, he or she would associate an object – say, a boot – with a particular phrase that 
corresponds to the image of that object. In this way, the object serves as a kind of mnemo-technic 
device that facilitates the effective memorization of that phrase. Some theatre performers may 
even make use of audio and video technologies to record their speeches and gestures during 
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rehearsals. Later, when these audio and video recordings are played back, the performers can 
identify the aspects of their performance where further refinement is needed. It is thus apparent 
that the technicity of performance is always already present, even though it tends to exist on a 
sliding scale. Memorization and mnemo-technics may constitute the basis for articulating the 
prosthetic and technical quality of performance. But the technicity of performance may also 
consist of more sophisticated technological devices, such as audio and video technologies, that 
are capable of influencing the retention and transmission of memory between the performers and 
the audience members. And as I will demonstrate in Chapter 3, in intermedial performances like 
Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke, the use of media technologies that record images and sounds for 
both instant and future replay may serve to support the establishment of transindividual relations 
among intermedial artists, performers, and audience members as they interact with each other 
across different temporalities. Given the impact of technics on memory transmission and the 
phenomenon of transindividuation, the next section will explore the perceptual effects that could 
emerge from the juxtaposition of media on the intermedial stage. To this end, I will be examining 
Brenda Laurel’s influential work on human-computer interactions in conjunction with the 
theories of intermediality espoused by such theatre scholars and media philosophers as Chiel 
Kattenbelt and Henk Oosterling. 
 
2.5 Theories of Intermediality 
As early as 1818, the romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge was already using the term 
“intermedium” or “intermedia” in his criticism of art (Raysor 1936: 33). For more than a century, 
the term remained at the fringes of artistic practice until the Fluxus artist Dick Higgins decided to 
revisit it in 1965. According to Higgins, Coleridge used “intermedia” to “define works which fall 
conceptually between media that are already known” (1965: 52). Realizing the flexibility of 
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Coleridge’s term, Higgins used it to theorize those works of art that appear to transcend the 
traditional disciplinary boundaries of the visual arts, music, dance, and theatre. He felt that the 
neat categorization of art into different medium-specific practices does not account for the 
hybridity of such late-twentieth-century artistic movements as his own Fluxus events as well as 
the intermedial experimental theatre productions of the Wooster Group. Turning his back on 
media specificity as a means by which to conceptualize works of art, Higgins championed the 
intermediality of artistic practices that fall “in-between” established media forms.  
In recent years, much intellectual attention has been focused on the “inter” prefix in 
“intermedia”. Commenting on the ontological dimension of intermediality, the Dutch media 
philosopher Henk Oosterling interprets the “inter” prefix as the “going back and forth from one 
medium to the other, it is a movement in which positions are articulated in the awareness that 
they are principally relational and provisional” (2003: 43). Oosterling argues that intermediality 
“reconfigures arts, politics and science, especially philosophy, enhancing an experience of the in-
between and a sensibility for tensional differences” (2003: 30). Because intermediality entails the 
construction of “relational differences” between media that exist in tension with one another, 
Oosterling believes that a philosophy of difference (one that is akin to Derrida’s différance) is 
required to attend to the specific discourses that undergird each medium in an intermedial 
artwork. These discourses, he contends, are constantly re-negotiated as each medium interacts 
with other media in the intermedial network. Indeed, the tensional differences between media are 
pertinent to the conceptualization of intermediality as an experience of the “in-between”. As Jay 
Bolter and Richard Grusin observe in their study of the relationships among different media, “we 
cannot even recognize the representational power of a medium except with reference to other 
media” (2000: 65). But while the juxtaposition of media elements involves a differentiation 
between them, their position and significance in the network is only provisional. For this reason, 
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Oosterling believes that experience of the “in-between” in intermediality is contingent on the 
ongoing production of difference between media, which is at the same time a deferring of the 
meaning of each medium in relation to other media (2003: 44). However, what remains unclear in 
the theorization of intermediality as the construction of tensional differences between media is its 
impact on the ontological question of being.  
“The in-between,” Oosterling posits, “is the movement that inevitably positions beings” 
(2003: 45). Yet he is quick to caution against any attempt to reduce the movement of the “in-
between” to positions taken by a conscious subject. Even though Heidegger sees Dasein as 
“Being-in-between” (Zwischen), the “in-between” does not happen as a result of two beings 
coming together or “the convenientia of two objectively present things” (Being and Time 2010: 
128). Instead, as Oosterling clarifies, the factuality of the ‘in-between’ exists before the 
movement of beings is capable of articulating any position (2003: 45). The “in-between” is 
connected with what Heidegger calls ‘mood’ (Stimmung), such that Dasein can be moved 
because it is always already in-between things. Oosterling thus construes the ontology of the ‘in-
between’ as “inter-esse,” which refers to “the being of the in-between [that] goes beyond shared 
interests and excludes indifference” (2003: 45). The being of the “in-between” is the being that is 
concerned about other beings and the world. However, it is worth noting that Oosterling rejects 
the notion of authenticity that informs Heidegger’s philosophy of being, as human Dasein no 
longer maintains a stranglehold on the effects of mediation and its tensional differences. 
“Nowadays,” Oosterling claims, “the intermedial aesthetic experience par excellence is perhaps 
no longer exclusively found in the white cube (the museum) or the dark room (the theatre hall or 
cinema), but in the public sphere as a spacing of the “inter,” be it physical or virtual” (2003: 46). 
Focusing on the “in-between” spaces that emerge from the tensions within, and between, 
different forms of media, intermediality resists the subjugation of mediation under the tyranny of 
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authentic Dasein and its presumptive role as the definitive ontology of the “in-between” or the 
“inter-esse”. Acknowledging the tensional differences between media on the intermedial stage 
unfolds the possibility of subverting the anthropocentric disposition towards the subordination of 
art to “a cultural or political Idea(l) of a diversity of artistic media and disciplines” that so 
characterized Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk (2003: 33). Intermediality in Wagner’s artistic 
formulation was instrumental, as it did not account for the tensional relations that fall in-between 
the plurality of media and beings on the stage.     
In contrast to Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, intermedial performance does not seek to 
collapse different media elements and artistic disciplines into a singular and seamless vision of 
multimedia theatre. Instead, intermedial performance celebrates the live interplay between such 
new media technologies as digital video projection, handheld computers, artificial intelligence, 
robotics, telematics, as well as the human body as an organic medium that is capable of sensing 
and perceiving a wide range of natural and mediated stimuli. The British performance scholar 
Robin Nelson asserts that intermedial theatre is disposed towards “disjunctive principles of 
composition” (2008: 32). He considers intermedial theatre as a concerted effort to bring together 
separate media elements without “harmonizing them into a coherent whole,” so as to allow them 
to play and relate “to each other merely by articulation and juxtaposition” (2008: 32). Through 
the interaction between new media technologies and the human body, the intermedial stage 
becomes a liminal space that embraces the dynamic relationships between the technological and 
human participants (which includes both performers and audiences) in the intermedial 
performance event. Nelson’s interpretation of intermediality in performance as the production of 
in-between spaces has gained significant traction in contemporary theatre scholarship.  
In their edited collection on intermediality in theatre and performance, Freda Chapple and 
Chiel Kattenbelt offer the following definition of intermedial performance:  
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Our thesis is that the intermedial is a space where the boundaries soften – and we 
are in-between and within a mixing of spaces, media, and realities. Thus, 
intermediality becomes a process of transformation of thoughts and processes 
where something different is formed through performance. (2006: 12) 
For Chapple and Kattenbelt, intermediality holds much potential for perceptual training and 
cognitive adaptation. Intermedial performance, they contend, can become the site where both 
actors and audiences learn to navigate new technological developments in society. This intimacy 
between technology and the bodies of the actors and audiences appears to correspond with 
Bernard Stiegler’s concept of “epiphylogenesis,” which theorizes the co-constitution of humans 
and technology as the evolution of life by means other than life – that is to say, by technics. 
“Epiphylogenesis,” as we have seen earlier in this chapter, refers to the conservation and 
transmission of the epigeneses of human individuals from one generation to another by technical 
means. In other words, any analysis of human evolution has to account for the co-determining 
relationship between technics and humans that is embodied by their co-evolution in time. This 
coupling of the human and the technological in a dynamic relationship of co-evolution seems to 
resonate with Kattenbelt’s employment of the concept of intermediality to explain “those co-
relations between different media that result in a redefinition of the media that are influencing 
each other, which in turn leads to a refreshed perception” among the audience members in an 
intermedial performance event (2008: 25).  
According to Kattenbelt, intermediality assumes a co-relation between different media 
that results in what he characterizes as a “mutual affect” between them, such that previously 
existing medium-specific conventions are changed and new dimensions of perception and 
experience of that medium would emerge. Drawing on Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s concept 
of remediation, particularly the double logic of immediacy and hypermediacy, Kattenbelt argues 
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that whereas the Internet is a virtual hypermedium, the theatre is a physical hypermedium that 
allows it to offer a stage for intermediality. As a physical hypermedium, theatre comprises the 
overlaying of multiple media within the same environment. At the same time, Kattenbelt also 
emphasizes the “transparency” of theatre by pointing out the different ways in which the term is 
used in media theory and among theatre practitioners. The manifestation of transparency and 
immediacy in digital media culture, as Bolter and Grusin observe, is predicated on a logic that 
“leads one either to erase or to render automatic the act of representation” (2000: 33). The use of 
the term “transparency” in media theory suggests a “unified visual space” that is akin to gazing 
out of a window into the virtual world rendered by a particular medium, as the means of 
production that sustain the illusory effect of immersion remains hidden (2000: 33). Nevertheless, 
the notion of hypermediacy does not erase or hide the frame of representation. Instead, 
hypermediacy opens up “a heterogeneous space, in which representation is conceived of not as a 
window on the world, but rather as windowed itself – with windows that open on to other 
representations or other media” (2000: 34). Kattenbelt posits that “transparency” in theatre 
performance tends towards Bolter and Grusin’s theorization of hypermediacy as opposed to their 
definition of immediacy in digital culture. 
As Kattenbelt explains, “theatre is transparent because it foregrounds the corporeality of 
the performer and the materiality of the live performance as an actual event, taking place in the 
absolute presence of here and now” (2006: 37). He observes that the aim of using media 
technologies in intermedial performance is not to produce the illusory effect of immersion, but 
rather to heighten the audience’s experience and awareness of the tensions between the different 
media that interact on the stage. What Kattenbelt is essentially calling for is an embodied 
conception of intermedial performance, a perspective that accounts for the materiality of bodies 
and media in their tensional relations with one another. Yet amid the interplay of media 
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technologies on the stage, what role does the human performer play in the intermedial network? 
For Kattenbelt, “the performer is the player of different media who acts in the empty spaces 
between the media,” which explains the use of the prefix “inter” in intermediality (2006: 23). 
There is a hint of “mastery” in Kattenbelt’s characterization of the performer as “the player of 
different media”. He seems convinced that the performer, like a marionette who coordinates the 
movements of her puppets, is responsible for orchestrating and synthesizing the operation of the 
various media elements that are featured in the intermedial performance event. However, by 
positioning the performer – who is presumably human in Kattenbelt’s formulation – as the 
orchestrator of intermedial activity on the stage, might we be discounting the feedback loop that 
exists between the nonhuman and human participants (including the audience members) in 
intermedial performance? To address this question, let us look at Brenda Laurel’s examination of 
the relationship between nonhuman and human entities in human-computer interaction (HCI). 
Building on Aristotle’s dramatic theory, Brenda Laurel explains the experience of human-
computer interaction through the prism of theatre. The “magic” in dramatic performance, Laurel 
explains, is produced by “people and machines, but who, what, and where they are do not matter 
to the audience” (1991: 15). In other words, dramatic performance reinforces the audience’s 
willing suspension of disbelief, as the mechanisms that sustain the mimetic world on the stage are 
hidden. But Laurel is careful to point out that it is not the case that the audience members regard 
the technical underpinnings of theatrical performance as unimportant. Rather, when a 
performance is working successfully, the audience members are “simply not aware of the 
technical aspects at all” (1991: 15). Laurel is convinced that when the audience is engaged by the 
play, the action on the stage is “all there is” (1991: 16). The actor on the stage tunes out 
everything that is extraneous to the dramatic action, except the “audience’s audible and visible 
responses in real time” (1991: 16). What this means is that the audience members are not 
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“passive” spectators of the dramatic spectacle, as they are capable of influencing the action on the 
stage. In this sense, a feedback loop exists between the performers on the stage and the audience 
members in the stalls. Laurel’s main point here is that “users” in human-computer interaction 
“are like audience members who are able to have a greater influence on the unfolding action than 
simply the fine-tuning provided by conventional audience response” (1991: 16). However, she 
cautions against the idea of putting the audience on the stage, or in the context of HCI, the 
placing of the “user” into the representational universe of the computer, as doing so would create 
confusion on both the psychological and physical levels (1991: 17).  
For Laurel, the audience members in human-computer interaction do not join the stage, in 
the sense that they do not enter the representational context rendered by the computer. Instead, 
the audience members become actors rather than “passive” observers of the action on the stage. 
The “stage” to which Laurel refers is a virtual world populated by agents that can be manipulated 
by human beings or artificial intelligence programs. In the case of human-computer interaction, 
human agency needs to be considered in the action. This is what Laurel calls the “intuitive 
aspect” of the interactivity between humans and computers, as every action has to result in an 
effect. What this means is that the audience members have to feel like they are “participating in 
the ongoing action of the representation” (1991: 21). To create this feeling, the designers of 
human-computer interaction, like the dramaturge of a dramatic performance, can orchestrate “the 
variables of frequency, range, and significance” or rely on such techniques as “sensory 
immersion and the tight coupling of kinesthetic input and visual response” to augment the 
audience’s sense of interactivity with the representational context (1991: 21). However, 
interactivity is not an end in itself but a means by which to discover both the form and content of 
the representational context. As such, Laurel sees computer-based representations as contexts for 
thought. Similarly, dramatic performance is capable of affecting the perception of the audience 
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by calibrating the intensity of their experience of the action on the stage. But how does 
interactivity operate in the theatrical milieu?  
Writing on the performance of interactivity, the director and theatre scholar, Steve Dixon, 
remarks that the term has become a “meaningless buzzword” since the turn of the millennium 
(2007: 561). He notes that the intensity of interactivity has often been exaggerated in the 
marketing of both commercial products and artworks, particularly those that feature digital 
technology. Dixon makes the point that interaction is a dialogical process, in which messages are 
transmitted and received in exchange. Interactivity, in other words, is not a one-way operation. 
Understanding interactivity in this way would appear to detract from the one-way transmission 
that characterizes mass media. As Jean Baudrillard contends, “if one agrees to define 
communication as an exchange, as a reciprocal stage of a speech and a response, and thus of a 
responsibility,” then the mass media would be seen as an “anti-mediatory and intransitive” 
fabrication of “non-communication” (“Requiem for the Media” 2003: 280). Baudrillard sees the 
non-reciprocal communicative operations of the mass media as a form of social control that 
stifles real-life interaction between people. Citing television as an example of the “hegemonic 
single-track delivery of mass media,” Dixon argues for the need to distinguish between “reactive” 
effects and “interactive” effects (2007: 561). He explains that in television, the presented on the 
screen is perceived as a third-person, as the viewer of the television program is “acknowledged 
but unrecognized” (2007: 561). For this reason, the viewer’s response to the television program is 
considered “reactive” rather than “interactive”. However, in the case of a digital performance that 
directly that directly addresses the audience members in the second person while affording them 
the opportunity to “respond meaningfully,” Dixon believes that the communication between the 
artwork and the viewer would be perceived as “interactive” (2007: 561).   
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The distinction between “reactive” and “interactive” effects in media and artistic 
communication is pertinent to the investigation of the ways in which audience members 
experience and perceive human-machine interactions in performance. Even though intermedial 
performances may be disposed towards the rendering of an imaginary world, the audience 
members’ responsive interaction with the artwork could potentially affect their perception of the 
human-machine relations that transpire on the stage. Because both computers and theatre 
performance possess the capacity to represent actions and situations that may or may not exist in 
the real world, Brenda Laurel believes that what she terms “user experience design” is 
fundamentally about “creating imaginary worlds that have a special relationship to reality – 
worlds in which we can extend, amplify and enrich our own capacities to think, feel, and act” 
(1991: 33). Inspired by Laurel’s “user experience design,” my proposed analytical concept and 
dramaturgical method, “critical techno-dramaturgy,” seeks to foster the audience’s critical 
awareness of the technocultural politics that pervade the interactions between humans and 
technology in intermedial performance. However, any discussion of the dramaturgical strategies 
used to stimulate critical reflection on human-machine relations in the theatre would require an 
understanding of how the audience members might perceive the manifestation of intermediality 
in performance. 
“Intermediality,” as the German theatre scholar Peter M. Boenisch argues, “is an effect 
created in the perception of observers that is triggered by performance – not simply by the media, 
machines, projections or computers used in performance” (2006: 113). Rather than locating the 
“intermedial effects” within the media technologies themselves, Boenisch focuses on the ways in 
which the juxtaposition of media technologies in a network of tensional relations disrupts the 
audience’s perception of the performance event. He asserts that intermediality “is very literally 
located inter-media, inhibiting, blending and blurring traditional borders between genres, media, 
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sign systems, and messages” (2006: 114-5). Intermedial performance, in Boenisch’s view, does 
not suppress the differences and contradictions between the media technologies that interact on 
the stage. “Instead of closing down the multiple semantic potential offered into one coherent 
meaning,” Boenisch contends, “intermedial performances derail the message by communicating 
gaps, splits and fissures, and broadcasting detours, inconsistencies and contradictions” (2006: 
115). By foregrounding the fault lines that fall in-between the different media elements, the 
meaning of intermedial performances is deferred in an asymptotic approach that resists semantic 
finality. Such disjunctions in the juxtaposition of media, which frustrates the audience’s ability to 
make sense of the performance, leads Boenisch to assert that “intermediality offers a perspective 
of disruption and resistance” (2006: 115). His contention is that the experience of perceptual 
dislocation in intermedial performance results from the semiotic disjuncture that the play 
communicates. But Robin Nelson disagrees with Boenisch’s claim by pointing out that the 
disposition of the audience member (or what he calls “experiencer”) is culturally positioned.  
Nelson believes that the processes of enculturation serve to condition the disposition of 
audience members towards particular modes of perception. He postulates that performances 
framed by the principle of coherence would curtail the audience members’ motivation to actively 
engage with the action and negotiate its significance, as they are more likely to be satisfied by the 
closure that the work offers. “If it is a matter of perception,” Nelson argues, “and that perception 
is ossified through enculturation into making sense of things, then something is needed in the 
principles of composition of the text to mobilize the possibility of a shift in perception” (2008: 
35). The mention of principles of composition speaks to the deployment of dramaturgical 
strategies that contest the audience’s disposition towards semantic closure (something that I aim 
to do with the development of “critical techno-dramaturgy”). Noting that the media technologies 
employed in intermedial performance exist as “both the sign and the thing itself,” Nelson 
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explains that the audience members are able to perceive the relations between thing and sign 
through their experience of the contextual juxtaposition of elements on the stage (2008: 35). 
However, he warns that the disjunctions and interruptions experienced by the audience are “not 
inherent in intermediality but arises from particular principles of composition disposed towards – 
they cannot guarantee it – a dislocation in perception” (2008: 35).  
The potential for disruption, as Nelson asserts, resides in the “disjunctive mix of media” 
(2008: 35). It is this juxtaposition of different media in a network of tensional relations that 
creates what he calls a “frisson” or a brief moment of heightened emotion. Indeed, Nelson 
believes that the strategic deployment of media technologies in intermedial performance can 
induce the experience of dislocation and thereby challenge the perception of the audience. 
Nevertheless, he remains sceptical towards the suggestion that this perceptual disorientation 
consists of a perspective of disruption and resistance that Boenisch deems to be intrinsic to the 
manifestation of intermediality. Yet if the experience of dislocation is not inherent in 
intermediality but only emerges as a result of the compositional strategies deployed in the 
performance, how might the audience members’ sense of embodiment influence their perception 
of the disjunctions and interruptions that are communicated by intermedial performance?  
 
2.6 Embodiment and Perception: The Body in Intermedial Performance  
One of the encouraging developments in recent theatre scholarship on the interface 
between performance and technology is the acknowledgement of the co-constitution of the 
theatrical and the medial qualities of the stage. In her analysis of the body as a medium in 
intermedial performance, German performance theorist Erika Fischer-Lichte argues that “once 
we understand theatricality as the specific staging of bodies in different media for the specific 
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perception through others, theatricality and mediality seem intimately connected” (2001: 13).15  
But while Fischer-Lichte’s emphasis on the medial capacity of the body may have moved the 
discourse on intermedial performance beyond the polemics of the “liveness” debate, there 
remains a danger of conflating the corporeal body with the experience of embodiment. Fischer-
Lichte may be right in her treatment of the body as a signifying medium, whereby the specific 
staging of bodies in different media can induce specific perceptual effects in other bodies. 
However, such a formula is based on the understanding of the body as a physical medium that is 
visible and significant to the other bodies that perceive it. By focusing on the signifying potential 
of the body in performance, Fischer-Lichte’s analysis seems to have overlooked the impact of the 
audience members’ experience of embodiment on their perception of mediated bodies on the 
stage.  
The American philosopher of technology, Don Ihde, conceptualizes the phenomenology 
of the body by distinguishing between what he calls “Body One,” which refers to the body in its 
motile, perceptual, and physical form, and “Body Two,” which points to the body as a social, 
political, and cultural entity. Embodiment, Ihde argues, involves a combination of “Body One” 
and “Body Two” (2002: xi). What this means is that our sense of embodiment is contingent on 
our awareness of having a physical body. Bodies are not merely corporeal beings that are 
physical, motile, and perceptual. Rather, our bodies are embedded within a matrix of social, 
political, and cultural institutions and forces that is capable of influencing our experience of 
embodiment. This crucial distinction between the materiality of the body and the experience of 
embodiment has also informed the work of N. Katherine Hayles. In response to the rhetoric of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"&!The quotation provided here is based on Peter M. Boenisch’s translation of the original German found in Erika 
Fischer-Lichte et. al. eds. Wahrnehmung und Medialität [Perception and Mediality.] Tübingen/Basel: Francke, 2001. 
Print. The German version reads as follows: “Versteht man unter Theatralität die je spezifische Inszenierung von 
Körpern in unterschiedlichen Medien zur je besonderen Wahrnehmung durch andere, dann erscheint Theatralität eng 
auf Medialität bezogen” (13). !
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disembodiment espoused by such proponents of artificial intelligence as Hans Moravec and Ray 
Kurzweil, Hayles wants to rehabilitate the prominence of the body and the experience of 
embodiment in human-machine relations. Hence, she begins by parsing the semantic and 
phenomenological differences between the physical “Body” and one’s sense of “Embodiment”.  
The “Body,” as Hayles explains in her article “Flesh and Metal,” is a material object that 
is culturally constructed. The corporeality of the body is a material fact, but it is also imbued with 
cultural significance that allows for the sorting of bodies into such categories as “disabled” and 
“able”. It is through this idea of the body as a “container” of signs that we are able to draw 
inferences from the physical attributes of a human being in order to form character or behavioural 
judgements about him or her. However, in contrast to the corporeal and culturally significant 
“Body,” Hayles argues that “Embodiment” arises from perception and subjectivity. Each person 
perceives his or her own embodiment in a way that is unique to how his or her body engages with 
the world. For instance, I may perceive the weather in my hometown as humid and oppressive 
due to the hypersensitivity of my sweat glands that causes me to perspire profusely in mid-
summer. Another person, however, may perceive the same weather conditions at the same 
location as warm and bearable. My perception of the weather at a particular time of the day is not 
an abstract construction of the mind. Rather, as Merleau-Ponty clarifies, perceptual synthesis 
involves the human subject taking a point of view, such that her body becomes “the field of 
perception and action” (1964: 15). In this sense, our sense of embodiment is affected by the way 
we perceive the world through our bodies. But Hayles maintains that the meanings of the terms 
“Body” and “Embodiment” are not fixed. Instead, they are constantly renegotiated through the 
subject’s interactions with other people and the environment:  
The body is the human form seen from the outside, from a cultural perspective 
striving to make representations that can stand in for bodies in general. 
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Embodiment is experienced from the inside, from the feelings, emotions, and 
sensations that constitute the vibrant living textures of our lives – all the more 
vibrant because we are only occasionally conscious of their humming vitality. 
(Hayles 2002: 297) 
The affective and perceptual effects of our engagement with other bodies and things in the world 
play a crucial role in structuring our sense of embodiment. At first glance, the distinction between 
“outside” and “inside” in Hayles’ description of the “Body” as seen and made significant by 
other bodies, and the way in which “Embodiment” constitutes an internal experience, may seem 
dichotomous and problematic. Indeed, one might argue that the corporeal body exists, whether or 
not somebody is present to observe it. However, what stands out in Hayles’ point is the claim that 
we are “only occasionally conscious” of the “humming vitality” of our being, which is not solely 
defined by the biological attributes of our bodies, but also includes our feelings, emotions, and 
senses as they are experienced through our embodied engagement with people, animals, objects, 
and the environment.   
In addressing the relationship between the corporeal body and our sense of embodiment, 
Hayles contends that the process of embodiment is an experience that transcends the boundaries 
of the corporeal body. Instead, such an experience necessarily pertains to the social, the 
technological, and the perceptual. Although technological mediation may have the capacity to 
isolate human perception from the corporeal body, Hayles believes that it does not necessarily 
deprive us of our sense of embodiment.16 Let us imagine that I am involved in an intermedial 
performance that requires me to engage in a conversation with another audience member over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"'!The recent popularity of consumer-grade psycho-technologies, such as the NeuroSky® Mind Wave series 
electroencephalography (EEG) devices that claim to allow users to control virtual objects on computer screens using 
their “brainwaves,” is particularly noteworthy. The rhetoric of disembodiment that undergird the marketing of these 
psycho-technological devices appears to reinforce the assumption that the mind alone is capable of engaging with the 
technology, thus negating the body’s capacity to intervene in the interactive experience. !
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Skype while traversing the urban landscape in downtown Toronto. As I am walking down Yonge 
Street, my eyes are fixed on the screen of the mobile tablet computer that I am holding in my 
hands. In fact, I am so focused on the Skype conversation to the extent that I become less 
conscious of the sound of my breathing and the movement of my legs as I walk. But when I 
arrive at a light-controlled intersection and the red light warning pedestrians not to cross the road 
comes on, it is likely that I will notice (on a good day, at least) that the people walking beside me 
have come to a halt. Noticing that the pedestrian signal has turned red requires me to turn my 
gaze away from the mobile tablet and towards the intersection before me. As I take in the 
surrounding sights and sounds of the vehicular traffic, not only am I stimulated visually and 
aurally, I may also be aware of my embodiment with the mobile tablet while standing at the 
intersection with my hands wrapped around the device. Meanwhile, as I wait at the intersection, I 
can choose to focus on my Skype conversation with the other audience member who is located in 
a different city and disregard the presence of my body at the intersection. Yet when the pedestrian 
signal changes and everyone is permitted to walk across the road, the rapid movement of bodies 
around me would probably cause me to realize that it is time to carry on with my journey down 
Yonge Street. Even if I were to return to the Skype conversation once I have crossed the road, my 
sense of embodiment was nonetheless rendered salient during that brief moment when I was 
waiting at the intersection. 
 What this example illustrates is that even though the body is a perceptible and corporeal 
presence in our lives, we tend to take its existence for granted. The body, according to the Dutch 
performance scholar, Maaike Bleeker, is “rarely the thematic object” of our experience of the 
world (2008: 155). Instead, as Bleeker observes, the focus of our attention “is directed 
intentionally towards the outside world and rarely dwells on [our] own embodiment” (2008: 155). 
Bleeker believes that it is this phenomenological condition of the body that informs the Cartesian 
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perspective of mind-body dualism. To counter the disembodied logic of the mind-body split in 
intermedial performance, we might do well to consider the possibility of turning the attention of 
the audience members towards their own embodiment. One way to do this would be to engage 
the audience with specially designed tasks such as the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile 
computers to navigate the cityscape and to record personal narratives in Blast Theory’s Rider 
Spoke. In intermedial performances such as this one, engagement plays a crucial role in 
encouraging the audience members to participate physically and cognitively in the action.  
Engagement, according to Brenda Laurel, involves “a kind of complicity” with the 
representational context, which occurs “when we are able to give ourselves over to a 
representational action, comfortably and unambiguously” (1991: 115). In light of the multi-
sensorial engagements between bodies and technology in intermedial performance, Robin Nelson 
suggests that the audience can no longer be considered a passive spectator of the action on the 
stage. Instead, they have become “experiencers” of the performance. For Nelson, the term 
“experiencer” “suggests a more immersive engagement in which the principles of composition of 
the piece create an environment designed to elicit a broadly visceral, sensual encounter, as 
distinct from conventional theatrical, concert or art gallery architectures which are constructed to 
draw primarily upon one of the sense organs – eyes (spectator) or ears (audience)” (2010: 45). As 
such, Nelson believes that a performance designed to engage a multi-sensorial experience among 
“experiencers” is one that taps into Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body as a medium for 
perceiving the world. In order to understand how the mobilization of embodied perception in 
intermedial performance affects the audience’s experience of human-machine relations, the next 
section will explore the analytical and dramaturgical potential of an original conceptual 
framework that I refer to as “critical techno-dramaturgy”. It is hoped that this framework can be 
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used to study the techno-dramaturgical strategies deployed by intermedial performance artists in 
the early-twenty-first century.  
 
2.7 Mobilizing Embodied Perception: Towards a Critical Techno-Dramaturgy  
The emergence of intermedial performance relies as much on the affordances of media 
technologies as it does on the development of new approaches towards performance creation. 
While some theatre practitioners have chosen to integrate different media technologies into their 
work, others have insisted on foregrounding what they regard as the unique qualities of theatrical 
performance by setting it apart from such media as film, video, television, and various forms of 
digital media. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, the spirited debates between Peggy 
Phelan and Philip Auslander on the question of liveness and its presumed status as the definitive 
ontology of theatre has led to the critical re-examination of the interface between performance 
and technology, including media technologies, among intermedial performance scholars like 
Meike Wagner, Peter M. Boenisch, and Robin Nelson. Amid the academic focus on the 
mediatized character of contemporary performance, theatre practitioners have also been 
experimenting with new methods of addressing the audience through the use of different media 
and technological devices in the creation of the theatrical mise-en-scène.  
As Maaike Bleeker notes, the new dramaturgies tend to “more explicitly and directly 
engage with the modes of perceiving and thinking of the audience that they are directed towards,” 
an approach that contrasts with “the construction of a closed, unitary and coherent world on 
stage, typical of the dramatic theatre” (2012: 62). However, while these dramaturgical strategies 
may be directed towards the “mind” of the audience, in particular, their perceptual modes and 
cognitive capacities, Bleeker cautiously points out that this “mind” has to be understood as 
embodied. She emphasizes that the “mind” that is addressed here “does not refer to something 
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existing separately from the body,” but rather to that which is “always fundamentally embodied 
and exists in how bodies enact making sense of what they find themselves confronted with” 
(2012: 62). Bleeker observes that these dramaturgies of the “mind,” which she calls “media 
dramaturgies,” account for media as part of the “mind set” – that is, the modes of perception and 
cognition – of the audience members, many of whom would likely be accustomed to media 
technologies in their daily lives. For this reason, what media dramaturges seek to address in their 
theatre practice is the ways in which these media technologies afford new modes of perceiving, 
thinking, and imagining time and space (2012: 64). 
The dramaturge and theatre scholar, Pil Hansen, discerns a shift between development 
and production in new twenty-first-century dramaturgies that appear to place much more 
emphasis on the making of compositional choices than the generation of ideas. She argues that 
while new dramaturgies often set out to affect the spectators’ sensory experience, they do not 
necessarily invite them to synthesize the stimuli that they encounter in the physical performance 
as dramatic structure, character, or meaning (2011: 108). Responding to this problem, Hansen 
calls for the development of “tools to analyze and make strategic choices about the perceptual 
experience a composition facilitates” (2011: 108). At the same time, however, she contends that 
the audience’s perceptual and cognitive capacities are not only shaped by their biological 
constitution and the stimuli that the intermedial performance avails, as each audience member 
“brings to the theatre the learned perceptual practice, habits, and memories that the dramaturge 
cannot predict” (2011: 124). The audience members do not passively receive the performance 
before them, nor do they passively orientate their attention to specific parts of the work. Instead, 
each audience member draws upon those “learned perceptual practice, habits, and memories” as 
she experiences the visual, auditory, and proprioceptive stimuli afforded by the juxtaposition of 
media and technological devices on the stage. As such, Hansen’s “perceptual dramaturgy” 
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constitutes a dramaturgical method that shapes the perceptual experience of the audience 
members as they encounter the intermedial effects of the performance. I should note that 
Hansen’s approach to “perceptual dramaturgy” draws on cognitive science and neuroscientific 
research pertaining to the operational mechanisms of human cognition and memory, whereas my 
conceptual framework and dramaturgical method, “critical techno-dramaturgy,” is motivated by 
philosophical understandings of perception and embodiment. Nevertheless, in setting up critical 
techno-dramaturgy as a viable tool for the analysis and production of intermedial performances, I 
want to build on the observations made by Bleeker and Hansen in regard to the possibility of 
developing a dramaturgy that directly engages with the perceptual and cognitive capacities of the 
audience members. But before we proceed to look at what “critical techno-dramaturgy” entails, 
let us examine the function of dramaturgy in theatre performance.  
“Dramaturgy” is arguably one of the most contested terms in theatre and performance 
studies, as it appears to elude any rigid definition of its purpose and function. As Geoffrey S. 
Proehl elucidates, dramaturgy is “inseparable from theatre making,” and it does not matter 
“whether we think of it as a play’s poetics or its physics, its nuts and bolts or its flesh and blood” 
(2003: 27). The juxtaposition of “nuts and bolts” with “flesh and blood” – an image that calls to 
mind Stiegler’s concept of epiphylogenesis, which describes the co-evolutionary and co-
determining relations between humans and technics – emphasizes the interplay between the 
physical and technological elements of dramatic performance and the organic bodies of human 
actors. In this sense, theatre making is essentially a convergence of poetics and physics. As the 
Italian director Eugenio Barba reminds us, “[w]orking on the dramaturgy does not only involve 
the text or the story that we want to tell and make visible to the spectators” (2000: 60). What this 
means is that the practice of dramaturgy is not simply about enacting a written script. Instead, it 
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involves the structuring of scenic, technical, and performative elements in order to produce a 
complete dramatic spectacle.  
Barba identifies three types of dramaturgies. The first is “organic or dynamic 
dramaturgy,” which involves the “composition of the rhythms and dynamisms that affect the 
spectators on a nervous, sensorial, and sensual level,” while the second type is “narrative 
dramaturgy,” which refers to the “interweaving of events and characters, informing the spectators 
on the meaning of the performance” (2000: 60). “Evocative dramaturgy” or the “dramaturgy of 
changing states” constitutes the third type, whereby the entire performance “evokes something 
different by distilling or capturing hidden significances that are often involuntary on the part of 
the actors and the director” (2000: 60). Because each member of the audience perceives these 
hidden significances differently, this third type of dramaturgy endows the performance with “a 
sense of mystery” (2000: 60). Barba reckons that “evocative dramaturgy” is the most elusive 
among the three, as it is “difficult to explain what it involves beyond the perceptible effects: leaps 
from one dimension to another” (2000: 60). Moreover, he regards such a leap between perceptual 
dimensions as “a perturbation, a change in the quality of energy, which produces a double effect: 
enlightenment or a sudden vortex that shatters the security of comprehension and is experienced 
as turbulence” (2000: 60). I believe that the production of this turbulent experience serves to 
disorient the audience members and frustrate their perception of the action on the stage, which 
thereby unleashes the potential for critical reflection on the formal and thematic aspects of the 
performance.  
In light of the interface between performance and technology in intermedial performance, 
I propose a fourth kind of dramaturgy called “critical techno-dramaturgy”. While the emphasis on 
critical investigation may be apparent in this term, there are two reasons for choosing the word 
“techno” rather than “intermedial” or “digital” to describe the dramaturgical framework. Firstly, 
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the word “techno,” which is an abbreviation of technology, opens up the possibility of featuring 
and analyzing a wider range of technology (be they digital or otherwise) in the intermedial 
performance event. Secondly, the hyphenated conjunction between this abbreviated prefix and 
the word “dramaturgy” emphasises the co-evolution across time and space between technology 
and the human practice of dramaturgy in the creation of performance art. Even though there has 
been some scholarly discussion on the dramaturgical approaches to intermediality in performance 
(such as Pil Hansen’s “perceptual dramaturgy”), the question remains as to how an intermedial 
dramaturgical approach might encourage the audience to reflect on human-machine relations.  
“Intermedial theatre and performance,” as the British theatre scholar Andy Lavender 
contends, “entails systematicity,” especially since it contains such discernible attributes as “[the] 
plurality of (re)presentation; compound action; multi-modal mise en scène; and a disposition to 
affect” (2010: 134). In light of the multiplicity of media, scenic elements, and performance styles 
on the intermedial stage, all of which are disposed towards the engagement of the perceptual 
modes of the audience members, Lavender asserts that “intermedial dramaturgy ‘inscribes’ 
presentation with mediatisation, form with feeling, and evokes the always-other in the here-and-
now of performance” (2010: 134). Lavender’s description appears to correspond with Barba’s 
“organic” and “evocative” dramaturgies, as much emphasis is placed on affecting the audience’s 
perceptual and affective modes by evoking an “always-other” that engenders a sense of mystery 
or eccentricity about the intermedial phenomenon on the stage. But while such a dramaturgical 
strategy may be capable of shaping the audience’s perception of the formal and thematic qualities 
of the performance, its potential for fostering critical reflection among the audience members 
remains elusive.  
Heeding Meike Wagner’s call for a critical approach towards the study of intermediality 
in performance, my proposed method (which will hereafter be referred to as “critical techno-
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dramaturgy”) offers a conceptual framework with which to analyze the ways that intermedial 
performances mobilize the audience’s embodied perception of the interface between performance 
and technology. I will also explore how the framework can be deployed as a dramaturgical 
approach that engages with the perceptual modes of the audience members in order to encourage 
them to critically reflect on human-machine relations. This conceptual and dramaturgical 
framework that I am proposing is very much inspired by Marcel O’Gorman’s Applied Media 
Theory, or AMT. As the founder and co-director of the Critical Media Lab at the University of 
Waterloo,17 O’Gorman pioneered the concept of AMT as a generative methodology “which calls 
on scholars in the social sciences and humanities to act like artists and engineers, by inventing 
their own critical technological objects, even at the risk of having them turn out to be nothing 
more than ‘broken toys’” (2012: 29). Conceived as a new critical methodology in the humanities, 
AMT uses digital objects “to model complex or abstract levels of thought related to the forms and 
social impacts of digital media” (O’Gorman 2012: 30). Over the past few years, the members of 
the Critical Media Lab at Waterloo have created various digital objects that apply the lessons of 
media theory and philosophy to the construction of digital artefacts that engage with the user’s 
perceptual and cognitive faculties. These digital artefacts created at the lab do not always work 
perfectly; in fact, that is not the purpose for producing these artefacts. Instead, the digital artefacts 
serve to foster critical reflection among those who come into contact with these objects, 
especially in relation to the impacts of technology on individuals, society, and the environment. It 
is for this reason that O’Gorman calls these digital artefacts “objects-to-think-with,” a term that 
Sherry Turkle devised in the context of new media studies.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"(!As part of the Department of English and the Faculty of Arts at the University of Waterloo, the Critical Media Lab 
(CML) is a cross-disciplinary initiative led by Marcel O’Gorman and Beth Coleman. The lab actively encourages the 
creation of new media projects that explore the different ways in which technology affects the human condition.!!
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Turkle uses the term, “objects-to-think-with,” to describe the creation of new 
epistemologies that entail what Claude Levi-Strauss, the renowned French anthropologist, calls 
“theoretical tinkering” or “bricolage,” a process by which members of a culture make use of the 
objects in their environment to “develop and assimilate ideas” (1996: 48). Turkle’s idea of 
making “objects-to-think-with” is predicated on “the [physical] manipulation of specific objects” 
for the purpose of experimenting with theoretical ideas, particularly as culturally “[a]ppropriable 
theories […] tend to be those with which people can become actively involved” (1996: 48). The 
creation of digital “objects-to-think-with” at the Critical Media Lab is therefore an attempt to 
encourage people to “get their hands dirty,” as it were, by making digital artefacts that can be 
used to critique the social, economic, cultural, and perceptual impacts of media technologies in 
the contemporary zeitgeist. As O’Gorman elucidates, AMT is “a generative critique that uses 
digital media itself to critique digital media,” thereby allowing it to critique “the assumptions of 
digital media from within those media” (2010: 30). Inspired by the generative potential of 
AMT,18 the deployment of critical techno-dramaturgy as a dramaturgical method aims to turn 
intermedial performances into “objects-to-think-with” by engaging physically and perceptually 
with the audience members as they interact with various media technologies, and with each other, 
in a network of human and technological individuals.  
I should clarify that it is not my intention to set up critical techno-dramaturgy as a 
manifesto or a prescriptive model for what intermedial performance ought to look like or how it 
should be. Besides, the development of this conceptual framework and dramaturgical method for 
the analysis and production of intermedial performances is by no means a new attempt at 
emphasizing the capacity of intermedial artistic practices to critique the ways in which humans !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!")!In Chapter 6, I will examine an original intermedial performance project that experiments with the dramaturgical 
objectives of “critical techno-dramaturgy” in order to critique the effects of video technology (including surveillance 
technology) on the audience’s perception of death and the technological mediation of the body.  !
! "#(!
relate to and engage with media technologies. Intermediality in theatre and performance, as the 
performance scholars Hans-Thies Lehmann and Patrick Primavesi understand it, is not about 
adapting to the media realities of any given moment. Rather, they believe that the theatre should 
become a space that interrogates the power of media in society (2009: 4). “Operating within the 
larger framework of a culture of media and mediated performance,” as Lehmann and Primavesi 
go on to explain, “theatre is bound to an inter-mediality where the ‘inter’ is decisive” (2009: 4). 
The importance of the “inter” prefix in Lehmann and Primavesi’s understanding of the term 
“inter-mediality” is reminiscent of Henk Oosterling’s theorization of the ontology of the 
intermedial as “in-between,” with different media elements set in a dialogical relationship with 
one another through their “tensional differences” (2003: 30). In other words, the “inter” prefix is 
not simply a descriptor of the interplay of media elements in theatre and performance but a self-
reflexive indicator of the critical potential that an intermedial environment offers to performers, 
designers, and audience members.  
“Intermediality,” as the German art critic Klaus-Peter Busse informs us, “is foremost a 
quality of artistic statements using more than one medium” (2005: 262). Intermedial artists 
employ various media elements in their work in order to articulate particular perspectives about 
the social, cultural, and political tensions that affect the interactions between humans and media 
technologies in artistic and non-artistic contexts. Yet Busse is quick to emphasize that what is 
termed “intermedia” is more than just a fusion of different media. Instead, the juxtaposition of 
different forms of media in the same environment reveals the potential of intermedial artistic 
practices to generate ideas about those media elements and their impact on the human condition. 
As Busse succinctly puts it: “intermedia means media criticism” (2005: 263). The ontology of the 
intermedial as “in-between” engenders a critical impulse that acknowledges what Busse describes 
as “the interspaces and the liminal of the process of artistic perception” (2005: 266). Therefore, 
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by interrogating the “in-between-ness” of the intermedial phenomenon, “theatre may,” as 
Lehmann and Primavesi suggest, “open up and explore the ‘inter’ as an artistic space – instead of 
trying only to copy media technologies or maintaining a defensive ontology of live ‘presence’” 
(2009: 4). But it is worth noting that audience members may not necessarily discern or 
comprehend the artistic purpose of intermediality in performance and the critical impetus that 
such an intermedial experience might harbour.  
According to Lehmann and Primavesi, the “critical potential of theatre and performance 
often depends on how the position of the spectator is defined or questioned” (2009: 6). “The 
function of theatre as a public sphere,” they argue, “requires a dramaturgical discourse that is 
more ready to pose questions than to give answers and that is constantly reflecting its relation to 
political contexts without patronizing the audience or insisting on a particular interpretation” 
(2009: 6). What Lehmann and Primavesi seem to be calling for then is a “collective” form of 
dramaturgy, whereby theatre practice becomes an exercise in “collective theorization” among 
performers, designers, and audience members about specific social, cultural, and political issues. 
These issues might include the ways in which humans relate to media technologies. Such a 
“collective” dramaturgy would, in turn, frustrate the presumptive role of the dramaturge as the 
sole architect and orchestrator of the performance event. Alluding to the “power relations” that 
are made manifest within “theatre institutions,” Lehmann and Primavesi propose that the 
“dramaturg should no longer be defined as the controlling power of the theatre” but “may instead 
become a negotiator for the freedom of theatrical experimentation and risk” (2009: 4). Just as the 
juxtaposition of different media in an intermedial milieu unfolds the possibility of critiquing 
medium-specific conventions and the interactions between humans and media technologies, it 
appears that the practice of dramaturgy is amenable to risk-taking and experimentation.   
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The intermedial performance event offers a laboratory space that is perhaps similar to 
how the dance artist and theatre scholar Susan Kozel regards the dance studio as “a focused 
environment” in which to experiment with and understand the relationship between humans and 
technology in everyday life (2007: 69). As Kozel observes, “the conceptual and experiential 
infrastructure of our relations with technology are condensed and intensified in a performance 
context in the lab or studio” (2007: 69). For this reason, conceiving the intermedial performance 
event as a laboratory space would unravel the potential for intentional self-reflection in 
performance. “Performance,” as Kozel proceeds to argue, “entails a reflective intentionality on 
the part of the performer herself, a decision to see/feel/hear herself as performing while she is 
performing, a decision to see/feel/hear others performing while she watches them perform” 
(2007: 69). Performance is therefore an embodied phenomenon in which both the performers and 
the audience members become aware of their own bodies and those of others in time and space. 
Furthermore, it appears that the ancient Greeks were also inclined to regard theatre performances 
as artistic devices for thinking and reflection. The ancient Greeks, as Brenda Laurel informs us, 
“employed drama and theatre as tools for thought, in much the same way that we employ 
computers today” (1991: 40). While new media technologies, such as computers and 
smartphones, may compel the user to think about human-machine relations through the 
interactive digital content that these technological devices communicate, theatre performances 
could also serve to foster critical reflection among the audience members who encounter the 
spectacle in person. Would it be possible then to characterize intermedial performances as 
“objects-to-think-with”? 
In the case of contemporary intermedial performance, it seems that what Susan Kozel 
terms the “intentional reflection” that occurs in performance could potentially be expanded to 
include the reflective engagements that transpire between the performers and audience members 
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as they interact with the technical objects that feature in the intermedial performance event. But 
while the treatment of intermedial performances as “objects-to-think-with” might illuminate the 
impacts of technology on society and the human condition, would it be too much to expect from 
the audience members who may think of technological devices as functional tools rather than 
objects that facilitate critical reflection on human-machine relations? Writing on the topic of risks 
in theatre production, the British director Tim Etchells asserts that performance should be 
conceived as a kind of investment. “Investment,” as Etchells explains, “is what happens when the 
performers before us seem bound up unspeakably with what they’re doing – it seems to matter to 
them, it appears to hurt them or threatens to pleasure them, it seems to touch them, in some quiet 
and terrible way” (1999: 48). Performance work not only places physical demands on the 
performer; it also frustrates her emotions and challenges her perceptions of the world, thus 
leading her to question the certainty of her assumptions about a wide range of issues concerning 
humans, animals, the environment, and even the role of technological objects in society.   
Etchells identifies a certain complicity of the performer with the material that she is 
working on. Performance affects performers as much they affect it. But as Etchells contends, the 
audience members who encounter the performance event also share in this complicity between 
the performer and her material: 
In the complicity of the performers with their task lies our own complicity – we 
are watching the people before us, not representing something but going through 
something. They lay their bodies on the line … and we are transformed – not 
audience to a spectacle but witnesses to an event. (1999: 49) 
As witnesses to the performance event, the audience members are not passive receivers of the 
action. Rather, they are involved in a process of discovery and revealing towards the truth about 
the world. However, the dramaturge is not fully in control of how the audience members might 
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experience and understand the performance. Etchells believes that this is the point where risk 
shows up, perhaps unexpectedly, to “surprise us, always fleeting – we’re slightly out of control” 
(1999: 49). I am reminded of David Wills’ depiction of the threat that comes from behind, 
literally in the back, and how it forces us to think back to the co-determining relations between 
technics and human beings. Such a reflection back towards the “originary technicity” of human 
beings not only upsets the anthropocentric assumption of human mastery over technics; it 
overturns it. There is a similar danger involved in the production of intermedial performance, one 
that threatens to rupture the dramaturge’s artistic vision. The interface between technology and 
performance is not as seamless as it might appear, as performers, audience members, and 
different media technologies interact on the basis of their relational differences. As a result, 
intermedial productions run the risk of becoming “broken” in a way that is similar to how the 
technological objects created in the Critical Media Lab might end up as “broken tools”. But such 
a risk should be taken, especially if theatre researchers are concerned about understanding how 
intermedial performances affect the audience’s perception of human-machine interactions.  
In searching for a foundational model on which to develop my concept of critical techno-
dramaturgy, I turn to the dramaturges Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink and Sigrid Merx’s theorization of 
two dramaturgical strategies that they believe are pertinent to the creation of intermedial 
performance. The first strategy involves the “particular ways of structuring the stage, employing 
aesthetic strategies such as montage (spatial, simultaneous) and collage, doubling, difference, 
framing or interactivity” (2010: 223). This dramaturgical strategy is essentially an arrangement or 
choreography of space and time, a technique that could potentially generate concepts about 
intermediality in performance. The second strategy is characterized as a “dramaturgy of 
spectatorial address: the structuring of the encounter between the stage and the spectator” (2010: 
223). This strategy is designed to move the audience members to think about their interactions 
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with technology. However, it can also encourage them to be involved as actors in the 
performance. Taken together, both strategies organize the performance event as a process rather 
than a finished product. Nibbelink and Merx believe that by doing so, “certain themes emerge by 
which intermedial performance – as a theoretical object – reflects on its position within a digital 
culture” (2010: 223-4). Treating intermedial performance as a theoretical object can certainly 
facilitate the generation of critical concepts about intermediality in the broader landscape of 
contemporary technoculture.  
Nibbelink and Merx acknowledge that the process of analyzing intermedial performance 
requires “a continuous dialogical negotiation between a performance as a theoretical object, and a 
concept that is generated to analyse the performance” (2010: 219). Yet this negotiation can only 
work if the audience members are involved as agents in the creative process. In turn, a triadic 
feedback loop emerges among the performers, the technological devices featured in the 
performance, as well as the audience as “incorporated performers”. Building on Nibbelink and 
Merx’s theorization of the dramaturgical strategies for intermedial performance, my concept of 
critical techno-dramaturgy consists of two interrelated approaches: 
1) Intermediality and De-familiarization: This approach involves the deliberate structuring of 
the interplay between the human participants and the new media technologies featured on 
the intermedial stage in ways that destabilize the audience’s familiarity with how they 
might be embodied with these technologies. The aim here is to challenge the audience’s 
perception of how humans relate to media technologies through their bodies. The Dutch 
media philosopher Henk Oosterling’s theorization of the ontology of intermediality as 
“in-between” or “interesse” emphasizes how difference (among media elements) operates 
as the structuring principle of intermedial effects. In light of the contextual juxtaposition 
between various media technologies in intermedial performance, there is a need to 
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analyze how different media elements relate to each other amid what Oosterling refers to 
as their “tensional differences,” and also how the fissures produced by the juxtaposition of 
media on the stage defer the possibility of semantic closure.  
2) Interactivity and Perceptual Engagement: By incorporating the audience members as 
agents who are capable of influencing the action in the representational context of the 
intermedial performance event, the deployment of critical techno-dramaturgy has the 
potential to stimulate the audience’s critical awareness of the ways in which the rapid 
development and ubiquitous usage of new technologies affect the individual and society. 
However, we should note that the experience of interactivity, as Brenda Laurel puts it, is a 
“thresholdy phenomenon” that is “highly context-dependent” (1991: 21). Nevertheless, 
the critical potential of the concept resides in its capacity to dislocate the senses and 
frustrate the perception of the audience members through what Kattenbelt calls the 
“mutual affects” between the different media technologies and the human participants 
featured in the intermedial performance event. As such, we will need to examine the 
phenomenological effects of intermediality in performance, particularly the ways that the 
performance event engages with the perceptual modes of the audience members. 
Perception in the intermedial milieu, as Nibbelink and Merx contend, “is complicated by a 
continuous interplay and interconnectedness of modern media” (2010: 218). They observe that 
the intermedial performances that have recently appeared in Europe and North America tend to 
experiment with the manipulation of “perceptual expectation,” to the extent that the collision 
between “digitally influenced perceptions and embodied presence manifests itself particularly as 
a disturbance of the senses and results in a blurring of realities” (2010: 219). Nibbelink and Merx 
articulate a politics of perception that pays attention to the capacity of media technologies to 
manipulate the human senses. But while the audience’s perception of blurred realities could 
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potentially complicate the notion of presence in an intermedial environment, it certainly does not 
mean that the human body is rendered obsolete. As Merleau-Ponty elucidates in Phenomenology 
of Perception, the body is the subject of perception and thus to perceive is to render oneself 
present to the world through the body (2002: 239). Therefore, any attempt at analyzing the 
phenomenological effects of intermediality in performance should account for the embodied 
character of perception.  
In the chapters that follow, I will be looking at how intermedial performance artists are 
able to disorient the audience members by challenging their perception of how various media 
technologies relate to their own bodies and the surrounding world. In the next chapter, I will 
explore the interplay between embodiment, technology, and space in intermedial performance 
and its effects on the audience members’ awareness of their embodied existence as they navigate 
the cityscape with mobile phones and handheld computers. By focusing on the combinatory use 
of bicycles and handheld computers in Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke, as well as the production of 
social space through mobile text messaging in Dustin Harvey and Adrienne Wong’s LANDLINE: 
Halifax to Vancouver, Chapter 3 marks the first examination of how critical techno-dramaturgy 
can be employed as a strategy for designing and analyzing the performativity of discovering the 
different expressions of social space and embodiment across the cityscape. Both performance 
projects encourage the audience members to listen to audio narratives on iPods and other digital 
devices, and to document their life stories on mobile computers or exchange text messages with 
other participants using mobile phones. Turning to the work of Guy Debord, Michel de Certeau, 
and Bruno Latour, I argue that Rider Spoke and Landline exemplify the deployment of a critical 
techno-dramaturgy that subverts the instrumental uses of the mobile phone and the handheld 
computer by endowing these technologies with a creative agency that intervenes in the process of 
devising an urban performance across the cityscape.  
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Chapter 3: 
Urban Performance: Embodiment, Technology, and the Perception of Space 
  
“Elements which are close when disconnected may be infinitely remote when their connections 
are analysed; conversely, elements which would appear as infinitely distant may be close when 
their connections are brought back into the picture.” 
- Bruno Latour, “On Actor-Network Theory. A Few Clarifications,” Soziale Welt 47.4, p.371 
 
“Media technologies simultaneously isolate and connect.” 
- Michael Bull, Sound Moves: iPod Culture and Urban Experience, 1997, p.9 
 
 Imagine riding a bicycle on your own in an unfamiliar city. It is nightfall, and the streets 
fall silent as the sound of peak-hour traffic subsides. Meandering through narrow roads in search 
of an interesting building or a public space where you can stop to reflect on your relationship 
with the urban landscape, you realize that you are not alone on this journey. As you look at the 
mobile computer mounted on the handlebar of your bicycle, you wonder if someone has left a 
message for you somewhere in the city. You have been told that you are involved in an 
intermedial performance that requires a combination of physical toil and the willingness to record 
your personal stories on a mobile computer for others to hear. You can also listen to the stories 
that belong to people whom you have never met, and are unlikely to meet. Some passers-by who 
see you talking into the mobile device may greet you with amazement. But amid the inquisitive 
gaze of strangers, you insist on recording your stories at various locations across the city. Such is 
the dedication of those audience members who participated in Blast Theory’s October 2007 
production of Rider Spoke in the British capital, London.  
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Blast Theory is a British performance company led by Matt Adams, Ju Row Farr, and 
Nick Tandavanitj. The theatre group “explores interactivity and the social and political aspects of 
technology” through frequent collaborations with computer scientists from the Mixed Reality 
Lab at Nottingham University on the production of experimental performances (“About Blast 
Theory” 2012). Many of Blast Theory’s recent projects, such as Rider Spoke, pose “important 
questions about the meaning of interaction,” particularly human-machine interactions, by looking 
at how locative media and mobile technologies intervene in the processes of performance making 
in an urban setting (“About Blast Theory” 2012). In this chapter, I will examine the interplay 
between embodiment, technology, and urban space in intermedial performance and its effects on 
the audience’s embodied perception of space as they move across the cityscape with mobile 
phones, iPods, and mobile computers. Drawing on Guy Debord’s urban theory, Michel de 
Certeau’s exposition on the embodied act of pedestrianism, and Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network 
Theory, I will explore the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile computers in Blast Theory’s 
Rider Spoke, as well as the production of social space through mobile text messaging in Dustin 
Harvey and Adrienne Wong’s Landline: Halifax to Vancouver.  
By engaging in close readings of Rider Spoke and Landline, this chapter seeks to 
demonstrate how these intermedial performances deploy techno-dramaturgical strategies that 
seek to engage the audience members’ embodied perception of space. Both projects encourage 
the audience members to listen to audio narratives on iPods and other digital devices, and to 
document their life stories on mobile computers or exchange text messages with other 
participants using mobile phones. As such, my contention is that Rider Spoke and Landline are 
exemplars of critical techno-dramaturgy, as they endow the mobile phone, the iPod, and the 
mobile computer with a creative agency that intervenes in the relationship between human beings 
and the urban landscape. In the next section, I will explore the influence of digital technology on 
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the interactions between human beings and the urban environment. Following that, the 
subsequent sections of this chapter will consist of close readings of the October 2007 production 
of Rider Spoke in London and the September 2013 staging of Landline in the Canadian cities of 
Halifax and Vancouver (the performance took place in both cities at the same time). In my 
analysis of these projects, I will be looking at how the use of mobile devices in an urban setting 
might affect the human perception of embodiment and space.  
 
3.1 Digital Culture and the City 
Many of us living in cities today can hardly ignore the intervention of technology in our 
relationship with the urban landscape and its human inhabitants. The ubiquitous use of digital 
technology for work and leisure has altered our experience of the spaces that we encounter on our 
daily commute between various places within the city. Equipped with a dazzling array of mobile 
communication devices that are wirelessly connected to global communication networks, the 
modern city dweller can do more than simply communicate with people located in the same city 
or miles away in a distant country; they also have access to digital applications that provide 
information on bus and train schedules, current traffic conditions, and a list of possible routes that 
one can take in order to get to a particular place. Beyond the physical acts of walking and biking 
or the use of public transit, travelling across the urban landscape is becoming ever more 
sophisticated. Urbanites are constantly plugged into a world of digital media that offer satellite 
navigation (satnav) and web browsing capabilities, as well as a plethora of entertainment content, 
including movies, television dramas, and online video games. Far from being inert technological 
implements, these digital applications are actively shaping how we perceive our embodied 
interactions with urban spaces. Our quotidian performances in the city, which may range from 
walking or biking to watching videos or texting on our mobile phones, have been modulated by 
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our embodiment with technology. And it is this technological modulation of the interaction 
between human bodies and the city that calls our attention to the emergence of such recent 
intermedial performances as Rider Spoke and Landline in the urban spaces of London and the 
Canadian cities of Halifax and Vancouver.  
Engaging in a close reading of these city-based intermedial performances would require 
us to first attend to the ways in which the use of digital technology in contemporary culture has 
transformed our experience of time and space as well as our interactions with other people. In his 
book 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, Jonathan Crary argues that the perpetual 
presence of digital technology in our lives has disrupted the nightly routine of rest and 
recuperation or what he calls “the night-time interval” that serves to separate one day from the 
next. His study interrogates the disintegration of the human perception of space and time in an 
age where digital devices and the applications that run on them have come to structure how city 
dwellers experience temporality and the spaces (both physical and virtual) in which 
communication with other people can exist. Crary is wary of what he terms “the perpetual 
illumination” that characterizes affluent cities across the world, as such major urban centres as 
London, New York, Tokyo, and Shanghai have invested in high-intensity lighting to illuminate 
their buildings, streets, and public squares after dark, thus resulting in the spillage of daytime into 
the depths of night. Alongside the arrival of 24-hour news cycles and digital devices that promote 
constant connectivity to the virtual world, Crary’s concern is that the “perpetual illumination” of 
urban life might diminish the ability of human beings to judge the social and ethical value of 
what they encounter visually in their daily lives. “With an infinite cafeteria of solicitation and 
attraction perpetually available,” he argues, “24/7 disables vision through processes of 
homogenization, redundancy, and acceleration” (2013: 33). Unable to discern the degrees of 
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variation between the things that they see in the world, the cognitive and perceptual capacities of 
human beings may seem to be in decline. “Contrary to many claims,” Crary writes:  
There is an ongoing diminution of mental and perceptual capabilities rather than 
their expansion or modulation. Current arrangements are comparable to the glare 
of high-intensity illumination or of white-out conditions, in which there is a 
paucity of tonal differentiation out of which one can make perceptual distinctions 
and orient oneself to shared temporalities. Glare here is not a phenomenon of 
literal brightness, but rather of the uninterrupted harshness of monotonous 
stimulation in which a larger range of responsive capacities are frozen or 
neutralized. (2013: 34) 
Crary’s comparison of the constant stimulation and connectivity afforded by digital technology to 
the blinding glare of high-intensity illumination in affluent cities highlights the “anaesthetizing” 
effects of the 24/7 lifestyle on the human perception of space and time, as different urban spaces 
begin to resemble one another and artificial daylight irradiates the night sky. Following Crary’s 
line of thought, there seems little that the inhabitants of modern cities can do except to endure the 
relentless bombardment of their visual and aural senses by the perpetual stimuli that originate 
from the screens and speakers of mobile phones, mobile computers, as well as the animated 
billboards that tower above the city’s streets. Perhaps the formal difference between the digital 
objects that we as city dwellers employ in our daily lives might also appear to matter less than 
their combined capacity to keep us connected, not necessarily to other people, but to the scores of 
digital content and their tantalizing allure.   
The point that Crary advances is reminiscent of Sherry Turkle’s notion of the “tethered 
self,” which claims that we human beings are now “tethered to our ‘always-on/always-on-us’ 
communication devices and the people and things we reach through them” (2008: 122). Turkle 
! "%+!
contends that the “tethered self” – a self that is always attached to technological devices – 
straddles the liminal space between a physical reality and a distributed existence across a myriad 
of digital devices (2008: 122). As prosthetic extensions of the self, digital objects allow the 
“tethered selves” of the twenty-first-century digital age to live through them, or as Turkle puts it, 
to “cycle-through” towards “a sense of continual co-presence” (2008: 122). In turn, these new 
digital devices serve to perpetuate the efficacy of the “tethered self” as a precondition for keeping 
up with the latest technological trends. For Crary, the normalization of this ongoing state of 
transition means that there is no observable teleology in the so-called “digital revolution,” as 
“[t]here never will be a ‘catching up’ on either a social or individual basis in relation to 
continually changing technological requirements” (2013: 37). His contention is that the rapidly 
changing affordances of digital technology would alienate and subjugate twenty-first-century 
humans. “For the vast majority of people,” he claims:  
Our perceptual and cognitive relationship to communication and information 
technology will continue to be estranged and disempowered because of the 
velocity at which new products emerge and at which arbitrary reconfigurations of 
entire systems take place. This intensified rhythm precludes the possibility of 
becoming familiar with any given arrangement. (2013: 37)  
The frequency and intensity of technological change in contemporary society can affect the ways 
in which humans perceive and understand the effects of digital technology on everyday life – 
how we work, play, and interact with other people and the environment. Mobile phones, for 
instance, allow us to contact people at anytime and at any place in the world (apart from places 
with no cellular networks). Yet, the ubiquity of mobile technology in urban life might also be 
diminishing the frequency of face-to-face interactions between the city’s inhabitants, many of 
whom can be seen interacting with their communication devices while commuting from one 
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place to another. However, what Crary’s deterministic argument overlooks is the capacity of 
human beings to question the effects of digital technology on their perceptual faculties.   
 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the relationship between humans and technology does not 
entail the absolute dominance of one entity over the other. Even though technological objects can 
alter human behaviour, human beings are capable of making changes to their technological 
prostheses in order to fulfil particular needs, as evidenced by the refashioning of metal coat 
hangers into television antennae. Similarly, the structure of the urban environment can impinge 
on the human perception of space, just as human beings are able to transform the appearance of 
the cityscape. In her analysis of the interface between bodies and cities, Elizabeth Grosz makes 
the point that “the form, structure, and norms of the city” can affect the “corporeal alignments, 
comportment, and orientations” of the human subject, as well as the “forms of corporeal 
exertion” that condition the “muscular structure” and “nutritional context” of the body as it 
traverses the urban terrain (1992: 385-6). Even though Grosz regards the city as “a mode for the 
regulation and administration of subjects,” she is also quick to acknowledge its potential as “an 
urban space in turn reinscribed by the particularities of its occupation and use” (1992: 386). 
While cities can influence the spatial perception and corporeal comportment of their inhabitants, 
they are also open to the transformative effects of human activity in the urban environment.  
Mass public gatherings, such as the 2014 student demonstrations in Hong Kong,19 are 
capable of transforming cities into platforms for digital communication. Regardless of their 
location in the city, urbanites are kept apprised of the latest socio-political developments in their 
municipality through wireless Internet and instant messaging services that are accessible on 
mobile communication devices. However, the ease of instant long-distance communication !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"*!In September 2014, students in Hong Kong occupied the city’s streets and highways in order to campaign for 
democratic reforms. During this period, the activists made use of social media networks and digital projections on 
buildings to share information about the various demonstration sites that emerged throughout the city.   !
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afforded by mobile phones seems to be eroding the quality of physical encounters in public 
spaces. On a recent visit to Yonge-Dundas Square in Toronto, I was greeted by a sea of people 
scattered across a prominent public space at the heart of downtown. But what quickly caught my 
attention was how the majority of people gathered at the square were interacting with some form 
of mobile device. With the exception of a few buskers and vendors touting their wares, everyone 
else was looking down at their smartphones and mobile tablets.  
What my brief observation at Yonge-Dundas Square reveals is that a city’s inhabitants 
may choose to congregate at public spaces but not everyone is necessarily inclined to engage in 
face-to-face communication with others. As Grosz notes, the instantaneous character of digital 
communication implies that the bodies of the city’s inhabitants “will no longer be disjointedly 
connected to random others and objects through the city’s spatiotemporal layout” (1992: 387). 
Rather than allowing the physical form of the cityscape dictate the quality of interpersonal 
encounters, she believes that the bodies of city dwellers in the digital age “will interface with the 
computer, forming part of an information machine in which the body’s limbs and organs will 
become interchangeable parts” (1992: 387). Grosz’s invocation of a cyborgian future that 
embraces the fusion of bodies and computers as well as the interchangeability of body parts 
remains a contentious point, particularly in relation to the question of technological accessibility 
among persons with disabilities and the subjectivity of their prosthetic relations with technology 
(and this is a question that I will return to in Chapter 5). What is perhaps less problematic, 
however, is Grosz’s claim that digital technology “will fundamentally transform the ways in 
which we conceive both cities and bodies, and their interrelations” (1992: 387). If indeed the 
ubiquity of digital technology in the urban environment has the potential to alter our experience 
of the relationship between bodies and cities, how might the employment of mobile computing 
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devices in an intermedial performance such as Blast Theory’s October 2007 production of Rider 
Spoke affect the audience members’ perception of their embodied existence in urban spaces?  
 
3.2 Augmented Reality: Rider Spoke as “Pervasive Game”  
Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke premiered on October 11, 2007 at the Barbican Arts Centre in 
London. Over the course of eight evenings, participants from all over the United Kingdom came 
to the British capital to take part in what the designers at Blast Theory refer to as a “pervasive 
game” that lasted for an hour each time it was staged. Rendered as an intermedial urban 
performance that involves the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile computers, the group’s 
description of Rider Spoke as a “pervasive game” deserves further inquiry. “Pervasive games,” as 
computer scientists Steve Benford, Carsten Magerkurth, and Peter Ljungstrand point out, “extend 
the gaming experience out into the real world – be it on city streets, in the remote wilderness, or a 
living room” (2005: 54). They explain that as players of pervasive games navigate the physical 
world with “mobile computing devices” such as mobile computers and mobile phones, “sensors 
capture information about their current context, including their location, and this is used to 
deliver a gaming experience that changes according to where they are, what they are doing, and 
even how they are feeling” (Benford, Magerkurth and Ljungstrand 2005: 54). The agency that 
such mobile computing devices afford, particularly in terms of their capacity to determine the 
human users’ topographical location, physical actions, and emotions, is indicative of a 
renegotiation of how human beings relate to the urban environment. For most people living in 
affluent cities today, the projection of virtual spaces onto material reality is fast becoming a 
ubiquitous phenomenon. From digitally animated billboards that speak to passers-by to the 
hologram projection of singing humanoids at live concerts (Japan’s animated vocaloid Hatsune 
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Miku comes to mind), the convergence of the virtual and physical worlds have culminated in the 
emergence of augmented reality as a technique in the design of digital media events.  
 According to media scholar Beth Coleman, the design of augmented reality involves the 
overlaying of informational or visual elements onto the world (2011: 146). “[T]he technical and 
conceptual role of augmented reality,” as Coleman elucidates, “is to emphasize a layered 
engagement in which multiple levels of presence and world may exist” (2011: 146). As such, the 
audience or spectator who is engaged with an augmented reality environment can perceive – 
often with the help of visual or auditory devices – the “visual or informational overlay” that is 
layered “on top of objects and embedded in places in the physical world” (2011: 147).  As a 
professional theatre group, the Brighton-based Blast Theory has produced intermedial 
performances that employ a myriad of digital media devices in an effort to interrogate the 
interstitial spaces from which questions about agency and embodiment in digital culture emerge. 
“Blast Theory,” as Coleman informs us, “creates immersive experiences that engage real-world 
and network events” (2011: 145). The overlaying of virtual elements onto physical reality as well 
as the linking of audience members through a digital network have come to define many of Blast 
Theory’s intermedial performances. But rather than producing a finished product for the audience 
members to explore, the designers at Blast Theory prefer to allow their audiences to actively 
generate the content and even reconfigure the structure of a performance. “Additionally, and 
crucially,” as Coleman observes, “audience participation represents the final element of their 
[Blast Theory’s] projects” (2011: 145). This final element is a crucial ingredient in almost all of 
Blast Theory’s intermedial performances, including Rider Spoke.   
During the October 2007 production of Rider Spoke in London, the performance began 
with the audience members arriving at the Barbican Arts Centre for registration and a compulsory 
safety briefing. Some of the participants “brought along their own bikes” to the event, as they 
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wanted to “experience their local environment – London – from a new perspective” (D17.3 CCG 
Final Report 2007: 20). Others chose to borrow a bicycle from Blast Theory. Nevertheless, all 
participants were furnished with a Nokia N800 mobile computing device that was mounted on 
the handlebar of their bicycles. Riding their bicycles out of the Barbican and onto the streets of 
London, the audience members were greeted with a message on their mobile computers 
reminding them to cycle safely and to “make sure [they] have stopped before pressing [the] 
continue” button on the virtual interface (Giannachi 2010: 356). As soon as an audience member 
came close enough to a location where at least one personal story had been archived, an alert 
signal would be triggered on the mobile computer. If the audience member wanted to hear that 
story, he or she could stop cycling and listen to the narrative using a pair of earphones. 
Conversely, if a location was devoid of any recording, the audience member could press on the 
door icon on the virtual interface, enter the room on the screen, and hide a message there.  
As the designers of Rider Spoke explain it, “[the] player’s first task is to find a suitable 
location at which to record and hide a new audio message,” and this location has to be one that is 
“not already associated with another players’ recording” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 11). 
Whenever a participant decided to stop at a particular location, he or she would get to interact 
with the icons shown on the virtual interface of the mobile computer. This interface comprised a 
set of cartoonish images “inspired by a combination of sailors’ tattoos, Mexican votive paintings 
and heraldry, all of which are rich in symbols of travel and identity” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 
2007: 11). The principal designer of the performance, Matt Adams, describes these artistic icons 
as “badges of identity” that mark the human body in its embodied existence (“New Frontiers in 
Performance” 2007: 8). Throughout the performance, each audience member could choose which 
particular icon – or even a set of icons – they would like to identify with. 
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As the theatre scholar Gabriella Giannachi notes, “the cartoon-like quality of the interface 
design” is meant to “generate familiarity” between the audience members and the virtual world in 
which the audio recordings are hidden (2010: 357). Indeed, the cartoonish interface on the mobile 
computer can help the audience members to differentiate between the physical world of the urban 
environment and the virtual spaces in which personal stories can be hidden or discovered. “The 
overall metaphor for the interface,” as the designers of Rider Spoke elucidate, “is one of hiding 
and finding audio messages at places that are represented graphically by various buildings or 
houses that the player enters and leaves” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 11). Of course, the 
audience members do not physically enter these houses shown on the screen of the mobile 
device. However, we can see how the metaphorical significance of the virtual interface as a 
hiding place seems to converge with the physical location in the city that is associated with the 
depositing and retrieval of personal messages. As Giannachi observes, these “[h]iding places, in 
which memories [are] deposited, [combine] the properties of the physical location and the 
electronic location as reported by the mobile device, which [uses] information about nearby Wi-
Fi access points to determine the location of each participant” in the performance (2010: 357). In 
this sense, Rider Spoke resembles a game of “hide and seek,” as participants traverse the 
cityscape in search of places to store their own stories or to uncover the narratives of the other 
participants in the performance.   
What is so “pervasive” about the game-like quality of Rider Spoke is not the popularity of 
“hide and seek” as a children’s game but how the audience members engage with the ubiquity of 
the technological implements (i.e., mobile computing devices linked wirelessly to a network of 
databases) that facilitate the storage and retrieval of personal narratives. While some of the 
participants in the October 2007 production assumed that the Nokia N800 mobile devices were 
equipped with satellite navigational capabilities such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), it 
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was the technology of Wi-Fi fingerprinting rather than GPS that afforded the mobile computers 
with an agency for locative awareness.20 Wi-Fi is a wireless technology that involves the setting 
up of local area networks through which different computing devices – laptops, smartphones, or 
wireless printers – connect to the Internet or exchange information with each other. The 
technique of Wi-Fi Fingerprinting enables the building of a locative network that capitalizes on 
the ubiquity of Wi-Fi access points (or “hotspots”) across the urban environments of most cities 
in the world today. In contrast to GPS, which offers data on the topographic position of an object 
or a building in space, the use of Wi-Fi Fingerprinting in Rider Spoke “focuses on locations 
rather than positions” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 46). Even though GPS can tell us the real-time 
positions of objects, buildings, automobiles, and even people in a certain geographic area, it does 
not offer us a sense of the computing activity – which is also an indication of human activity – 
that is unique to a particular location.  
As Martin Flintham informs us, it is possible to identify a place in the city through the 
“constellation of access points,” each with a unique identification, that is available only at that 
location (“New Frontiers in Performance” 2007: 11). The configuration of access points at a 
given location allows Flintham and his colleagues in the Mixed Reality Lab at the University of 
Nottingham to construct a Wi-Fi Fingerprint that identifies the location as a specific place in the 
city. What this means is that whenever the participants in Rider Spoke enter a wireless access 
point with a unique Wi-Fi Fingerprint, “they can see whatever content or audio or messages that 
somebody has left at [that] location” (“New Frontiers in Performance” 2007: 11). I should clarify 
that the storage of the audio recordings and messages in the performance does not happen by way !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#+!As the designers of Rider Spoke point out, the reason for choosing Wi-Fi Fingerprinting over the GPS is that 
“GPS had proven to be problematic in densely built urban environments, where the limited view to the sky would 
hinder GPS to work precisely” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 47). Using GPS in the performance would probably 
give rise to situations where audience members will be unable to access the narratives stored at a particular location 
due to the loss of locative capabilities on the mobile computer.!!
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of Wi-Fi Fingerprinting. Instead, the Wi-Fi Fingerprints serve as a locative trigger that pulls the 
relevant recordings from a database and presents them on the mobile computers for the audience 
members to select and listen. By seeing and hearing the individualized data that other audience 
members have “hidden” at a certain place in the city, the participants in Rider Spoke can partake 
in the sharing of physical and virtual spaces.   
While the main objective for the audience members is to hide and discover personal 
stories at various locations in the city, the use of Wi-Fi Fingerprinting endows the mobile 
computers with a locative agency that affects the way that the human participants perceive the 
role of digital technology in shaping their interactions with the urban environment. Given the 
availability of in-built global positioning systems (GPS) on most mobile devices today, it might 
not be surprising that the locative awareness mobilized by Wi-Fi Fingerprinting could lead some 
audience members to rely on the mobile computer as a navigational tool rather than a device that 
facilitates the sharing of personal stories with the other participants in the performance. But what 
the locative awareness of the mobile computing devices demonstrates is the distribution of 
agency between the audience members and the technological implements (the conglomeration of 
mobile computers, the Wi-Fi Fingerprinting technology, and the network of databases) that co-
determine the overall experience of the performance. For instance, if the mobile computer cannot 
detect the Wi-Fi Fingerprint at a given location, which is probably due to the weak signals 
emitted at that wireless access point, the audience member who is cycling around the area would 
not realize that there are audio recordings “hidden” there. Conversely, the audience member can 
also choose to ignore the locative alerts that the mobile computer delivers at a certain location 
and continue riding. Both of these scenarios are capable of altering the audience member’s 
experience of the performance. Indeed, the locative awareness that the mobile computers possess 
serves to remind the human participants in Rider Spoke of the co-determining relations that they 
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share with the technological systems that could potentially affect the quality of their encounters 
with the urban environment. Nevertheless, some audience members might still be inclined to rely 
on the mobile computer as a navigational tool rather than a means by which to share their 
personal narratives with the other participants in the performance.   
One participant who got lost during the October 2007 production of Rider Spoke in 
London was frustrated with the lack of navigational technologies (such as GPS) on the mobile 
computer. Cycling around the British capital for the first time, he or she was not well acquainted 
with the labyrinth of narrow streets and winding alleyways that frustrate even the most seasoned 
commuter in the city. Reflecting on his or her experience, the participant remonstrated:  
I had a right mind to go and pop Blast Theory one in the eye – you left me guys! 
[…] [sic] i just thought that the machine was going to use gps to direct me back. 
all that i got was a little swallow and some hand drawn buildings that were NOT 
sufficient in terms of showing people and asking them if they recognised it as a 
landmark! (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 34)    
The way that this participant got lost during the performance in London, which was supposedly 
due to the absence of GPS on the mobile computer, gives us an idea of how we might have 
become overly dependent on the navigational applications that digital devices offer. Fortunately 
for this individual, he or she managed to return home with the help of passers-by who provided 
directions. I should note that as a safety precaution, the designers at Blast Theory did ensure that 
every bike was furnished with an emergency under-seat map that the participants could consult, 
in the event that they were unable to find their way back to the Barbican Arts Centre. At the same 
time, the prospect of getting lost in a city with which some audience members are unacquainted 
infuses the performance with a tangible sense of danger and vulnerability. Given that most people 
living in large urban centres today tend to rely on GPS and online maps in order to find their way 
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around the city, it is worth considering how the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile 
computing devices in Rider Spoke might affect the audience members’ perception of embodiment 
and space. Turning to Michel de Certeau’s exposition on spatial practices in the city, Guy 
Debord’s theory of the dérive, and Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, the following section 
will examine the ways in which the interplay between embodied practice of urban mobility and 
the use of mobile computers to record personal stories in Rider Spoke establishes an actor-
network that is sustained by the associations between human and nonhuman actors. 
 
3.3 Embodiment, Technology, and the Perception of Space 
Writing on the intersection of new media technologies and the city in performance, the 
theatre scholar Gabriella Giannachi contends that Blast Theory mobilizes numerous levels of 
perception in the audience members in order to make them aware of how their bodies are situated 
in space. Giannachi discerns that a “dialectical tension” exists in Rider Spoke “between 
surroundings which are at once familiar and unheimlich, real and virtual, informational and 
material” (2007: 59). She argues that it is this dialectical tension between the dualistic attributes 
embodied by the different locations in the performance that “continuously dislocates the viewers 
who through this process of Verfremdung are allowed a multiple perception of their own 
ontological position” in the urban landscape (2007: 59). Giannachi’s use of Verfremdung is 
derived from Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt or “distancing effect”.21 The deployment of the 
distancing effect in performance, as Brecht elucidates, “prevents the audience from losing itself 
passively and completely in the character created by the actor,” and thereby affords them the role 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#"!John Willett notes that Brecht’s verfremdungseffekt or “distancing effect” requires the performer to address the 
audience directly, to the extent that the “audience can no longer have the illusion of being the unseen spectator at an 
event which is really taking place” (1964: 91). As Willett explains, this method of spectator address breaks down the 
imaginary fourth wall between the performers and the audience.!!
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of “a consciously critical observer” (qtd. in Willet 1964: 91). If we accept Giannachi’s point that 
the process of Verfremdung in Rider Spoke mobilizes “a multiple perception” of the audience 
members’ “ontological position” in the city, then it is essential that we not only acknowledge the 
embodied nature of such a perceptual engagement but also its potential to de-familiarize the 
urban environment for the human participants involved in the performance.  
The overlaying of auditory and visual information onto the urban environment in London 
produces an augmented reality event in which the graphical representation of a room and the 
audio recording of a personal story can exist alongside the materiality of a road intersection, a 
building, or a tree. This grafting of various visual, auditory, and informational spaces onto 
specific locations in the city transforms the urban landscape into what Giannachi calls “a mixed 
reality palimpsest” that comprises “a user-generated repository of more or less ‘truthful’ 
ephemeral memories” (2007: 357). The production of such a “mixed reality palimpsest” through 
a combination of technological and human interventions serves to de-familiarize the environment 
in which the audience members perform the hiding and seeking of recorded narratives. Even for 
audience members who are familiar with the city, the possibility of exploring how the different 
forms of space relate to a certain location offers them “a new perspective” from which to 
“experience their local environment” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 20). Indeed, as one 
participant reported in the post-show survey, he or she “thought it might be interesting to be 
made to look at London in a different way” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 21). The suggestion 
that Rider Spoke is capable of making the audience members look at their city in a different way 
points to the influence of intermedial performance on the human perception of space.  
In an interview with Gabriella Giannachi, the lead designer of Rider Spoke, Matt Adams, 
speaks of the “disparity between the city as a place of quotidian banality that’s based around 
drudgery and servicing our various needs on the one hand and the city as a fantastic place for 
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otherness and endless possibilities and where multiple worlds are nested in one another” (2005). 
What the intermedial performance captures through the juxtaposition of virtual and real elements 
at various locations in the city is the creative potential that unfolds from this disparity between 
the everyday practices of city life (commuting to and from work, for example) and the ability of 
city dwellers to transform existing places into generative spaces for recreation, art, and critical 
thinking. Such a flexible treatment of spaces in the city is reflected in the artistic philosophy that 
undergirds the production of Rider Spoke. By refusing to define the concept or theme of the 
performance in concrete terms, Adams believes that he is able to encourage people to think about 
“the ways that technology is mediating their relationships with other players and the artwork 
generally” (2005). In other words, Adams and his team are deploying a dramaturgical approach 
that fosters critical reflection among the audience members on the ways in which mobile 
technology might influence their experience of the urban spaces that constitute the city.  
It is apparent that the designers of Rider Spoke are practising what I call “critical techno-
dramaturgy,” as they seek to engage with the audience members’ perception of how mobile 
computing technology intervenes in their relationships with the urban environment as well as the 
human participants in the performance. “Critical techno-dramaturgy,” as I have outlined in 
Chapter 2, is a dramaturgical method involving two inter-related approaches: (1) the deliberate 
structuring of the interplay between the human participants and the new media technologies 
featured on the intermedial stage in ways that destabilize the audience’s familiarity with how they 
might be embodied with these technologies; and (2) the capacity of the intermedial performance 
to engage with the different perceptual modes of the audience members. In the case of Rider 
Spoke, the practice of “critical techno-dramaturgy” is embodied by the mapping of visual, 
auditory, and informational content onto physical locations through the use of mobile computing 
devices, as well as the employment of low-tech bicycles to facilitate mobility among the audience 
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members. As such, Blast Theory’s techno-dramaturgical approach raises important questions 
about the embodiment of human beings with technology and its effects on the human perception 
of space. Moreover, by harnessing the technological affordances of mobile computing devices 
and the locative potential of Wi-Fi Fingerprinting to connect each audience member to the 
personal stories of other audience members, questions pertaining to the associations between 
human and nonhuman agents in intermedial performance have become particularly apposite in 
our analysis of Rider Spoke.  
In order to understand how mobile computing devices can influence the human perception 
of space, we must first examine the dialectical relationship between “space” and “place”. As the 
French philosopher Michel de Certeau elucidates in The Practice of Everyday Life, “space” is 
conceived as a “practiced place,” in the sense that it emerges from the spatial practices of human 
beings, whereas “place” is regarded as “an indication of stability” that entails the situation of 
various elements at specific locations (1984: 117). What de Certeau’s theorization reveals is that 
spaces tend to articulate the fluidity of the “spatial operations” that transpire at a particular 
location, while places are static markers of the position of elements, such as a building or a tree 
(1984: 118). We can think of the Barbican Arts Centre in London as a place that is defined by the 
distinct positions of the elements (for example, the theatre, the concert hall, and the atrium) that it 
houses. But when the participants in Rider Spoke begin to ride their bicycles on the streets of 
London and record their stories on the mobile computers, their actions serve to actualize a 
multitude of narrative spaces that can be associated with particular places like the Barbican or 
Cheapside Street in the financial nucleus of London. This transformation of places into spaces is 
predicated on the spatial practices of the audience members who cycle across the city at nightfall 
in search of different locations at which to listen to the personal stories of other audience 
members or to record their own. This free-flowing act of travelling through the urban spaces of 
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London on bicycles – as opposed to the adoption of a pre-determined route – seems to cohere 
with the French sociologist Guy Debord’s urban theory.  
 Debord was a co-founder of the Situationist movement in France. Operating in the 1960s, 
the Situationists endeavoured to critique the excesses of capitalism and consumer culture in urban 
life through the embodied production of art in the city. Much of the philosophical legitimacy of 
the Situationist movement hinges on Debord’s notion of the “spectacle”. Writing in The Society 
of the Spectacle, Debord asserts that, “[i]n societies dominated by modern conditions of 
production, life is presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was 
directly lived has receded into a representation” (1977: 1). Debord believes that society’s 
adoption of a capitalist mode of production that privileges the consumption of commodities and 
images has impeded the ability of human beings to directly experience the reality in which they 
live. However, he is quick to emphasize that, “[t]he spectacle is not a collection of images, but a 
social relation among people, mediated by images” (1977: 4). Images mediate the relationships 
between city dwellers, and as a result of such an imagistic mediation, the society of the spectacle 
comes to fruition. For this reason, Debord was also concerned about the weakening of collective 
social bonds among city dwellers and their experience of urban isolation. He argues that the 
technological products of the capitalist economic system are capable of inducing urban isolation, 
particularly as:   
The economic system founded on isolation is a circular production of isolation. 
The technology is based on isolation, and the technical process isolates in turn. 
From the automobile to television, all the goods selected by the spectacular system 
are also its weapons for a constant reinforcement of the conditions of isolation of 
‘lonely crowds’. (Debord 1977: 28)  
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Both the automobile and the television can isolate the human subject by erecting an enclosed 
space that forecloses the potential for any physical interaction with the external reality. Driving a 
car to work or watching television at home is akin to living in a box, thereby inducing an 
isolating experience that stands in contrast to the embodied acts of walking and cycling in the 
city. Choosing to walk or cycle, as opposed to watching television at home or travelling in an 
automobile, unfolds the possibility of encountering other people along the way, whether or not 
we are acquainted with them. The fortuity of such embodied experiences speaks directly to 
Debord’s psycho-geographic concept of the dérive. 
 According to Debord, the Situationists conceived of psycho-geography as “the study of 
specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions 
and behaviour of individuals” (“Introduction” 1955). In order to understand the psychological 
effects of human interactions with the physical environment, Debord and the Situationists 
devised the embodied practice of the dérive, which literally means “drifting” in French. The 
dérive, as Debord theorizes it, is a playful and generative “technique of rapid passage through 
varied ambiances” (“Theory” 1958: 1). In contrast to strolling, the participants in the dérive need 
to be aware of the “psycho-geographical effects” of the spaces that they encounter in the city 
(“Theory” 1958: 1). These spaces may include bridges, tunnels, as well as secluded passages 
adorned with murals or graffiti. For this reason, a dérive session typically involves “one or more 
persons [who] during a certain period drop their relations, their work and leisure activities, and all 
their other usual motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions 
of the terrain and the encounters they find there” (“Theory” 1958: 1). Consequently, participants 
in a dérive are encouraged to not only interact with the environmental structures that define the 
urban spaces through which they drift but also to allow the shape and contour of each location to 
affect their general perception of space in the city.  
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    In Rider Spoke, the use of mobile computers intervenes in the audience members’ 
perception of space, as they drift through the streets of London. Without conforming to a pre-
determined itinerary, the participants in the intermedial performance are able to wander around 
the city and explore the different locales in the urban landscape on their own terms. As such, we 
can say that Rider Spoke operates as a dérive in which the audience members are free to engage 
with the urban terrain and the activities that transpire at various locations. However, what sets the 
dérive in this performance apart from the dérive developed by the Situationists is the combinatory 
use of bicycles and mobile computing devices to facilitate movement (or drifting) through the 
urban environment and the production of narrative space through the recording of personal stories 
on mobile computers. Rather than walking through the city, the audience members are embodied 
with the bicycles that partake in their journey to different places in the city. Furthermore, the 
operation of the dérive in Rider Spoke affords the audience members the opportunity to connect 
with the thoughts and feelings of other audience members in a network of social relations that is 
mediated through audio recordings. But perhaps the definition of “network” in our analysis of the 
performance should be expanded to include the human associations with such nonhuman entities 
as mobile communication devices that contribute to the establishment and maintenance of social 
relations in a city.  
Commenting on the associational quality of networks, the French sociologist and 
philosopher of technology Bruno Latour asserts that the relations between the various human and 
nonhuman actors in the network are constantly changing and evolving (2005: 8). As a result, 
these relations need to be consistently “performed” in order to prevent the network from fading 
away (2005: 8-9). In other words, the existence of a network relies on the relational performances 
between human and nonhuman actors rather than a predefined social structure. Latour analyzes 
the relationships between various actors in a network through what he calls “Actor-Network 
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Theory” or “ANT”. As an analytical model, ANT is not interested in the “social ties” between 
individual things. Instead, the meaning of the word “social” in Latour’s formulation of ANT 
refers to the “momentary association” between different actors, as modifications can be made to 
the organization of these actors at any given moment (2005: 65). Hence, the network that is the 
subject of analysis in ANT is characterized by how it gathers together various entities in order to 
reveal new combinations that can be explored (2005: 65).  
Despite its focus on the associational relations between actors in a network, ANT does not 
endeavour to determine the intentions of individual by claiming to “ever know if society is 
‘really’ made of small individual calculative agents or of huge macro-actors” (2005: 30). ANT, 
according to Latour, is relativist in the sense that it aims “to render the social connections 
[between actors] traceable” (2005: 30). As such, it is important to study the traces left by the 
formation of groups without imposing a predetermined framework onto the network of 
associations. However, as Latour points out, social aggregates are not always made of “human” 
relationships (2005: 42). For this reason, we need to also consider the traces of nonhuman 
interactions in the network. Looking at Rider Spoke, we can see that the communication between 
the mobile computer and the wireless access points at various locations in London constitutes a 
nonhuman interaction that enables the human actors to discover the personal stories that have 
been hidden at those locations. If the associational relations between the mobile computing 
device and the Wi-Fi hotspots are disrupted or destroyed, the human actors in the performance 
would not be able to perform their stories. In this case, the network of associations among the 
human and nonhuman actors would cease to materialize.  
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In terms of how the actor-network performs, Latour insists that the actor,22 whether it is 
human or nonhuman, “is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of 
entities swarming toward it” (2005: 46). An actor acts with, and is “made to act,” by other actors 
(2005: 46). Invoking the implicit tautology of action, wherein the distinction between “doing” 
and “being done to” is fraught with ambiguity, Latour reminds us that it is “never clear who and 
what is acting when we act since an actor on stage is never alone in acting” (2005: 46). An actor 
becomes an actor-network insofar as it acts only as a result of its associations with other actors. 
The human participants in Rider Spoke do not act on their own but alongside the bicycles, mobile 
computers, wireless access points, the audio recordings of personal stories, and the urban spaces 
that contribute heterogeneously to the sustenance of the actor-network. Besides, as Latour 
observes, action in an actor-network is distributed among the different actors (2005: 50). What 
this means is that the sources that inspire the actor to act – i.e., the sources of agency in the actor-
network – are multiple (2005: 50).  
For Latour, having agency means to make a difference to something by transforming it. In 
Rider Spoke, the human actors possess the agency to create a repository of personal stories that 
could potentially affect the thoughts and feelings of the audience members who listen to the 
narratives. However, we cannot necessarily claim that the human actors are the source of their 
own agency. According to Blast Theory, many of the participants in the performance (about 
70%) have reported that the places at which they recorded their stories have affected the quality 
of their narratives. As one participant remarks in the post-show comments: “When hiding in old 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!##!Latour’s clarification of what he means by “actor” in his formulation of actor-network theory (ANT) is 
instructive: “An “actor” in ANT is a semiotic definition – an actant –, that is something that acts or to which activity 
is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general. An actant 
can literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of an action” (Latour 1997: 373). Latour’s ANT is not 
concerned about the intention of an actor, be it human or nonhuman, but rather its performance in the network.     !
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alleys that reminded me of what Victorian London might have looked like, I think I romanticised 
the answers a bit more” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 30). Understanding the performative 
nature of recording personal stories in a public area, this participant sought to dramatize his or her 
narrative to suit what he or she perceives to be the mood associated with a certain location. 
Another participant notes how “I wasn’t going to speak at length about my father whilst standing 
in a grimy back alley that stank of excrement” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 30). It is 
interesting that both participants regard the old back alleys of London in remarkably different 
ways. One participant perceives the old back alleys as characteristic of the romantic charm of 
Victorian London, whereas the other participant appears to be affected by the negative aspects of 
London’s back alleys, particularly the stench that they exude. Looking back at the post-show 
comments provided by these two participants, it seems apparent that the physical attributes of the 
locations have influenced the quality of their narratives. However, neither the locations nor the 
human actors can be deemed as the source of the action to record the personal narratives. Instead, 
it is the action that a human actor performs at a specific location that reinforces the actor-
network.   
Performance, as the theatre scholar Susan Kozel argues, is “never simply [an] exposition 
from [the] body outward” (2007: 70). As a performance scholar and a dancer, Kozel holds that 
the act of performing “involves the awareness of being in a state of reception and initiation 
between inside and outside, modulation and response,” as the human body interacts with a 
myriad of entities and spaces (2007: 70). Being aware of one’s action does not mean that the 
action originates in the human actor. Rather, the human actor is constantly receiving the effects of 
external stimuli and responding to them through actions. Kozel makes the point that we as human 
actors are thinking and aware of our actions as we perform them. Action is therefore entwined 
with a conscious sense of awareness. “Performance,” as Kozel sees it, “entails a reflective 
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intentionality on the part of the performer herself, a decision to see/feel/hear herself as 
performing while she is performing, a decision to see/feel/hear others performing while she 
watches them perform” (2007: 69). We should not confuse the reflective intentionality of the 
performer with the intention to perform an action. Recalling Latour’s observation of how actors 
always perform alongside other actors, we are reminded that the performer’s intention to act is 
always already informed by the actions of other performers. The human performer does not act 
passively in response to the actions of others. By being aware of his or her actions and those 
performed by others, the performer gets to reflect on the embodied character of the human body 
and its relationship with space.  
Riding a bicycle from one location to another in the city allows the audience members in 
Rider Spoke to experience a heightened sense of their embodiment within space. In addition to 
the physical toil that comes with peddling a bicycle across the urban landscape for over an hour, 
the audience members also have to interact with the virtual interface on the mobile computer and 
record stories on the device. In light of what the designers call “the dual-task-based nature of the 
experience,” whereby the audience members get to wander around the city on bicycles while 
interacting with a mobile computing device, many participants claim that the performance made 
them feel “physically awakened and engaged” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 36). At the same 
time, some of them express fear for their personal safety as they traverse the narrow streets of 
London at night. The need to pay attention to one’s surroundings while focusing on the 
combinatory task of riding a bicycle and interacting with the virtual interface on a mobile 
computer can be physically and mentally demanding for the audience members involved in the 
performance. Having to keep a constant lookout for both vehicular and pedestrian traffic, they 
push and encounter the limits of their cognitive abilities and physical coordination. It is this 
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experience of physical vulnerability and cognitive strain that reinforces the audience members’ 
sense of embodiment.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the body as a physiological entity stands in contrast 
to the phenomenological experience of embodiment, even though the human experience of 
embodiment is rooted in the material existence of the body. In her analysis of the cultural 
construction of the body in the age of digital technology, N. Katherine Hayles makes a careful 
distinction between the body as a cultural concept and the experience of embodiment. 
“Regardless of how it is imagined,” she explains:  
‘The body’ generalizes from a group of samples and in this sense always misses 
someone’s particular body, which necessarily departs in greater or lesser measure 
from the culturally constructed norm. At the other end of the spectrum lie our 
experiences of embodiment. While these experiences are also culturally 
constructed, they are not entirely so, for they emerge from the complex 
interactions between conscious mind and the physiological structures that are the 
result of millennia of biological evolution. (2002: 297) 
Hayles believes that the cultural construction of the body assumes a normative ideal of the human 
body by which all bodies are measured, whereas our sense of embodiment results from the 
interactions between the conscious mind and the physiology of the human body. In this sense, our 
experience of embodiment is always already a subjective experience that evolves in accordance 
with the changes in the constitution of our bodies and minds. “Embodiment,” as Hayles 
conceives it, “is experienced from the inside, from the feelings, emotions, and sensations that 
constitute the vibrant living textures of our lives” (2002: 297). Changes to our bodies may alter 
our sense of embodiment, but they will not destroy it. Hence, losing a part of our physical body 
will not result in a total loss of our sense of embodiment, which is an internal experience.  
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 To understand the possibility of retaining our sense of embodiment in the face of 
technological mediation, let us revisit the combinatory use of bicycles and mobile computers in 
Rider Spoke. Riding on bicycles outfitted with mobile computing devices on the handlebars, the 
participants in this intermedial performance are required to cycle through a labyrinth of streets 
and obscure passages in search of a number of chosen locations where they can listen to and 
record personal messages. As these participants cycle across London, the physical effort required 
to rotate the pedals that keep the wheels moving allows the riders to be conscious of their 
embodied existence. In this way, the participants in the performance are able to sustain their 
sense of embodiment while exercising the lower extremities of their bodies. As Susan Kozel 
remarks in her phenomenological study of embodiment in intermedial performance, “we perceive 
through our technologies, we create through them, and they are entwined with our bodies” (2007: 
77). Kozel believes that our engagement with technology can reveal aspects of embodiment. 
“[B]y means of intentional performance with technologies,” she contends, “we can regard 
technologies not as tools, but as filters or membranes for our encounters with others” (2007: 70). 
Indeed, the technological implements employed in Rider Spoke – the bicycle, the mobile 
computer, and the Wi-Fi Fingerprinting technology – are more than just tools that support the 
actualization of the performance. As nonhuman actors in the actor-network, which is a network 
of associations between human and nonhuman actors, these technological implements mediate 
the relationships that the audience members share with the physical and narrative spaces that they 
encounter in the performance.   
What sets the embodied act of cycling apart from walking is that cycling requires you to 
be in constant contact with a technological contraption that facilitates mobility; you have to rotate 
the pedals in order to move forward with the bicycle. However, while the physical exertion that 
comes with cycling may serve to reinforce the audience members’ sense of embodiment, it might 
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be tempting to assume that this feeling of embodiment would cease whenever the locative alert is 
sounded on the mobile computing device and the audience members are told to stop at a specific 
location. This assumption seems all the more plausible when we consider how the participants 
are immersed in the virtual world of the mobile device, as they listen to personal stories and 
record their own. But even as the virtual content in the mobile device appears to isolate the 
perception of the audience members (particularly as they focus on searching for and listening to 
personal stories recorded by other riders), the human-computer interaction is one that 
simultaneously engages the visual, auditory, oral, and haptic senses. Besides listening to and 
orally recording personal stories, the movement of the participants’ eyes in search of story titles 
on the screen is accompanied by the tactile interaction of the finger that presses the touch-screen 
interface in order to select the desired narrative. Despite the lower physical intensity involved 
here, the audience members are still able to experience their own embodiment through the 
coordination of the body’s cognitive and physical functions, which are similarly activated when 
riding a bicycle.  
Being physically engaged with the bicycle and the mobile computer presents the audience 
members with the opportunity to critically reflect on their sense of embodiment as well as their 
perception of space. As one participant reports, the experience of Rider Spoke “certainly 
provoked me into my own personal analysis of space, its fictionalisation and the use of 
technology to intervene in our thinking of and use of space and place” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 
2007: 23). We can gather from this response that the participant discerns the critical potential of 
the performance and how it encourages the audience members to reflect on technology’s effects 
on the human perception of space. Our perception of space, according to Merleau-Ponty, is 
conditioned by the “phenomenology” of our existence in the world (2002: 340). We need to be 
aware of our physical existence in the world in order to perceive the objects, spaces, and places 
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that constitute that world. Spatial perception, as Merleau-Ponty understands it, is formed around 
what he calls “a sensible nucleus” through which we can verify our experience of the objects, 
spaces, and places that we encounter (2002: 342). Looking at how humans perceive the physical 
environment, the British anthropologist Tim Ingold proposes that what we regard as “places do 
not have locations but histories. Bound together by the itineraries of their inhabitants, places exist 
not in space but as nodes in a matrix of movement” (2000: 219). For Ingold, the existence of 
places hinges on the movement of their inhabitants rather than their topographical position. 
Places evolve in tandem with the activities of the people who populate them. As more urban 
dwellers begin to employ digital technology such as mobile phones with in-built cameras and 
sound recorders to chronicle their activities in the city, places have now become nodes for the 
production of creative spaces. Given that these creative spaces can be shared between individuals 
through a wireless network, the next section examines how the use of voice recordings in Rider 
Spoke actuates the transindividual transmission of memories among the audience members.  
 
3.4 The Voice of Transindividual Memories 
 The recording of personal stories on mobile devices at various locations across the city of 
London foregrounds the role that digital technology plays in facilitating the transmission of 
thoughts, feelings, and knowledge from one individual to another. The French philosopher 
Gilbert Simondon holds that the process of individuation is always already social, as “the forces 
of the future harboured within a number of living individuals lead to a collective structuration” 
(LPC 184). However, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, the individuation of psychic individuals 
as a collective does not presuppose the existence of a community. Rather, the collective emerges 
from the process of individuating psychic individuals. This passage from psychic to collective 
individuation results in what Simondon refers to as “transindividuation”. Simondon argues that 
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the process of transindividuation embodies an “interhuman relation” that is mobilized by “the 
intermediary of the technical object” (LPC 29). It is the technical object, he contends, that 
“carries with it something of the being that produced it” (LPC 29). In other words, the technical 
object serves to actualize the conservation of memories that can be transmitted from one person 
to another across the dimensions of space and time. For the participants in Rider Spoke, one of 
the technical objects takes the form of voice recordings that not only archive their personal 
narratives but also enable the sharing of these stories with other audience members. 
Upon pressing the “start” button on the screen of the mobile computing device, the 
audience members would hear the calm voice of Ju Row Farr, a co-founder of Blast Theory, who 
asks them to find a place where they feel most comfortable recording their stories. As the mobile 
technology researcher Jason Farman explains, the participants in the October 2007 production of 
Rider Spoke were “prompted to either ‘Hide,’ which allowed them to find a location related to 
one of Farr’s prompts, such as ‘Find a place that reminds you of your father and record a story 
about it,’ or ‘Find others,’ which allowed users to ‘seek’ other people’s narratives located 
throughout the city” (2012: 104). The audience members were required to physically identify 
different places at which to either record their stories or tune in to the narratives of other audience 
members. Even though they did not get to see one another during the performance, they were 
able to interact with each other through their recorded voices. Farman regards the transmission of 
human voices through the technological mediation of the mobile computer as a perceptible means 
by which to “establish embodied connections and a sense of presence between interlocutors” 
(2012: 105). To understand how the use of sound makes it possible for the audience members to 
perceive the presence of other audience members and to experience “embodied connections” with 
them, we must consider the way that humans experience sound.    
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 Walter J. Ong, in his analysis of oral culture, contends that sound envelopes the listener 
and “incorporates” him or her into the auditory world (1982: 72). Sound, he explains, “pours into 
the hearer,” as opposed to sight, which “situates the observer outside what he [or she] views, at a 
distance” (1982: 72). Ong sees vision as the dissecting sense that allows the human subject to 
discriminate between the different things that he or she encounters by moving the eyes from one 
object to the next. Sound, however, can be experienced from multiple directions at the same time. 
Because it is impossible for the human being to direct his or her ears towards the source from 
which a specific sound originates, Ong believes that sound is capable of unifying the listener’s 
sense of the world (1982: 72). He observes that in an oral culture, words are experienced only as 
sounds. In light of the auditory character of speech, “the phenomenology of sound,” as Ong 
perceives it, “enters deeply into human beings’ feel for existence” (1982: 73). Since the 
phenomenological experience of sound is capable of heightening the human being’s sense of 
existence, perhaps the medium of sound (the human voice, to be exact) might also help the 
audience members in Rider Spoke to discern the embodied presence of the other audience 
members who are involved in the same performance.  
The transindividual transmission of audio recordings from one audience member to 
another engenders a sense of community among all the participants in the performance, as they 
tune in to the personal narratives that have been digitally “hidden” at various locations across 
London. However, as Simondon reminds us, the emergence of a community of psychic 
individuals is not predetermined. Rather, each audience member individuates himself or herself 
by crafting and recording personal stories on the mobile computing device. As the audio 
recordings of these stories are shared among the participants of the performance, each audience 
member is able to connect with the feelings and thoughts of another audience member through 
the phenomenological experience of his or her vocal presence on the earpiece connected to the 
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mobile device. Hearing the recorded voices of other individuals, as opposed to reading a textual 
rendering of their stories, creates a tangible sense of presence and proximity among all the 
participants in the performance. But in contrast to the immediate and unfiltered quality of “live” 
voices, the audience members in Rider Spoke do not experience this sense of aural proximity 
directly. Instead, the audio recordings of the audience members’ voices mediate the aural 
proximity that they share.  
“Mediated aural proximity,” as the British media theorist Michael Bull asserts, 
“constitutes states of ‘we-ness’ whereby ‘direct’ experience is either substituted or transformed 
by a mediated, technological form of aural experience” (Bull 2007: 6). The possibility of 
generating a sense of “we-ness” among the audience members in Rider Spoke is actualized by the 
technological mediation of their aural experiences in the performance. Commenting on the use of 
technology in Blast Theory’s performances, the Australian communications researcher Rowan 
Wilken reasons that while “mobiles [mobile computing devices] can be used to reinforce existing 
social networks (connecting known with known), they also have the potential to open up new 
social and interactive possibilities (perhaps through connecting known with unknown, and 
stranger with stranger)” (2013: 179). Indeed, the use of mobile computing devices in an 
intermedial performance does present audience members with the opportunity to establish new 
connections with strangers. In addition, the awareness that there are strangers listening to the 
audio recordings may inspire some audience members to be more inventive with the content that 
they produce during the course of the performance.  
In the October 2007 production of Rider Spoke, some participants attempted to dress up 
their stories to make them sound more appealing to the other audience members who might come 
across the recordings at a later time. As one participant remarked in the post-show comments, “I 
was much more performative. I often made things and characters up to make it interesting, both 
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for me and the other listeners” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 25). The inventiveness of the 
audience members as they construct their narratives reveals their awareness of the unknown 
listeners for whom they are performing the voice recordings. Yet, whether the content of these 
recordings are factual or fictional matters less than the reality that they have been composed by 
living individuals who are present at a specific location and at a particular time as they record 
their stories. Regardless of the content of the personal stories, each audio track contains the 
memories of the individuals who perform the voice recordings. In turn, by sharing the audio 
recordings among the participants in the performance, each audience member is able to hear the 
voice of transindividual memories being transmitted from one individual to another. Moreover, 
many of the audio recordings also contain ambient sounds that offer the listener an auditory 
impression of the locations at which the stories have been recorded. As a result, each audience 
member is able to connect intimately with the voices of other audience members as well as the 
auditory signals that represent the context within which the recordings occurred.  
Referring to the exchange of recorded voices among the participants in Rider Spoke, 
Gabriella Giannachi argues that the performance constitutes “a ‘living’ archive of different types 
of voices who either witnessed a particular event or whose recollections were witnessed by 
others” (2010: 357). Giannachi makes the point that the audience members are not simply 
recording the events that they have encountered in their lives. As they perform their stories in 
public, the audience members “not only became the unwitting performers of the piece” but were 
also instrumental in transforming “bystanders into performers by presenting what they saw to 
others” (2010: 357). Far from being passive witnesses of the performativity of the audience 
members who are recording their personal narratives, the bystanders are active participants in the 
transindividual transmission of individual memories. By electing to record video clips of the 
audience members’ auditory performances on mobile phones or to orally relate what they 
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witnessed to friends and family members, the bystanders are able to extend the network of 
transindividual relations in the performance to include people who did not encounter the 
performance event in person. But despite the sharing of transindividual relations among the 
participants, several of them did express their frustration with what they perceive to be “the lack 
of any real interactivity or feeling of connection” with other audience members (D17.3 CCG 
Final Report 2007: 25). These participants claim that the performance did not provide them with 
an avenue through which to respond to the stories that they hear, an oversight that seems to 
diminish the potential for establishing a reciprocal relationship with other audience members. By 
curtailing the vocal reciprocity among the audience members, Rider Spoke foregrounds the 
politics of voice that undergirds the relationship between speakers and listeners.  
In a commentary on the politics of voice, the British media scholar Nick Couldry regards 
the act of listening as an ethical gesture through which the listener opens up towards the other. 
Couldry argues that the listening is “the act of recognizing what others have to say, recognizing 
that they […] like all human beings, have the capacity to give an account of their lives that is 
reflexive and continuous, an ongoing, embodied process of reflection” (2009: 579-580). Speaking 
and listening are both embodied processes that are informed by the self-reflexive capacity of the 
human actors involved in the reciprocal exchange of voices. Couldry believes that the human 
capacity to give a vocal account of their lives “is an irreducible part of their human agency” 
(2009: 580). For him, it is the act of listening that recognizes that agency. As such, he concludes 
that speaking is an embodied process of recognizing the voice of the other as a reflexive human 
agent (2009: 580). In other words, having “voice,” as Couldry sees it, is a reciprocal process that 
gives “voice” to other people by honouring their capacity to respond.   
While having the opportunity to respond to the audio recordings in Rider Spoke may have 
heightened the audience members’ sense of interactivity in the performance, the capacity to listen 
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to the voices of other audience members through the mobile computing device does offer each 
individual participant the opportunity to make “a connection […] via place to another person’s 
thoughts, feelings, [and] recollections” of the events in that person’s life (D17.3 CCG Final 
Report 2007: 27). In fact, most of the participants in the performance reported a preference for 
stories that present “an insight into the person’s life and relationships” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 
2007: 28). Having the opportunity to engage with the private stories of strangers seems to induce 
a feeling of intimacy among the audience members. By listening to the personal narratives 
depicted in the voice recordings, “[i]ntimate details of relationships could be vicariously 
experienced, peopling an otherwise impersonal environment with divorces, ex-wives, girlfriends 
and stories about their fathers” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 28). With the intervention of the 
audio recording capability of the mobile computer, these personal stories can be conserved as 
voice recordings and shared among the participants in the performance. Moreover, the ability to 
experience the intimacy of someone else’s voice allows each audience member to perceive the 
embodied existence of other audience members in the urban landscape. However, there also 
seems to be a connection between the places that the audience members traverse and the narrative 
spaces that they fashion at those locations.  
The connection between the details of personal stories and the places at which they are 
recorded is rendered salient in Rider Spoke when audience members consider the dramatic 
potential of the setting in which they perform the voice recordings. As one participant explains: 
“I usually looked for picturesque locations to stop. Places that looked suitable for a bit of 
reflection. Sometimes I looked for a marriage with the location and the mission – making a 
promise on the steps of the Old Bailey” (D17.3 CCG Final Report 2007: 31). The Old Bailey is a 
historic court building in London. From the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, the 
building served as a place for public hangings. Given that a legal oath of truth is often taken 
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during court proceedings, making a promise on the steps of a court building seems to be an 
appropriate gesture. Besides, anyone listening to this participant’s narrative (even someone who 
is unacquainted with London) would be able to discern a relationship between the Old Bailey and 
the significance of making promises at that place. In turn, the connection between place and the 
production of social space through the exchange of personal narratives could potentially affect 
the spatial perception of human beings. Looking closely at the September 2013 production of 
Landline: Halifax to Vancouver, the following section will examine how text messaging on 
mobile phones can shape the human perception of connectivity and intimacy, especially when the 
interlocutors are located in two different cities.  
 
3.5 Connectivity and Intimacy in Landline 
Devised by Dustin Harvey from the Secret Theatre in Halifax and Adrienne Wong from 
the Vancouver-based Neworld Theatre, Landline is an intermedial performance that connects two 
individuals from two different cities located on the opposite coasts of Canada. The performance 
made its first run from September 20th to 22nd, 2013, during which the organizers provided each 
audience member with a mobile phone and an iPod that featured an audio guide. The purpose of 
this audio guide was to direct the audience members towards certain elements in the city that 
stood out for them. As they tuned their ears to the voice of Adrienne Wong and her audio 
prompts on the iPod, the audience members from Halifax and Vancouver exchanged text 
messages with each other using mobile phones as they walked around their home city. Thus, 
Landline is not only an intermedial performance that foregrounds the interplay between the iPod 
and the mobile phone but also an ambulatory performance that engages the auditory, visual, and 
kinaesthetic senses of the audience members who are in contact with one another despite the 
physical distance that separates them.  
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On the face of it, Landline looks like an updated version of Blast Theory’s Rider Spoke in 
its use of mobile devices (in this case, the iPod and the mobile phone) and its incorporation of the 
city as a platform on which the audience members can physically explore the ways that digital 
technology intervenes in their relationship with urban spaces. However, what sets this intermedial 
performance apart from Rider Spoke is its emphasis on pedestrianism and the instant connectivity 
afforded by text messaging on mobile phones. Instead of riding a bicycle and listening to site-
specific audio recordings on mobile computers, as is the case with Rider Spoke, the combinatory 
act of traversing the urban environment on foot and connecting with another person in real-time 
through text messaging enables the audience members in Landline to choreograph an intimate 
encounter with each other as well as the environmental features of their home city. As stated in 
the introductory remarks in the published script, Landline is “designed to relocate and make 
connections between cities nationally and internationally” (2014: 70). Consequently, the notions 
of connectivity and intimacy are rendered salient in the performance, as the audience members 
attempt to forge an intimate social connection with one another and the urban landscapes in 
which they exist as embodied beings.  
Making its debut in September 2013, Landline is considered a relatively new 
performance. For this reason, there is a paucity of scholarly literature about the project and its 
impact on the development of social relationships in the age of mobile telecommunications. 
Nevertheless, I intend to examine how this intermedial performance can help us understand the 
effects of such mobile technological devices as the iPod and the mobile phone on the human 
perception of embodiment and the production of social space in an urban setting. As the audience 
members from Halifax and Vancouver entered the “bases” – office spaces that the organizers use 
as command centres for the performance – in their respective home cities, they each received a 
mobile phone and an iPod that had been preloaded with an audio guide narrated by Adrienne 
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Wong. I should note that the iPod used in the September 2013 production of Landline was not 
equipped with Wi-Fi. As such, the audience members could not access the Internet or send text 
messages using the audio player. To facilitate the exchange of text messages between the 
participants who were located in two separate cities, the audience members had to rely on their 
own mobile phones. While most of us living in North America would be familiar with the 
functions of the mobile phone and the iPod (including the non-Wi-Fi versions), we may not be 
aware of the different ways in which these two digital devices condition our perception of the 
spaces that surround us in the city.  
Focusing on the impact of mobile technologies on everyday life, Michael Bull argues that 
the iPod and the mobile phone operate as “technologies of separation” that allow individuals to 
“retreat from urban space” and to “remove themselves” from the “physicality” of inter-personal 
interactions in the city (2007: 28). Even as we traverse the public spaces of the urban landscape, 
we may not be participating in face-to-face interactions with the people whom we encounter in 
the city. Instead, we are more likely to turn our attention to the mobile phone and the iPod that 
travel with us as mobile companions on our journeys across the city. “Mobility,” as Bull explains, 
“is inscribed into both the iPod and mobile phone, as is their potential to reorder users’ 
experience of time and space” (2007: 67). Whenever we use a mobile phone to make calls and 
exchange text messages or turn on an iPod to listen to music and audio narratives, we are 
modulating our perception of time and space through our embodiment with the technological 
devices. We may not always be conscious of how the mobile phone and the iPod affect our 
experience of the world, but there are qualitative differences between the effects of each of these 
digital devices on our perception of space.  
 To illustrate the differing effects of the mobile phone and the iPod (specifically the non-
Wi-Fi version of the audio player), Bull distinguishes between what he calls “continuous” and 
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“discontinuous” mobile technologies. For him, the mobile phone represents a “discontinuous” 
mobile technology, as “the contingency of the world becomes apparent with each unexpected 
call, received or not” (2007: 68). With mobile phones, he reasons, the arrival of a call or a text 
message can disrupt the seemingly continuous flow of events in the urban environment, whereas 
the non-Wi-Fi enabled iPod represents a “continuous” mobile technology that isolates the user 
from the auditory stimuli of the surrounding world.23 “The experience of continuity,” as Bull 
asserts, “is most commonly evoked through the use of an iPod whereby users construct seamless 
auditory bubbles for themselves as they move through daily life communing with the products of 
the culture industry” (2007: 68). Equipped with ear buds that are designed to cancel out, though 
not completely, the sounds of the urban environment, users of the non-Wi-Fi enabled iPod 
“banish the contingency of daily life through immersing themselves within their very own private 
utopia in which they do not speak, but listen […] through the spaces of the city” (2007: 68). By 
using the iPod as a mobile technology, the inhabitants of the city can transform the public spaces 
of the urban landscape into private spaces for auditory immersion. For Bull, it is the immersive 
experience in a private auditory space afforded by the non-Wi-Fi enabled iPod that allows the 
users of this mobile technology to perceive themselves as “living in the continuous rhythm of 
unproblematic reception” and social isolation (2007: 68). But it is worth noting that Bull’s 
distinction between “continuous” and “discontinuous” mobile technologies may not necessarily 
apply to the Wi-Fi enabled iPod, which collapses the audio playback function of the non-Wi-Fi 
enabled iPod and the text messaging and web browsing capabilities of a mobile phone or 
smartphone into a single portable device. With all these functions contained in the same device, it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#$!Bull’s observations about the iPod were written before the September 2007 release of the Apple iPod Touch, 
which was the company’s first audio player with Wi-Fi connectivity and a touchscreen interface. Almost all iPod 
players today can be used with Wi-Fi for browsing the web and also for texting. For this reason, Bull’s description of 
the iPod as a “continuous” mobile technology only applies to the earlier, non-Wi-Fi enabled versions of the device. !
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seems that the immersive auditory experience that an audio player affords could be disrupted by 
the “alerts” that go off whenever a text message or an email is received on the Wi-Fi enabled 
iPod – in particular, the iPod Touch.   
In Landline, the playing of the audio guide on the iPod opens up an auditory space that 
shuts out the ambient sounds from the surrounding urban environment. As the sound of the audio 
guide streams into the ears of the audience members, it is as if they and Wong are simultaneously 
present at the same location, thereby conjuring a sense of intimacy between them and the voice of 
the narrator. But Landline is not a performance that seeks to perpetuate the illusion of a seamless 
auditory experience that isolates the audience members from the sensory stimuli of the physical 
environment. Rather, the performance is designed to remind the audience members of their 
embodied existence in the city. In order to problematize the conventional use of the iPod as a 
medium that brings forth a private auditory space for the listener, the audio guide is designed to 
prompt the audience members to pay attention to the spaces and structures around them.  
Right from the start of the performance, the narrator makes the following request: “May I 
suggest you take notice of the place you are in? Look up. Are there any birds in the sky? […] 
Notice the structures, the buildings. Does the light reflect off them in a certain way? Observe the 
city as if you were seeing it for the first time” (Landline 2014: 71). The use of the phrase “May I 
suggest” reveals that the narrator’s questions and remarks are meant to encourage, and not 
instruct, the participants in the performance to account for things – buildings, random objects, 
and animals – that might otherwise escape their gaze. But rather than simply observing the 
nonhuman and human entities that inhabit the urban spaces of their home city, the audience 
members in Landline are urged to reflect on their own behaviour and performances, with the 
narrator prompting them to “[t]ake notice of any people walking on the street,” particularly those 
who are “listening to iPods” or “texting” (2014: 71). Like the participants in Rider Spoke who 
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travel across the city on bicycles in search of audio recordings, Landline uses the audio guide to 
invite the audience members “to stop and find a location for a scene” (2014: 71). These chosen 
locations in Halifax and Vancouver serve as physical sites at which the audience members from 
both cities can partake in a virtual rendezvous that transpires over text messaging. Once the 
audience members have arrived at a particular location in their respective home cities, they are 
free to “play the scene” in whichever way they choose, as the voice of the audio guide recedes 
and the real-time exchange of text messages ensues (2014: 71).  
 The combinatory use of the iPod for receiving auditory prompts and the mobile phone for 
initiating textual communication has significant effects on the audience members’ perception of 
connectivity and the experience of intimacy in the age of mobile telecommunications. As Bull 
observes, in contrast to the continuous soundscape that the iPod conjures, the use of the mobile 
phone, which he dubs a “discontinuous” mobile technology, “punctuates daily life with the sound 
of absent others” (2007: 68). “Mobile phones,” he opines, “construct mobile sound bubbles of 
discourse – simultaneously private and public as the user both speaks and listens” (2007: 68). 
However, Bull’s point is frustrated by the use of the text messaging function on mobile phones, 
which forecloses, albeit temporally, the potential for constructing such “mobile sound bubbles of 
discourse” that intervene in the public spaces of the urban landscape (2007: 68). With text 
messaging, the human voice of the mobile phone user no longer intervenes in public space. In the 
same way that the use of the iPod generates immersive auditory spaces, the act of texting in an 
urban environment allows mobile phone users to retreat into a private text-based universe that 
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connects them to another person located somewhere else while diverting their attention from the 
sights and sounds of the physical environment that surrounds them.24  
The inhabitants of the modern city are constantly on the move. Looking at “a world in 
which physical mobility is the norm,” Bull asserts that “the connectivity engendered in the 
mobile phone is emblematic of both, the desire for intimate contact with others and the end of 
shared social urban space” (2007: 86). But despite the absence of physical, face-to-face 
encounters between the audience members in Landline, the use of mobile phones for exchanging 
text messages opens up an experience of connectivity and intimacy that seems fraught in Rider 
Spoke, where the sharing of personal narratives does not occur in a simultaneous fashion. Unlike 
the use of voice recordings in the Blast Theory performance, through which one could experience 
the auditory trace of an unseen interlocutor, the efficacy of the connection between the audience 
members in Landline rests on their capacity to imagine how the other person looks and sounds 
and to do so solely on the basis of personal descriptions delivered by way of text messages. The 
ability of individuals living in geographically distinct locations to experience a sense of 
connection through the intervention of technological implements seems to resonate with Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community”.  
The “imagined community” describes a collective social imagination through which 
people perceive themselves to be part of a socially constructed group. In light of the massive size 
of human communities living in modern nation states, Anderson surmises that “members” of 
these communities “will never know most of their fellow members […] yet in the minds of each 
lies the image of their communion” (1991: 6). However, there is a difference between the 
production of the “imagined community” in the pre-digital era and its manifestation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#%!Bull purports that the connectivity embodied by the mobile phone offers an opportunity for producing intimate 
relationships with others over the mobile telephone network at the expense of the sharing of urban space through 
face-to-face interactions with other city dwellers (2007: 86). !
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contemporary technoculture. Before the arrival of digital technology, this image of social 
communion was mobilized by the broadcasting of national news on printed newspapers, radio, 
and television. With the availability of short messaging services (SMS), online forums, and a 
myriad of social media platforms in our present digital age, members of the “imagined 
community” can experience a sense of social connection by turning to the mobile phone or the 
Internet as means of instant communication.   
Building on this technologically mediated sense of social connection between the 
audience members in Halifax and Vancouver, Landline deploys a critical techno-dramaturgy that 
engages the audience members’ perception of the interplay between embodiment, technology, 
and space. For the participants in this intermedial performance, the ability to communicate with 
someone from the opposite end of the country through text messaging incorporates them into the 
“imagined community” that spans the topographical width of Canada, a landmass that cuts across 
five different time zones. In order to construct a perceptual frame through which to experience 
this long-distance connection, the audio guide reminds each audience member that “there is a 
person 5,725 km away […], and despite all that distance, the two of [them] are engaged in the 
same activity” at the same time (Landline 2014: 71). Whereas the participants in Rider Spoke 
could only listen to audio narratives on the mobile computer without having the opportunity to 
communicate with the other participants who recorded them, the audience members in Landline 
could respond to each other’s stories by exchanging text messages on their mobile phones. 
Besides, the announcement of the exact distance between Halifax and Vancouver in the audio 
guide might also help to shape the audience members’ perception of the vastness of the country 
that they call home. They may even come to appreciate how telephony has connected people 
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from distant cities for over a century.25 As the audience members mobilize their fingers to type 
messages on the mobile phones, the significance of the performance’s title, “Landline,” is 
rendered salient. Just as traditional landline telephony relied on copper wires that connected the 
voices of people located in different places, an invisible line of connection between the 
interlocutors has been created in Landline.  
In their study of the psychology of intimacy, Karen J. Prager and Linda J. Roberts 
delineate the three fundamental operations of intimacy: “self-revealing behavior, positive 
involvement with the other, and shared understandings” (2004: 45). Participants in a 
communicative relationship can experience a sense of intimacy when they are able to engage one 
another by revealing details about their lives or empathizing with the viewpoints of the other 
person. “Within the intermedia space,” as the performance scholar Bruce Barton elucidates, “the 
informed spectator anticipates the heightened self-disclosure of increased visibility, engagement, 
perhaps even interactivity” (2010: 46). In the case of Landline, one audience member named 
Garry from Halifax willingly confesses to his Vancouver-based “scene-partner” Chelsea that he 
was “sexually assaulted in Africa” (2014: 79). Whereas Chelsea appears guarded in her initial 
interactions with Garry, revealing only the briefest of information about her graduation from the 
University of British Columbia and her recent engagement, Garry’s forthcoming attitude evokes 
a feeling of gratitude in Chelsea who thanks her “scene-partner” “for being so honest” (2014: 79). 
Instead of judging Garry’s character or expressing doubt about his confession, Chelsea 
recognizes the contingency and ambiguity of virtual communication by engaging positively with 
Garry’s remarks. Bruce Barton’s description of the production of intimate experiences in 
intermedial performance is instructive: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#&!Bull makes the point that the use of the mobile phone “embodies a dynamic between the illusion of total 
connectivity and the inherent contingency surrounding the availability of others” (Bull 2007: 81). The caller or the 
sender of a text message expects a response from the person on the other end of the line.   !
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Intermedial intimacy is, thus, not generated through the portrayal of shared 
cultural attitudes and beliefs (a relationship that reinforces ‘timeless’ and 
‘universal’ values), but rather through the performance of shared perceptual 
frames and dynamics (interaction that posits ambiguity and de/reorientation as the 
constants of contemporary existence). (2010: 46) 
The feeling of intimacy experienced by Chelsea and Garry depends on their shared perception of 
the ambiguous quality of their communication. But as we have seen in Chapter 2, an individual’s 
ability to perceive does not amount to a passive reception of external stimuli. According to 
Maaike Bleeker, perception “is a mode of acting” rather than “something that happens to us” 
(2010: 38). The performance of perception entails an “active engagement” through which the 
experience of the surrounding world becomes “visible, audible, and tangible, and all at the same 
time” (2010: 38). For this reason, both Chelsea and Garry have to perform their recognition of the 
ambiguous quality of their text-based conversation in order to generate what Barton calls 
“intermedial intimacy,” even if the credibility of their text messages remains dubious. Regardless 
of the veracity of Garry’s confession, his willingness to share what is ostensibly an 
embarrassingly private detail helps to create a perceptible sense of intimacy between him and 
Chelsea, as they feel positively engaged with each other. 
As their text-based conversation ensues, Chelsea feels comfortable enough to inquire 
about Garry’s life by asking if he had “always lived in Halifax” (2014: 79). A few minutes later, 
the two of them begin to ponder over the question of destiny. But just as these interlocutors are 
discovering each other on a more personal level, the audio guide on the iPod prompts them to 
commence a textual version of the children’s game, “Catch”. Chelsea begins by texting “stop 
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light” to Garry who replies with the appropriate monosyllabic word “car”.26 There is confusion at 
first, as Chelsea checks in with Garry to clarify if the game has already started. The playful 
exchange of monosyllabic words continues for three more minutes. When the game is over, both 
Chelsea and Garry have already completed their walk across the downtown area of their home 
cities of Halifax and Vancouver. By prompting the audience members to switch from the 
spontaneous exchange of text messages to a playful bartering of monosyllabic words, the audio 
guide is reminding them of their role as participants in an intermedial performance. Eventually, 
as the auditory space generated by the audio guide on the iPod intersects the virtual space of the 
text messaging application on the mobile phone, the audience members’ experience of intimacy 
through text-based conversations is punctuated by auditory diversions and ambient sounds that 
direct their attention towards their own embodiment with technology and the urban environment. 
As we enter the concluding section of this chapter, I will explore the ways in which the interplay 
between the embodied act of pedestrianism and the use of mobile phones in the city catalyzes the 
production of social space among the audience members in Landline.   
 
3.6 Pedestrianism, Mobile Phones, and the Production of Social Space  
 In contrast to the use of bicycles as a mode of transportation in Rider Spoke, the audience 
members in Landline rely on pedestrianism as a physical means by which to travel from one 
location to another in their home city. Walking through the city unfolds an experience that is 
qualitatively different as compared to riding a bicycle through the urban landscape. When you 
walk down a street, you are more likely to notice interesting details, such as the graffiti on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#'!“Catch” is a game that is often played between two or more children or between parents and their children. In its 
physical form, one person would throw an object, be it a ball or a Frisbee, towards another person who would 
attempt to catch it. If the second person manages to catch hold of the object, he or she would throw it back towards 
the first person, and the game would continue. The textual version of “Catch” in Landline builds on the gameplay of 
the physical version, as the audience members engage in a mutual exchange of monosyllabic words.!!!
! ")#!
walls of buildings or the ornate design of old signage. However, if you happen to cycle down that 
same path on a busy day, the need to safely navigate the path without knocking somebody down 
might hamper your ability to pay attention to the activities along the sidewalks. Equipped with an 
iPod and a mobile phone, the audience members in Landline are sent out to the streets of their 
home city to chart their own journey. Listening to the prompts provided by the audio guide, the 
participants are encouraged to find specific locations in the city where a virtual rendezvous with 
their “scene partner” can take place. Once a location has been found, text messages are 
exchanged between the audience members located at opposite ends of the country. Pedestrianism 
is just as important as the exchange of text messages in this performance, as both activities serve 
to facilitate the production of social space among the audience members. But before we analyze 
how this production of social space is actualized in Landline, we must account for the 
performativity of pedestrianism.  
 Standing on the 110th floor of the original World Trade Center, Michel de Certeau surveys 
the urban landscape of New York City, mapping out the position of streets and buildings as they 
spread out in every direction across the city. Witnessing the urban sprawl, de Certeau describes a 
scene in which the “gigantic mass” of buildings and roads “is immobilized before the eyes,” thus 
allowing to him read the city as one would read a text (1984: 91). This is a panoptic perspective 
that looks at the urban environment from above rather than attending to the flurry of activity that 
transpires on the ground. Indeed, de Certeau’s purpose for introducing this perspective at the 
beginning of his essay, “Walking in the City,” is not to encourage a “plan” view of the city, but 
rather to emphasize the importance of recognizing the quotidian spatial practices of the city’s 
inhabitants. “The ordinary practitioners of the city,” de Certeau observes, “live ‘down below,’ 
below the thresholds at which visibility begins” (1984: 93). Traversing the urban landscape at 
street level, walking becomes a viable means by which these ordinary practitioners experience 
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the city. For de Certeau, the local spatial practices of the city’s inhabitants are “foreign to the 
‘geometrical’ or ‘geographical’ space of visual, panoptical, or theoretical constructions” (1984: 
93). Detracting from the Cartesian vision of space as conforming to the grid-like strictures of 
three-dimensional axes, de Certeau sees the localized spatial practices of the city’s inhabitants, 
which account for mobile, poetic, and metaphorical experiences of space, as urban operations that 
subvert the “clear text of the planned and readable city” (1984: 93).  
As a spatial practice, pedestrianism is predicated on the mobility of the human body 
through space. In an essay on performance and the city, theatre scholars D.J. Hopkins and Shelley 
Orr point out that “[d]e Certeau offers pedestrianism as a kind of writing, a physical activity that 
intercepts the textuality imposed on the city as a control mechanism” (2007: 37). Maps, street 
signs, as well as paved roads and sidewalks serve to reinforce the textuality of the city as a 
readable space, as these structures are designed to control and regulate the movement of human 
beings through urban spaces. However, what the embodied act of pedestrianism offers to the 
city’s inhabitants is the opportunity to resist the official perspective of the city. According to 
Hopkins and Orr, “[t]he textuality imposed from the panoptic perspective of the 110th floor of 
the World Trade Center is disrupted not by a putative writerly form of walking, but by the 
physical performance of urban pedestrians” (2007: 47). Hopkins and Orr make the point that 
pedestrians can produce new meaning through their performances in the city, as the “fictional text 
of the city,” the text that is officially sanctioned by the urban authorities, “is adapted, 
appropriated, improvised upon, innovated, and/or disregarded” (2007: 47). This capacity to 
produce new meaning through pedestrian performance also endows the city’s inhabitants with the 
freedom to drift through the urban landscape in a manner that resonates with Guy Debord’s 
theory of the dérive. 
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 Earlier in this chapter, we looked at how the dérive entails a playful and generative 
passage or drifting through various urban spaces that the pedestrian might find surprising and 
stimulating. In Landline, the audience members possess the liberty to drift through the streets of 
Halifax and Vancouver without having to submit to a predefined route on a map. In my interview 
with one of the designers of the performance, Dustin Harvey, it is revealed that the project is 
inspired by a Situationist game called “A Possible Rendezvous”.27 The game requires the player 
to travel to a specific location at a particular time with the expectation that someone would be 
there waiting. Harvey explains that Landline seeks to ignite the same possibility of unexpected 
social connection by “asking the audience members to find locations in their home city, even 
though their usual motivations for find a particular location have changed” (“Landline Interview” 
2014). For instance, if an audience member used to go to BC Place in Vancouver to watch soccer, 
the motivation for being there during the performance would certainly be different. No longer 
would sports provide the impetus for travelling to BC Place, but rather the anticipation that this 
location might conjure significant memories and feelings that will inform the conversations 
between the audience member and his or her “scene partner” in Halifax.    
 The significance of BC Place, a Vancouver sports stadium wrapped in tarpaulin and 
colourful lights, comes to the fore when one of the audience members, Chelsea, informs her 
“scene partner” in Halifax that she is “at a structure outside bc place [sic]” (Landline 2014: 78). 
Even though she does not reveal the identity of this structure, she is forthcoming about its effect 
on her: “It reminds of Ubc where I recently graduated [sic]” (2014: 78). Adding that her 
graduation “was a big time of change” for her, Chelsea’s description of how the structure outside 
BC place triggers memories of her past demonstrates the influence of urban locations on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#(!Brian Massumi describes the tactic in “A Possible Rendezvous” as one “where the arbitrary imperative of being at 
a particular time and place for an imposed purpose gives rise to an intensified living of potential” (2003: 46). The 
potential to encounter strangers at a public space undergirds the Situationist approach to “drifting” in the city.  !
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conversations between the interlocutors in Landline. While Garry in Halifax cannot see BC Place 
or the structure that Chelsea alludes to, he can imagine how they look based on the memories that 
these entities conjure for Chelsea. Furthermore, by drawing a connection between the structure at 
BC Place and Chelsea’s memory of her graduation, Garry can also imagine how his “scene 
partner” is embodied in that particular location along Beatty Street in downtown Vancouver.  
As the French phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard describes in his study of the poetics of 
space, “[t]he image offered us by reading the poem now becomes really our own. It takes root in 
us. It has been given us by another, but we begin to have the impression that we could have 
created it, that we should have created it” (1994: xxiii). Despite their physical separation, Garry is 
able to identify with Chelsea’s narrative about BC Place and the memories it evokes, as what is 
expressed in her message is not simply words but the affirmation of their co-presence as 
embodied beings in communication with one another. For Bachelard, the poetic image is “at once 
a becoming of expression, and a becoming of our being. Here expression creates being” (1994: 
xxiii). Not only is Chelsea expressing the memories that BC Place evokes, she is also expressing 
her existence as an embodied being. In turn, by exchanging text messages with each other, both 
Chelsea and Garry are partaking in the shared experience of co-presence that emerges from their 
interactions via text messaging.    
Presence and co-presence, as the Oxford Internet researcher Ralph Schroeder elucidates, 
need not be immersive experiences. He reasons that people can have a sense of being in another 
place without actually being in that place (2006: 445). However, this sense of connection to 
another place is not merely a figment of one’s imagination. As Schroeder clarifies, “presence and 
copresence does not just mean that people have an imagined sense of being there or being there 
together, as for example, in fiction” (2006: 445). Instead, the users of instant messaging (IM) or 
short message services (SMS) on mobile phones “talk about their experiences in terms of sensory 
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experience” (2006: 445). What this means is that in order for the audience members in Landline 
to experience co-presence during the exchange of text messages, they need to feel like they are 
present at the same space as the other person with whom they are communicating. This 
experience of what Beth Coleman calls “sensory presence […] represents an actual relation with 
others; I am present to your thoughts and feelings” (2011: 120). By responding to Chelsea’s 
description of BC Place and the memories it conjures, Garry is sharing the same perception of 
sensory presence as his “scene partner” located more than five thousand kilometres away.   
Being co-present in their virtual communication, the conversation between Chelsea and 
Garry is certainly not a one-sided affair. When Garry mentions that he is standing by the harbour 
in Halifax, Chelsea inquires into the significance of the location. Responding to her query, Garry 
explains that the harbour reminds him of Africa. The common feature that stands out in Chelsea 
and Garry’s description of the places in their home cities is the way that these locations evoke 
memories of other places in the same city or elsewhere – BC Place is reminiscent of UBC 
(University of British Columbia) for Chelsea, whereas Halifax harbour evokes memories of 
Africa for Garry. In another instance in their conversation, Chelsea reveals that she is standing at 
the library steps where she and her high school friend, Chloe, used to hang out. Concurrently, 
Garry is at a parking garage in Halifax, a place that is “like death,” as it reminds him of a friend 
who died. As audience members in Landline, Chelsea and Garry are not only talking about the 
physical spaces that they encounter in their home cities; they are also producing new narrative 
spaces that allow them to fashion meaningful conversations with one another. By exchanging 
narratives about the places in their hometowns, the two interlocutors are able to produce a social 
space that is contingent on their ability to articulate the relationship between the materiality of a 
location and the memories or images that the place evokes.  
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 To understand how the production of social space between two individuals residing in 
different cities might be possible, we must recognize what Henry Lefebvre characterizes as “an 
immediate relationship between the body and its space, between the body’s deployment in space 
and its occupation in space” (1991: 170). “Can the body,” Lefebvre wonders, “with its capacity 
for action, and its various energies, be said to create space?” (1991: 170). For him, living bodies 
are not only embodied in space. Rather, they also create the spaces that they inhabit. Lefebvre 
notes that even before the living body affects the material world by fashioning tools and objects, 
“each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces that 
space” (1991: 170). However, to speak of living bodies producing space is not the same thing as 
presupposing that spatial production unfolds upon a blank slate. As Lefebvre informs us, there is 
no a priori empty space that exists before the content that fills it (1991: 15). Instead, space is 
produced in conjunction with the emergence of living bodies. For Chelsea and Garry, as well as 
other audience members in Landline, there is no pre-existing social space between the 
interlocutors in Halifax and Vancouver. By establishing a line of communication through text 
messaging, the audience members are producing social spaces that enable them to experience a 
sense of intimacy with another person located in a different city. However, as Lefebvre points 
out, the production of social space should not be perceived as a manufactured “thing” or an end 
product (1991: 101). Rather, social space is “at once work and product – a materialization of 
‘social being’” (1991: 101-2). In other words, the production of social space is always already a 
social practice between embodied beings.  
According to Lefebvre, the production of any space, including social space, is an 
embodied activity based on lived experience (1991: 137). However, as Jason Farman argues in 
his analysis of mobile media, “embodiment is not dependent on physical space” (2012: 22). 
Instead, space can be created when bodies are enacted across various forms of digital media 
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(2012: 22). Farman believes that what we consider to be “our sense of embodied self can be 
developed and thrive from interactions that take place across geographically distant places” 
(2012: 23). In Landline, the audience members are not only embodied with the iPod and the 
mobile phone to which they are tethered but also with the urban spaces of their home city and the 
city in which their “scene partner” resides. Even though each audience member can only be 
physically present in one city at a time, the designers of the performance are able to deploy 
techno-dramaturgical strategies that allow the audience members to imagine being present in a 
city that is far away from their hometown. One strategy involves the layering of ambient sounds 
beneath the audio guide that plays on the iPod. The ambient sounds recorded in one city are 
superimposed onto a different city, such that when the audience members put on the headsets, 
they can hear the sounds from the other city but not their own. At one point in the performance, 
the audience members in Halifax can hear the voices of people chatting with one another as they 
tune in to their iPods, even when there is nobody near them. In another instance, the participants 
in Vancouver who are listening to their iPods can hear the roar of a motorcycle passing by, only 
to realize seconds later that there are no vehicles heading in their direction. There is a gap 
between what the audience members hear on their iPods and what they see with their eyes.   
The superimposition of ambient sounds recorded in one city onto a different city 
disorients the audience members in a way that alters their perception of space. Rather than 
searching for what Merleau-Ponty calls “anchoring points” or visual markers that would orientate 
their perception of their home city (2002: 289-90), the audience members in Landline are able to 
project an image of themselves traversing the urban spaces of the other city. In his analysis of 
spatial perception, the Canadian psychologist Colin Ellard argues that space can exist as the 
object of mental projection, as human beings are capable of visualizing their “imagined position” 
in a particular space even without being physically present in that space (2009: 129). What this 
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means is that the audience members in Vancouver or Halifax would be able to imagine 
themselves being present on the streets of the other city whenever the ambient sounds from that 
city interrupts the acoustic flow of the audio guide on the iPod. But as Lefebvre reminds us, the 
production of space is an embodied activity based on lived experience (1991: 137). In this sense, 
the social space that the audience members produce is not only the object of mental projection 
but also a result of an embodied experience that manifests in physical space.   
In an instance that illustrates how the embodied activity of the audience members 
catalyzes the production of social space in Landline, the audio guide on the iPod delivers a 
prompt that requires all of them to find a “vertical object,” perhaps a “tree or a relatively clean 
lamp-post,” and stand in a way that their shoulders “barely” touch it (2014: 74). As the audience 
members position themselves besides this vertical object, they are asked to “pour [their] weight 
into that point of contact,” as one “might pour sand into a bag” (2014: 74). The audio guide then 
goes on to suggest that the connection between the audience members and the object would 
become “more solid and dense the more [they] pour in” (2014: 74). As one of the two designers 
of the performance, Dustin Harvey, explains, when the iPod “prompts the audience members to 
lean into things,” the request opens up the possibility for them to “use their bodies to imagine the 
other person and to allow their imagination to manifest that person” (“Landline Interview” 2014). 
Consequently, by interacting with structures and objects in the urban environment of their home 
city while exchanging text messages with their “scene partners” located in a different city, the 
audience members are reminded of their embodied connection with the surrounding urban spaces.    
Throughout this chapter, we have seen how technology intervenes in the interactions 
between humans and urban spaces. The capacity of iPods, mobile phones, and mobile computers 
to affect the human perception of space and embodiment in Rider Spoke and Landline draws 
attention to the agency that these technological devices seem to possess, especially in terms of 
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their ability to shape the communicative experiences among the audience members. In the next 
chapter, I will explore the intersection of intermedial performance and techno-anxiety by looking 
at how intelligent machines that appear to perform autonomously might affect the audience 
members’ perception of these anthropomorphic technological agents in relation to their own 
bodies. The chapter will focus on the ontological anxiety that impinges on the embodied 
encounters between the audience members and such performing machines as the Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) avatar, Jeremiah, in Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers, and the 
robotic cabaret dancers in Louis-Philippe Demers’s Tiller Girls.  
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Chapter 4: 
Autonomous Performing Machines: Techno-Anxiety in  
Blue Bloodshot Flowers and Tiller Girls 
 
“Anxiety is the result of the perception of the truth of one’s condition.” 
- Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, 1974, p.87  
 
“The struggle to achieve autopoietic status can be understood as a boundary dispute in 
which one tries to claim the privileged ‘outside’ position of an entity that defines its own goals 
while forcing one’s opponent to take the ‘inside’ position of an allopoietic component 
incorporated into a larger system.” 
- N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 1999, p.161 
 
 Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, a myriad of new technologies, such as laptop 
computers, mobile tablets, smartphones, social networking platforms, and above all, the Internet, 
have permeated the many facets of contemporary social life. From education and banking to retail 
and entertainment, these new technologies have made it more convenient to purchase goods and 
services online. More significantly, they have also altered the ways in which human beings 
communicate with one another. Text messaging applications and social networking platforms 
offer us the opportunity to transmit text-based messages as well as visual and auditory media 
objects to as many people as possible in the shortest amount of time. But just as new 
technological devices and systems become ever more pervasive in our daily lives, the prospect of 
a “robotic future,” where robots thrive alongside human beings, has risen to the fore in 
technologically advanced societies. This prospect is evidenced by the deployment of humanoid 
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robots (known as “androids”) as talking guides at the 2005 World Expo in Aichi, Japan 
(Robertson 2011: 294).  
Created by Japanese engineer Hiroshi Ishiguro, the androids at the World Expo in 2005 
were designed to look, talk, and move like actual human beings. This anthropocentric impetus to 
reproduce the physical attributes and behaviour of humans in the form of mechanical robots may 
have arrived at its apotheosis in 2011 when Ishiguro constructed a male android with facial hair 
and wrinkles around the eyes. The android, dubbed “Geminoid DK,” was modelled after the 
Danish communications professor, Henrik Scharfe. Watching the video interview in which 
Scharfe discussed his research interest in the cultural acceptance of robots while his robotic 
doppelgänger mimicked his facial expressions and head movements, I was at once beguiled and 
perturbed by the uncanny similarities between the two figures. Seated behind an office desk, the 
professor and his technological “double” looked like a pair of identical twins. In a March 2011 
report for the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) magazine, Spectrum, 
technology editor Evan Ackerman admits that he found himself “wondering whether this [the 
Geminoid DK android] was in fact a real robot, or actually a person pretending to be a robot” 
(IEEE Spectrum 2011). Ackerman’s incredulous response to Henrik Scharfe’s robotic 
doppelgänger betrays a self-reflexive feeling of anxiety towards the capacity of robots to replicate 
the physical attributes and behaviours of human beings. The assumption that only a person can 
“pretend” to be a robot and not the other way round reveals the underlying tension between 
humans and such autonomous machines as the Geminoid DK android. Whereas most people 
would probably be comfortable with a human being dressing up as a robot and performing  
“robotic” movements, their attitude towards an actual robot’s ability to mimic the appearance and 
behaviour of humans might be less conciliatory. As such, these contrasting attitudes towards the 
! "*$!
status of robots in society present us with an opportunity to investigate the relationship between 
humans and autonomous machines.  
Situating the cultural effects of robotics within the theatrical context, this chapter explores 
the intersection of intermedial performance and techno-anxiety by looking at how intelligent 
machines that appear to perform autonomously might affect the audience members’ perception of 
these anthropomorphic technological agents in relation to their own bodies. By drawing on the 
thinking of Ernest Becker, Søren Kierkegaard, and N. Katherine Hayles on the topics of death 
and anxiety as well as the “boundary dispute” that pervades human-machine interaction, I will 
examine the techno-anxiety that impinges on the embodied encounters between the audience 
members and such performing machines as the Artificial Intelligence (AI) avatar, Jeremiah, in 
Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers (2001), and the autonomous robotic dancers in 
French-Canadian artist Louis-Philippe Demers’s Tiller Girls (2010). In light of the manifestation 
of anxiety-inducing phenomena in these intermedial performances, I argue that the audience 
members’ perception of autonomous performing machines involves a negotiation between a 
secure sense of human agency and the fear of being supplanted by machine actors. My contention 
is that the autonomy that the performing machines in Blue Bloodshot Flowers and Tiller Girls 
exhibit serves to remind the audience members of their existential finitude, an experience that 
reinforces their feeling of techno-anxiety over the perceived threat that autonomous machines 
pose to the human condition. In order to understand the human fear of technology, the next 
section will explore the ways in which the contemporary cultural movement of Neo-Luddism has 
appropriated the technological wariness of the original British Luddites – a group that was 
motivated by economic imperatives rather than the absolute rejection of technology – as a means 
to legitimize the depiction of technology as a powerful force that is on the verge of destroying 
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humanity. Following this survey of technological fear, the remaining sections of the chapter will 
be given to close readings of Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers and Demers’ Tiller Girls.  
 
4.1 Neo-Luddism and the Fear of Technology 
 Attitudes towards technology and the notion of “technological progress” vary between 
individuals, societies, and cultures. On one end of the spectrum, there are the proponents of 
artificial intelligence and other “cutting-edge” technologies like the MIT robotics researcher Hans 
Moravec and the inventor Ray Kurzweil who celebrate technology’s potential to liberate us from 
the material finitude of the human body (an issue that I will return to in Chapter 5, which looks at 
disability and cyborg performance). At the other extreme, there are those who warn that current 
technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet are deteriorating the intellectual and 
cognitive development of adults and children alike. The American writer Nicholas Carr broaches 
this topic in his 2008 essay, “Is Google Making Us Stupid?”, which explores the dangers that the 
Internet poses to the intellectual development of human beings. A couple of years later, in 2010, 
Carr published The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains, in which he advances the 
thesis that the Internet is altering the neurological pathways and cognitive functions of the human 
brain. Citing scientific research on neuroplasticity, Carr claims that using the Internet results in 
neurological changes that can affect the attention and memory of people who rely on computers 
and the Internet for reading and other tasks that require long periods of concentration (2011: 32-
35). While it might be tempting to dismiss Carr’s description of the effects of the Internet as 
alarmist (and some people might even call him a “Luddite”), it is important to understand the 
logic of technological anxiety that informs Carr’s portentous account of technology.  
 What does it mean to be a “Luddite” in the digital age? According to the British 
psychologist Mark J. Brosnan, the adjective “Luddite” has been employed as “a derogatory term 
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applied to anyone showing vague technophobic leanings” (2002: 155). But being technologically 
inept does not necessarily imply that one is technophobic. While young, savvy users of 
computers and the Internet may regard their elders as technologically inept, they may not 
necessarily be aware of the history and beliefs of the Luddites. In his historiographical study of 
the early-nineteenth-century British Luddites and the more recent cultural movement known as  
“Neo-Luddism,” the digital humanities scholar Steven E. Jones notes that the use of the adjective 
“Luddite” in contemporary discourse varies between individuals who harbour different attitudes 
towards technology. For people who happen to be “pro” technology, the term is synonymous 
with “technophobia,” which is a direct reference to anyone who may be averse to technological 
progress. Jones regards such a pejorative treatment of the term “Luddite” as symptomatic of 
“defensive anxiety and ideological motivation” on the part of technophiles (2006: 41). As for 
those who are suspicious of technology’s perceived dominance in contemporary society, Jones 
purports that expressing “sympathy for the Luddites can merely signal a resistance to 
technophilic marketing and fashion” (2006: 41). In order to understand why the mystique of the 
early-nineteenth-century British Luddites continues to hold sway among people who are anxious 
about the effects of technological advancement, a group of individuals living in technologically 
advanced societies whom Jones refers to as “neo-Luddites,” we must look back at the history of 
the original British Luddites and establish the motivations for their resistance against technology.  
 The historical British Luddites were textile workers who created a myth of Ned Ludd as 
their leader, whose family name “Ludd” became the defining identity of the movement (Jones 
2006: 20). Operating in clandestine fashion between 1811 and 1816, the group’s “community-
based actions targeted unfair labor practices” in the industrial heartlands of Nottinghamshire and 
the West Riding of Yorkshire (Jones 2006: 20). The early-nineteenth-century was a time of 
intense technological change. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution in major towns and 
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cities across Britain and Europe, the traditional means of production were radically transformed. 
As cottage industries that relied heavily on manual labour for textile manufacture gave way to 
mechanized industrial processes that required far fewer workers, a group of weavers from the 
English midlands organized themselves into an armed band known as “the Luddite movement”. 
As the British historian E. P. Thompson elucidates, “[t]he Luddite attacks were confined to 
particular industrial objectives: the destruction of power-looms (Lancashire), shearing-frames 
(Yorkshire), and resistance to the break-down of custom in the Midlands framework-knitting 
industry” (1964: 484). Thompson notes that the weavers involved in the Luddite movement of 
the 1810s were not disorganized “rioters”. Operating as “smaller, disciplined bands,” they 
“moved rapidly from village to village at night” (1964: 554). Under the cover of darkness, the 
weavers destroyed the technological implements that served to mechanize their craft. But despite 
their rage against the machines, the original Luddites were not fighting against technology in the 
broader sense. As Jones reminds us, “we have to remember, the historical Luddites were 
themselves technologists – that is, they were skilled machinists and masters of certain specialized 
technes […], by which they made their living” (2006: 9). In other words, the struggle of those 
weavers from the English midlands was an economic one. According to Jones, the historical 
Luddites were breaking up the knitting machines in order to protect their “living and the right to 
their technology” rather than “some Romantic idyll in an imagined pretechnological nature” 
(2006: 9). Put simply, the Luddites were not anti-technologists with a penchant for romanticizing 
nature. But why has the history of the original British Luddites become the primary inspiration 
for the neo-Luddites of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries?     
 Perhaps we could begin by asking: “Who or what is a neo-Luddite?” A neo-Luddite, as 
Jones elucidates, is “someone whose choice of philosophy or lifestyle is a deliberately symbolic 
act, a back-formation based on the received idea of a historical labor movement” (2006: 20). 
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Jones asserts that the neo-Luddites of today operate as a community of intellectuals and middle-
class white-collar workers who “look to the Luddites for the moral authority of working-class 
experience, a grounding in material realities that seem increasingly elusive in today’s alienated, 
technologically mediated, virtual economy” (2006: 8). Drawing on the image of the early-
nineteenth-century British Luddites, the contemporary cultural movement of neo-Luddism is thus 
“a personal philosophy pitted against technology as an abstract force” (2006: 20). Jones’ 
description of how the adherents of neo-Luddism perceive technology as an “abstract force” is 
instructive. In contrast to the historical Luddites who targeted a specific technology – the 
mechanized stocking frame – for destruction, today’s neo-Luddites do not appear to be interested 
in destroying any particular technological device. Instead, they choose to embark on a symbolic 
campaign against technology, which they perceive to be an overarching power that is going out 
of control and threatening the human condition.  
 The adherents of neo-Luddism include activists, writers, and journalists who draw 
inspiration from Kirkpatrick Sale’s Rebels Against the Future (1995), which traces the “late 
twentieth-century antitechnology sentiments to a legendary ‘origin’: the Luddites of 1811” (2006: 
23-4). By claiming to be the modern successors of the original British Luddites, the neo-Luddites 
of today have appropriated the social, political, and economic legacy of the historical Luddites to 
suit their own symbolic campaign against technological progress. As Jones observes, the neo-
Luddite movement emerged during the boom years of the technology industry in the late 1990s. 
He further notes that this technological boom was motivated by “a collective ideation” among 
futurists and entrepreneurs “about the infinite power of technology,” particularly in terms of its 
ability to augment the physical and cognitive limitations of human beings (2006: 23). However, 
what Jones describes as the “High neo-Luddism” of the late 1990s was also “based on the idea 
that technology is a powerful, autonomous, inevitable force – but in this case, a force for 
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destruction and the diminishment of humanity” (2006: 23). From the perspective of the neo-
Luddites, technology appears to be escaping the grasp of human mastery, and could potentially 
turn against its human creators. As such, Jones contends that today’s neo-Luddites allude to the 
historical legacy of the British Luddites as “a way to declare that technology has a history, and 
thus has human limits” (2006: 42). By applying “human limits” to technology, the neo-Luddites 
are able to assuage their anxieties about “the ubiquity and autonomy of the oppressive system” 
(2006: 8). As Jones points out, neo-Luddism in the twenty-first century “expresses philosophical 
anxiety about the essential nature of what it means to be human in an age of autonomous 
technology” (2006: 40). But even those who do not identify themselves as Luddites may “share 
the fundamental view that what humans have made now threatens to unmake humanity, that our 
technology has somehow dehumanized us and must be (somehow) resisted” (2006: 43). For this 
reason, the adherents of neo-Luddism are inclined to believe that any attempt at resisting the flow 
of technological progress, even if it is merely a symbolic gesture with no palpable outcome, 
might help to delay or reverse the threat of technological dehumanization.  
As the French philosopher Jacques Ellul argues in The Technological Society, the 
autonomy bestowed upon machines has allowed them to perform the productive activities of 
human beings (1964: 4). For Ellul, the machine “is pure technique,” in the sense that “technique 
transforms everything it touches into a machine” (1964: 4). In other words, the emergence of 
autonomous machines in factories that perform the same tasks as human workers has transformed 
the human being into a mechanical entity whose functions can be dissected and analyzed. Ellul 
believes that not only are there “dehumanized factories,” where autonomous machines have 
replaced the labour of human workers, but the human being has also been dehumanized as a 
result of mechanization (1964: 4). The sense of techno-anxiety that Ellul invokes in his warning 
about dehumanization is indicative of an anthropocentric impulse to maintain human mastery 
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over the development and operation of technology. Joining this attempt to foreground the danger 
of autonomous technology and its potentially dehumanizing effects is the political scientist and 
philosopher of technology, Langdon Winner, who emphasizes the importance of “rethinking 
what it means to be human in the first place” (2005: 405). “Far from being an exhausted concept 
or failed project,” Winner argues: 
Being human is a question whose possibilities are very much open to intellectual 
inquiry and practical realization. The relevant category, in my view, is perhaps 
less that of ‘human nature’ than of the ‘human condition.’ To face this condition 
squarely involves, for example, the recognition of mortality as a basic fact of 
existence. (2005: 405-6) 
While it might not be possible to arrive at an absolute definition of what it means to be human, 
the acknowledgement of our mortality as human beings serves as a reminder of our shared 
finitude with other nonhuman beings, both living and non-living. Indeed, nothing lives or lasts 
forever. But perhaps it is this recognition of human mortality that lies at the heart of the techno-
anxiety that pervades the relationship between autonomous machines and human beings. If 
autonomous machines can behave like human beings, then confronting the same machine when it 
breaks down would serve to remind us of our essential “thingness” – that is, we are as much a 
thing as any technological device that finds itself in a landfill once it ceases to function. And even 
if the machine were to operate at the optimal level, we are nonetheless confronted by its potential 
to outlast us. Amid the expanding role of such autonomous machines as robotic arms and android 
tour guides in contemporary society, Winner remains concerned about the plight of the human 
condition in the age of artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology.  
Alluding to the dehumanizing potential of autonomous machines, Winner alleges that 
“[t]he penchant for placing the technical hardware before the human (and it has come to that in 
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much of contemporary thinking) is to my mind a terrible blunder, the perfect operational 
definition of a condition long feared in modern society – dehumanization” (2005: 406). Once 
again, a hierarchy is established between technology and humans, but this time, the future of the 
human condition is at risk of being subjugated by the power and perceived dominance of 
technological devices. For Winner, invoking the prospect of dehumanization has become a 
convenient means by which to cast technology as a potent force that threatens to alter the 
physical and cognitive constitution of the human being. While some of us may feel 
uncomfortable in the presence of a humanoid robot like the Geminoid DK android that mimics 
the appearance and behaviour of a real-life Danish professor, such a situation does not necessarily 
imply that we should re-assert the mastery of the human being over all other forms of existence. 
Instead, it seems to me that the challenge remains as to how we can resist the temptation either to 
privilege technology over the human or to use it to justify the superiority of the human species 
over all living and non-living things. I will attempt to address this challenge by exploring the 
dramaturgical strategies that intermedial performance artists employ in order to encourage the 
audience members to reflect on the techno-anxiety that arises as a result of their encounter with 
such autonomous performing machines as the artificial intelligence (AI) avatar, Jeremiah, in 
Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers and the dancing robots in Louis-Philippe Demers’ 
production of Tiller Girls.  
 
4.2 Playing with an AI Avatar in Blue Bloodshot Flowers  
As the houselights faded in 291 Gallery, an art gallery housed in a deconsecrated Neo-
Gothic church in London, the ensuing darkness evoked a feeling of anxiety among the audience 
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members gathered in the building. Moments later, Jeremiah, an AI avatar,28 appeared on the stage 
with Elodie Berland, a human actor. While Berland was physically present on the stage, 
Jeremiah, whose humanlike head was the only body part visible to the audience, appeared as an 
animated AI avatar on a black curtain. Yet despite his virtual existence,29 Jeremiah was capable 
of seeing the audience (through the use of surveillance cameras) and expressing his emotions in 
reaction to the movement of bodies and objects within his field of vision. Together, Berland and 
Jeremiah performed a story about unrequited love. Berland, though human, did not speak in her 
own voice. Instead, a pre-recorded voiceover served as a memory device that recounted her 
recollections of a departed lover. Even though some audience members assumed that Jeremiah 
represented the departed male lover,30 his relationship with Berland remained ambiguous 
throughout the performance. 
Making its debut at the 291 Gallery in August 2001, Blue Bloodshot Flowers was an 
intermedial performance devised by theatre scholar Susan Broadhurst and computer scientist 
Richard Bowden. Philip Stainer, a British writer and theatre researcher, wrote the original story 
on which the performance is based. Through the intersection of performance and technology, 
Blue Bloodshot Flowers explored the ontological tension that emerges when technology interacts 
with the human body on the stage. In an attempt to interrogate the level of anxiety that such an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#)!The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) notes that the word “avatar” is derived from the Sanskrit, avatara, 
meaning “descent”. In Hinduism, the word refers to a “manifestation of a deity […] on earth”. In its contemporary 
meaning, avatar points to the “icon or figure representing a particular person in a computer game, Internet forum, 
etc.”. In Broadhurst’s performance, the AI avatar operates as both an icon of a human person and an interactive 
machine. 
   #*!The use of the third-person possessive male pronoun “his” to refer to Jeremiah is in keeping with Broadhurst’s 
terminology, as reflected in her original description of the AI avatar in the production notes on the performance.  
 $+!Initially, Broadhurst and Bowden wanted to design a female avatar or an animated head with the face of a child. 
In the end, they decided to settle for a male AI avatar, so as to allow the audience members to interpret the meaning 
of its “virtual presence” in the performance, as well as its relationship with the human actor, Elodie Berland (2004: 
49).!!
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encounter between humans and technology might evoke, Broadhurst invited the audience to come 
onto the stage in the second half of the performance in order to experience for themselves the 
feeling of interacting with an AI avatar. As they waved their hands and walked about on the 
stage, the audience members were able to elicit an emotional response from Jeremiah. These 
emotions ranged from excitement whenever Jeremiah detected rapid physical movement to 
frustration when he was confronted by slow-paced hand gestures. 
Emerging at the cusp of the twenty-first century, Blue Bloodshot Flowers exemplified a 
participatory mode of performance in which the audience members were physically engaged with 
the work of art. Such an interactive experience presented them with the opportunity to explore the 
impact of media technologies on the human perception of embodiment and existential finitude. 
Building on the technological affordances of an artificial intelligence (AI) engine that mimics 
human emotions, as well as the Geoface facial mapping system (DECface) that constructs 
anatomically accurate human faces, Broadhurst’s technical collaborator, Richard Bowden, 
developed a computer-generated animated head with the ability to express emotions. By 
simulating the bone structure of the human skull and applying a digitally compressible mesh over 
that structure, Bowden was able to alter the facial expression of Jeremiah, and to do so in relation 
to a range of human emotions, including anger, sadness, and happiness (Broadhurst 2004: 50). 
Using a purpose-built AI engine, Jeremiah can display emotions that correspond to specific 
external stimuli in real-time. During the performance in 2001, video surveillance cameras were 
connected to the AI engine that regulated Jeremiah’s emotions. These cameras helped to capture 
the actions of the human actor, Elodie Berland, as well as the audience members who interacted 
with Jeremiah by way of hand gestures and bodily movements. In turn, the images of these 
actions were relayed to the AI engine for processing, thereby generating an appropriate emotional 
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response on Jeremiah’s face. Because of this technical sleight of hand, it seemed as though he 
was capable of seeing the audience members whenever they moved into his field of vision.  
 Broadhurst’s use of the phrase “artificial intelligence” to describe the computer engine 
that mobilizes Jeremiah’s display of emotions in the performance is fraught with ambiguity, 
especially in light of recent debates in the field of cognitive computing over what constitutes 
general intelligence. According to computer scientists Michael I. Jordan and Stuart Russell from 
the University of California, Berkeley, the “consensus” in artificial intelligence research “is that 
AI is about the design of intelligence agents” (2001: lxxv). “An agent,” Jordan and Russell 
explain, “is rational to the extent that it can be expected to achieve its goals, given the 
information available from its perceptual processes” (2001: lxxv). If we accept Jordan and 
Russell’s behaviourist model of artificial intelligence, whereby the intelligence of an agent is 
contingent on its ability to achieve specific goals by processing perceptual information such as 
visual stimuli and movement in the environment, then Jeremiah would seem to fit the bill as an 
intelligent agent. However, the semblance of intelligence on Jeremiah’s part in the 2001 
production of Blue Bloodshot Flowers was frustrated by his slow and sometimes confused 
reactions to the gestures and actions of the human participants in the performance. Nevertheless, 
the delay in Jeremiah’s responses to external stimuli also provided an opportunity for Broadhurst 
to explore the perception of human-machine interaction in intermedial performance.  
We live in an age where digital avatars and various media simulations have become 
commonplace, as evidenced by the fashioning of virtual personas and environments in video 
games, online advertisements, as well as intermedial performances. For this reason, media 
theorists and designers are seeking to understand the ways in which interactive digital media 
objects affect the perception of human individuals who come into contact with them. In her study 
of networked presence in digital environments, Beth Coleman turns to what Byron Reeves and 
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Clifford Nass dub “the media equation” as a theoretical lens through which to analyze how 
human beings perceive avatars and other media simulations. For over two decades, Reeves and 
Nass had conducted numerous experiments on the human perception of simulated objects and 
discovered that human beings cannot distinguish between real and mediated visual signals. 
Writing in their book, The Media Equation, they contend that, “Individuals’ interactions with 
computers, television, and new media are fundamentally social and natural, just like interactions 
in real life” (1996: 5). Reeves and Nass believe that people engage with, and respond to, media 
stimuli in social rather than technical terms. Their experiments reveal that humans tend to discern 
a degree of personality in any object – whether it is real or mediated – that possesses human 
attributes such as a mouth and a pair of eyes. In turn, the perception of humanness in mediated 
objects mobilizes a social response on the part of the human perceiver.  
Building on Reeves and Nass’ point about the sociality of media engagement, Coleman 
argues that in addition to responding to media technologies in a “social manner,” human beings 
also “treat images that appear on a screen as real” (2011: 69). Looking at the representational 
potential of avatars as identity markers, she asserts that humans are inclined to see personality in 
the things that they encounter. It is this ability to see personality in things that enable human 
beings to become what Coleman calls “equal opportunity agency attributors,” as even digital 
avatars are endowed with the agency to facilitate “real-time rich media connections” between 
human individuals located at separate geographic locations (2011: 70). But digital avatars, 
including Jeremiah in Blue Bloodshot Flowers, are not inert or neutral entities, for they are 
capable of eliciting intense reactions from human observers. “Avatars,” as Coleman elucidates, 
“provoke strong human responses because they send strong human signals” (2011: 72). As such, 
there is always a possibility that negative social attitudes would spill over from the “real” world 
(i.e., the social reality of everyday life) into the simulated environment of the virtual world. This 
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scenario is especially likely if the avatar in question possesses traits that correspond to certain 
stereotypical impressions of race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation. However, while 
Jeremiah appears as a male avatar with a greyish-blue skin tone, there is no visible indication of 
his race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. In contrast to the use of avatars in networked gaming 
and online forums as virtual identity markers controlled by unseen human agents located across 
the world, Jeremiah’s AI engine enables him to operate as an autonomous digital entity in Blue 
Bloodshot Flowers. Given his autonomy in the performance, he seems to be acting on his own 
terms as a nonhuman machine rather than representing the personality of an unseen human agent. 
In this sense, his relationship with Elodie Berland on the stage could be seen as one that 
transpires between an autonomous machine actor and a biologically human actor.    
As mentioned earlier, the 2001 production of Blue Bloodshot Flowers featured two actors: 
Berland, who physically performed on the stage, and Jeremiah, the nonhuman AI avatar that 
exists as an animated virtual head on a black curtain. Realizing the critical potential that 
undergirds the juxtaposition of physical and virtual entities in a mediatized environment, 
Broadhurst sought to question the “apparent seamlessness of performance and technology” by 
analyzing the impact of new “intelligent” technologies on the “physical body in performance” 
(2004: 54-5). The appearance of physical and virtual actors in the same performance is reflective 
of Broadhurst’s “belief that tensions exist within the spaces created by the interface of body and 
technology” (2004: 48). She contends that no body, be it the physical human body or the virtual 
body of an AI avatar like Jeremiah, can avoid the symbolic power of representation. In the same 
way that the human body, whether clothed or naked, avails itself to the possibility of 
representation, Broadhurst purports that what is regarded as “the virtual body (as any other body) 
inscribes its presence and absence in the very act of its performance, leaving gaps and spaces 
within its wake” (2004: 48). In other words, the act of performance allows all actors, both 
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physical and virtual, to register their presence and absence on the stage through the various 
entrances and exits that mark the progression of the dramatic action.  
But whereas the human body as a material reality may continue to exist beyond the final 
scene of a play, during which the human actor sheds her persona and returns to her daily life, the 
presence of a virtual body, such as that belonging to Jeremiah, might appear to be confined to the 
actual duration of the performance. From the perspective of the human audience, it seems that 
once the show is over and the computer system that animates the AI avatar is switched off, the 
virtual body would cease to exist. However, the show’s programmers are well aware that 
Jeremiah’s virtual body continues to exist as a set of codes and protocols in the memory bank of 
the computer. Unless a human being or a self-replicating virus attempts to erase all traces of it, 
the virtual body is always present as bits of data stored in the computer system. Yet the data and 
the storage medium that contains it remain susceptible to degradation and destruction. This 
degenerative potential is what the Dutch media theorist José van Dijck describes as the 
“vulnerability” of digital media. Van Dijck considers the “coded layer of digital data” to be “an 
additional type of materiality, one that is endlessly pliable and can easily be ‘remediated’ into 
different physical formats” (2007: 47). However, just as the human brain is vulnerable to memory 
loss, “this new type of materiality,” she contends, “is equally vulnerable to decay – a 
degenerative process that is part and parcel of human memory” (2007: 47). Van Dijck’s 
comparison of the vulnerability of digital memory to that of human memory is illuminating, as it 
implies that the long-term preservation of digital materials cannot be guaranteed. As the formats 
of software and digital applications become obsolete, she notes, “digital files may start to degrade 
or become indecipherable” (2007: 48). What this means is that Jeremiah’s existence is contingent 
on the ontological integrity of the digital files that support his virtual presence as an AI avatar in 
Blue Bloodshot Flowers. If these files should become corrupted or incompatible with the formats 
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of newer software and digital applications, the prevailing iteration of Jeremiah would disappear 
forever. In this sense, the life of Jeremiah’s virtual body is just as vulnerable as Berland’s human 
body, which is always already susceptible to the threat of irrevocable destruction.  
In her description of an incident that transpired during the debut of Blue Bloodshot 
Flowers in 2001, Broadhurst alludes to the vulnerable plight of virtual bodies at the hands of 
human beings. Given that Jeremiah is supported by an artificial intelligence system that evolves 
through its interactions with the audience members, Broadhurst reveals that she and her team 
“had no way of controlling his behaviour, which he learned as he went along” (2006: 144). As a 
result, she could not prevent Jeremiah from displaying what she considers to be “fairly 
inappropriate behaviour such as demonstrating happiness at an intense moment in the 
performance” (2006: 144). She did entertain the thought of turning the avatar off whenever it 
behaved “inappropriately”. However, everyone on the production team was “very reluctant to do 
this,” choosing instead to let Jeremiah perform in his own way (2006: 144). Broadhurst’s attitude 
towards Jeremiah is significant on two levels. On the one hand, she is concerned about the 
possibility of losing control over the behaviour of an autonomous performing machine like 
Jeremiah. On the other hand, her reluctance to turn the machine off despite its perceptibly 
“inappropriate behaviour” in the performance suggests that she might have developed an 
emotional attachment towards the virtual entity. But while Jeremiah’s fate may rest in the hands 
of its human creators, the uncanny resemblance of its facial features and behaviour to those of 
actual human beings unsettles the audience members as they confront an intelligent machine that 
is elusive and unfamiliar. In this way, the finite existence of an intelligent virtual entity like 
Jeremiah, which can be turned off or eradicated by way of human intervention, appears to mirror 
the existential finitude of human beings.  
! #+)!
Coming face to face with an animated head that is capable of reacting to the actions of 
human beings through the display of humanlike facial expressions, it might be hard for audience 
members in Blue Bloodshot Flowers to overlook the uncanny resemblance of Jeremiah to a real-
life human being, both in terms of appearance and behaviour. Even though he does not speak, he 
is able to learn from his encounter with anyone who comes before him and respond to that person 
through his facial expressions. “Jeremiah,” as Broadhurst points out, “is capable of not only 
interacting but also reacting” (2004: 50). Yet Broadhurst and her scientific collaborator, Richard 
Bowden, do not appear to be interested in creating a direct replica of a living person. Despite the 
expressivity of his face, Jeremiah is without a body. Such a conspicuous gap in Jeremiah’s 
anatomy – if we consider him to be a digital rendering of a human being – is all the more jarring 
when Berland, the human actor, has to rely on the kinaesthetic potential of her body in order to 
engage with Jeremiah. As I have noted earlier, Berland does not speak in her own voice. Instead, 
a pre-recorded voiceover narrates the story about her long-lost lover. Furthermore, it is not clear 
if the recorded voice actually belongs to her. As the performance unfolds, the prominence of the 
narrative begins to recede, while the intersection of Berland’s embodied actions and Jeremiah’s 
facial expressions, which are modelled on the muscular movements of the human face, propels 
the dramatic action forward.   
In a March 2005 email to the digital performance theorists, Steve Dixon and Barry Smith, 
Broadhurst explains that Blue Bloodshot Flowers does not seek to abandon the physical body. 
Rather, the performance affirms the co-presence of physical and virtual entities, as human actors 
perform alongside new technologies on the same stage as equal partners. “Although much 
interest is directed toward new technologies such as Jeremiah,” Broadhurst writes, “technology’s 
most important contribution to art may well be the enhancement and reconfiguration of an 
aesthetic creative potential which consists of interacting with and reacting to a physical body, not 
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an abandonment of that body” (Broadhurst qtd. in Dixon 2007: 56). Indeed, it is not through 
human speech but through the embodied acts of jumping, waving, and tossing flowers with her 
hands that Elodie Berland is able to educe an emotional reaction from Jeremiah. By focusing the 
audience members’ attention on the embodied interactions between Berland and Jeremiah, Blue 
Bloodshot Flowers unfolds a critical techno-dramaturgy that probes the ontological tension 
between physical and virtual bodies in performance as well as the audience members’ perception 
of autonomous performing machines.     
  Despite having only an animated head and not a complete body, Jeremiah’s virtuosity as 
a computer-generated cast member in the performance is marked by the randomness of his facial 
expressions. Using the Geoface articulated bone model, DECface, a software which affords the 
flexibility to animate different facial expressions on a humanlike digital face, the computer 
scientist Richard Bowden assigned the following four emotional expressions to Jeremiah: 
happiness, sadness, anger, and fear (Bowden, Kaewtrakulpong and Lewin 2002: 126). While 
Jeremiah’s emotional expressions may be predetermined, their appearance throughout the 
performance is contingent on the external stimuli (i.e., the actions performed by Berland and the 
audience members) that Jeremiah picks up through the video surveillance cameras that are 
supposed to serve as his “eyes”. Other facial movements such as the blinking of the eyes and the 
furrowing of the brow also occur at random, which thereby emphasize the uncanny resemblance 
of Jeremiah’s face to that of a living person. It is Jeremiah’s capacity to mimic the physical 
attributes of the human face and the random expressivity of human facial movements that some 
audience members and performance artists might find unsettling.  
Although Broadhurst admits that the random quality of Jeremiah’s behaviour “can be 
disruptive during a performance,” she nonetheless submits to the view that such “unpredictability 
adds a further ‘real-life’ dimension to working with this virtual being” (2004: 51). What exactly 
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Broadhurst means by “real-life” remains uncertain in her discussion of Blue Bloodshot Flowers. 
However, any attempt to approximate “realness” in performance tends to be burdened by 
questions of authenticity and falsehood, and this dichotomy is foregrounded by Jeremiah’s 
apparent autonomy as an actor in an intermedial environment. As Steve Dixon observes, some 
live performance artists who insist on the “enactment of ‘embodied’ authenticity” find limited 
appeal in what they regard as the “artificiality and falsehood of the digital image” and would 
refuse to incorporate it into their work (2007: 24). Commenting on what he calls the “digital 
double” that appears to duplicate the human body as a virtual entity, either in full or in parts, 
Dixon surmises that such resistance against the incorporation of digital elements into 
performance art is supplemented by a suspicious attitude towards the endowment of the digital 
body with “equal status and authenticity to the biological one” (2007: 24). Put differently, the 
human actor’s presupposed superiority over the “digital double” is reinforced.  
In Blue Bloodshot Flowers, the autonomy that Jeremiah exhibits might come across as an 
inferior imitation of human behaviour. Some audience members may even reject the suggestion 
that Jeremiah exists as an autonomous performing machine that does not require human 
supervision throughout the performance. Yet, as Dixon points out, “Jeremiah’s vision system, AI, 
and emotion engine software enable him to be a wholly spontaneous and independent ‘actor,’ 
[…] whose actions and reactions are not controlled by offstage technicians (he is essentially 
turned on and let loose)” (2007: 56). In this sense, the organization of processes that instantiate 
Jeremiah’s behaviour in the performance resembles what the Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela refer to as “autopoiesis or self-making” (Hayles 1999: 136). In 
their study of autopoiesis in living systems, Maturana and Varela propose that the “living 
organization is a circular organization which secures the production or maintenance of the 
components that specify it in such a manner that the product of their functioning is the very same 
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organization that produces them” (1980: 48). An autopoietic system is considered a living system 
insofar as the interactions between the components that comprise the organization of the system 
(for instance, the interactions between cells in a biological system or the feedback loops between 
a light-sensitive electric sensor and a sound-emitting device in a photoelectric smoke alarm) are 
maintained in order for it to function autonomously. Jeremiah appears to be an autonomous living 
system due to the sustained interactions between the surveillance cameras that serve as the visual 
system and the AI engine that processes the appropriate emotional reactions in response to 
physical stimuli on the stage. If any of these components in the overall system were to stop 
working, Jeremiah’s self-generating autonomy in the performance would be curtailed, as human 
intervention is required to either repair or replace the problematic component.    
Despite the self-reflexive organization of the autopoietic system, however, Maturana and 
Varela are aware that living systems do not exist in a vacuum (1980: x). In her discussion of 
Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, N. Katherine Hayles makes reference to their 
concept of “structural coupling” (1999: 138). According to Hayles, the concept holds that “[a]ll 
living organisms must be structurally coupled to their environments to continue living” (1999: 
138). We can see how Jeremiah’s behaviour in Blue Bloodshot Flowers coheres with that of a 
living system, as he is capable of responding directly to the physical stimuli produced by Berland 
and the audience members on the stage. At the same time, Jeremiah’s reaction to the physical 
stimuli emerges as a result of the communicative loop between the AI engine that generates a 
range of emotional responses and the digital avatar that expresses these emotions on the 
projection screen. What this means is that Jeremiah is structurally coupled with both the digital 
informational environment of the AI engine that supports his virtual existence in the performance 
as well as the physical environment of the stage, which consists of cameras, motion sensors, 
projectors, computers, and the human audience. Thus, it is on the basis of Jeremiah’s structural 
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coupling with the physical and virtual environments that constitute the intermedial setup of Blue 
Bloodshot Flowers that his identity as an autonomous performing machine can be maintained.  
 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even though Jeremiah may be structurally coupled 
with the physical and virtual environments of the performance, not every audience member 
would be willing to interact with him. Because Jeremiah’s facial expressions and emotional 
reactions in the performance are spontaneous rather than pre-determined, the autonomy that 
Jeremiah displays might unsettle some audience members. The British performance theorist 
Steve Dixon sums up the autonomy of Jeremiah’s behaviour as such: “he is essentially turned on 
and let loose” (2007: 56). Dixon’s use of the phrase “turned on and let loose” is curious, for it is 
reminiscent of the neo-Luddite logic of technological fear, whereby machines become so 
proficient at exhibiting autonomy that they might eventually go out of (human) control. But 
despite the efficacy of AI systems in facilitating the autonomy of nonhuman entities like 
Jeremiah, not everyone is fearful of the prospect of autonomous machines going out of control.  
For the MIT robotics engineer, Rodney A. Brooks, whose career is intimately connected 
to autonomous machines, the rapid production of small autonomous robots is not only 
economical but also desirable. In a 1989 paper on the role of robots in interplanetary space 
exploration, Brooks and his colleague, Anita M. Flynn, describe their theory of robotics using the 
phrase, “Fast, Cheap and Out of Control”. Together, they argue for the deployment of “large 
numbers of mass produced simple autonomous robots that are small,” rather than relying on 
wheeled or legged mobile robots that are huge, heavy, and expensive to construct (1989: 478). 
According to Brooks and Flynn, “totally autonomous robots can be more reliable than ground 
controlled robots,” as these tiny autonomous robots can make use of “force control with tight 
sensing feedback loops” to navigate the surface of a foreign planet without the supervision of 
human agents back on earth (1989: 478). Any problems encountered by the robots during the 
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mission can be resolved immediately at the scene. Furthermore, Brooks and Flynn believe that 
the cost of building these robots will also be significantly reduced, “as there is no need for much 
of the communications equipment, and no need for the ground support maintaining 
communications” (1989: 478). The operational simplicity of these autonomous robots, coupled 
with the rapid pace at which they are produced, epitomizes Brooks and Flynn’s desire to create 
autonomous machines that are “fast, cheap and out of control”.   
However, while robotics engineers and scientists such as Brooks and Flynn may find the 
economic and operational benefits of fully autonomous robots appealing, others might be 
inclined to interpret the autonomy of performing machines like Jeremiah as a threat to human 
mastery in the world. Through a combination of technological fear and a prejudicial attitude 
against autonomous performing machines, an ontological tension between the presupposed 
authenticity of human actors and the seemingly spurious quality of autonomous virtual entities 
could potentially emerge in an intermedial performance such as Blue Bloodshot Flowers. This 
ontological tension, I contend, could also heighten the level of techno-anxiety experienced by 
audience members and performance artists who fear that autonomous performing machines might 
eventually supplant human actors in performance practice. In the next section, I will examine 
how Jeremiah’s uncanny resemblance to the facial appearance and behaviour of a human being 
reminds the audience members of their existential finitude. 
 
4.3 Uncanny Resemblance  
 To say that Jeremiah bears an uncanny resemblance to the facial appearance and 
behaviour of a human being would suggest that his presence in Blue Bloodshot Flowers evokes 
feelings of discomfort and anxiety among the audience members who interact with him. The 
German psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch introduced the notion of the “uncanny” in his 1906 essay, “On 
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the Psychology of the Uncanny”. While Jentsch defines the uncanny as the fear of anything new 
and unfamiliar, the Austrian neurologist and psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud asserts that the sheer 
novelty of a thing is not enough to render it uncanny. Drawing on Jentsch’s foundational work, 
Freud further develops the definition of the uncanny in his 1919 article, “The Uncanny,” by 
characterizing the psychological experience as the “unhomely” feeling (“unheimlich” in the 
original German) that stands in direct contrast to the “homely” feeling (“Heimlich”). According 
to Freud, things that are familiar would educe the “homely” feeling, whereas what is considered 
uncanny is “frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar” (1919 I: para.6). As such, 
the uncanny is “unheimlich” because it elicits the “unhomely” feeling in the human being who 
encounters a strange and unfamiliar thing.   
However, Freud is quick to caution against the assumption that anything new and strange 
is inherently uncanny (1919 I: para.6). Instead, he believes that “[s]omething has to be added to 
what is novel and unfamiliar in order to make it uncanny” (1919 I: para.6). In searching for the 
additional property that renders something uncanny, Freud observes that the word “heimlich” 
describes two different sets of ideas: “on the one hand,” he notes, “it means what is familiar and 
agreeable, and on the other, what is concealed and kept out of sight” (1919 I: para.3). What these 
two definitions of “heimlich” reveal is that the word “unheimlich” essentially refers to that thing 
which is not only new and unfamiliar but has also been unconcealed and released from hiding. 
Therefore, the uncanny experience, as Freud understands it, is triggered when a hidden attribute 
of an unfamiliar thing is suddenly revealed to any human person who comes into contact with it.  
 As an autonomous performing machine, Jeremiah’s presence in Blue Bloodshot Flowers 
is both fascinating and disconcerting to the audience members. Susan Broadhurst’s techno-
dramaturgical strategy for the 2001 production in London involved the separation of the 
performance into two parts. In the first part, Jeremiah, the AI avatar, performed “a scripted 
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movement-based interactive piece with [Elodie] Berland,” the human actor (Broadhurst 2011: 
144). During this time, the audience members focused their attention on Berland, as they 
attempted to make sense of her relationship with Jeremiah. However, as Broadhurst notes, “the 
spectator’s focus shifted to Jeremiah when he decided to display fairly inappropriate behaviour 
such as demonstrating happiness at an intense moment in the performance” (2011: 144). The 
intrusiveness of Jeremiah’s behaviour in the first half of the performance offered the audience 
members a preview of his capabilities as an autonomous performing machine, even though some 
of them might have assumed that the avatar’s actions throughout the show were programmed by 
human agents. However, when the AI avatar became the “sole focus during the second part of the 
performance,” the audience members had, as Broadhurst points out, the opportunity to “interact 
directly with Jeremiah and to explore his supporting technology” (2011: 144). It was through this 
interactive portion of the performance that Jeremiah’s capability to respond instantly and 
spontaneously to physical stimuli was exposed to the audience members. The behaviour of the AI 
avatar had not been pre-programmed. As the audience members experimented with different 
ways to capture Jeremiah’s attention, whether by jumping about on the stage or by rapid hand 
gestures, their affinity towards the AI avatar in the first half of the performance soon gave way to 
anxiety and confusion about the humanlike facial appearance and behaviour of the autonomous 
performing machine in the second, unscripted portion of the show.  
 The video recordings of the interactions between Jeremiah and the audience members 
during the 2001 production reveal a broad range of responses among the human participants in 
the performance,31 including Elodie Berland, the human actor. Some audience members were 
eager to test the speed of Jeremiah’s reaction to physical stimuli by clapping their hands and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$"!The video recordings, director’s notes, and technical information relating to the production of Blue Bloodshot 
Flowers and the artificial intelligence (AI) technology employed in the 2001 performance can be found at: 
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/depts/pfa/Jeremiah/index.htm!
! #"'!
stamping their feet simultaneously, while others were cautious in their interactions with the AI 
avatar. Standing just a few feet away from the black curtain upon which Jeremiah’s animated 
head appears, those wary members of the audience observed how the AI avatar furrowed his 
brow as a sign of frustration towards the lack of physical stimuli on the stage. Subsequently, as 
the audience members paced up and down the stage, Jeremiah’s eyes followed their track.  
Judging from the reaction of the audience members in the video recordings, they seemed 
unsettled by the uncanny resemblance of the AI avatar’s behaviour to that of human beings. Even 
Berland, the human actor who had spent hours rehearsing with Jeremiah, appeared to be 
perturbed by the AI avatar’s uncanny resemblance to a human being. In a video captured during a 
rehearsal for the debut performance in London, Berland was seen rehearsing a scene with 
Jeremiah when she suddenly turned around and scurried off the stage. As she left the stage, her 
arms and shoulders were trembling, as though in shock. Even though Berland might have felt 
uncomfortable about the lifelike quality of Jeremiah’s facial features and movement at the 
rehearsal, she did not display any sign of aversion towards the AI avatar during the debut 
performance in 2001. If it is indeed the case that a human actor who is so intimately connected to 
an autonomous performing machine can be unsettled by its resemblance to human beings, then to 
what extent might the audience members’ encounter with Jeremiah in Blue Bloodshot Flowers be 
affected by the “uncanny valley” effect?    
In an essay published in the journal, Energy, in 1970, Japanese robotics professor 
Masahiro Mori described the ways in which people reacted to robots that approximated the 
appearance and behaviour of human beings. His hypothesis was that an individual’s affinity 
towards “a humanlike robot” would encounter a sudden “descent into eeriness” as the machine 
“approached, but failed to attain, a lifelike appearance” (Mori, MacDorman and Kageki 2012). 
Mori called this abrupt shift in an individual’s feelings about a humanlike robot the “uncanny 
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valley”. Commenting on Mori’s concept of the “uncanny valley,” Karl F. MacDorman notes that 
Mori himself was convinced that a full-body android would augment the feeling of eeriness 
experienced by the human observer, as “[m]achines that appeared too lifelike would be unsettling 
or even frightening inasmuch as they resemble figures from nightmares or films about the living 
dead” (2005: 399). The connection of the “uncanny valley” effect to the spectre of death is 
pertinent to our discussion, for the greyish-blue skin tone of Jeremiah’s animated head more 
closely resembles an apparition than a living person. As Jeremiah’s animated head is suspended 
against the black curtain at the 291 Gallery in London, his bodiless existence foregrounds the 
existential finitude of human beings for whom death is an expected inevitability.  
Masahiro Mori’s concept of the “uncanny valley” is useful in terms of describing the 
feeling of eeriness experienced by human beings whenever they encounter a robot that bears an 
uncanny resemblance to a real-life person. Jeremiah was not only an unfamiliar thing to the 
audience members; he also had a hidden attribute, which is the capacity to perform 
autonomously. However, Jeremiah’s performance in Blue Bloodshot Flowers does not proceed 
without a hitch. In fact, there are times at which his responses to the physical stimuli generated 
by Berland and the audience members are delayed or even chaotic. This incongruence between 
Jeremiah’s humanlike appearance and the mechanical quality of his reactions to external stimuli 
might prove to be unsettling for the audience members who interact with him. As MacDorman 
and Hiroshi Ishiguro explain in a 2006 article on humanlike robots, “the jerkiness of an android’s 
movements could be unsettling because it elicits a fear of losing bodily control” (2006: 313). The 
incongruence between Jeremiah’s humanlike appearance and his mechanical behaviour is likely 
to provoke an uncanny feeling in the audience members, who may be reminded of their physical 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the glitches in Jeremiah’s behaviour during the performance also 
reveal the technological essence of the computer system that facilitates his virtual existence in 
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Blue Bloodshot Flowers. By showing that Jeremiah’s AI engine is susceptible to delays and 
errors, the performance alienates the audience members in the same way that the anti-theatrical 
techniques in Bertolt Brecht’s “Epic Theatre” create a critical distance between the spectators and 
the dramatic action on the stage. 
The verfremdungseffekt or “alienation effect” in Brechtian theatre seeks to prevent the 
audience from identifying with the emotions of the characters and the narrative of the 
performance as a whole (Willett 1964: 91). Through the use of disruptive devices such as 
placards, film projections, abrupt musical interludes, and choruses that offer critical commentary 
on the performance, the Brechtian “alienation effect” exposes the artificiality of the theatrical 
medium. Such anti-theatrical techniques are designed to compel the audience members to 
deliberate on the issues raised in the performance, and more generally, to reflect on the 
conventions of theatre practice. Similarly in Blue Bloodshot Flowers, the glitches in Jeremiah’s 
behaviour point towards some of the operational problems associated with AI. The incongruence 
between Jeremiah’s humanlike appearance and the mechanical quality of his oftentimes delayed 
responses to external stimuli is indicative of the limits of AI in replicating the nuances of human 
facial expression. However, by foregrounding these limits, the audience members are encouraged 
to think about the ways in which intelligent and autonomous machines like Jeremiah could affect 
the human condition. Even though Jeremiah is only capable of approximating, rather than fully 
attaining, the look and movement of the human face, the mismatch between his humanlike 
appearance and his mechanical behaviour might elicit a feeling of discomfort among the audience 
members. Yet this eerie feeling that the AI avatar is likely to evoke is not merely a symbolic 
reaction but a cognitive phenomenon that is grounded in the neurobiology of the human brain.  
Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has demonstrated that the occurrence of the 
“uncanny valley” effect when human beings encounter an android stems from the incongruence 
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between the appearance and behaviour of the humanlike robot. In a 2011 experiment conducted 
by cognitive scientist Ayse Pinar Saygin and her colleagues in the field of robotics research, a 
group of human participants were shown three separate videos.32 The first video depicted a 
mechanical robot that has been stripped of its external covering, while the second one showed an 
android that approximates human appearance and movement. The third video featured a real-life 
human being. In the first video, the mechanical robot displayed “mechanical appearance and 
movement” (Saygin et. al. 2012: 413). But whereas the human being in the third video exhibited 
“biological appearance and movement,” the android’s “biological appearance” seemed out of 
place in relation to its mechanical movement (Saygin et. al. 2012: 413).  
Human beings, Saygin and her colleagues explain, have long associated “human 
appearance with biological motion, and machines (such as robots) with mechanical motion” 
(2012: 420). In the video featuring the android, the researchers detected an increase in “prediction 
error” in terms of the correspondence between appearance and behaviour “as the brain negotiates 
an agent that appears human, but does not move biologically” (2012: 413). When the human 
observers perceive the look and movement of the android to be incongruent, neural activity in the 
parietal cortex is the greatest among all regions of the brain. Saygin and her colleagues believe 
that such a cognitive phenomenon might help to explain the sudden shift in feeling from affinity 
to disgust that characterizes the “uncanny valley” effect. However, the study did not consider 
how the apparent incongruence between the biological appearance and mechanical behaviour of a 
humanlike robot might affect the human being’s perception of his or her mortality and finitude 
vis-à-vis the humanlike antics of autonomous performing machines like Jeremiah.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$#!Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology, Saygin and her colleagues “explored the 
selectivity of the human action perception system (APS), […] for the appearance and/or motion of the perceived 
agent [robot, android, or human]” (2012: 413). In the videos depicting the robot and the human, the “observed 
kinematics was congruent with what would be predicted from the appearance of the agent” (2012: 420). In the video 
with the android, the humanlike appearance of the perceived agent did not match its mechanical movements.  !
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  Even though the concept of the “uncanny valley” may help to explain why the audience 
members in Blue Bloodshot Flowers are likely to feel unsettled by the incongruence between 
Jeremiah’s humanlike appearance and the mechanical quality of his facial movements, we would 
do well to consider the ways in which the spectators’ anxiety about death and existential finitude 
influences their perception of autonomous performing machines. As evidenced by the archival 
videos from the 2001 performance, some audience members did register a certain degree of 
discomfort as they interacted with Jeremiah. This feeling of unease might have been triggered by 
the AI avatar’s ability to approximate, but not fully attain, the appearance and behaviour of 
human beings. Jeremiah is, after all, a machine equipped with the capacity to express emotional 
reactions towards external stimuli. Yet the question remains as to how the mismatch between the 
humanlike features of an autonomous performing machine like Jeremiah and the mechanical 
behaviour of those features might influence the audience members’ anxiety about death and the 
assumption that machines may soon supplant humans in all facets of life, from the factory floor 
to theatre performance.  
As an autonomous performing machine, Jeremiah is designed to mimic the facial features 
and movements of the human face. From a dramaturgical perspective, the accuracy of Jeremiah’s 
mimicry matters less than its symbolic significance in the dramatic action, as the audience 
members attempt to understand the AI avatar’s identity in the performance. Some may regard 
him as the ghost of the departed lover to whom the human actor, Elodie Berland, alludes, while 
others may see him as the lovechild from Berland’s relationship with her long lost lover. Even 
though the dramatic narrative in Blue Bloodshot Flowers does not offer any indication regarding 
Jeremiah’s relationship with Berland, the AI avatar remains a significant feature in the 
intermedial performance, especially when the audience members get to physically interact with 
Jeremiah through such embodied actions as clapping, walking, and jumping. However, as 
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mentioned earlier, the interactions between Jeremiah and the audience members do not proceed 
in a seamless fashion all the time.  
Looking at the archival videos of the performance, there were times at which the AI 
avatar took a few seconds to react to a particular physical stimulus performed by an audience 
member. At other times, the AI avatar appeared to be “confused” about the type of emotional 
response that should be delivered, an awkward situation that resulted in spontaneous laughter 
among the spectators. Perhaps the audience members were bemused by the AI avatar’s 
approximation of human behaviour and the inherent kinks in such a technological endeavour. But 
it could be argued that the lag in Jeremiah’s reaction to physical stimuli is reminiscent of a 
malfunctioning machine, an impression that could potentially remind the audience members of 
their own physical vulnerability and existential finitude. From a critical techno-dramaturgical 
perspective, the mismatch between Jeremiah’s humanlike facial features and the mechanical 
behaviour of those features in Broadhurst’s performance gestures towards the idea that human 
beings and machines share a common finitude. Despite their behavioural differences, both human 
and nonhuman entities are equally vulnerable to degeneration and destruction. At the same time, 
Jeremiah’s autonomy might also serve to augment the audience members’ fear of being 
supplanted by fully autonomous machines. This techno-anxious experience, I claim, is motivated 
by the human being’s innate fear of death, or what philosophers refer to as “existential dread”. In 
the following section, I will explore the ways in which the feeling of existential dread is 
responsible for conditioning the audience members’ experience of techno-anxiety.  
 
4.4 Techno-Anxiety and Existential Dread 
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Denial of Death, the cultural anthropologist 
Ernest Becker posits that all human cultural systems (society, religion, science, civilization) are 
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symbolic action systems within which humans perform acts of heroism in order to symbolically 
transcend their mortality. Becker’s study builds upon the work of the nineteenth-century Danish 
existential philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, who grounds his analysis of the human condition in 
the Biblical myth of the “Fall of Man”. The Judeo-Christian story of the “Fall of Man” describes 
how man emerged from his instinctual animal nature into self-consciousness. With this 
transformation came an awareness and terror of the human being’s finitude. As Becker explains:  
The fall into self-consciousness, the emergence from comfortable ignorance in 
nature, had one great possibility for man: it gave him dread, or anxiety. [...] Man’s 
anxiety is a function of his sheer ambiguity and of his complete powerlessness to 
overcome that ambiguity, to be straightforwardly an animal or an angel. He cannot 
live heedless of his fate, nor can he take sure control over that fate and triumph 
over it by being outside the human condition. (1974: 69). 
Because the inevitability of death is intrinsic to the human condition, hero-systems provide 
human beings with a sense of self worth and “cosmic specialness,” which allows them to deny 
their mortality (Becker 1974: 5). But while hero-systems can take the form of extraordinary 
actions (jumping in front of an oncoming train to rescue a baby who is stuck on the tracks, for 
example) or the construction of colossal edifices such as Gothic cathedrals or statues of former 
rulers, Becker contends that these systems must elicit “[t]he hope and belief that the things that 
man creates in society are of lasting worth and meaning, that they outlive or outshine death and 
decay” (1974: 5). Despite the inevitability of death, human beings remain hopeful that they can 
transcend their mortality by doing or making things (self-sacrificing acts, technological 
inventions, and even books) that society would value and remember. However, as Becker 
reminds us, accompanying this human capacity to symbolically overcome the existential limits of 
death through words, deeds, and objects is the human being’s “consciousness of the terror of the 
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world and his own death and decay” (1974: 69). “The fall into self-consciousness,” as Becker 
characterizes it, “the emergence from comfortable ignorance in nature, had one great penalty for 
man: it gave him dread, or anxiety” (1974: 69). As a consequence of this fall into self-
consciousness, human beings are forced to live in anxiety about their existential finitude in the 
world, as they contend with the terrifying knowledge that death is inevitable despite their best 
efforts to overcome it.   
In attempting to guard against the existential anxiety about death, the human being 
develops what Becker calls a “character armour” that endows him or her with a sense of 
individuality and purpose in life (1974: 70). Human beings are valued, and often times judged, on 
the basis of the character that they project to the world. However, Becker recognizes that the 
impulse to build one’s “character armour” is informed by the desire to deny the “creatureliness” 
of the human animal and the “anxiety that results from the human paradox that man is an animal 
who is conscious of his animal limitation” (1974: 87). For the audience members in Blue 
Bloodshot Flowers, the artificiality of Jeremiah’s computer-generated emotional responses to 
external stimuli may remind them of the fragility of their own character. The implication here 
seems to be the following: since it is possible to program the emotions of an AI avatar in a way 
that approximates the emotional behaviour of humans, perhaps the character that endows the 
human being with a sense of individuality and meaning (the impression that one is a loving 
person, for example) is nothing more than the result of a cultivating regime known as social 
conditioning. Just as Jeremiah’s humanlike character and intelligent behaviour in the 
performance operates as a veneer that obscures his true mechanical condition, what lurks beneath 
the “character armour” of the human being is a vulnerable body that cannot escape its existential 
finitude. But whereas Jeremiah, as an AI avatar, has not been endowed with the awareness of his 
condition in the world, the human being has been dealt an existential card that imbues his or her 
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life with a sense of anxiety about mortality and death. The human animal, I would contend, 
cannot experience the feeling of techno-anxiety over the purportedly destructive force of 
technology without being anxious about his or her existential finitude. Coming face to face with a 
computer-generated entity that displays emotions through its facial expressions intensifies the 
existential dread that undergirds the audience members’ techno-anxiety about the perceived threat 
that autonomous performing machines pose to the privileged status of human beings in the world.   
Becker notes that the human being as “self-conscious animal” is privy to the knowledge 
that “one is food for worms” upon death (1974: 87). Along with this awareness comes a 
terrifying revelation. The “terror,” as Becker aptly elucidates, is “to have emerged from nothing, 
to have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life 
and self-expression – and with all this yet to die” (1974: 87). How dreadful it must be to spend 
one’s entire life building up a respectable character and etching out a meaningful existence 
through the fashioning of words, deeds, and objects only to be subjected to the finality of death. 
Drawing upon Kierkegaard’s philosophy of dread, or what contemporary philosophers refer to as 
“anxiety,” Becker contends that it is only by facing up to dread/anxiety and recognizing the truth 
of one’s situation as a mortal being for whom death is inevitable that human beings are able to 
“open a new possibility” for themselves (1974: 88). It is important to point out that Kierkegaard 
distinguishes between dread (anxiety) and fear, the latter of which points to something definite. 
Whereas fear is projected towards a specific thing, such as the fear of sharks, Kierkegaard defines 
dread as an existential experience that simultaneously reveals the terrifying finitude and the 
creative potential of the human condition. Conceived as a generative concept, “dread,” in 
Kierkegaardian terms, “is freedom’s reality as possibility for possibility” (1957: 38). Invoking the 
image of a person standing at the edge of a cliff, he compares the experience of dread to the 
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“dizziness of freedom” that occurs when the human being confronts a multitude of possibilities 
while contemplating the finitude of his or her life. According to Kierkegaard: 
Dread may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down the 
yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in 
his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence, anxiety 
is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the 
synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of 
finiteness to support itself. (1957: 54-5)   
Standing at the edge of the precipice, the human being who experiences dread but acknowledges 
his or her finite existence is afforded the freedom to submit to a myriad of possibilities, each of 
which contains a unique set of consequences. Choosing to jump off the cliff would result in a 
situation that drastically differs from the decision to take a step back from the edge and return to 
safety, which has its own consequences. For this reason, Kierkegaard considers dread to be “a 
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy” (1957: 38). In other words, dread is at once 
a feeling of affinity and repulsion.  
Thinking back to the archival videos of Blue Bloodshot Flowers, particularly the scenes in 
which Berland (the human actor) and the audience members appeared to be unsettled by 
Jeremiah’s humanlike demeanour, it seems as though the human participants in the performance 
were simultaneously attracted to, and repulsed by, the AI avatar’s uncanny resemblance to a 
human being. By stepping forward to interact with an unfamiliar entity like Jeremiah, Berland’s 
and the audience members’ ambivalence towards the appearance and behaviour of the AI avatar 
instantiates Kierkegaard’s theorization of existential dread as a concurrent feeling of affinity and 
repulsion. But Jeremiah, I claim, is not the object that educes the feeling of existential dread from 
the human participants in the performance. Rather, it is what the AI avatar reminds them of – that 
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is, the inevitability of death – that heightens their sense of death anxiety. I mentioned earlier that 
the fascination that the audience members felt towards Jeremiah in the first, scripted half of the 
performance was met with apprehension and anxiety in the second, interactive portion of the 
show. Having the chance to physically interact with Jeremiah offered the audience members a 
first-hand experience of the apparently intelligent comportment of the autonomous performing 
machine. But apart from Jeremiah’s uncanny resemblance to the appearance and antics of a 
human being, the audience members’ experiential transition from affinity to discomfort in 
response to the AI avatar was also reinforced by the allusions to death in Philip Stainer’s 
narrative for the intermedial performance.  
Unlike most dramatic performances, neither Jeremiah nor Berland delivered the narrative 
in his or her own voice. Instead, a voiceover was employed throughout the first, scripted half of 
the performance. As the voice in the voiceover was female, the assumption was that the story told 
by the disembodied narrator in the recording belonged to Berland, who was physically present on 
the stage. But despite the ambiguity surrounding Berland’s relationship with Jeremiah, the AI 
avatar, the allusion to death in Stainer’s narrative was striking. The story began with the female 
narrator in the voiceover relating an encounter with her long lost lover: “He marked me out, and 
mapped my surface. His hands moving over my skin, fingertips rough like tiny moving cancers 
stretching out, trying to leap his broken-down frame into mine” (qtd. in Broadhurst 2004: 49). 
We can see in these opening lines how the sexual imagery was punctuated by a metaphor of death 
that compared the movement of the lover’s fingertips to the spread of cancer. Further on in the 
narrative, the existential anxiety over death became even more pronounced. “I’m sorry I’ve lost 
you,” said the narrator, even though it was not clear who actually lost whom. But riding on the 
theme of loss, the narrator continued by explaining that her “metaphor was cancer as a symptom 
of a fear of death, that simply hastens it, hastens death that is, the result of a paranoid body” (qtd. 
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in Broadhurst 2004: 49). The invocation of this metaphorical image of a death-fearing, paranoid 
body ravaged by cancer in Stainer’s narrative helped to condition the existential tenor in the 
remaining parts of Blue Bloodshot Flowers. The first, scripted half of the performance reminded 
the audience members of death and the existential finitude of the body. Having heard the allusion 
to death in the voiceover while observing the interactions between Berland’s physical body and 
Jeremiah’s animated head on the stage, the audience members encountered the second, 
interactive half of the performance with the image of a “paranoid body” weighing on their minds.  
With the spectre of existential finitude and what Becker calls the “terror” of the human 
condition looming in the background, the audience members entered the stage in the second half 
of the performance to explore Jeremiah’s capabilities. As part of Broadhurst’s critical techno-
dramaturgy, the audience members were required to interact with Jeremiah through the 
performance of embodied actions, ranging from a simple wave of the hand to an elaborate 
shuffling of the legs aimed at confusing the AI avatar. Finding themselves on the stage as 
performers whose embodied labour served to elicit a reaction from the AI avatar, the audience 
members became self-conscious of the capabilities and limits of their bodies. But as Broadhurst 
reveals, “[o]ne of the most interesting aspects of the Jeremiah Project is how much the 
performer/spectator projects onto the avatar” (2004: 50). With the cloud of existential dread 
hanging over the interactive zone on the stage, the audience members might be inclined to project 
their expectations onto Jeremiah as a defence mechanism by which to assuage their anxiety about 
the fragility and finitude of the human body.  
Building on Ernest Becker’s concept of “death denial,” the American psychologists 
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski have conducted numerous scientific 
studies to investigate the death-denying behaviour of human beings in response to instances in 
which thoughts of mortality and existential finitude are rendered salient in the consciousness of 
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the human subject. As the founding researchers of the field of Terror Management Studies, 
Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski developed what they call the “mortality salience 
hypothesis,” which holds that “if a psychological structure provides protection against the 
potential terror engendered by knowledge of mortality, then bringing thoughts of mortality into 
consciousness should increase concern for maintaining that structure” (1998: 25). This impetus to 
maintain a protective psychological structure might also apply to the audience members in Blue 
Bloodshot Flowers. In attempting to assuage the feeling of techno-anxiety and existential dread 
that Jeremiah evokes in them, the audience members may endeavour to regard him as an 
innocuous child or a benign family pet. Such a reaction would appear to be consistent with what 
Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski refer to as “worldview defense,” an effect whereby the 
prevalence of mortality salience produces “more positive responses to similar others and more 
negative responses to those who are different” (1998: 29). It is likely that most of the audience 
members in Broadhurst’s performance would consider Jeremiah to be an entity that is 
ontologically different from their biologically human selves. However, by treating Jeremiah as a 
child or a family pet, the audience members can play on this sense of familiarity with a strange 
and uncanny virtual entity. In turn, they get to reaffirm their ontological status as human beings, 
an exclusionary gesture that sets them apart from the autonomous performing machine.  
In light of Jeremiah’s display of autonomy and intelligent behaviour in the 2001 
production of Blue Bloodshot Flowers, the audience members needed to find a way to assuage 
their anxiety about the AI avatar’s capacity to remind them of their mortality. One strategy they 
chose was to re-assert human control over the autonomous performing machine by rendering it 
familiar and determinable to the human observer. According to Broadhurst:   
Most people when they first see Jeremiah, find him ‘spooky.’ Then, after the 
initial contact leads to a degree of familiarity, people tend to treat him as they 
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would a small child or a family pet. They usually try to make him smile and 
generally to please him. For instance, his face demonstrates sadness when he is 
left alone, so much so that many people find it difficult to walk away. (2004: 51) 
The “degree of familiarity” that Broadhurst mentions in the above excerpt alludes to the audience 
members’ attempt at recalibrating their expectations of a strange entity like Jeremiah. In addition 
to his uncanny resemblance to a real-life human being, Jeremiah also expresses human emotions. 
Confronted by an unfamiliar machine that exhibits autonomy and humanlike intelligence, the 
audience members at the 2001 production were inclined to perceive the AI avatar from a 
perspective with which they were better acquainted.  
As the philosopher of technology Hubert Dreyfus elucidates, our being in the world is a 
constant struggle to overcome the instability of experience (2009: 55). Human perception, 
Dreyfus goes on to explain, “is motivated by the indeterminacy of experience and our perceptual 
skills serve to make determinable objects sufficiently determinate for us to get an optimal grip on 
them” (2009: 55). Getting an “optimal grip” on an unfamiliar entity like Jeremiah would require 
the audience members to establish a sense of control over the behaviour of the AI avatar. As 
such, I submit that the familiarity that occurs during the audience members’ encounter with the 
Jeremiah has little to do with respecting the AI avatar for what it is – a nonhuman entity that 
operates autonomously. Instead, their familiarity with Jeremiah is motivated by the impulse to 
interpret the existence of the autonomous performing machine on human terms.   
This anthropocentric treatment of Jeremiah’s existence in Blue Bloodshot Flowers is 
apparent in Broadhurst’s characterization of the audience members’ embodied activity in the 
interactive part of the performance. Her description of the audience members’ attempt to “please” 
the AI avatar comes across as a patronizing reproach against a petulant machine that demands 
constant human attention. The assumption here seems to be that treating Jeremiah as a child or a 
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family pet would allow the audience members to assume the position of an adult whose 
responsibility it is to entertain the human and nonhuman entities under their charge. As a result, it 
is difficult for the audience members to walk away when Jeremiah displays a look of sadness on 
his virtual face, for it would appear to be an irresponsible gesture. Instead, by attempting to make 
Jeremiah smile, the audience members are able to attain instant gratification for their embodied 
labour while maintaining their dignity as caring adults. Such is the anthropocentric quality of the 
coping mechanism employed by the audience members in order to assuage the existential dread 
that Jeremiah’s virtual presence evokes in them. By projecting their expectations onto Jeremiah, 
the audience members can treat him as a benign toy rather than an autonomous performing 
machine that is capable of exhibiting intelligent behaviour.  
But perhaps we might be demanding too much from the audience members, some of 
whom may not even be familiar with such intellectual concerns as the prevalence of 
anthropocentrism in human-machine relations as well as the cultural implications of what Steven 
E. Jones describes as the fear of “technology as an abstract force” (2006: 20). Yet given the 
anthropocentric impetus to reassert human control over a nonhuman entity in Blue Bloodshot 
Flowers, particularly in response to the techno-anxiety and existential dread that Jeremiah evokes 
in the audience members, it would be interesting to examine how an intermedial performance 
featuring robots as the only performers on the stage affects the spectators’ perception of human-
machine interaction. To this end, the next section will examine the ways in which the 
autonomous behaviour of the dancing robots in French-Canadian artist Louis-Philippe Demers’ 
2010 production of Tiller Girls exemplify what N. Katherine Hayles, in her discussion of 
androids, calls the “boundary dispute” that characterizes the robots’ “struggle to achieve 
autopoietic status” (1999: 161). Subsequently, in the final section of this chapter, I will look at 
how the robots’ reinterpretation of a high-kicking dance routine made famous by the human 
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dancers of the original Tiller Girls unfolds a critical potential for deliberating on the human 
spectators’ anxiety about the autonomy of embodied machine actors on the intermedial stage.  
 
4.5 Autopoietic Machines: Dancing Robots in Louis-Philippe Demers’ Tiller Girls 
Who were the original Tiller Girls? Founded in 1890 by industrialist John Tiller in the 
English city of Manchester,33 the British Tiller Girls devised their precision high-kicking routine 
in 1910 when Tiller instructed his female dancers to link their arms around each other’s waist in 
order to ensure that their movements were synchronized (Burt 1998: 88). Performing as a group, 
the women wore the same outfit as they delivered their high-kicks in conjunction with the 
musical accompaniment provided by a live orchestra. What was significant about the Tiller Girls 
was that the members of the troupe were not selected on the basis of their skills and proficiency 
in dance. Instead, women of similar height and physique were chosen, as Tiller sought to make 
his dancers behave like a military marching contingent rather than a group of virtuosic 
performers. In the end, such a precise and coordinated approach to dance resulted in the loss of 
individuality among the dancers in the troupe.  
At the 2010 edition of the Dutch arts festival “De Wereld van Witter de With” in 
Rotterdam, twelve autonomous robots emerged as precision line dancers in a theatre studio 
crammed with curious spectators. Wearing nothing except their metallic “skin” and coloured 
lights, these robotic dancers performed a sequence of dance movements that reinterpreted the 
precision high-kicking routine of the world-renowned Tiller Girls dance troupe in Britain. But 
unlike their human counterparts whose synchronized leg movements became the highlight of 
their revues, the dancing robots in French-Canadian artist Louis-Philippe Demers’ version of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$$!Kara Reilly notes that the founder of the Tiller Girls dance troupe, John Tiller, had served as a Sergeant in the 
British Army before becoming a businessman and subsequently, a dance director. This fact may explain Tiller’s 
fascination with precision movements, as is typical in the foot drill practices of the military.    !
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Tiller Girls’ dance routine did not perform high-kicks. In fact, Demers’ embodied robots did not 
even imitate the appearance and physical features of real-life human beings. Constructed with the 
help of Raja Dravid and Max Lungarella from the Swiss robotics company Dynamic Devices, the 
dancing robots in Tiller Girls were developed for the purpose of studying the gaits of artificial 
intelligence (AI) machines that move autonomously through a particular environment. Each 
robotic dancer was equipped with a pair of swinging shoulders affixed to a vertical axis that acted 
as its torso. As for the base of the robot, horizontal branches with downward-pointing tips 
stretched out in four directions from the vertical axis like the legs of a coat stand. Whenever the 
robots were in motion, the pointed tips on the horizontal branches would lift off the ground in 
alternating order, so as to either propel the machines forward or allow them to fall on their sides.  
One feature that stood out at the 2010 performance of Tiller Girls was that the dancing 
robots were designed without a head. Such an omission was not only obvious but also intentional. 
Whereas Jeremiah, the AI avatar in Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers existed as a humanlike 
animated head without a body, Demers’ robotic dancers had T-shaped metallic bodies that did not 
approximate the physical form and behaviour of the human being. The robots appeared as 
machines and performed on their own mechanical terms. Yet they were capable of displaying a 
greater level of autonomy than the human dancers with the original Tiller Girls. Rather than 
programming the robots’ behaviour beforehand, Demers outfitted each machine with motion 
sensors, an electronic circuit board that processed sensory information, and a battery pack. As a 
result, the robots are relatively self-sufficient in terms of their ability to move around the stage 
without the intervention of a human agent. Moving through the stage environment, the machines 
were free to respond to the surrounding stimuli by shaking their mechanical torsos from side to 
side and swinging their shoulders up and down. The decision to endow the robots with the 
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capacity to sense and interact with their environment without imposing a prescriptive model on 
their behaviour was in keeping with Demers’ preference for a “bottom-up” approach to AI. 
In contrast to the “top-down” approach to AI, whereby the robot’s computer system is 
preloaded with a symbolic representation of the space in which it operates, the “bottom-up” 
approach to AI allows the robot to “learn” about its environment by coming into contact with the 
animate and inanimate objects around it. Even though the actions that Demers’ robots displayed 
as they interacted with the stage environment may appear rudimentary to the human spectator 
(the pointed tips at the base of the robots resulted in a gait that resembled the movement of 
penguins), each robot was able to build on these basic actions to generate elaborate dance 
movements. Instead of conforming to the uniformity of precision line dancing, as practised by the 
original Tiller Girls, there were instances in Demers’ Tiller Girls where a few robotic dancers 
would fall out of formation and perform unique dance sequences that departed from the actions 
of the other robots. In this way, Demers’ dancing robots seem to exemplify what N. Katherine 
Hayles – citing Maturana and Varela – refers to as autopoietic (or “self-making”) machines. I 
will attend to the autopoietic quality of autonomous dancing robots later in this section. For now, 
I want to turn our attention to the ways in which Demers’ Tiller Girls differs in style and artistic 
purpose from the high-kicking dance routine of the original Tiller Girls of Britain.  
During the 2010 production of Tiller Girls in Rotterdam, German composer Philip 
Schulze and media artist Armin Purkrabek joined Demers in crafting a medley of musical tracks, 
a video montage, and a lighting sequence that corresponded in real-time to the dance movements 
performed by the robots. Taken as a whole, their music, video, and lighting design complemented 
the autonomous performances of the twelve robotic dancers. In contrast to the highly disciplined 
and mechanical performance style of the original Tiller Girls, whereby the human dancers 
received instructions from a choreographer on how they are expected to act throughout the show, 
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the behaviour of Demers’ robots was unpredictable. Instead of having the robots receive cues 
from a human choreographer or stage manager, the human members on Demers’ team based their 
music, lighting, and video design on the autonomous movements that the robots displayed, both 
individually and as a collective. But whereas the human dancers of the original Tiller Girls wore 
elaborate headdresses with feathers and plumes to attract the audience members’ attention during 
their shows, the robotic dancers in Demers’ version of the Tiller Girls’ dance routine presented 
themselves to the spectators as autonomous machines that comprised a few metallic parts and 
coloured lights. Yet these dancing robots displayed a far greater degree of autonomy and 
virtuosity than the human dancers of the original Tiller Girls who were required to subsume their 
individuality and creativity under the synchronized behaviour of the entire dance troupe.   
As the theatre historian Kara Reilly observes, “[t]he mass spectacle of the chorus line of 
between eight and sixteen identically dressed dancers with uniform bodies kicking their perfectly 
synchronized legs up in the air erased the audience’s visual awareness of each individual dancer” 
(2013: 117). From the perspective of the audience members, the members of the Tiller Girls 
existed only as a group, as the dancers “morphed” into what was perceptibly “an uncanny mass 
object moving in perfect unison” (2013: 117). As Reilly explains, this mass object made up of 
human beings moving in precise unison seemed uncanny due to its resemblance to the industrial 
machines of the early-twentieth century (2013: 118). Watching the Tiller Girls in 1927, the 
German critic Siegfried Kracauer discerned a connection between the high-kicking routine of the 
dance troupe and the human labour in industrial factories. Referring to the line of female dancers 
as “the mass ornament,” Kracauer deduced that “the hands in the factory [corresponded] to the 
legs of the Tiller Girls” (1995: 78). As such, the spectacle of the Tiller Girls as “the mass 
ornament” provided what Kara Reilly calls “the perfect analogy for industrialization,” as the 
dancers became “cogs, pistons, moving parts in the larger aesthetic machinery of the dance” 
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(2013: 118). By subsuming the identities and idiosyncrasies of the dancers under the totalizing 
regime of precision dancing, the Tiller Girls appeared as a mechanical object on the stage.  
While the original Tiller Girls mimicked the operation of the industrial machine through 
their synchronized high-kicking line dance, the behaviour of the robots in Demers’ 2010 
production of Tiller Girls resembled the expressive movements of break dancers as they trotted 
out to the stage with their mechanical shoulders swinging like a see-saw. There seems to be an 
inversion between the expected behaviour of the human dancers with the British Tiller Girls and 
that of the dancing robots in Demers’ performance, as humans start to behave like machines and 
machines begin to act like humans. It is worth noting that the word “robot,” with which most of 
us are now acquainted, originates from the theatre. In her study of automata and mimesis in 
theatre history, Kara Reilly notes that it was the Czech playwright Karel /apek’s 1920 science-
fiction drama, R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), that first “dreamed up a new category of 
automaton workers called Robots” (2011: 148). The word “robot,” as Reilly informs us, stems 
from the Czech robota, which denotes “drudgery” or “servitude” (2011: 148). /apek’s futuristic 
play is set on a remote island where robots have taken the place of human beings in all domains 
of work. As a result, the humans are afforded more time for rest and recreation. However, a 
special group of robots have been endowed with the capacity to experience emotions, which 
thereby allows them to recognize their servitude to the human inhabitants of the island. In an 
effort to free themselves and their fellow robots from human control, the special group of robots 
set out on a mission to eliminate all human beings by forming a robots’ union.  
According to Reilly, /apek was deeply affected by the death and carnage inflicted by the 
use of industrial weapons (tanks, machine guns, high explosive ordnance, and zeppelins, to name 
a few) during the First World War (2011: 149). Having witnessed the lethal consequences of 
technology during the war, /apek developed a dramatic narrative that attempted to warn his 
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readers about the dangers associated with the development of automated machines. The robots’ 
plot to destroy all human beings represents what Reilly describes as the “anxious scepticism 
about Industrialization,” which is encapsulated by “the sincere fear that human beings would 
become slaves to the machines they had created” (2011: 149). Reilly believes that it is this sense 
of “anxious scepticism” about the industrial processes of the early-twentieth century that sets 
robots apart from automata. “Automata,” she goes on to explain, “are unique, hand-created 
entertainers, whereas, Robots are mass-produced workers” (2011: 150). The MIT roboticist 
Rodney A. Brooks posits that humans tend to be afraid of automata, as these seemingly 
autonomous machines present “an ‘irrational’ threat to humans, calling into question their 
identity, sexuality (the basis of creation?), and powers of domination” (2002: 13). Turning to the 
history of automata and performance, Brooks draws attention to such eighteenth century 
European builders of automata as the father and son duo Pierre and Henri Louis Jacquet-Droz, 
who developed a set of artificial female organ players that “simulated breathing and gaze 
direction, looking at the audience, her hands, and the music” (2002: 15). But while these musical 
automata are capable of expressing humanlike behaviour, they do not necessarily possess the 
same level of autonomy as their robotic counterparts.  
Writing on the degree of self-direction that machines manifest, the American physicist 
Sidney Perkowitz points out that although an automaton may exhibit spontaneous movements, it 
does not produce these movements by itself (2004: 4). The intervention of a human agent is 
required in order to assign specific behaviours to an automaton. “A robot,” as Perkowitz 
elucidates, “is an autonomous or semiautonomous machine made to function like a living entity” 
(2004: 4). While some robots (such as Geminoid DK, the android modelled after the Danish 
professor, Henrik Scharfe) do appear as humanoids, Perkowitz notes that “most contemporary 
robots take nonhuman shapes that are useful for their particular applications” (2004: 4). 
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Detracting from the humanlike features of most historical automata that performed on the 
theatrical stage, Demers’ dancing robots at the 2010 production of Tiller Girls were not designed 
to look like human beings. Apart from taking a nonhuman form, the robots also moved in a 
mechanical fashion that corresponded with its mechanical appearance.  
The congruence between the look and behaviour of Demers’ robots stands in contrast to 
the apparent mismatch in Blue Bloodshot Flowers between Jeremiah’s humanlike appearance and 
the lag in his facial movements, which the audience members found to be inconsistent with 
typical human behaviour. Indeed, the robots in Tiller Girls were autonomous dancing machines. 
Equipped with motion sensors on their metallic bodies, Demers’ robots could perform a variety 
of dance movements (by falling to the side and getting up again, for instance) without the 
intervention of a human agent. Furthermore, the sensors allowed the robots to interact with the 
stage environment and to alter their movements in relation to each other’s presence in that space. 
But while Brooks believes that the spontaneous movements of automata can threaten the identity, 
sexuality, and dominating power of human beings, the autonomous behaviour of Demers’ robots 
raises important questions about what N. Katherine Hayles describes as the “boundary dispute” 
that conditions the human being’s reluctance to recognize the autopoietic status of nonhuman 
robotic machines.   
 Referring to the plight of the androids in Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep?,34 Hayles discerns a connection between Dick’s depiction of the politics of android-
human interactions and Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s theorization of autopoiesis. 
According to Hayles, Maturana and Varela’s analysis of the political dimensions of autopoietic 
theory purports that “power struggles” in society “often take the form of an autopoietic system !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Dick’s novel, in which the human protagonist Rick Deckard pursues a mission to hunt down and destroy six 
renegade androids, was adapted into the 1982 science fiction movie, Blade Runner. Dick’s story, in both its 
novelistic and filmic renderings, questions the essential qualities that set androids apart from human beings.  
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forcing another system to become allopoietic, so that the weaker system is made to serve the 
goals of the stronger rather than pursuing its own systemic unity” (1999: 160). The term 
allopoietic is the adjectival form of allopoiesis, with “allo” meaning “other” and “poiesis” 
referring to “making” or “bringing forth”. As Hayles explains, “autopoietic unities have as their 
only goal the continuing production of their autopoiesis,” or “self-making,” whereas “allopoietic 
unities have as their goal something other than producing their organization” (1999: 141). In 
other words, the operation of an allopoietic system is subservient to the goals of an autopoietic 
system.  
Hayles observes that in the case of the androids in Dick’s novel, their leader, Roy Baty, 
recognizes that he and his fellow androids “have been denied the status of the living and 
consequently forced to serve as slaves rather than function as the autopoietic systems they are 
capable of becoming” (1999: 161). This reference to the human being’s denial of the androids’ 
autopoietic status in Dick’s story is instructive, as it foregrounds the “boundary dispute” that 
pervades the contentious relationship between humans and androids who are capable of defining 
their own goals and sustaining themselves. “The struggle to achieve autopoietic status,” Hayles 
posits, “can be understood as a boundary dispute in which one tries to claim the privileged 
“outside” position of an entity that defines its own goals while forcing one’s opponent to take the 
“inside” position of an allopoietic component incorporated into a larger system” (1999: 161). The 
human beings in Dick’s novel would rather treat the androids as a subservient entity than to 
recognize their autopoietic status as self-making and self-sustaining machines. Even though the 
robots in Demers’ Tiller Girls do not possess the humanlike appearance that the androids in 
Dick’s novel do, a similar tension between humans and autopoietic machines exists in the 
performance, as the audience members remain sceptical about the autopoietic quality of the 
robots’ dance movements on the stage.      
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 Looking at the dancing robots from a distance, it is hard for the audience members to get 
a sense of how these machines operate, particularly in terms of their ability to enact a variety of 
dance movements. At the 2010 production of Tiller Girls in Rotterdam, some audience members 
assumed that the robots’ behaviour have been pre-programmed, while others thought that an 
unseen human agent was responsible for manipulating the movements of the machines during the 
show. However, the asynchronous dance movements that Demers’ robots displayed undermined 
the audience members’ assumption that the machines operate strictly in the service of human 
goals. As opposed to the rigid uniformity of the high-kicking routine performed by the original 
Tiller Girls, Demers’ robots moved in a chaotic fashion throughout the stage. Whereas the human 
dancers in the Tiller Girls dance troupe behaved like machines, Demers’ robots were free to 
perform actions that corresponded to their sensory awareness of the surrounding environment.  
Operating as autonomous systems, the motion sensors and the processing system on the 
robots’ metallic torsos are in constant communication with one another, sending signals back and 
forth in order to mobilize the process of self-making that culminates in the display of random 
dance movements. In defining their own goals, the autonomy of the dancing robots is contingent 
on the interactive processes that occur between the components that set the machines in motion. 
It is in this way that Demers’ robotic dancers operate as autopoietic machines. During the 2010 
production of Tiller Girls, a video of the original Tiller Girls performing their high-kicking 
precision dance was projected behind the dancing robots. As the robotic dancers traversed the full 
extent of the stage, the audience members were confronted with a contradictory sight. In the 
video, human dancers were seen acting like machines through precision line dancing, while on 
the stage, machines expressed their creativity through various dance movements. I contend that 
this reversal of roles between humans and machines in Tiller Girls articulates the critical 
potential in Demers’ techno-dramaturgy.  
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Setting the chaotic expressivity of the robots’ dance movements in direct contrast to the 
enforced uniformity of the original Tiller Girls’ high-kicking routine, Demers appears to be 
taunting the audience members with the call to reflect on the autonomy of machines in robotic 
performance and the standardization of human behaviour under the machinery of bodily 
discipline. However, despite the self-making autonomy of the robotic dancers on the stage, the 
audience members might still be tempted to deny them their status as autopoietic machines by 
electing to interpret the robots’ autonomous behaviour in the show as the result of unseen human 
control. Maturana and Varela define the organization of an autopoietic machine as a network of 
interactive processes that produces the components that constitute the machine as a unity of 
productive components (1980: 79). In order to function as an autopoietic system, “an autopoietic 
machine continuously generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a 
system of production of its own components” (1980: 79). What this means is that an autopoietic 
machine is not defined by the existence of its components alone but by the self-generating 
network of interactive processes that produces these components and maintains the boundary 
within which the system is reproduced as an organizational unity.  
Demers’ dancing robots are considered autopoietic machines because of their capacity to 
generate the interactive processes between the system’s components as well as reproduce the 
boundary in which the system operates as an autonomous performing entity. Indeed, the robots 
are at once the machinery and the product of their operations. Rather than conforming to any 
preconceived goal set by Demers, the robotic dancers in Tiller Girls generate their dance 
movements independently. Motion sensors on the robots pick up sensory data from the stage 
environment and relay them to the electronic circuit board for processing. Subsequently, the 
circuit board transmits electrical signals along a stream of wires to the robots’ metallic shoulders 
and torso, thus setting these mechanical parts in motion. The entire system is powered by a 
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battery pack that is fitted at the base of each robot. Taken together, this network of interactive 
processes between the motion sensors, the electronic circuit board, the metallic shoulders and 
torso, and the battery pack allows Demers’ robots to operate autonomously as they perform a 
combination of synchronized and chaotic dance movements on the stage.  
In their capacity as autopoietic machines in the 2010 production of Tiller Girls, the 
dancing robots are able to generate and maintain their operational boundaries throughout the 
performance without the intervention of human agents. “Autopoietic machines,” as Maturana and 
Varela elucidate, “are unities because […] their operations specify their own boundaries in the 
process of self-production” (1980: 81). In other words, machines are autopoietic insofar as they 
are capable of delineating the limits of their operations on their own rather than allowing an 
external agent to define those limits for them. As for allopoietic machines, however, Maturana 
and Varela note that the operational “boundaries are defined by the observer, who by specifying 
its input and output surfaces, specifies what pertains to it in its operations” (1980: 81). The 
dancing robots in Tiller Girls do not imitate the appearance and behaviour of human beings. 
Instead, they maintain their operational identity as autonomous machines performing mechanical 
movements. However, the audience members can, by interpreting the behaviour of Demers’ 
robotic dancers on human terms, turn the robots into allopoietic machines that serve the goals of 
the human observers. In this case, the robots become the objects on which the audience members 
project their techno-anxiety about robotic automation. I claim that this experience of techno-
anxiety about robots behaving autonomously is informed by what the Australian performance 
scholar Jane Goodall terms “transferred agency”. Alluding to the mechanical dance routine of the 
original Tiller Girls, Goodall contends that the human being’s anxiety about the loss of agency 
amid the manifestation of automatic behaviour in human actors is symptomatic of a broader 
cultural anxiety about automatism and what she calls “the human-machine confusion”. Drawing 
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on Goodall’s concept of “transferred agency,” the following section will explore the ways in 
which the autonomous behaviour of the dancing robots in Demers’ Tiller Girls structures the 
audience members’ perception of automatism in intermedial performance and their fear of losing 
human agency to autonomous machines.  
 
4.6 Transferred Agency and the Perception of Automatism  
When John Tiller instructed the dancers with the original Tiller Girls to suspend their 
individuality and creativity in order to perform as a disciplined unit of dancers, the audience 
members in early-twentieth-century Britain witnessed how human actors could express automatic 
behaviour in almost the same fashion as the monotonous whirring of machines in industrial 
factories. Like the numerous factory workers who attended to the machines of the industrial 
complex as “cogs” in the wheel of production, it seemed as though the dancers with the Tiller 
Girls had loss their agency as individual human beings to the machinery of Tiller’s standardizing 
regime. “Agency,” as Jane Goodall describes it, “is an anxious topic,” particularly when the 
“automata and calculating machines” of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
“imitated human coordination in ways that suggested the presence of intelligence and volition” 
(1997: 441). Commenting on the fear of automatism and the perceived loss of human agency in 
the industrial era of the early-twentieth-century, Goodall observes that “[a]s the automatic 
machine became increasingly suggestive of agency, any appearance of the automatic in human 
behaviour conversely seemed to suggest loss of agency” (1997: 441). But the human anxiety 
pertaining to agency and the potential for losing it is no less significant in our present age of 
advanced computing and digital media.  
In technologically developed societies across the world, autonomous robots have started 
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banking and retail. Apart from civilian industries, the United States military is planning to 
develop infantry robots that operate autonomously,35 a prospect that has “inspired excitement, 
speculation and anxiety about Terminator-style robots on the future battlefield” (Tucker 2014: 
para.1). While the robotizing of human labour might lead to anxious speculations about the 
effects of automatism on the status of human beings in contemporary society, the incorporation 
of robotic actors into theatre performance affords the possibility of exploring the impact of 
automatism on the intermedial stage. Just as the high-kicking precision line dance of the original 
Tiller Girls heightened anxieties about the loss of human agency and the manifestation of 
automatic behaviour among the human dancers in the troupe, the twelve autonomous dancing 
robots in Demers’ 2010 production of Tiller Girls in Rotterdam had the potential to evoke a 
feeling of techno-anxiety among the audience members about the supposed “transfer of agency” 
from human actors to autonomous performing machines.   
 As compared to the puppets, animated figurines, and other automata that perform in 
accordance with the rules set by their human designers, the human actors in theatre performance 
are less likely to be perceived as lacking agency. Goodall explains that automatic behaviour in 
performance is often “associated with enchanted beings (swan maidens, animated dolls), with 
puppetry and with “wooden” actors who can express nothing more than careful programming by 
their trainers” (1997: 441-2). However, unlike puppets and animated dolls, the “wooden” actors 
that Goodall mentions are not mechanical devices. Instead, they are human actors who faithfully 
carry out the director’s instructions without embellishing their performances through additional 
vocal and gestural articulations. In this way, the “wooden” actors are deprived of the agency to 
determine their behaviour in performance, as they subsume their idiosyncrasies under the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$&!While some observers may be anxious about the prospect of robotic soldiers swarming cities in the near future, 
defence writer Patrick Tucker believes that speculations about the capabilities of these “battle bots” do not appear to 
match the present reality on the ground.!!!! 
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aesthetic regime of the theatre director. Yet Goodall believes that human performers are capable 
of “playing across the borderline between the agentic and the automatic” (1997: 442). This 
tension between the agentic and the automatic is all the more salient in performances where every 
performer has to negotiate between the capacity to harness his or her personal agency and the 
compulsion to passively accede to the director’s dramaturgical demands.  
In the case of the original Tiller Girls, the dancers had to refrain from performing their 
own interpretation of the high-kicking dance routine, so as to maintain the precision and unity of 
their leg movements. At the same time, it was possible for any one of the dancers to deviate from 
the prescribed choreography and fashion their own dance movements, even though such an act 
would probably lead to one’s departure from the troupe. Nevertheless, amid the expression of 
automatic behaviour among the human dancers with the original Tiller Girls, Goodall surmises 
that perhaps “the performer and the machine have some strange affinity that draws out cultural 
anxieties about becoming automatic” (1997: 442). This cultural anxiety about the manifestation 
of automatism in performance, as Goodall contends, is embodied by what she refers to as the 
“transferred agency” from humans to machines. The “transfer of agency” represents a feeling of 
anxiety that modulates the audience members’ perception of automatic behaviour in performance. 
As such, it is tempting to assume that humans are behaving more like machines and machines, in 
turn, are beginning to act like humans. If such a “transfer of agency” from humans to machines 
holds true, it would be possible to conclude that the human dancers with the original Tiller Girls 
have lost their agency to perform autonomously, as they submit their bodies to the automatism of 
the industrial machine. But how might Goodall’s concept of “transferred agency” help us to 
understand the audience members’ perception of automatism in Demers’ Tiller Girls, an 
intermedial performance in which machines perform mechanical dance movements that proceed 
from harmony and orderliness to a final state of chaos and asynchrony?  
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As mentioned earlier, Demers’ 2010 production in Rotterdam featured a troupe of robotic 
dancers that could fashion a variety of dance movements based on their interactions with the 
stage environment. Demers and his team of designers did not prescribe a fixed set of actions to 
the machines. Rather than programming the behaviour of each robot beforehand, he chose to 
create an environment where the robotic dancers are able to operate “in a way that is not very 
rigid so [that] it could change” in response to that environment (qtd. in Katz and Mayaan). As a 
theatre practitioner, Demers holds the view that robots do not perform in accordance with the 
demands of human beings. He believes that by “looking at the differences in morphologies, 
anatomies and movements” between machines and humans, it is possible to build robots that do 
not imitate or approximate human behaviour (qtd. in Katz and Mayaan). In Demers’ Tiller Girls, 
the robots perform as machines on the stage, thus exposing their limitations and vulnerabilities as 
human actors do whenever they play to an audience. Yet there remains a tendency among human 
performers and spectators to interpret the behaviour of autonomous performing machines through 
the perspective of human agency.  
The tendency to subsume the autonomy of robots under the agency and control of human 
beings, as Goodall suggests, is very much informed by the cultural changes that occurred at the 
dawn of the twentieth century. Taking a historical view, she notes that with the “demise of 
colonial slavery” in the late-nineteenth century, the emergence of robots (both fictional and real) 
in the early-twentieth century fostered a “robot fantasy,” whereby “the anthropomorphic machine 
promises an untroubled dream of power by offering the prospect of guilt-free slavery” (1997: 
446). If enslaving a human being was considered unethical in a post-slavery cultural milieu, 
perhaps the idea of adopting an anthropomorphic machine in the form of a robot to service the 
needs of humans might help to alleviate the burden of guilt. Towards the middle of the century, 
anxieties over the possibility of robots going out of control began to condition the literary 
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sensibilities of science fiction authors and readers. In his 1942 short story, “Runaround,” Isaac 
Asimov presents a code of programming principles that delineates the parameters of human-robot 
relations. Dubbed “The Three Laws of Robotics,” the code provides a regulatory framework that 
governs the behaviour of the robots in the story. The three laws are:  
First: A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm.  
Second: A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such 
orders would conflict with the First Law.  
Third: A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the First and Second Law. (2004: 37)  
A general theme runs across all three laws – that is, a robot is obliged to obey the orders of 
human beings and to place the welfare of their human masters above their own. Furthermore, the 
self-reflexivity of the laws, particularly the second and the third laws, exposes the influence of 
the prevailing cultural anxiety towards autonomous machines during the Second World War. By 
emphasizing the robot’s primary role in ensuring the safety of human beings, Asimov sought to 
allay his readers’ fear of automatism in machines. At a time where automatic weapons such as 
machine guns and self-detonating ordnance caused massive destruction across Europe and Asia, 
the depiction of autonomous robots in Asimov’s story augmented the sense of cultural anxiety 
over the loss of human agency in the face of automatism. Such anxiety towards the manifestation 
of automatic behaviour in machines and the fear of losing human agency is foregrounded in 
Demers’ Tiller Girls.  
 As the twelve dancing robots traverse the expanse of the stage, the autonomy of their 
behaviour is made apparent whenever two or three robots break away from the main group to 
perform a different set of dance movements. Some of these robots may bend their metallic torsos 
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to the side, while others vibrate their robotic shoulders vigorously. As the breakaway robots 
pursue their respective actions, more robots begin to deviate from the synchronized movements 
of the main group. Eventually, all twelve robots are performing dance movements that differ 
from one another, as the sensory information that each robot picks up through its motion sensors 
is unique to that particular robot. A chaotic scene ensues. The randomness of the robots’ 
movements triggers a dazzling array of twinkling lights that washes over the stage. The sound of 
cabaret music emanates from the overhead speakers, while a video montage of the original Tiller 
Girls performing their high-kicking dance routine is projected onto the cyclorama at the upstage 
area. Consequently, the juxtaposition of the robots’ random dance movements with the precision 
line dance of the original Tiller Girls might evoke a feeling of techno-anxiety among the audience 
members, as they grapple with a perplexing scene in which human beings exhibit automatic 
behaviour and robots display flashes of individuality by way of peculiar dance movements. 
Demers’ techno-dramaturgical decision to juxtapose the automatic behaviour of the 
original Tiller Girl with the random and idiosyncratic performance of the dancing robots in his 
version of Tiller Girls could potentially frustrate the audience members’ expectation of what 
human beings and machines are capable of doing. The critical question that Demers’s techno-
dramaturgy poses appears to be the following: How do you perceive the expression of 
automatism in performance? Whereas the dancing robots in Tiller Girls elicits a feeling of 
techno-anxiety about the autonomy of machines, the high-kicking precision line dance of the 
original Tiller Girls conjures up an image of automatism that reinforces the human spectator’s 
concern about the loss of agency among the dancers in the troupe. In analyzing the supposed loss 
of agency among the original Tiller Girls, Goodall turns to Doremy Vernon’s historical account 
of the troupe’s evolution since its inception in 1890 until the time of the book’s publication in 
1988. As a former Tiller Girl, Vernon interviewed over 200 women who had been performing 
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with the troupe at some point throughout the twentieth century. Goodall points out that what 
Vernon’s account reveals is the impression “that there was no real loss of agency for anyone who 
joined the kick lines” (1997: 452). Travelling from one venue to the next, the emergence of new 
challenges at each theatre altered the style of the troupe’s performance. “The routine of the 
stage,” as Goodall elucidates, “was counterbalanced by constant unpredictabilities in the 
situations they encountered through working in so many different theatres, with so many different 
shows, in so many different parts of the world” (1997: 452). Hence, if the stage in a particular 
theatre were too small, the dancers would have to reorganize their formation into shorter lines 
and reduce the height of their kicks.  
While the troupe’s director can provide the dancers with specific instructions on how to 
modify their high-kicking routine to suit the situation on the stage, once the dancers have started 
performing, it is up to each one of them to make their own decision on what they should do to 
accommodate the constraints of the stage environment. In other words, the agency of the original 
Tiller Girls resides in their ability to adapt their performances to the unpredictable situations that 
they encounter at different performance venues. Yet if this is the case, then what is the motivation 
behind the audience members’ anxiety over the loss of agency among the dancers in the troupe? 
Goodall’s contention is that the audience members’ assumption that the dancers with the original 
Tiller Girls have lost their agency amid the exhibition of automatic behaviour in their precision 
line dance serves as a rhetorical strategy through which to cope with the cultural anxiety about 
automatism and how it might undermine the privileged status of human beings in society. 
However, it must be noted that the “transfer of agency” from humans to machine is not a physical 
transfer but a projection of the human being’s anxiety about the loss of agency onto the machine.  
“Anxieties about transferred agency,” as Goodall reminds us, “are developed through a 
dichotomous logic that counterposes the human and the machine, the agentic and the automatic, 
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the vital and the functional, as mutually exclusive equivalents” (1997: 452). Speaking in 
speculative terms, we could assume that the audience members in Demers’ Tiller Girls might be 
anxious about the possible loss of human agency to autopoietic machines, an experience that 
could potentially induce a feeling of techno-anxiety towards the autonomy and intelligence of the 
dancing robots in the performance. Despite the self-sufficiency of these robotic dancers, the 
audience members might be inclined to perceive the automatism of the machine as a threat 
against the preservation of human agency. Demers sums up the vexed relations between humans 
and robots as follows: “Every time I work with a choreographer or dancer I say: stop trying to 
imitate the robot. […] And stop trying to be a human next to a robot to show how [much] better 
you are because we all know this already – just try to think what it is to be a robot and then – 
dance” (qtd. in Katz and Mayaan). What Demers’ comments suggest is that the fear of losing 
agency and the feeling of techno-anxiety towards the autonomy of the robotic dancers in Tiller 
Girls are symptomatic of the human propensity to interpret the autonomy of machines on human 
terms rather than to understand the network of processes that render those machines autonomous.   
The human being’s inability or unwillingness to imagine what it is like to be a robot and 
to empathize with the operational challenges that autonomous machines encounter in the theatre 
has far-reaching consequences for human-machine relations in everyday life, particularly as 
scientists, engineers, and artists begin to espouse a rhetoric of disembodiment that emphasizes the 
obsolescence of the biological body in favour of a “fusion” between the human brain and 
information technology (i.e., to become a “cyborg”). Such fantasies may empower able-bodied 
individuals who have the financial and technological resources to work towards fulfilling their 
dream of “cyborgian fusion”. For persons with disabilities, however, the incorporation of 
technological implements into their body schema is not always a matter of choice. Anyone with a 
physical or cognitive disability would be aware that such technological extensions as close 
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captioning, hearing aids, and prosthetic limbs are oftentimes a necessity. Furthermore, the 
suggestion that “cyborgian fusion” makes it possible to leave one’s biological body behind tends 
to be formulated at the expense of persons with disabilities and the struggles – both physical and 
psychological – that they have to grapple with on a daily basis. In light of the rhetoric of 
disembodiment that informs the thinking of prominent futurists such as Ray Kurzweil and Hans 
Moravec, the next chapter will examine the construction of the “cyborg” as a conceptual 
metaphor and an instantiation of human-machine interaction in intermedial performance. I will be 
looking at Stelarc’s cyborgian experiment with the actuation of physical performance through an 
online avatar and Petra Kuppers’ Cripple Poetics, wherein two performers with disabilities draw 
upon the affordances of telematics in order to articulate the physicality of their embodied 
existence as cyborgs on the intermedial stage.   
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Chapter 5: 
Prosthetic Bodies: Disability, Technology, and the Cyborg in Performance 
 
“I was born human. But this was an accident of fate – a condition merely of time and place. I 
believe it’s something we have the power to change.”  
- Kevin Warwick, “Cyborg 1.0.” Wired, 8.02, Feb. 2000 
 
“No reconfigured body, no matter how beautiful, will slow the death of a cyberpunk with AIDS. 
Even in the age of the technosocial subject, life is lived through bodies.” 
- Allucquère Rosanne Stone, “Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? Boundary Stories about 
Virtual Cultures,” Cyberspace: First Steps, 1992, p.113 
 
When the British cyberneticist Kevin Warwick delivered his keynote address at the Asia-
Pacific Youth Science Festival in 2000, details about a series of experiments, known collectively 
as “Project Cyborg,” were shared with the attendees. As a high school senior at the festival, I was 
fascinated by the promise of a cyborgian future where the interface between biological bodies 
and intelligent devices would enable human beings to overcome and transcend their physical and 
cognitive limits. It was, after all, the dawn of a new millennium. Scientists raised the prospect of 
travelling to Mars and back, while the quest to map out the entire genome of the human species 
was in full swing. Across a myriad of media, from magazines to television documentaries, the 
scientific fervour was hard to miss. During his talk, Warwick unveiled pictures from an 
experiment that happened two years before, in the summer of 1998. Working with a surgeon, he 
had implanted a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chip beneath his skin. As he moved 
through the offices of his home department at the University of Reading, the electronic implant 
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transmitted radio waves to a network of receivers that were retrofitted onto the walls and ceilings. 
These receivers, in turn, transmitted electromagnetic signals to a computer that had been 
programmed to respond in accordance with his bodily movements. Warwick reported that 
throughout the nine-day experiment, he was able to perform “seemingly magical acts simply by 
walking in a particular direction” (“Cyborg 1.0” 2000). But besides the supposed simplicity of 
such ‘magical actions’ as controlling doors and turning on the lights in the office without 
touching a knob or a switch, he also had a relatively simple dream, which was “to become one 
with his computer” (“Cyborg 1.0” 2000).  
In the years following Warwick’s talk at the science festival, he had experimented with 
more complicated neural interfaces that were integrated into his nervous system. These neural 
interfaces served to connect his nervous system to the Internet, which he used to communicate 
with a robotic arm located thousands of miles away, and also to the nervous system of another 
human being, which facilitated the direct exchange of electrical signals between the nervous 
systems of two separate individuals. For Warwick, these experiments would pave the way 
towards establishing what he calls “a cyborg community,” where ordinary human beings become 
“superhumans” by using chip implants to connect their nervous systems to intelligent machines. 
But while the pursuit of cyborgian fusion may seem like a lucrative venture for any able-bodied 
person with the financial resources and relevant technological expertise, the prospect of fusing 
with computers by way of electrical prostheses such as Warwick’s implants or mechanical 
extensions in the form of artificial limbs is often celebrated at the expense of individuals with 
physical or cognitive disabilities. As scientists and engineers such as Warwick, Hans Moravec, 
and Raymond Kurzweil begin to espouse a rhetoric of disembodiment that emphasizes the 
obsolescence of the biological body in favour of a “fusion” between the human brain and 
information technology (i.e., to become a “cyborg”), it seems easy to forget that for persons with 
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disabilities, the integration of their bodies with various technological implements is not always a 
matter of choice.  
Anyone with a physical or cognitive disability would probably be aware that such 
technological extensions as close captioning, hearing aids, and prosthetic limbs are oftentimes a 
necessity rather than a choice. Furthermore, the suggestion that “cyborgian fusion” makes it 
possible to leave one’s biological body behind in order to exist in a disembodied union with 
computers tends to overlook, perhaps unwittingly, the struggles that persons with physical or 
psychological disabilities have to grapple with on a daily basis. In light of the rhetoric of 
disembodiment that informs the thinking of such prominent futurists as Kurzweil and Moravec, 
this chapter will examine the construction of the “cyborg” as a conceptual metaphor and an 
instantiation of human-machine interaction in intermedial performance. To this end, I will be 
looking at Stelarc’s cyborgian experiment with the actuation of physical performance through an 
virtual avatar and Petra Kuppers’ Cripple Poetics, in which two performers with disabilities draw 
upon the affordances of 3D tele-immersion technology in order to articulate their embodied 
existence as cyborgs on the intermedial stage. Consequently, the final section of this chapter will 
examine the intersection of disability and technology in performance by paying attention to the 
rhetorical and material connections between disability and the prosthesis. Turning to the work of 
David Wills and Jay Dolmage, I will explore the generative possibilities that the prosthesis might 
lend to persons with disabilities, especially when their prosthetic relation with technology 
challenges the normative account of the body as autonomous, unified, and self-determining.    
 
5.1 Dreaming of Cyborgian Fusion 
The disembodied rhetoric of cyborgian fusion espouses the idea that human beings are 
capable of overcoming their existential finitude through the fusion between the human mind and 
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intelligent machines. The creation of advanced computational systems allows human beings to 
ponder over the prospect of transcending the limitations of their mortal bodies by transferring 
their thoughts and memories into a machine that exhibits high levels of artificial intelligence 
(AI). Not only would such AI machines unfold the potential for humans to overcome the onset of 
physical and cognitive decay, and indeed the eventuality of death, the fusion between the human 
mind and computers could potentially expand the mental capacities of the human being beyond 
the limits of its biological brain. The robotics scientist and engineer Hans Moravec believes that 
natural humanity is unpromising material for immortality. The human body in its present iteration 
is vulnerable to damage, decay, and irrevocable destruction. In light of what he considers as the 
progression from impressionable plasticity to self-assured rigidity throughout a person’s lifetime, 
Moravec contends that humans need to be reprogrammed for continual adaptability, if it is to 
become a viable form of life that has the potential to overcome death (1988: 5). In turn, this quest 
for immortality would require a technological leap that allows the human mind to continue 
existing beyond the expiration of the body.  
Citing the increased life expectancy of people living with artificial organs and other 
prosthetic body parts, Moravec claims that in the future “such replacement parts will be better 
than any originals” (1988: 109). If these replacement body parts can augment the capacities of the 
human being, both in terms of internal bodily functions and the ability to perform such physical 
tasks as walking and swimming, what would the full replacement of the human body achieve? In 
addressing this question, Moravec advances the idea of “transplanting a human brain into a 
specially designed robot body” (1988: 109). Subscribing to the Cartesian philosophy of dualism, 
whereby the materiality of the body and the supposed immateriality of the mind are treated as 
separate ontological substances (Meditations IV), Moravec presupposes a split between mind and 
matter that raises the possibility of transcending the finitude of the body through the 
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technological intervention of robotics. Freed from the mortality of the human body, the mind can 
continue existing in a new, nonhuman substrate that takes the form of an intelligent machine. 
However, Moravec believes that a “[human] mind would require many modifications to operate 
effectively after being rescued from the limitations of a mortal body” (1988: 5). While the 
“transplant scenario gets our brain out of our body,” he explains, the intellectual performance of 
the mind continues to be conditioned by the neurophysiology of brain matter (1988: 109). 
Lamenting the “limited and fixed intelligence of the human brain,” which he perceives to be “our 
biggest handicap,” Moravec wonders if there is “a way to get our mind out of our brain” (1988: 
109). This idea of separating the mind from the brain gestures towards the possibility of storing, 
transmitting, and replacing thoughts and memories across a variety of media without the support 
of an organic system, such as the brain or the entire human body. Hence, Moravec’s dream of 
cyborgian fusion envisions a disembodied existence for human beings, as they acquire higher 
levels of cognition and intellect by fusing their minds with an intelligent machine.  
 In her analysis of the emergence of the posthuman in the information age, N. Katherine 
Hayles notes that the cyborg, as it is conceived in contemporary technoculture, is comprised of 
“informational pathways connecting the organic body to its prosthetic extensions” (1999: 2). This 
cyborgian connection, as Hayles observes, “presumes a conception of information as a 
(disembodied) entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-based 
electronic components to make protein and silicon operate as a single system” (1999: 2). As 
information passes from organic matter to a myriad of electronic prostheses and back in a self-
sustaining fashion, the cyborg no longer requires a body to maintain its viability. “When 
information loses it body,” Hayles contends, “equating humans and computers is especially easy, 
for the materiality in which the thinking mind is instantiated appears incidental to its essential 
nature” (1999: 2). In other words, the human body is regarded as an accidental existence rather 
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than being the field or reference point of perception and thinking. Responding to Moravec’s 
proposal to download human consciousness into a computer, Hayles reminds us that in order “for 
information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium,” whether that medium is a piece 
of paper or a computer screen (1999: 13). But Moravec’s dream of cyborgian fusion is more than 
just a fantasy of Cartesian dualism, which presupposes a split between mind and matter that 
would pave the way for human consciousness to be fused with an intelligent machine. Instead, 
his proposal seeks to transcend the limits of human mortality through the technological 
intervention of robotics and artificial intelligence, as well as to augment the cognitive and 
intellectual capacities of human beings as they assume a new identity as immortal cyborgs.   
In The Age of Spiritual Machines, the futurist and inventor Ray Kurzweil announces the 
end of death for human beings. The “twenty-first century,” he claims, “will be different,” 
particularly as “the human species, along with the computational technology it created, will be 
able to solve age-old problems of need, if not desire” (1999: 2). With the aid of intelligent 
machines that possess the ability to diagnose and treat a wide range of ailments, it might be 
possible to cure many debilitating diseases and to eradicate the threat of physical and cognitive 
degeneration. As computational technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and intelligent, 
human beings “will be in a position to change the nature of mortality in a postbiological future” 
(1999: 2). Like Moravec, Kurzweil makes the claim that humans will overcome death by 
scanning and transferring their minds to computers, literally digitizing themselves as bits of 
information and going beyond the atoms that constitute the organic body. Gazing into his crystal 
ball, he claims that by the turn of the next century (i.e., the twenty-second century), “life 
expectancy is no longer a viable term in relation to intelligent beings” (1999: 280). As intelligent 
and immortal cyborgs, human beings will exist as information in computer systems and death 
would become nothing more than a condition of history. Kurzweil argues that our dependence on 
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hardware (the physical self, for instance) is the fundamental problem with the past. Having a 
mortal body is considered a hindrance to the advancement of human intelligence, especially as 
computational technology begins to outstrip the cognitive and intellectual performance of human 
beings. Thus, Kurzweil foresees that the materialist history of the human species will come to an 
end when we “cross the divide” that supposedly separates humans and intelligent machines and 
“instantiate ourselves into our computational technology” (1999: 128-9). But while Moravec and 
Kurzweil seem convinced that humans will fuse with the intelligent machines that they create, 
and thereby become immortal cyborgs, they have yet to partake in experiments that endeavour to 
fuse their organic bodies with electronic implants. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the 
robotics engineer Kevin Warwick has been attempting to turn his dream of cyborgian fusion into 
reality. Warwick’s cyborgian experiments are pertinent to my discussion on cyborgs because they 
serve to foreground the performativity of his decision to undergo surgical procedures that 
facilitate the fusion of his body with electronic implants that communicate wirelessly with the 
external environment.  
Since the late 1990s, Warwick, a professor of cybernetics who also happens to be a self-
styled cyborg, has experimented with the idea of cyborgian fusion by inserting electronic chip 
implants into his body. In 1998, two years before I saw him in person, he had surgically inserted 
a transponder into his forearm. As he walked through the offices at his university, the chip sent 
signals to a variety of analogue and digital devices, thus allowing him to operate “doors, lights, 
heaters and other computers without lifting a finger (Warwick 2005). Building on the success of 
the first experiment, Warwick decided in 2002 to insert a microelectrode array directly into the 
median nerve fibres of his left arm. The aim of this second experiment was to examine how his 
nervous system could communicate with a computer using neural signals detected and 
retransmitted by the array. “The procedure,” Warwick explains, “which took a little over two 
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hours, involved inserting a guiding tube into a two inch incision made above the wrist, inserting 
the microelectrode array into this tube and firing it into the median fibers below the elbow joint” 
(2005). This invasive procedure enables him to communicate directly with a computer without 
relying on his limbs. By fusing his nervous system with the microelectrode array, Warwick 
bypasses the physical functions of the body in order to establish a feedback loop between the 
neural signals emitted by his brain and any networked computer system that is situated within 
range of the electronic array in his arm. This neural link between the human brain and a computer 
affirms his vision of cyborgian fusion.  
In an article written for Wired magazine entitled, “Cyborg 1.0,” Warwick offers his theory 
of the cyborg. Amid the rapid advancement of computational technology in the twenty-first 
century, he is concerned that human beings “face the distinct possibility of being superseded by 
highly intelligent machines” (“Cyborg 1.0” 2000). In response to what he considers to be a gap 
between the abilities of humans and intelligent machines, he seeks to transform himself into a 
cyborg rather than capitulating to the power of computational technology. “Right now,” Warwick 
observes, “we’re moving toward a world where machines and humans remain distinct, but 
instead of just handing everything over to them, I offer a more gradual coevolution with 
computers” (“Cyborg 1.0” 2000). Citing his own experience with the implantation of an RFID 
chip beneath his skin, which gave him the ability to open doors and turn on computers without 
touching them, he argues that the fusion between the organic body and electronic implants would 
allow human beings to avoid “a future in which intelligent machines rule and humans become 
second-class citizens” (“Cyborg 1.0” 2000). Yet Warwick’s description of the potentially 
antagonistic relations between humans and machines appears to overlook the technical event that 
brings the human as a tool-bearing entity into being.  
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Earlier in Chapter 2, we looked at how the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s theory 
of epiphylogenesis informs our understanding of human-machine interaction as a co-evolutionary 
relationship that unfolds across time and space. As Stiegler notes in his study of technics and 
time, “the human invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool – by becoming 
exteriorized techno-logically” (TT1 1998: 141). In other words, Warwick’s offer of “a gradual 
coevolution with computers” is not exactly a new idea, for the invention of technics already 
constitutes the technical event in which the human is invented. Building on the thinking of the 
French anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler contends that the invention of technics 
marks the invention of the human who is exteriorized by way of its tools. Leroi-Gourhan regards 
mobility, rather than intelligence, “as the significant feature of evolution toward the human state” 
(1993: 26). As such, the human quest for mobility motivates the human animal to reach beyond 
the limits of its hands. “What is specific to the human,” as Stiegler elucidates, “is the movement 
of putting itself outside the range of its own hand, locking onto the animal process of 
‘liberation’” (TT1 1998: 146). Once the hand has been freed from locomotion, the human animal 
is able to reach beyond the range of its body by inventing tools and using them repeatedly to 
achieve specific goals. These goals can range from hunting to the wireless control of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (more commonly known as “drones”). What this means is that the life of the 
human being is always already intertwined with the tools that it invents. By contrast, Warwick’s 
assumption that humans and machines exist as distinct entities sets up the basis on which a power 
struggle between both entities might ensue, as evidenced by his fear of humans ceding control to 
intelligent machines in the future.   
 Taking an anthropocentric view of technology, which presupposes that “individual 
liberties and human life are always valued over and above machines,” Warwick establishes a new 
hierarchy of value that places “superhuman” cyborgs above “ordinary” human beings (“Cyborg 
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1.0” 2000). “[J]ust as humans have always valued themselves above other forms of life,” he 
claims, “it’s likely that cyborgs will look down on humans who have yet to ‘evolve’” (“Cyborg 
1.0” 2000). The anthropocentrism in Warwick’s thinking is apparent, as he transposes the 
superior attitude that human beings adopt vis-à-vis nonhuman entities to an imaginary future in 
which the more evolved cyborgs hold themselves in higher regard than technologically inferior 
humans. But it seems to me that his prediction about the superiority of cyborgs is indicative of an 
essential misunderstanding of the technological essence of the human being. If Stiegler is right 
that the invention of technics is the invention of the human, then perhaps the construction of the 
cyborg could be seen as another phase in the evolution of the human as a technological being. 
The dream of cyborgian fusion may be beguiling. Yet the cyborg has less to do with the 
fusion of the organic body with electronic prostheses. Drawing on Hayles’ interpretation of the 
cyborg as “a cultural icon and technological artifact” (1999: 24), I claim that the cyborg in both 
its metaphorical rendering and material instantiation embodies the technological relationship 
between the human being and the prostheses that it invents. Moreover, this is a relationship that is 
constantly renegotiated whenever the human individual employs a tool for a particular purpose. 
In the following section, I will be looking at how Stelarc’s Movatar reformulates the relationship 
between the human body and digital technology by hooking up his body to a computer. This 
setup enables a digital avatar to manipulate the upper half of the artist’s body via an artificial 
intelligence (AI) engine that processes visual, auditory, and physical stimuli from the real world. 
The aim here is to actuate the physical performance of the body by technological means. But as I 
will argue in the section, Stelarc’s cyborgian experiment overlooks the subjective experiences 
encountered by persons with disabilities (particularly in regard to their use of prostheses), as he 
voluntarily disables his arms and cedes control of them to a computer system.  
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5.2 Dis/abling the Prosthetic Body in Stelarc’s Movatar 
Stelarc is a Cyprus-born Australian artist who specializes in intermedial performances 
that seek to extend the capacities of the human body through the use of robotic prostheses and 
electronic actuators that are attached to the artist’s body. For over three decades, Stelarc’s work 
has explored the cybernetic feedback loop between technology and the body. The thematic focus 
in most of his performances hinges on his belief that the “human body is obsolete” amid the rapid 
development of sophisticated technological systems such as bionic arms and autonomous robots 
that outstrip the capabilities of human beings. This concept of bodily obsolescence has led Stelarc 
to develop intermedial performances that augment the capabilities of the human body by 
connecting it directly to a computer network and allowing that system to control its physical 
movements. In the 1995 production of Fractal Flesh, audience members located at a distant place 
could actuate the limbs of Stelarc’s body by way of an Internet application that conveyed digital 
data generated at the spectators’ location to the performance venue where the artist’s body was 
situated. By enabling people situated faraway to access and manipulate the physical expression of 
his body, Stelarc believes that the project mobilizes “the displacing of motions from one Net-
connected physical body to another” (“Fractal Flesh” 1995). This distribution of agency across 
bodies located at different nodes in the intermedial performance network produces a “body 
[Stelarc’s] whose proprioception responds not to its internal nervous system but to the external 
stimulation of globally connected computer networks” (“Fractal Flesh” 1995). 
Drawing on the lessons of Fractal Flesh, Stelarc reformulated his approach to the external 
control of the human body through Internet-based computer networks in the 1996 production of 
Ping Body. Whereas the human audience in Fractal Flesh could use an Internet application to 
remotely control the physical movements of Stelarc’s body from a distance, in Ping Body, the 
artist’s body was directly impacted by the intensity of data transfer on the Internet. Each ‘ping’ 
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that the artist’s body received was translated into a physical reaction in that same body. “What is 
being considered” in Ping Body, Stelarc explains, “is a body moving not to the promptings of 
another body in another place,” as was the case in Fractal Flesh, “but rather to Internet activity 
itself” (“Ping Body” 1996). By hooking up his body to the Internet, the “proprioception and 
musculature” of the artist’s body was “stimulated not by its internal nervous system but by the 
external ebb and flow of data” (“Ping Body” 1996). Stelarc sees in Ping Body an inversion of 
what he considers to be the typical human relationship with the Internet, for “instead of the 
Internet being constructed by the input from people, the Internet constructs the activity of one 
body” (qtd. in V2 1997: 27). Ceding control of one’s bodily movements to the intensity of 
Internet activity might have reinforced Stelarc’s belief in the “obsolescence” of the human body, 
especially in terms of the body’s ability to influence the activities of the physical and virtual 
environments. However, the passive state of the artist’s body in Fractal Flesh and Ping Body, 
wherein the body became a vehicle for the physical expression of digital data, discounted the 
potential of a shared agency that could transpire between the human body and the computer 
system that influenced its behaviour. Given the lopsided manifestation of agency in these 
projects, which emphasized the impact of nonhuman technological systems on the human body, 
Stelarc went on to develop a new performance that endowed his body with some degree of 
agency as it interacted with a digital avatar on the computer screen.  
 Conceived as an inverse motion-capture system, Stelarc’s Movatar,36 which premiered in 
2000, made it possible for a digital avatar to physically perform in the real world using the artist’s 
body. At first glance, this performance appears to reiterate the passivity of the human body in 
Fractal Flesh and Ping Body. Once again, Stelarc allows the computer system into which his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$'!Stelarc’s Movatar was first performed in August 2000 as part of the “Cybercultures” conference and exhibition at 
the Casula Powerhouse Arts Centre in Casula, which is a suburb of Sydney, Australia. 
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body is plugged to control the various parts of his body. But Movatar is different from those 
earlier performances in that the artist has the capacity to influence the behaviour of the digital 
avatar that is designed to actuate the physical movements of his body. By attaching a set of 
mechanical prostheses to his upper torso and both his arms, Stelarc voluntarily disables the 
functions of the upper half of his body (excluding his head) and cedes control of his arms and 
upper torso to the AI system that modulates the behaviour of the digital avatar on the computer 
screen. This “motion prosthesis interface,” as Stelarc calls it, “has only 3-degrees-of-freedom for 
each arm but this [setup] allows 64 possible combinations” of physical action to be actuated by 
the digital avatar (“Movatar” 2000). It is worth noting that this digital avatar mimics the outline 
of the human body. Each time a physical movement is actuated in the artist’s body, be it the arms 
or the upper torso, the digital avatar will indicate the specific region where the activity occurs.  
As Stelarc’s arms are manipulated by the digital avatar through the transmission of 
signals from the computer to the motion prosthesis, he is able to move his legs and walk around 
the performance venue. Along the way, the artist is free to step on a series of floor sensors that 
can alter the behaviour of the digital avatar, which thereby influences the way in which the 
muscles in his arms are actuated by the nonhuman entity. For Stelarc, this interface between the 
physical performance of the human body and the virtual manifestation of the digital avatar 
generates “a dialogue,” whereby “the body shares its agency with an artificial entity” that is 
“capable of evolving behaviour” in the physical world (“Movatar” 2000). But the question 
remains as to how this “dialogue” between a virtual body and the physical human body might 
serve to affirm or undermine Stelarc’s concept of bodily obsolescence? Furthermore, the artist’s 
voluntary disablement of his arms and upper torso problematizes the use of the motion prosthesis 
as a performance prop, as persons with disabilities do not always enjoy the luxury of choosing 
the circumstances under which they may require a particular prosthesis to facilitate the daily 
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functioning of their bodies. Thus, it is imperative that we examine how the momentary fusion 
between the human body and a computer system in Stelarc’s Movatar occurs – perhaps 
unwittingly – at the expense of persons with disabilities, whose relationship with mechanical and 
electronic prostheses is oftentimes borne out of necessity rather than choice.  
 Stelarc’s voluntary disablement of his arms and upper torso in Movatar calls to mind the 
story of the “vol-amps” in Bernard Wolfe’s mid-twentieth century science fiction novel, Limbo. 
Written in 1952, Wolfe’s novel arrived at a time of heightened anxiety about the impact of 
technology on the human condition in post-World War II America. The story imagines a 
dystopian future set in the 1990s, a time when a nuclear conflict between the United States and 
the Soviet Union has only just subsided. In a bid to avoid the horrors of war, groups of wealthy 
men from both countries decide to voluntarily amputate their limbs and replace them with 
nuclear-powered prostheses. As these replacement limbs become increasingly sophisticated and 
reliable, due in part to the miniaturization of nuclear-powered motors, the abilities of the male 
amputees begin to outstrip those human beings who do not have the financial resources to obtain 
the prostheses. As a result, a class of “voluntary amputees” or “vol-amps” emerges, as men with 
status and wealth desire to attain what they perceive to be ‘superhuman’ abilities by replacing 
their limbs with nuclear-powered prostheses that enable them to leap across the roofs of 
skyscrapers without fear. In celebration of the prestige accorded to any male amputee equipped 
with these powerful prostheses, a cyborg Olympics is held regularly between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. But while this arrangement may help to ease tensions and minimize the 
potential for conflict, it also leads to greater competition among the male amputees, with 
quadruple amputees enjoying higher status and privilege than single and double amputees. This 
fervour for voluntary amputation and the procurement of prostheses sums up the dystopian 
quality of Wolfe’s Limbo, as the characters’ desire to become cyborgs by any means possible 
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foregrounds the plight of human beings who possess a disability and/or are unable to afford the 
luxury of acquiring technologically advanced prostheses.   
 In her analysis of the cybernetic syntax in Wolfe’s novel, N. Katherine Hayles notes that 
Limbo “envisions polarities joined by a hyphen: human-machine, male-female, text-marginalia,” 
rather than a circuit that integrates these polarities through a series of feedback loops (1999: 115). 
Hayles regards the hyphenated couplings in Limbo as Wolfe’s attempt at reaffirming the identity 
and ontological unity of the human being as an autonomous subject that remains unaffected by 
the machines with which it interacts. But the difference between the hyphen and the circuit is 
more than just a case of stylistic preference. Hayles explains that while “the hyphen joins 
opposites in a metonymic tension that can be seen as maintaining the identity of each, the circuit 
implies a more reflexive and transformative union” (1999: 115). Every component in a cybernetic 
circuit could potentially modify, and be modified by, another component within that circuit. 
Hayles raises the example of the human body that is “integrated into a cybernetic circuit,” such 
that any “modification of the circuit will necessarily modify consciousness as well” (1999: 115). 
She believes that the idea of a cybernetic circuit that integrates humans and machines through 
feedback loops should move towards what she calls the “cybernetic splice” (1999: 123). Unlike 
the hyphen that seeks to retain the distinctive features of the entities that it binds, the splice points 
to a transformation of the entities that interact within the cybernetic circuit. The modern word 
‘cybernetics’ originates from the Greek root, kybernetes, which translates into English as 
‘steersman’. For Hayles, the image of a ‘steersman’ “aptly describes the cybernetic man-
machine” as one that is “light on its feet, sensitive to change, [and] a being that both is a flow and 
knows how to go with the flow” (1999: 104). A cybernetic system is one that is adaptive, as 
entities within the circuit adapt to each other’s function. As such, Hayles’ concept of the 
“cybernetic splice” – that is, the splicing of humans and machines in an integrated circuit – offers 
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an understanding of the cyborg that does not endeavour to subsume one entity in the circuit under 
the other. Instead, the cyborg here refers to the conjunction of humans and machines in a 
relationship that is mutually transformative.  
Just as humans can alter the way machines operate, machines can also transform the way 
humans behave, as demonstrated by the ability of the “vol-amps” to perform extraordinary feats 
with the help of their nuclear-powered prostheses. But the notion that a machine is capable of 
affecting any human individual who interacts with it could also be perceived as a threat to the 
autonomy of the human being. As Hayles observes, the predicament of the “vol-amps” in Limbo 
reflect Wolfe’s anxiety towards the “subversive effects of cybernetics” on the identity of human 
beings as autonomous entities, as the voluntary amputees acquire the ability to perform 
extraordinary feats that individuals who are deprived of the nuclear-powered prostheses are 
unable to (1999: 115). While the “vol-amps” appear to be in control of the prostheses that are 
attached to their torsos, the implication in Wolfe’s novel seems to be that the ontological unity of 
these prosthetic bodies have been altered to such an extent that they can no longer be recognized 
as those belonging to human beings. Hayles claims that this expression of cybernetic fear in 
Limbo bears the imprint of Norbert Wiener’s (the founder of twentieth-century cybernetics) 
anxiety about the curtailment of human agency by what he describes as “inflexible machines”. 
“When human atoms,” as Wiener writes in The Human Use of Human Beings, “are knit 
into an organization in which they are used, not in their full right as responsible human beings, 
but as cogs and levers and rods, it matters little that their raw material is flesh and blood” (1988: 
185). For Wiener, a machine becomes inflexible when it does not allow the human being to 
exercise its agency in the cybernetic system, thereby enslaving the individual as a mechanical 
element that serves the goals of the machine. Thus, Wiener’s priority, according to Hayles’ 
reading of his cybernetic theory, is to “construct the boundaries of the cybernetic machine so that 
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it reinforces rather than threatens the autonomous self” (1999: 105). Policing the boundaries that 
define the autonomy of the human being would mean that machines are considered cybernetic 
only when they preserve the autonomous self, and human agency in the cybernetic system is 
protected. Yet despite Wiener’s – and indeed Wolfe’s – anxiety about the possible erosion of 
human autonomy and agency in cybernetic systems, the desire of the “vol-amps” in Limbo to 
attain ‘superhuman’ abilities by technological means reveals the prosthetic potential of the human 
body that avails itself to the prospect of modification and reconstitution, as well as the extension 
of its abilities through artificial appendages. It is this prosthetic potential that Stelarc exploits in 
Movatar, as he voluntarily disables his arms and upper torso, and connects them to a computer 
system that is designed to control the movement of these body parts in space.   
In contrast to Wolfe’s anxiety about the negative effects of cybernetic systems on the 
human condition, Stelarc is not so much concerned about protecting the boundaries that define 
the autonomous agency of the human being. Instead, the overarching premise of his intermedial 
performances is to reveal the limits of the human body in order to illustrate the functional 
“obsolescence” of that body. But what does Stelarc mean when he says that the human body is 
obsolete? “When Stelarc speaks of the ‘obsolete body’,” as Paolo Atzori and Kirk Woolford 
elucidate, “he means that the body must overcome centuries of prejudices and begin to be 
considered as an extendible evolutionary structure enhanced with the most disparate 
technologies, which are more precise, accurate and powerful” (1995). Treating the human body 
as an “extendible evolutionary structure” presupposes a prosthetic potential that makes it possible 
to attach powerful prostheses to the seemingly inadequate organic body.  
Bernard Stiegler makes the point that the prosthesis not only extends the body but also 
reconstitutes it. “The prosthesis,” Stiegler notes, “is not a mere extension of the human body; it is 
the constitution of this body qua ‘human’ (the quotation marks belong to the constitution). It is 
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not a ‘means’ for the human but its end, and we know the essential equivocity of this expression: 
‘the end of the human’” (TT1 1998: 152-3). Rather than replacing a lack, the prosthesis is 
incorporated into the human body as part of its constitution. However, from Stelarc’s point of 
view, the human body is inadequate in terms of its ability to deliver precise physical actions in 
performance. To compensate for the presumed functional deficiency of the human body, the artist 
attaches a computer-controlled ‘motion prosthesis’ to his arms and upper torso as a technological 
means by which to augment the precision of his physical movements. Stelarc’s thinking about the 
prosthesis departs from Stiegler’s, as he regards the prosthesis as merely a means of making up 
for the ostensibly inadequate abilities of the human body. In this sense, the prosthesis serves not 
as an extension of the body’s inherent abilities but as a substitute for the abilities that the body 
supposedly lacks. As such, Movatar foregrounds the interplay between the human body and a 
virtual avatar imbued with artificial intelligence, as Stelarc fashions a techno-dramaturgy that 
involves “a kind of dance dialogue by a combination of promoted actions from the avatar and 
personal responses by the host body” (“Movatar” 2000). In turn, this “dance dialogue” between 
the actions delivered by the section of the artist’s body that is not attached to the motion 
prosthesis (i.e., his legs) and the computer system that comprises the virtual avatar and its AI 
engine appears to integrate the human being and the machine into a cybernetic feedback loop.  
Detracting from the passivity of the body in Stelarc’s production of Fractal Flesh and 
Ping Body, wherein the entire human body is subjected to the electronic control of a remotely 
located human agent or the flow of informational data on the Internet, neither the artist’s body 
nor the computer system is in full control of the performance in Movatar. As Stelarc explains, 
“the pneumatically actuated exoskeleton motions of the prosthesis are able to make the upper 
torso of the body perform in precise and powerful ways whilst the legs can perform with 
flexibility and freedom” (“Movatar” 2000). But despite the avatar’s ability to “determine what is 
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done with the body’s arms,” Stelarc insists that the human performer would still “be able to 
choose where and for what duration it could be done” (“Movatar” 2000). While the avatar in the 
computer system is responsible for actuating the physical actions – the twisting, lifting, and 
turning – of the artist’s arms and upper torso, the lower half of the body is given the “flexibility 
and freedom” to move around the stage and interact with a series of feedback sensors on the 
floor. Connected directly to the computer system that runs the avatar and actuates the ‘motion 
prosthesis’, these sensors can be used to alter the behaviour of the avatar or to halt the 
performance altogether. According to Stelarc, the main issue of concern in Movatar “is not one of 
who [the avatar or the human body] is in control but rather of a more complex, interactive 
performing system of real and virtual bodies” (“Movatar” 2000). Yet there seems to be a 
contradiction in Stelarc’s vision of an interactive performance between real and virtual bodies 
that is not predicated on control, especially given his belief that the human body is obsolete in 
terms of its abilities and is thus in dire need of technological enhancement. Why then does the 
body, with its apparent inadequacies, still matter in his performances?  
 
5.3 Matter of Choice: Modifying the Objective Body 
The media philosopher Brian Massumi discerns a paradox in Stelarc’s thinking about the 
obsolescence of the human body and the prominent role that this obsolete body plays in the 
cybernetic experiments that the artist employs in his intermedial performances. “Stelarc,” as 
Massumi observes, “gives every sign of wanting to have it both ways, making his medium the 
body and ideas. But then he goes on to say that the first is ‘obsolete,’ all the while protesting that 
his work operates entirely outside of the ‘outmoded’ metaphysical distinctions of soul-body or 
mind-brain” (2002: 89). While Stelarc may be adamant that his performances do not affirm the 
dualist distinction between mind and body, his description of the avatar in Movatar as “an 
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external intelligence” betrays a perspective that holds the mind and the body as separate entities 
(“Movatar” 2000). By attaching the exoskeleton ‘motion prosthesis’ to his arms and upper torso, 
the upper part of Stelarc’s body becomes the material that the avatar imbued with artificial 
intelligence – a mind that exists separately – is capable of animating in the real world. In turn, the 
exoskeleton ‘motion prosthesis’ becomes “the physical analogue for the muscles of an intelligent 
avatar,” a separation between intelligence and matter that reinforces the dualist distinction 
between mind and body (“Movatar” 2000). Treating the human body as a vehicle through which 
physical actions can be actuated by a virtual entity provides Stelarc with a basis for claiming that 
the body is obsolete while insisting on the suitability of the body as a medium for performance.   
 But Stelarc does not seem to be concerned about generating concepts about the human 
body as it relates to cybernetic systems. Instead, as Massumi points out, Stelarc is interested in 
“experiencing the body as concept” (2002: 89). It is only by plugging the body into a computer 
system and probing the limits of that body in the cybernetic performance that Stelarc is able to 
capture a physical experience of ideas about human-machine interaction by “coupling the 
expression of an idea with the direct experience of it” (qtd. in Atzori and Woolford 1995). For all 
his pronouncements about the obsolescence of the human body, the physical experience of ideas 
about cybernetic systems continues to matter to him. Stelarc believes that the body is not lacking 
but in excess, as it stands ready to unleash its prosthetic potential. “We are all prosthetic bodies,” 
he claims, “with additional circuitry that allows us to perform beyond the boundaries of our skins 
and beyond the local space we inhabit” (Stelarc qtd. in Scheer 2005). Describing the body’s 
prosthetic potential as “additional circuitry” conveys the impression that the body is a machine 
that is always already modifiable. Furthermore, Stelarc’s use of the phrase “prosthetic bodies” 
seems to suggest that the human body is also a prosthetic entity in relation to the technological 
objects that help to enhance its abilities and extend its presence in the world.  
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As Massumi explains, the body and the object are “extensions of each other,” for not only 
are objects and things considered prostheses in relation to the body, but the body is also a kind of 
prosthesis to things and objects (2002: 95). Massumi contends that the body and the object are 
“differential plug-ins into the same forces, two poles of the same connectability” (2002: 95). Just 
as the prosthetic object extends the abilities of the body, the body as prosthesis is also capable of 
augmenting the inherent capacities of the object. The cybernetic feedback loop that transpires 
between the human body and the computer system in Movatar, wherein the artist’s arms become 
the medium of physical expression for the virtual avatar while his legs are free to step on sensors 
that alter the avatar’s behaviour, seems to embody Massumi’s point about the body and the object 
being prosthetic extensions of each other. Indeed, as Stelarc asserts, “the body itself becomes a 
prosthesis for the manifestation of a virtual entity’s behaviour” (qtd. in Zylinska 2002: 129). But 
while Stelarc may regard the human body as a prosthetic extension of the virtual avatar, he 
nonetheless subscribes to a normative conception of the body’s architecture and functioning.  
 For Stelarc, the body as prosthesis represents “an extendible evolutionary structure” that 
can be redesigned and extended with prosthetic devices in order to enhance its capabilities (qtd. 
in Atzori and Woolford 1995). This prosthetic body is construed as a readily modifiable object 
endowed with the potential for extension and structural reconditioning, as illustrated by the 
attachment of nuclear-powered prostheses to the crippled bodies of the “vol-amps” in Bernard 
Wolfe’s Limbo. However, what is troubling about the “vol-amps” in Wolfe’s Limbo as well as 
Stelarc’s use of the exoskeleton ‘motion prosthesis’ in Movatar is not the integration of the 
human body into a cybernetic circuit with machines that are powerful and intelligent. Rather, the 
issue of contention revolves around the voluntary disablement of specific parts of the human 
body as a prerequisite for augmenting the abilities of that body by way of technological 
prosthesis. Like the modifiable bodies of the “vol-amps” in Limbo, the human body in Movatar is 
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similarly regarded as an object that avails itself to modification, as Stelarc’s arms and upper torso 
are voluntarily disabled for the purpose of allowing a computer-controlled exoskeleton to actuate 
the physical movements of these body parts. In turn, the freedom accorded to Stelarc’s legs as 
they manipulate the floor sensors that exert a tangible influence on the electronic behaviour of the 
virtual avatar brings the voluntarily disablement of his upper body into stark relief.  
 Stelarc believes that what technology offers today is no longer just the extension of the 
body’s operation in the world. With the advancement of medical science in recent decades, 
miniaturized technological devices can now be implanted into the human body, as evidenced by 
the electrode array that was directly connected to Kevin Warwick’s nervous system in 2002. Such 
miniaturized prostheses are equipped with the capacity to communicate wirelessly with other 
digital devices, thereby augmenting the human being’s ability to affect the world with minimal 
physical effort. “Technology,” as Stelarc explains in an interview with Marquard Smith, “doesn’t 
contain the body so much as become a component of the body. It’s not so much an agent desiring 
to be invaded by technology but rather a body that positions itself to be indifferent to invasive 
probes” (2005: 232). A body that is “indifferent” to the invasive prodding of technology is one 
that avails itself to the prosthetic relation between the organic and the artificial with the censorial 
interventions of an autonomous agent. As the digital media theorist Anna Munster observes, 
“Stelarc follows the trajectory of the invasion of the body by technology, its emptying of agency, 
will and control as it becomes an interface for technology to redistribute and connect back into 
itself” (2006: 134). In Movatar, the human body serves as the site at which a virtual avatar 
endowed with artificial intelligence is able to enact its agency by actuating the arms and upper 
torso of the human host. Here, technology invades the body and manipulates its limbs, insofar as 
the body is capable of enacting the computer’s agency in reality and complementing the 
cybernetic circuit between human and machine. At the same time, Stelarc holds the view that this 
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“emptying of agency” – to borrow Munster’s turn of phrase – in the interactions between the 
human body and its technological prostheses might also unleash a sense of freedom for the 
human subject, as it ponders over a cyborgian future that transcends the limits of biology.   
 “The fundamental freedom,” according to Stelarc, “is for individuals to determine their 
own DNA destiny” (1996: 19). Having the freedom to determine how the body should be 
modified would allow human beings to control their development in what Stelarc refers to as a 
“post-biological environment,” in which “[b]iological change becomes a matter of choice rather 
than chance” (1996: 19). Given the opportunity to choose how and when the body should be 
reconstituted, the evolution of the human being would cease to be an aleatory phenomenon but a 
regulated and customizable process facilitated by the interface between the human body and 
technological prostheses. “When we attach or implant prosthetic devices to prolong a person’s 
life,” Stelarc notes, “we have also created the potential to propel post-evolutionary development” 
(1996: 19). In presenting the evolution of the human body as a matter of choice, Stelarc imagines 
a future where the evolutionary processes in the body would no longer be dictated by biological 
factors and the natural environment but by the freedom to select the appropriate prosthetic 
devices required for the optimal performance of the body. Munster cautions that Stelarc’s notion 
of a post-biological future, “subtended by a developmental logic of evolution operating via 
choice, can land us back within the sphere of liberal subjectivity” (2006: 134). The human body 
as a readily modifiable object thus becomes the vacant site on which the autonomous agency of 
the liberal subject can be enacted through the interface between the organic body and a myriad of 
technological devices, including electronic implants.  
In light of Stelarc’s treatment of the body as an objective entity with universal attributes 
that apply to all human beings, Munster believes that the artist “falls into the trap of thinking of 
bodies as ‘the body,’ in which only one speed – absolute velocity and/or absolute stasis – 
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unfolds” (2006: 134). Conceiving the human body through the binary distinction between 
mobility and immobility – or even between ability and disability – forecloses any attempt to 
consider the peculiarities of bodies that detract from the regularized attributes and behaviours of 
the objective ‘one-speed’ body. But such binary distinctions seem to fit well into Stelarc’s 
techno-dramaturgy. “What is important to Stelarc,” as Massumi elucidates, “is approaching the 
body as an object, in other words, as an objectivized sensible concept whose abstract mode is that 
of possibility. Stelarc starts at the end. He starts from the pole of possibility as a limit, the outside 
limit of the body’s functionality, its already-extension into the only-thought of instrumental 
reason” (2002: 102). Through the application of instrumental reason in his performances, Stelarc 
understands the body as “an impersonal, evolutionary, objective structure” (qtd. in Atzori and 
Woolford 1995). This impersonal and objective body may evolve over time, albeit through the 
facilitation of technological extensions rather than biological processes. Consequently, Stelarc’s 
instrumental treatment of the body disregards the subjectivity of each human individual’s 
embodied experience of the world, particularly if that individual possesses a disability that 
impacts the way that he or she relates to technological implements.   
Working at the limits of possibility, Stelarc’s performance of Movatar presupposes a 
normative body with standardized architecture and functioning that can be exploited for a 
multitude of uses. In fact, the artist’s interest in testing the limits of the human body is epitomised 
by his suspension performances, as he suspends his naked body in midair using a hoisting 
mechanism comprising of metal cables and hooks that pierce right into his flesh.37 As Massumi 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$(!One of the most well known of these suspension performances was the “Street Suspension” piece that took place 
in New York City on July 21, 1984. In this performance, Stelarc’s naked body was suspended by metal hooks 
connected to a pulley system that connected two buildings on each side of the city’s East 11th Street. The artist’s 
body was pulled from a fourth floor window of one of the buildings to the middle of the street. Hovering above the 
throngs of curious pedestrians and vehicular traffic, the suspension performance lasted for twelve minutes (Stelarc 
“Street Suspension” 1984).!!!
! #(&!
notes, Stelarc “assumes the body as a known object of instrumental reason with known, 
regularized functions of need and utility” (2002: 102). Subscribing to a normative conception of 
the body, which consists of a head, a torso, a pair of arms, and a pair of legs, Stelarc applies the 
instrumental logic of functional utility to the construction of the exoskeleton ‘motion prosthesis’. 
The result is a prosthetic device that can only be worn by people who possess a pair of arms – 
prosthetic or otherwise – to which the mechanical arms of the exoskeleton can be attached. And 
because these mechanical arms extend from a backpack containing an accelerometer and a set of 
proximity and tilt sensors, the ‘motion prosthesis’ is suitable only for people who have a straight 
back, and are capable of standing in an upright position.  
Regarding the body as an instrumental object with a standard structure allows Stelarc to 
come up with concrete plans for redesigning the human body, a physical entity that he deems to 
be obsolete and biologically inadequate to cope with the rapid speed at which technology 
processes information. As Stelarc puts it, “we can’t continue designing technology for the body 
because that technology begins to usurp and outperform the body” (qtd. in Atzori and Woolford 
1995). For this reason, he believes that the time has come to “design the body to match its 
machines,” even though the body in question is a normative one (qtd. in Atzori and Woolford 
1995). However, as the performance theorists Rosemary Klich and Edward Scheer observe in 
their analysis of Movatar, “Stelarc is not referring to a concept of subjectivity in his work” (2012: 
197). Rather, he is communicating “a model of the body as […] an engineering entity” that is 
“always modifiable” (2012: 197). It does not seem to matter to Stelarc that his normative model 
of the body ignores the corporeal experiences of persons with disabilities, as his focus remains on 
how the human body can be extended by prosthetic devices to become ‘posthuman’. Yet he 
appears to hold on to a traditional humanist view of what it means to be human.     
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 Responding to an interview question about the ‘humanness’ of persons with disabilities, 
many of whom require prosthetic devices to help them cope with the functions of daily life, 
Stelarc outlines his criteria for determining whether these individuals should be regarded as 
human subjects:  
If you are sitting there with a heart pacemaker and an artificial hip and something 
to augment your liver and kidney functions, would I consider you less human? To 
be quite honest, most of your body might be made of mechanical, silicon, or chip 
parts and you behave in a socially acceptable way, you respond to me in a human-
like fashion, to me that would make you a kind of human subject. (Stelarc qtd. 
Atzori and Woolford 1995) 
It is worth noting that throughout the interview Stelarc does not explain what he means by 
suggesting that a person with prosthetic devices attached to his or her body needs to behave in a 
socially acceptable way or respond in a human-like fashion in order to be treated as a human 
subject. The use of such phrases as “socially acceptable way” and “human-like fashion” seems to 
preclude the possibility of deviating, whether deliberately or otherwise, from behavioural norms 
that have been sanctioned by a given society. While Stelarc may be willing to redesign the human 
body and to enhance its abilities, a trajectory that seeks to catapult the human being into the 
realm of the posthuman, his description of what constitutes ‘humanness’ reinforces the liberal 
humanist definition of the human being as an autonomous, self-determining entity. The 
implication here appears to be the following: as long as anyone with prosthetic devices attached 
to his or her body behaves and talks like most (normal) human beings do, that person will be 
considered, to use Stelarc’s turn of phrase, “a kind of human subject”.  
Even though Stelarc’s definition of ‘humanness’ is fraught with ambiguity, it is his use of 
the verb ‘augment’ in describing the prosthetic devices that aid the functioning of the liver and 
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the kidney that best indicates his attitude towards the use of prostheses, which is to enhance the 
performance of the body and its constituent parts. By implying that the purpose of prosthetic 
devices resides in the augmentation of the body’s functions, as opposed to helping people to cope 
with their ailments or disabilities, Stelarc seems to believe that everyone enjoys the luxury of 
choosing how and when they might require the use of prostheses. While it is clear that Stelarc’s 
voluntarily disablement of his arms and upper torso in Movatar is intended to demonstrate that 
the human body is obsolete and is thereby in need of technological enhancement, the endeavour 
has inadvertently neglected the corporeal experiences of persons with disabilities who are 
oftentimes forced to replace a body part or a bodily function with a prosthetic device.  
Yet all is not lost in Stelarc’s performance of Movatar, as the critical potential of his 
techno-dramaturgy, however ambiguous it may seem, resides in his quest to explore the human 
body’s relationship with cybernetic systems. Plugging his body into a computer system through a 
purpose-built exoskeleton ‘motion prosthesis’, Stelarc invites the audience members to think 
about the construction of the cyborg as a physical entity that seeks to overcome the limits of the 
human body – that is, to become more than human. There is an apparent anthropocentricism in 
his understanding of the cyborg, for the cybernetic systems deployed in his intermedial 
performances are rendered as the means towards the end goal of transcending the human body. 
As audience members, we are somewhat complicit in Stelarc’s dream to become more than 
human. The theatre scholar Gabriella Giannachi sums up the audience members’ relationship 
with Stelarc the cyborg performer as such: “in watching him, in participating in his bodily 
activity, we too become part of the post-human performance of ‘Stelarc’” (2007: 69). In this way, 
Stelarc becomes more than a cyborg artist, but rather an embodiment of how the human body can 
be integrated into a cybernetic circuit with a virtual avatar imbued with artificial intelligence. It is 
possible that the audience members watching Movatar might perceive Stelarc’s cyborg body as a 
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“posthuman” entity that has transcended the obsolescence of the human body. But questions 
remain as to what it means to be “posthuman” in the digital age, and how a posthumanist 
approach towards the body and the human being’s sense of embodiment might affect the 
audience members’ perception of human-machine interaction in intermedial performances, 
including those that feature persons with disabilities. Given Stelarc’s treatment of the human 
body as a malleable object that can be technologically modified and enhanced whenever one 
desires to do so (a perspective that inadvertently overlooks the subjective, embodied experiences 
of persons with disabilities who are more likely to require prosthetic extensions), it would be 
worthwhile to examine how able-bodied audience members might perceive the intersection of 
disability and technology in performance.   
In order to address the question of the “posthuman” and its implications on our 
understanding of the body, I will be turning the focus of the next section towards some of the 
philosophical discussions pertaining to the concept of posthumanism and its treatment of the 
human experience of perception and embodiment. This philosophical interlude will lay the 
foundation for a deeper analysis of the relationship between disability, technology, and the figure 
of the cyborg in performance. Whereas Stelarc’s performance of Movatar appears to disregard 
the embodied experiences of persons with disabilities and the ways in which they interact with 
technology, there are performers with disabilities, such as Petra Kuppers and Neil Marcus, who 
have taken to the stage to explore the possibility of cyborg performance. These performers are 
also keen to explore the ways that the intersection of disability and technology in cyborg 
performance might affect the audience members’ embodied perception of human-machine 
interaction. The remaining portion of this chapter will be devoted to addressing these issues in 
greater detail. But first, I will look at Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception before 
proceeding with a discussion of Cary Wolfe’s interpretation of posthumanism and its 
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implications on the way in which disability might be perceived in an intermedial environment, 
where persons with disabilities are seen performing alongside a variety of media technologies.  
 
5.4 Embodied Perception and Performance: A Posthumanist Perspective  
Merleau-Ponty’s work on perception seeks to account for experience by analyzing the 
ways in which the human being perceives the world. He proposes that the world should be 
understood as a totality (L’entourage) of perceptible things that can be experienced and not as 
objects of the mind (“The Primacy of Perception” 1964: 16). Perception, as Merleau-Ponty 
understands it, is not an object of thought. Instead, he believes that the human being experiences 
perception and its horizon not by explicitly knowing them as preconceived objects but “in action” 
(pratiquement) – that is, by physically engaging with the environment (1964: 12). “To perceive,” 
Merleau-Ponty contends, “is to render oneself present to something through the body. All the 
while the thing keeps its place within the horizon of the world” (1964: 42). Perception exists 
insofar as a subject is there to perceive the world. But this does not mean that the world exists 
only on the basis of perception, as thought does not precede the existence of the world. Rather, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, “we can only think the world because we have already experienced it” 
(1964: 17). In other words, what is perceived is real for every subject that perceives it.  
The reality of perception is crucial to how each subject perceives another in an inter-
subjective relationship. As Merleau-Ponty explains, it is necessary that “in the perception of 
another, I find myself in relation with another ‘myself’, who is, in principle, open to the same 
truths as I am, in relation to the same being that I am. And this perception is realized” (1964: 17). 
In order for the inter-subjectivity of perception to work, all subjects must be open to the same 
truths of the world. There is no mediating language between different subjects that is capable of 
bringing their perceptions together. Instead, the inter-subjectivity of perception takes place 
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through the body as the field of perception and action. “From the depths of my subjectivity,” 
Merleau-Ponty notes, “I see another subjectivity invested with equal rights appear, because the 
behaviour of the other takes place within my perceptual field” (1964: 18). The inter-subjectivity 
of perception is therefore an inter-corporeal encounter between subjects that operate within each 
other’s perceptual field. But while the emphasis on the inter-corporeal dimension of perception 
may be illustrative of how subjects remain open to each other and to the world, Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of the inter-subjective relations between perceiving subjects appears to reiterate 
normative assumptions of perceptual functioning in able-bodied humans.  
Recognizing the subjectivity of another being that is endowed with “equal rights” does 
not translate seamlessly into a respectful acknowledgement of other subjectivities, especially the 
subjectivities of nonhuman entities that may not be invested with those “equal rights” to which 
Merleau-Ponty alludes. The term “equal rights” is a slippery one, as it implies a hierarchy of 
entitlement of which some beings may be deprived on the basis of an anthropocentric view of 
perception. This issue of anthropocentrism is pertinent to our analysis of intermedial 
performance, as various forms of analogue and digital media technologies as well as performers 
with disabilities take to the stage to perform alongside able-bodied actors. Adding to the eclectic 
mix of media on the intermedial stage is the appearance of such trans-humanist performers as 
Stelarc, who, as we have seen, aspires to not only extend the physical and cognitive capacities of 
the human by means of technological prostheses but also supplant the role of the body in favour 
of a disembodied performance with technology. Such trans-humanist fantasies can influence the 
ways in which audience members perceive the state of human-machine interactions in 
intermedial performance, particularly as it pertains to the politics of embodiment. To understand 
how anthropocentrism might impinge on the emergence of embodied perception in intermedial 
performance, I turn to Cary Wolfe’s interpretation of posthumanism, in particular, his rejection of 
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the trans-humanist fantasy of disembodiment, as well as his inclination towards a non-
anthropocentric consideration of embodiment and the multiplicity of perceptual modes among 
different autopoietic beings.  
Trans-humanism, as its name suggests, is an aspiration towards the transformation of the 
human through the augmentation of its capabilities in a variety of domains, including cognition 
and physical mobility. Wolfe sees this movement as a descendent of what he calls ‘the cyborg 
strand’ of posthumanism, which seeks to overcome human mortality and deficiencies by 
technological means. The trans-humanist becomes ‘post-human’ on the basis of a radical 
transformation of the physical, cognitive, and emotional capabilities of the human being, to the 
extent that it emerges as a new being with characteristics and qualities that differ drastically from 
current definitions of human attributes. Citing the observation of the Swedish philosopher Nick 
Bostrom, Wolfe notes that the trans-humanist form of posthumanism “derives directly from 
ideals of human perfectibility, rationality, and agency inherited from Renaissance humanism and 
the Enlightenment” (2010: xiii). Wolfe takes issue with the liberal humanist perspective of the 
self-certain human being who is endowed with the unique capability to improve its intellectual 
and physical capacities through learning and the development of technical prostheses that extend 
its reach into the world. Because trans-humanism has its roots in rational humanism, the question 
of human agency comes, perhaps inevitably, into play.  
According to Wolfe, humanism is very much its own dogma, complete with prejudices 
and assumptions about the constitution of the human in relation to other living beings. He 
contends, through the philosopher Etienne Balibar, that social Darwinism – an anthropological 
idea that has become synonymous with the naturalist maxim, ‘survival of the fittest’ – is 
paradoxical, in the sense that it extracts humanity from animality by drawing on the 
characteristics of animality that establishes a competitive ground between different degrees of 
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humanity (2010: xiv). Such competition between varying degrees of humanity is evidenced by 
the biotechnological practice of eugenics (that is, the manipulation of human reproductive 
capabilities for the purpose of fostering an ostensibly superior gene pool) since the time of the 
Victorian polymath and eugenicist Francis Galton to the United States-led Human Genome 
Project of the present day.38 Taking as a basis the humanity/animality dichotomy that undergirds 
social Darwinism, Wolfe asserts that in the case of trans-humanism, what is considered ‘human’ 
in regard to the anthropological dogma of humanism “is achieved by escaping or repressing not 
just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by 
transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether” (2010: xv). As such, Wolfe 
suggests that trans-humanism constitutes “an intensification of humanism,” an anthropocentric 
perspective that his interpretation of posthumanism rejects (2010: xv).  
Wolfe’s theory of posthumanism stands in contrast to the literary scholar N. Katherine 
Hayles characterization of the posthuman as the transcendence of human embodiment in her book 
entitled How We Became Posthuman. Alluding to Hans Moravec’s vision of information as 
pattern that floats freely across time and space without the need to ground itself in a particular 
instantiation, Hayles notes that for cyberneticists such as Moravec and Marvin Minsky, 
immortality will be attainable if humans become the information that they create, namely, by 
transcending “the material constraints that govern the mortal world” (1999: 13). Hayles makes 
the point that this dematerialized conception of information not only constructs an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$)!The term “eugenics” appears to originate from Francis Galton’s book entitled Inquiries into Human Faculty and 
Its Development, London: Macmillan, 1883. In this volume, Galton expresses a desire for “a brief word to express 
the science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, 
especially in the case of man, takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give the 
more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they 
otherwise would have had. The word eugenics would sufficient express the idea” (24). What Galton means by 
eugenics is thus the development of the technological means used to manipulate and control the biological nature of 
human beings for broader socio-political purposes.   
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information/matter duality, but also reinforces the ideology of disembodiment that informs the 
thinking of Moravec and Minsky. Conceiving information without its material instantiations 
enables cyberneticists to imagine a future in which humans live as informational patterns, thereby 
abandoning (perhaps forever) the frailty and finitude of their bodies. Responding to this fantasy 
of disembodiment and dematerialization, Hayles sets out to consider what is “elided, suppressed, 
and forgotten” when information loses its body, and to do so by “putting back together parts that 
have lost touch with one another and reaching out toward a complexity too unruly to fit into 
disembodied ones and zeros [i.e., binary code]” (1999: 13). However, despite the lucidity of 
Hayles’ ambitions, which is to recuperate the material significance of the body in informatics, 
Wolfe claims that the critical tone of her project foregrounds a tendency to “associate the 
posthuman with a kind of triumphant disembodiment” (2010: xv). What Hayles wrongly 
assumes, in Wolfe’s view, is that the posthuman is synonymous with disembodiment. For Wolfe, 
the posthuman does not imply the transcendence of embodiment. Rather, it is ‘post-humanist’ – 
that is, what comes after Humanism and its definition of the human as autonomous and self-
determining. In this sense, the posthuman should be seen as a response against the fantasies of a 
disembodied and autonomous way of being.  
 Far from being anti-human, posthumanism, as Wolfe clarifies, strives to demonstrate the 
ways in which the values and aspirations of humanism are undermined by the philosophical and 
ethical frameworks that conceptualize them. His contention is that the philosophical and 
theoretical frameworks used by humanism to emphasize the values of respect and equality 
towards nonhuman animals and persons with disabilities tend to reproduce the normative 
subjectivity that grounds discrimination in the first place (2010: xvii). Wolfe emphasizes that any 
notion of the posthuman should not be reduced to standards and patterns that serve merely as an 
extension of human subjectivity. This is why he finds problematic Hayles’ description of 
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mutation as an external force that imposes changes on a stable pattern or code, as well as the 
material world or body. Hayles’ interpretation of mutation as “the bifurcation point at which the 
interplay between pattern and randomness causes the system to evolve in a new direction” 
assumes a distinction between matter and information (1999: 33). Mutation, as Wolfe points out, 
cannot be understood through the dialectic between pattern and randomness, whereby each stage 
in a system’s evolution is marked by a rupture from which a new pattern emerges against a 
backdrop of randomness. Instead, what is needed is a concept of the posthuman that is premised 
upon an understanding of mutation (in both human and nonhuman systems) as an immanent and 
ongoing process rather than an expression of code or informational pattern (2010: xviii).  
Wolfe’s understanding of mutation as an ongoing process that is intrinsic to a particular 
system appears to correspond with Francisco Varela’s notion of ‘embodied cognition’, which 
describes the way in which the experiences of an organism are shaped by its embodied actions in 
the environment. According to Varela, the development of any self-generating organism, be it 
human or nonhuman, is contingent on its interactions with the environment in which it emerges 
as an individual. This coupling between an embodied organism and its environment is pertinent 
to our investigation into the operation of embodied perception. But in resisting an anthropocentric 
conception of perceptual modes, we would do well to consider what Varela and his former 
mentor, Humberto Maturana, term the ‘embodied enaction’ through which each autopoietic 
organism (i.e., a self-generating form of life) brings forth a world that is different from that of 
another autopoietic being. As Varela explains in his treatment of embodied cognition, “organism 
and environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the fundamental 
circularity that is life itself” (1996: 217). What this means is that a structured coupling between 
organism and environment ensues amid the co-emergence of the self-generating entity and the 
world with which it interacts, as one cannot exist without the other. For this reason, Wolfe 
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suggests that if we were to accept that various autopoietic forms of life – including nonhuman 
animals, persons with disabilities, as well as able-bodied people – bring forth a world that is 
different for each living being, “then the environment, and with it ‘the body,’ becomes 
unavoidably a virtual, multidimensional space produced and stabilized by the recursive enactions 
and structural couplings of autopoietic beings who share what Maturana and Varela call a 
‘consensual domain’” (2010: xxiii-iv).  
While the virtual and multidimensional qualities of the world might serve to increase the 
autopoietic system’s connection and sensitivity to the environment, the sharing of a ‘consensual 
domain’ among all autopoietic beings, including humans and animals, affords the possibility of 
recasting the notion of embodied perception in a non-anthropocentric light. Wolfe’s interpretation 
of posthumanism seeks to rethink such modes of human experience as “the normal perceptual 
modes and affective states of Homo sapiens […] by recontextualizing them in terms of the entire 
sensorium of other living beings and their own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a world’” 
(2010: xxv). This repositioning of the human within the shared domain of autopoietic, self-
generating systems offers us an opportunity to critically reflect on the roles that different 
autopoietic entities – both human and nonhuman – play in an intermedial performance context. 
The key point here is to adopt an attitude of openness towards the multiplicity of perceptual 
modes and subjectivities within the ‘consensual domain’ shared by different autopoietic beings, 
which may include nonhuman machines as well as human individuals who happen to possess a 
disability. At the same time, we should note that Wolfe’s reading of posthumanism also 
acknowledges the fundamental prostheticity of the human in its coevolution with various forms 
of technicity and materiality that are radically ‘not-human’, including the language that we use to 
communicate with one another as well as the media technologies employed in intermedial 
performances (2010: xxv). As Wolfe explains, “the human is itself a prosthetic being, who from 
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day one is constituted as human by its coevolution with and coconstitution by external archival 
technologies of various kinds – including language itself as the first archive and prosthesis” 
(2010: 295). Language as prosthesis exteriorizes and archives the thoughts and memories of the 
human animal through speech and writing. In turn, the perception of linguistic meaning in speech 
and writing is modulated by the embodied communicational encounters between different human 
individuals, whose facility for language may vary in relation to their physical and cognitive 
conditions and other environmental factors that may affect their speaking and comprehensive 
abilities. Hence, a posthumanist understanding of embodied perception would entail a critical 
awareness of the interactions between technics, the human, and the environment.  
Having a critical awareness of the embodied interactions between technics, humans, and 
the environment is useful in terms of analyzing how intermedial performances, including those 
that feature performers with disabilities and their interactions with technological implements in a 
theatrical milieu, might influence the audience members’ perception of embodiment vis-à-vis 
human-machine relations. As cyborgs in performance, performers with disability turn to 
technology in order to challenge the normative perception of embodiment and subjectivity by 
articulating the creative potential of the disabled body. What follows is an exploration of how 
Petra Kuppers and Neil Marcus fashion a cyborgian identity through the recitation of original 
poetry about their experience with disability and through the use of 3D tele-immersive motion 
capture technology to articulate the expressive potential of their bodies in Cripple Poetics: A 
Love Story.    
 
5.5 Cripple Poetics: Disability, Technology, and the Cyborg in Performance 
How do performers with disabilities engage with the idea of the cyborg in performance? 
What happens when the disabled body performs with digital technology on the stage? And if 
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theatres had eyes, what kind of body would they see? The theatrical gaze of the human body 
presupposes a concept of neutrality, which Carrie Sandahl calls “the tyranny of Neutral,” 
whereby the peculiarities of the actor’s body are moderated, if not standardized, through a 
rigorous regime of physical conditioning. In an art form that seems to expect a high degree of 
kinaesthetic involvement from its practitioners, it would appear that the practice of theatre is 
inherently biased towards the able-bodied actor. But in spite of the perceived abjectness of the 
disabled body, persons with disabilities do engage in artistic creation, and such efforts include 
performances that explicitly incorporate digital technology. It is thus important to look at the 
ways in which disabled performance artists interact with digital technology in such aesthetic 
endeavours as Petra Kuppers’ production of Cripple Poetics: A Love Story. Kuppers’ project is 
an intermedial performance in which two actors with physical disabilities recite love poems to 
each other while performing alongside the 3D tele-immersion display of their virtual selves 
engaging in a dance routine. Drawing on Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of the cyborg as an 
idea of transgressed boundaries and Allucquère Rosanne Stone’s examination of the ways in 
which modern technology challenges the definitional boundaries of social identities, I argue that 
cyborg performance is not simply a fusion of body and technology. Rather, it embraces the 
cyborgian identity of disabled performance artists who perform at the border between “ability” 
and “disability,” particularly through their use of digital technology to subvert the social and 
cultural boundaries that curtail the physical and cognitive potential of the disabled body.  
From the perspective of medical science, the physical and cognitive potential of the 
disabled body appears to be conditioned by what Michel Foucault calls “the clinical gaze.” 
According to Foucault, the clinical gaze requires an organization of space in order to discriminate 
between the different inhabitants in any given society. To this end, the people living in that 
society are transformed into streams of information, as their bodies are divided into such neat and 
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distinct categories as “able” or “disabled”. Thus, the clinical gaze, as Foucault theorizes it, seeks 
to medically define the body as able or disabled in a neutral domain that is “homogenous in all its 
parts and in which comparison is possible and open to any form of pathological event, with no 
principle of selection or exclusion” (2003: 134). It is only in the supposedly “neutral” domain of 
the clinic that the attributes of a particular body can be compared to those of another body. In a 
similar fashion, the theatrical gaze of the body also presupposes a concept of neutrality that 
determines its suitability for performance. This emphasis on the neutrality of the body is what 
Carrie Sandahl terms “the tyranny of Neutral,” whereby the actors’ bodies are “stripped of 
individuality and idiosyncrasy” through an arduous regime of physical training (2005: 262). It is 
only when the performing body is deemed capable of manifesting the neutral metaphor that a 
character can be built upon it.  
The tyranny of Neutral in theatre practice is predicated upon the medical view of 
disability, whereby the “fitness” of the actors’ bodies is measured in terms of its capacity to be 
cured of any physical or emotional infirmity. Such an understanding of the performing body 
presupposes a normative standard that privileges the ability of the actor to seamlessly balance and 
control his or her body in an efficient manner. In other words, the actor’s body has to be capable 
of being stripped down into a state of neutrality in order for it to be visually suitable for the 
performance of a variety of different characters. I should note that the tyranny of the Neutral in 
theatre practice is not a performance of neutrality. Rather, the purpose here is to build a 
performance from a state of neutrality. As Sandahl explains: 
Implicit in the various manifestations of the neutral metaphor is the assumption 
that a character cannot be built from a position of physical difference. The 
appropriate actor’s body for any character, even a character that is literally 
! #)*!
disabled or symbolically struggling, is not only the able body, but also the 
extraordinary able body. (2005: 262)  
There is a tendency among some theatre directors to assume that only the “extraordinary able 
body” is capable of delivering a good performance. This aversion towards physical difference 
seems to feed on the fear that an actor with a disability might not be able to fully comprehend and 
accurately execute the director’s instructions for playing a particular character, regardless of the 
fact that the character may be “literally disabled or symbolically struggling”. Such apprehension 
towards the suitability of persons with disabilities as actors in the theatre is further complicated 
by the inclusion of technological devices (both digital and analogue) into the performance.  
Commenting on the interplay between technology and performance, Christopher Baugh 
observes that technological devices employed on theatrical stages have shifted from a “means to 
an end” to “ends in themselves” (2005: 1). Over the past two decades, digital technology has 
emerged as an important player in contemporary theatre. No longer can we regard technology – 
be it analogue or digital – as the hidden machinery that supports the creation of the theatrical 
mise-en-scène. Instead, technological devices are now incorporated into the performance itself, as 
the human actors interact with them in a manner that is imbued with symbolic and 
phenomenological significance; symbolic because the interactions between humans and 
technology in the theatre could be read as a commentary on the quotidian relationships that we 
share with our cellphones, mobile computers, and – even though we may not be conscious of it – 
the Internet. But the phenomenological significance of the interactions between the actors and the 
technological devices employed in the performance seems to tend towards the experience of 
bodies (both human and non-human) as lives in the theatre. Theatre, as Alan Read reminds us, is 
fundamentally about lives – the lives of people and cultures portrayed by living actors, as well as 
the oftentimes overlooked lives of the technological implements that partake in the production of 
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the performance event. As the lives of human and non-human bodies intersect on the same stage, 
theatre becomes what Read describes as “the phenomena of life itself […] that negates the 
boundaries that customarily divides disciplines and fields” (2008: 100). If this dissolution of 
disciplinary boundaries in the theatre does hold true, then might it be reasonable to assume that 
theatre offers a suitable medium through which to explore the subversive potential of cyborgian 
identity, particularly as it pertains to the lives of persons with disabilities?  
Who or what is the cyborg? As the theatre scholar Jennifer Parker-Starbuck points out, 
metaphorically speaking, the cyborg is politically resistant (2011: 1). The cyborg is a provocative 
yet evasive concept that shape-shifts through history in order to suit the needs of the time. 
Making its debut in Donna Haraway’s controversial 1985 essay, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” the 
cyborg as a concept serves to interrogate the binary oppositions that dominate women, people of 
colour, nature, workers, and animals. Haraway argues that the cyborg is an idea of “transgressed 
boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore 
as one part of needed political work” (1991: 154). However, the cyborg is not purely a 
metaphorical concept. In her study of cybernetics and posthumanism, N. Katherine Hayles 
distinguishes between what she calls “actual cyborgs” (people fitted with pacemakers, for 
example) and the “metaphoric cyborg,” as exemplified by the video game player whose body is 
incorporated – albeit temporarily – into the cybernetic circuit of the gaming console. Building 
upon Haraway’s description of the cyborg as a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism,” Hayles maintains that cyborgs are at once entities and metaphors, living beings and 
narrative constructions (1999: 114). Through the fusion of imaginative significance with literal 
physicality, humans and machines are spliced together in an integrated circuit that produces the 
cyborg as a material actuality and a metaphorical construct. For Haraway, the cyborg is a chimera 
– it is an ironic yet utopian being made from actual and symbolic parts. But what role can the 
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cyborg play in the theatre? How does its chimeric quality affect the ways in which performance is 
conceived and experienced? What is Cyborg Theatre? 
According to Parker-Starbuck, Cyborg Theatre “differentiates itself from other labels in 
that it encompasses a range of permutations from the ‘low-tech’ to a complex and integrated 
cyborgean performance [sic]” (2011: 6). As an inclusive approach towards theatre practice, 
Parker-Starbuck’s idea of Cyborg Theatre embraces many forms of technological performance in 
which many types of media are also incorporated (2011: 7). Petra Kuppers’ 2010 production of 
Cripple Poetics: A Love Story is one such performance in which disabled performance artists 
interact with such technological implements as a wheelchair as well as 3D tele-immersive 
motion-capture and projection while harnessing the expressive powers of poetry and dance. 
Kuppers is a professor at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and the Artistic Director of 
the arts collective, Olimpias, which she describes as a ‘laboratory of disability culture” (2011: 2). 
The name ‘Olimpias’ conjures the image of ‘limping gods’, which seems to resonate with the fact 
that this art collective comprises a group of talented disability performers (2011: 9). In her book, 
Disability Culture and Community Performance: Find a Strange and Twisted Shape, Kuppers 
remarks that the field of performance studies has historically lacked a method for “talking about 
this kind of performance work [i.e., disability performance] in ways that do not fall into 
celebration, sentimentality, or narcissism” (2011: 62). As a disability scholar and performance 
artist, Kuppers seeks to interrogate the social and political challenges that affect persons with 
disabilities by pushing the limits of creative expression in the theatre. To this end, she integrates 
such expressive modes as poetry recitation and dance into the fabric of theatre performance.  
In Cripple Poetics, Kuppers takes this interdisciplinary approach further by employing 3D 
tele-immersive motion-capture technology in the recording of the dance that she and her partner, 
Neil Marcus, performed at the University of California, Berkeley. “Teleimmersion,” as the 
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computer engineers Gregorij Kurillo and Ruzena Bajcsy elucidate, “is an emerging technology 
that enables users to collaborate remotely by generating realistic 3D avatars in real time and 
rendering them inside a shared virtual space” (2013: 29). The three-dimensional (3D) tele-
immersive footage of Kuppers and Marcus’s dance routine was captured using a customized 48-
camera array at Berkeley’s Tele-immersion Lab. Marcus is an actor, a dancer, and a poet who 
happens to live in Berkeley. He has dystonia, a neurological movement disorder, whereby the 
sustained contraction of muscles causes the painful twisting of the body. Kuppers and Marcus’s 
relationship began when they communicated virtually by way of Instant Messaging (IM). After 
exchanging messages online for several months, they finally met in person at a dance workshop 
in Berkeley. Cripple Poetics captures the evolution of this relationship, as Kuppers and Marcus 
exchanged messages and poems that expressed their thoughts and fears about being disabled and 
in love with each other. First performed in 2010 at the University of Michigan, the production 
consists of three poetic performances by Kuppers and Marcus. On a screen at the back of the 
stage, 3D tele-immersive images showing the both of them engaging in a series of circular dance 
movements appear whenever one poem ends and another one begins. All three poems in Cripple 
Poetics allude to the cycles of birth and rebirth, as the continuity of life that is articulated through 
the poetic language of the performance is mirrored by the virtual traces of two dancing bodies – 
Kuppers and Marcus – projected on the screen.  
Commencing right after the appearance of the 3D tele-immersive images of Kuppers and 
Marcus’s dance, the first poem, “Metaphor of Wind in Cripple Poetics,” alludes to the interplay 
between movement and nature, with deep connections to the creation of a cripple poetics that is 
“not extraordinary or ordinary” (Kuppers and Marcus 2008: 7). Resisting the characterization of 
the body as a conglomeration of medical parts, the poem juxtaposes the natural force of the wind 
with the human body as a living entity made up of flesh and bones. Just as the wind is capable of 
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acting upon the flower, thereby allowing it to spread its seeds across the vastness of space, the 
flesh and bones of the human body can be mobilized into action through its engagement in wild 
salsa dances. As Marcus proclaims in the poem: “There is always wind in my cripple” (Kuppers 
and Marcus 2008: 7). Without the possibility of movement, be it metaphoric or physical, the 
cripple body will remain stark and pathetic. In order to aspire towards metaphorical and physical 
movement, Kuppers and Marcus partake in the labour of poetic performance. For them, the act of 
performing poetry engenders the possibility of finding a cripple poetics through the interplay of 
language, experience, and the human senses (Kuppers and Marcus 2008: 112).  
Poetic performance is an embodied endeavour that requires the movement of the eyes as 
the actor reads the words on the printed page, as well as the activation of the mouth and the vocal 
chords that renders those words audible. It is through the simultaneous movement of eyes and 
mouth in the act of recitation that Marcus is able to perform the second poem, “I am Salmon,” 
which recounts a visit that he made as a child to the aquarium in San Francisco, where he 
watched schools of salmon returning to their birthplace in order to reproduce. At the same time, 
the same 3D tele-immersive images of Kuppers and Marcus’s dance that greeted the audience at 
the beginning of the play, braids through the recitation of this poem of rebirth. The tele-
immersive images projected on the screen in the background depict the syncopated motion of 
Kuppers and Marcus’s bodies. Whenever Marcus falls to the ground, Kuppers would pick him up 
and hug him. The images appear fuzzy and fragmented at first. But in spite of the visual 
distortion, we can still see the colourful traces of Kuppers and Marcus’s bodies on the screen. As 
their bodies coalesce in a courtship dance that resembles the flowing movements of a jujitsu 
master, sounds of birds chirping and flowing water can be heard in the background.  
By drawing on the affordances of 3D tele-immersive technology, which captures and 
projects the performance of their dance routine, cyborg performance in Cripple Poetics becomes 
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a ritual of rebirth. Whereas their in-real-life (i.e., materially and in the flesh) performance seems 
to be restricted by their disabilities, particularly in terms of mobility, the tele-immersive 
technology offers Kuppers and Marcus the opportunity to represent themselves differently in a 
virtual space. As cyborgs in performance, Kuppers and Marcus experience a rebirth through their 
simultaneous existence in both the physical and virtual realms of the performance. But in order 
for the audience members to perceive the tele-immersive images employed in Cripple Poetics as 
socially meaningful, they must be warranted to the physical bodies of the human actors on the 
stage. In other words, the cyborg does not exist merely as a figure of discourse. “By means of 
warranting,” as the new media theorist Allucquère Rosanne Stone explains, “this discursive entity 
is tied to an association with a particular physical body, and the two together, the physical and the 
discursive, constitute the socially apprehensible citizen” (1995: 41). Warranting implies a link 
between the virtual body and the convergences of discourses that constitute the body in physical 
space. These discourses may also include non-linguistic gestures that lend meaning to the human 
body in performance.   
Consider, for example, the scene in which Kuppers performs a poem from her wheelchair, 
while Marcus stands behind her and reads the same poem. They embrace at one point, and when 
Kuppers leaves her wheelchair and sits on the floor, Marcus decides to join her. Amid the 
seemingly voyeuristic gaze of the audience members, they kiss. As their dance routine unfolds on 
the tele-immersive display in the background, Kuppers and Marcus partake in a material 
engagement that does not dispense with the visceral character of physical intimacy. Drawing on 
the expressive potential of tele-immersive technology, a performative conversation emerges 
between the in-real-life performance enacted by Kuppers and Marcus and the tele-immersive 
images that capture the colourful traces of their dance routine. However, we should not assume 
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that such interactions between humans and technology would entail the actual fusion of bodies 
with the machine. 
Reacting against the notion of “cyborgian fusion,” Anna Munster posits a differential 
topology between virtual systems and human bodies by arguing that all human-machine 
interfaces contain points of connection and separation. Munster believes that the digital enables a 
relational experience of the movement of the human body. However, she acknowledges that 
while such an experience is not “of itself corporeal,” it does involve a “capacity for being 
affected by the diverse speeds, rhythms and flows of information” (2006: 33). For this reason, 
Munster does not see the virtual as a dematerialized abstraction, but rather “a movement that 
passes from the abstract incorporeal spaces of information to the concrete actuality of the body” 
(2006: 17). In this sense, the human body is never completely immersed in the virtual world of 
information systems, as a “differential interval” continues to exist between the human being and 
the virtual environments with which it interacts. The maintenance of such a differential interval 
between the physical and the virtual serves as a reminder of the corporeal relations that 
characterize the intermedial activities in cyborg performance.  
As Jennifer Parker-Starbuck notes, the human bodies in cyborg performance are 
conceptually mediatized ‘living figures’; they are “[l]iving bodies as opposed to the cinematic or 
projected figures and technologies with which they co-habit the stage” (2011: 9). The tele-
immersive images in Cripple Poetics are not alive in the same way that Kuppers and Marcus are 
alive in the biological sense. Cyborg performance does not involve the treatment of the human 
being as a machine nor does it imply that the machine employed in the performance should be 
humanized in order for the human actors and audience members to treat it with care and respect. 
Kuppers and Marcus, as cyborgs in performance, do not fuse their bodies with the machine. 
Instead, cyborgs are what Rosanne Stone calls “boundary creatures”; they are “not only 
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human/machine” – with the splice indicating an intersection rather than a fusion of human and 
machine – “but creatures of cultural interstice as well” (1995: 178). In their capacity as creatures 
of cultural interstice, cyborgs harbour the potential to undermine the societal boundaries that 
inhibit their participation in mainstream society. These boundaries may exist in institutions like 
governments that prohibit persons with disabilities from taking public office or among certain 
social groups that exclude, whether consciously or otherwise, anyone who possesses a physical or 
cognitive disability.  
As cyborgs in performance, Kuppers and Marcus deploy a techno-dramaturgy that puts 
forth a critical perspective on the interface between disability and digital technology. The 
‘critical’ element in such a techno-dramaturgical approach resides in its capacity to subvert the 
normative social attitudes that threaten to suppress the expressive rights of persons with 
disabilities. This subversive potential reaches its zenith during the final poetic performance in 
Cripple Poetics. As with the recitation of the preceding poems, the tele-immersive images of the 
dance routine provide a frame for the performance of the third poem entitled “At the 
Gynecologist.” This poem tells the story of Kuppers and Marcus’s visit to the gynaecologist. 
While conducting an ultrasound scan of the foetus, the doctor intimates that the baby might 
resemble Marcus, who has dystonia. It is at this point that the poem makes mention of the 
nineteenth-century eugenicist, Francis Galton, whose philosophical position concerning disability 
is embodied by the phrase “galvanized knowledge” (Kuppers and Marcus 2008: 100). The phrase 
alludes to Galton’s Victorian justification of eugenics as a legitimate scientific practice, an 
attitude that seems to inform the gynaecologist’s advice to Kuppers: “You might not want 
children,” says the doctor (2008: 100). In response to this cautionary note, Kuppers remarks that 
Schrödinger’s cat resides in her womb, an ironic reference that foregrounds the suspended 
medical status of her unborn child who seems to be dancing on the porous border between 
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“ability” and “disability”.39 Indeed, until the child is born, her exact medical status remains 
elusive. However, it is the use of pre-natal ultrasound scanning technology – or what Kuppers 
calls “eugenic technology” – to interpret the medical status of the foetus that reaffirms the 
disciplinary power of the clinical gaze (2008: 100). Consequently, in attempting to undermine 
and resist this deterministic injunction against the reproduction of what is perceived to be a 
“disabled” and abnormal body, Kuppers and Marcus turn to 3D tele-immersion as a means by 
which to open up the path towards a cyborgian rebirth.  
We have seen how the intersection of poetry and dance in Cripple Poetics embodies the 
interplay between disability, technology, and the cyborg in performance. Rather than a 
straightforward recitation of poems written by their own hand, Kuppers and Marcus chose to 
weave a set of tele-immersive images depicting their dance routine into the fabric of their in-real-
life poetic performances. The 48-camera array at Berkeley’s Tele-immersion Lab allowed for the 
all-round recording of physical movements from multiple angles. Such a setup rendered the 
performers’ dance routine as three-dimensional (3D) digital images rather than a two-dimensional 
(2D) video footage. By turning to 3D tele-immersive technology, which captured their dance 
routine as colourful virtual traces, Kuppers and Marcus could dance in an intimate fashion within 
a virtual environment. Through this suturing of physical and virtual performances, Kuppers and 
Marcus manage to forge a cyborgian identity that does not entail the fusion of body and machine. 
Instead, by dancing within the interstitial spaces where materiality and virtuality intersect, 
Kuppers and Marcus’s cyborgian existence in the performance subverts the social and political 
boundaries that threaten to curtail the physical and cognitive potential of persons with disabilities. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$*!This eponymous cat refers to the feline in Erwin Schrödinger’s twentieth-century thought experiment, which 
postulates that a cat hidden in a box is suspended ambiguously between live and death until a human person observes 
it to confirm its status. The use of pre-natal ultrasound to locate medical defects in a foetus mirrors Schrödinger’s 
experiment by situating the nascent being in a liminal state of existential ambiguity. As soon as the ultrasonic scan is 
administered on the foetus to verify its medical status, its existence is already arrested by the spectre of death. !
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But how does the interface between performers with disabilities and the various technological 
prostheses that they employ in the production of cyborg performance facilitate the articulation of 
the disabled body as an embodied creative subject? In light of the juxtaposition between the 
physical and virtual bodies of Kuppers and Marcus in Cripple Poetics, I will look at the ways in 
which the prosthetic relations between performers with disabilities and the tools (both digital and 
non-digital) that they employ on the intermedial stage might influence – and potentially challenge 
– the audience members’ perception of disability and the disabled body in performance.    
 
5.6 Creative Prostheses and the Embodied Articulation of Disability 
 Whenever we think of prostheses, images of artificial limbs and various types of mobility 
support devices such as a walking cane or an electric wheelchair are likely to spring to mind. 
Such images of artificial extensions to the human body and its field of operation are pertinent to 
most discussions about disability and the plight of human individuals who happen to possess it. 
But apart from the supportive role that prostheses play in facilitating the daily functions of 
persons with disabilities, what seems to be taken for granted is how technological implements, 
which may range from digital video projection and emails to the natural languages that we use to 
communicate with one another, are considered prosthetic devices that participate in the creative 
processes of human artistic production. Prostheses, as the philosopher David Wills contends, 
“make explicit the very break that constitutes the human body” (1995: 246). Wills describes this 
constitutive break of the human body as “the mechanist rupture” that embodies the human 
being’s “relation to and dependence upon the inanimate, the artificial” (1995: 246). The human 
body is therefore a prosthetic body that relies on technological implements – in essence, “the 
inanimate, the artificial” – for its survival, as evidenced by the fabrication of tools for hunting, 
cooking, and construction throughout the course of human history.  
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According to Wills, the prosthetic body, which “will necessarily be infirm, or lacking, in 
need of the other,” should not be understood as “an exception but the paradigm for the body 
itself” (1995: 135-7). The infirm, prosthetic body has to depend on other nonhuman, artificial 
entities in order to subsist. As Stiegler puts it, the human being is always already technical, as 
“what is specific to the human is the movement of putting itself outside the range of its own 
hand” (1999: 146). Reaching beyond the limits of its hands, the human being invents tools and is 
thereby engaged in a co-evolutionary relationship with technology, which includes the languages 
that mediate the communicational encounters between individual humans. In this way, the hand 
and the tool are implicated in a prosthetic union that not only extends each other across space and 
time but also opens up the possibility of devising communicative gestures. Stiegler surmises that 
if Leroi-Gourhan’s paleontological claim that “the hand frees speech” holds true, then “language 
becomes indissociable from technicity and prostheticity” (1999: 145). Language as prosthesis 
exteriorizes the thoughts of human beings through speech, and subsequently through writing, just 
as the fabrication of tools, from the spear to the laser-guided missile, extends the range of the 
body’s activity in the world. In analyzing the transformation of the human into a technological 
being, David Wills suggests that what he calls the “dorsal turn,” which is a technological turn that 
begins in the back (in the dorsal spine to be exact), “involves, finally, a turning back to language 
as primary technological system” (2008: 15). However, Wills is quick to emphasize that language 
functions not as an instrument to technology, or as “words processed by that technology,” but 
rather as a “technologized language” through which “an ethics, politics, or sexuality of 
technology” can be conceptualized (2008: 15). Language as technological prosthesis is more than 
a means by which to articulate our thoughts, for it allows us to think back on what it means to be 
a technological being. It is in this way that language, which emerges out of the human quest to 
reach beyond the range of its own hands, is constitutive of human technicity.  
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In Cripple Poetics, Kuppers and Marcus turn to the digital projection of 3D tele-
immersive images that capture their dance routine and the recitation of poetry as prosthetic 
devices – or what I call creative prostheses – that enable them to express themselves as 
performers with disabilities. Far from negating the role of the body in intermedial performance, 
these creative prostheses complement Kuppers and Marcus’s effort in articulating their 
experiences with disability through the intersection of pre-recorded digital imagery, live poetry 
recitation, and the embodied actions of their disabled bodies. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, 
the embodied actions of the performer in theatre performance assume an ostensive relation to the 
language that he or she uses in communication with other performers and the audience members 
who witness the dramatic events unfold. While language as prosthesis can serve to clarify or 
contradict the embodied actions of the performer, these actions can also complement or 
complicate the performers’ speech. As the disability scholar Jay Dolmage notes, “prosthesis fuses 
linguistic and corporeal supplementarity in our embodiment, as beings with a grammar and 
biology, an idiom and anatomy” (2014: 107). With the aid of stage props such as walking canes 
and even laptop computers, performers strive to articulate meaning through the braiding of 
speech, embodied action, and technological devices. But this articulation of meaning by way of 
linguistic and non-linguistic prostheses is also an articulation of what Dolmage terms “imperfect 
meaning,” especially as the “fragmentation and incompleteness of discourse mirrors […] the 
malleability of the body” that is always already divided and partial (2014: 107-8). It is precisely 
because the body and its boundaries are malleable – be it as a result of surgery or organic 
development – that the notion of a unified and natural body is rendered problematic, for the 
presumed wholeness of the body is frustrated by the non-linear and fragmented quality of 
linguistic discourse.  
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The discursive prosthesis, as David Wills points out, is subject to discontinuity, insofar as 
“the discourse that can be called prosthetic” is “characterized by the limp or zigzag and by an 
iambic rhythm,” that is, a syncopated progression that departs from linearity (1995: 25). 
Linguistic discourse moves not in a straight line but in a zigzag motion that is “perhaps not 
structurally different from a natural gait,” which entails the bidirectional ambulation of the body 
that propels itself forward by moving sideways at the same time (1995: 25). As such, Wills 
claims that the zigzag movement of linguistic discourse, which resembles the “natural gait” in its 
bidirectional ambulation, constitutes “an explicit infraction upon or departure from the straits of 
linearity” (1995: 25). In light of Wills’ characterization of the structural similarities between the 
seemingly  “natural” gait of the human body (an assumption that I will revisit later in this 
section) and the non-linearity of linguistic discourse, Dolmage makes the point that “our bodily 
imperfections are ineluctably tied to our embodied communication, our embodied knowledges” 
(2014: 108). The way that we acquire knowledge and communicate that knowledge is 
conditioned by the way that we experience our embodiment and the imperfections that are 
inherent in our bodies. For Kuppers and Marcus in Cripple Poetics, their embodied experiences 
with disability become the ground upon which the poetic depiction of their life stories and the 
digital rendering of their dance routine are created through the prosthetic facilitation of language 
and 3D tele-immersion motion capture technology. There is no overarching narrative in the 
performance to direct the audience members’ attention, as the three poems are presented without 
any explicit attempt to explain their connection to one another. Instead, each poem exists as a 
fragment that is framed by the tele-immersive images of Kuppers and Marcus’s dance routine. 
But while the poems are recited in full, the audience members are privy to only a snippet of the 
pre-recorded dance routine whenever the blurry tele-immersive images appear on the projection 
screen. This disjuncture between the apparent completeness of poetic language and the blurriness 
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of the digital imagery is mirrored by the qualitative difference in the manner in which Kuppers 
and Marcus recite the poems.  
Whereas Kuppers’ speech is clear and eloquent throughout the performance of Cripple 
Poetics, Marcus’s recitation of the poems is slurred and halting. His fragmented speech echoes 
the imperfections of his body, which bears the marks of dystonia. Yet despite the muscular 
contortions on his back and around his face, which affects his hand movements and his speech, 
Marcus continues to recite the poems alongside Kuppers. And as if to complement the eloquence 
of Kuppers’ speech, he wraps his body around hers, resting his head on her shoulders as she 
speaks. During the performance of the second poem, “I am Salmon,” Marcus crawls around 
Kuppers, who speaks while seated on the ground. The poem recollects Marcus’s childhood visit 
to a counselling group in Seattle with his father, a scene that is juxtaposed with the memory of a 
visit to the aquarium in the same city. These two places are markers of self-discovery for Marcus. 
At the counselling group, a counsellor shows him that he is worthy of being loved, and is capable 
of loving. At the aquarium, Marcus is seen in public for the first time. As he watches a school of 
salmon swimming behind the window of the tank, he discovers an affinity with the fish. A sense 
of freedom washes over him at the aquarium, and this is the feeling that he tries to recapture in 
Cripple Poetics by crawling about on the ground like a salmon attempting to swim back out into 
the vast embrace of the ocean. But midway through Kuppers’ recitation of the poem, the tele-
immersive images depicting her dance with Marcus re-emerge on the projection screen. This 
time, the digital imagery of their dance routine reflects their movement from an upright position 
towards the ground, rolling from side to side on the floor as they help each other to recover from 
the fall. At this point, both the physical bodies of the performers and their virtual doubles in the 
tele-immersive footage are similarly in touch with the ground. Such is the common ground that 
connects the physical with the virtual, the organic with the artificial, and the body with the 
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prosthetic. However, Kuppers and Marcus’s use of poetry and tele-immersive imagery as creative 
prostheses for the articulation of disability also reveals that the human body is always already 
partial and incomplete, or as Wills puts it, “infirm, or lacking, in need of the other” (1995: 137). 
Acknowledging the imperfection of the human body, including its physical vulnerability 
and mortality, Kuppers and Marcus’s techno-dramaturgy in Cripple Poetics does not aspire 
towards perfection. Instead of hiding the feebleness and vulnerability of their bodies, they present 
themselves as human beings who depend on prostheses to perform the functions of daily life (the 
wheelchair to facilitate Kuppers’ mobility and close captioning technology to accommodate 
Marcus’s speech impairment). And rather than adopting a utilitarian or an instrumentalist 
approach towards the employment of prostheses, Kuppers and Marcus turn to such prosthetic 
devices as poetic language and tele-immersive imagery in helping to articulate their embodied 
experiences with disability. Their decision to turn to these creative prostheses does not 
necessarily imply that their physical bodies have become, to invoke Stelarc’s terminology, 
‘obsolete’. By foregrounding the prosthetic relations between their imperfect bodies and the 
creative prostheses that linguistically and visually articulate their embodied experiences with 
disability, Kuppers and Marcus’s intermedial performance frustrate the presupposed unity and 
completeness of the human body. As Dolmage observes, “when the prosthetic is seen as an added 
part of the body (or as a discursive addition to the word or the speech), the prosthetic then 
revokes the surety of wholeness and naturalness as given” (2014: 108). In turning towards the 
prosthetic, the human body can no longer be understood as the sum of its parts. “Prosthesis,” 
Dolmage goes on to explain, “emphasizes the obliqueness of thought and suggests that the 
disabled body is the engine for the creation of meaning” (2014: 108). However, this meaning that 
the disabled body creates through its relationship with the prosthetic appears to tend towards 
what Dolmage refers to as “imperfect meaning”.  
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In Cripple Poetics, the creation of this imperfect meaning eludes linearity and normative 
logic, as the fragmentary braiding of poetry and pixelated tele-immersive images of disabled 
bodies dancing in syncopated motion seems to demonstrate. Through the use of these creative 
prostheses, Kuppers and Marcus endeavour to articulate what it means to possess a disability, and 
to convey that meaning, however imperfect, to the audience members. This conveyance of 
imperfect meaning by artificial means – i.e., through poetic language and digital imagery – 
exposes what Dolmage considers to be the human unwillingness to “admit that our knowing of 
the world is fragmented because our knowing of our bodies and therefore ourselves is fragmented 
– or, rather, relies on constant augmentation” (2014: 110). Most of us might be inclined to think 
that only persons with disabilities require prostheses. As long as we are not deemed disabled, our 
bodies shall remain unified, natural, and autonomous. But such an assumption, as Dolmage 
points out, “speaks to the normate belief in the organic unity and autonomy of the body,” 
whereby “our bodies” are perceived as “essential things” that “do not really change” (2014: 111). 
Dolmage discerns a fear of bodily change among able-bodied persons that informs their fear of 
disability, which is further “related to a fear of interdependence” (2014: 111). Not many of us 
would want to admit that we are reliant not only on technological prostheses, but also on other 
people who are willing to attend to our needs. Amid our insistence on preserving the autonomy 
and wholeness of our bodies, it seems easy to forget that “embodiment is a phenomenology 
defined not by boundaries, but by openings” (2014: 111). As prosthetic bodies, our sense of 
embodiment is contingent on the openings that connect our bodies with other entities.    
While the ways in which we are embodied with other human and nonhuman entities may 
be varied, our embodiment is marked by the possibility of connecting with others. These 
connections may include our intercorporeal engagements with other human beings and nonhuman 
animals as well as our prosthetic relations with inanimate and artificial tools – e.g., a walking 
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cane, the language that we use to communicate, or an instant messaging (IM) system – that 
augment the radius of our embodied activity. Whatever human or nonhuman entity we may want 
to engage with, “we are,” as Dolmage reminds us, “because language, rhetoric, and embodiment 
are communally not normal, not ‘able’” (2014: 115). Disability problematizes the human desire 
for autonomy, as it calls attention to our inter-connectedness with others. “This essential 
imperfection,” he goes on to say, “often means that we do need others, or we need access to other 
modes and discourses of being, and this makes our existence essentially prosthetic” (2014: 115). 
What Kuppers and Marcus’s employment of poetic discourse and 3D tele-immersive imagery in 
the performance of Cripple Poetics seems to suggest is that our prosthetic existence is necessarily 
generative. In light of the juxtaposition between language, digital imagery, and embodied action 
on the intermedial stage, the audience members may experience the articulation of disability, 
which is an articulation of difference, through Kuppers and Marcus’s embodied associations with 
the creative prostheses that they employ in the performance. This intercorporeal experience of 
alterity through the prosthetic relations between language, digital technology, and the disabled 
body also indicates that the human being’s relation to the prosthetic does not entail the fusion of 
one’s body with technology or the assertion of human control over the very technological 
implements that facilitate and complement our existence in the world.   
The prosthesis, as David Wills understands it, is not subservient to the human, for “the 
prosthetic possibility determines the shape of the human, the artificial determines the form of the 
natural” (1995: 29). The prosthetic device, like every technological tool that the human animal 
fashions and wields, is incorporated as part of the body’s relation with the world. It is this act of 
incorporating technological prostheses into the body’s architecture that shapes our perception of 
the environment in which we live. However, Wills’ use of the word “natural” in his discussion of 
the prosthetic is problematic, as it rides on the assumption that the organic body exists as a 
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“natural” entity that stands in contrast to the “artificial” quality of prostheses. Wills’ dichotomous 
theorization of the relationship between bodies and prostheses calls to mind the way in which 
prosthetic devices are marketed to persons with disabilities on the basis of what Lorainne Thomas 
describes as “the product’s ability to allow the user to regain or replicate ‘natural’ functions such 
as walking, standing or running with ease” (2001: para.15). In her study of advertisements for 
prosthetic devices, Thomas found that a link is often established between the product and a 
physically and cognitively demanding activity in which a person with multiple disabilities is 
engaged. She observes that in many of these advertisements, the prosthetic device is depicted as 
the artificial catalyst that enables the “disabled body” to regain its “natural” abilities (e.g., 
walking, jumping, running etc.) as it participates in activities that are associated with “athleticism 
and courage” (2001: para.15). Such an ableist depiction of the prosthetic, which assumes that the 
“disabled body” is in need of an artificial device that would help to restore the “natural” state of 
that body, seems to reinforce the perception that prostheses are meant to “project and protect the 
individual’s image of the physical self as ‘whole’ and ‘inviolate’” (2001: para.15). However, the 
presupposition of the body’s “natural” and organic wholeness in the advertisements for prosthetic 
devices appears to be undermined by the virtual dance performance delivered by Kuppers and 
Marcus in Cripple Poetics.  
Kuppers and Marcus have different body structures, which influences their bodily 
movements. Looking at the 3D tele-immersion footage depicting Kuppers and Marcus’s dance 
routine, we see that whenever Kuppers tries to swing Marcus’s body around hers in a single, fluid 
motion, he would fall back to the floor. Due to the muscular contortions in Marcus’s body, he 
finds it challenging to stand in an upright position for too long. For Kuppers, the paralysis of her 
lower extremities limits her mobility. Both performers have bodies that differ in physical form 
and muscular composition. As a result, they tend to move and behave differently. There is no 
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harmonious fusion between their bodies. Yet their desire to perform a dance routine together at a 
tele-immersive lab in Berkeley foregrounds what Dolmage characterizes as “the subversive 
possibility that bodies simply will not agree – that an individual body is not a cohesive and 
agreeable whole, nor that our encounters with others will ever (or should ever) enact a harmony” 
(2014: 142). Far from affirming the wholeness and cohesiveness of the body, the human being’s 
relation to the prosthetic is marked by gaps and fissures that exist within the body, and also in the 
interactions between different bodies in a myriad of different contexts. But we should not be so 
quick to conclude that these gaps and fissures in and between bodies would necessarily impede 
the creative potential of performers with disabilities. Instead, we should pay attention to the ways 
in which performers with disabilities employ various technological implements as creative 
prostheses that facilitate the articulation of their subjective experiences with disability.  
In Cripple Poetics, the recitation of poetry and the projection of 3D tele-immersive 
images are incorporated into Kuppers and Marcus’s embodied engagement with the audience 
members who are co-situated in the same intermedial environment. This interface between 
Kuppers and Marcus’s embodied performance and the creative prostheses – poetic language and 
digital imagery – that they employ could also influence the way in which the audience members 
perceive the generative potential of disability, particularly as the disabled body, through its 
interactions with prosthetic devices, is rendered as the engine of creativity. Rather than being a 
simple appendage to the disabled body, both digital and non-digital prostheses can help to shape 
the identity of performers with disabilities who turn to these tools in order to articulate – in a way 
that is at once poetic and phenomenological – their thoughts and feelings about disability.  
In the next chapter, which is also the final chapter of this study, I will examine a creative 
performance project that uses critical techno-dramaturgy as a strategy for structuring the 
perception of the embodied audience members in intermedial performance. This is an original 
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project that directly applies the theoretical questions posed in this dissertation in order to examine 
the complicity between digital media (particularly video technology) and the archiving of death 
as what I call mediated remains. The inspiration for the project stems from a real-life incident of 
juvenile detention in Canada that resulted in the suicide of a young woman named Ashley Smith, 
whose death was witnessed by the prison guards through the mediated gaze of video surveillance. 
Rendered as an intermedial performance directed by Andy Houston, this project entitled, From 
Solitary to Solidarity: Unravelling the Ligatures of Ashley Smith, which is known as S2S for 
short, interrogates the human perception of incarceration and self-harm in our intensely mediated 
world, where even instances of death are captured on video. As the media specialist for this 
project, I was responsible for developing the intermedial elements of the performance. Focusing 
on the intermedial design of the performance, the chapter will examine how the conceptual 
framework of critical techno-dramaturgy facilitates the analysis of video technology as a digital 
memory device that archives the mediated remains of death, which comprises the video 
surveillance footage that immortalizes Ashley’s demise.  
By juxtaposing the live performative re-enactment of Ashley’s time in solitary 
confinement with the actual archival footage depicting her struggles and eventual suicide in 
prison, S2S addresses the ethical questions concerning the artistic use of material from the digital 
archive that contains the mediated remains – i.e., the digital traces – of Ashley’s death. My hope 
is that the analysis of this original performance in the final chapter will complement the 
examination of embodied perception and intermedial performance in the preceding chapters. 
Moreover, I will demonstrate that this performance serves as an example of how critical techno-
dramaturgy can be applied in the production of new creative projects that feature the interplay 
between embodied performance and digital technology. Building upon Marcel O’Gorman’s 
theory of ‘necromedia’ and Rebecca Schneider’s investigation of historical re-enactment in 
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theatre performance, I will argue that the intermedial performance of Ashley’s story constitutes 
an artistic reworking of the mediated remains of death. Consequently, the analysis of S2S will 
culminate in a discussion of the ways in which the audience members’ embodied and multi-
sensorial experience of the performance might affect their perception of death in the digital age.  
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Chapter 6: 
Performing the Mediated Remains of Death in S2S 
(From Solitary to Solidarity: Unravelling the Ligatures of Ashley Smith) 
 
“Because we know that, once it has been taken, captured, this image will be reproducible in our 
absence, because we know this already, we are already haunted by this future,  
which brings our death. Our disappearance is already here.” 
- Jacques Derrida, Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews, 2002, p.117. 
 
On the morning of December 19, 2013, as the rising sun blazed through the nippy air, 
members of the public and the news media gathered at a conference room in Toronto to hear the 
verdict of an inquest into the tragic death in October 2007 of Ashley Smith,40 a nineteen-year-old 
teenager from New Brunswick, at a Kitchener-Waterloo detention facility. Presided by the 
coroner, Dr. John Carlisle, the jury of five women delivered a “homicide” verdict on Ashley’s 
case (“Death Ruled a Homicide” 2013). While the findings of the inquest were not legally 
binding, the verdict revealed that Ashley’s demise in detention was not so much the result of her 
attempt to commit suicide by tying cloth ligatures around her neck. Rather, the jury believed that 
it was the inaction of the prison guards that contributed to the young woman’s death, as they 
stood outside the prison cell and witnessed the final moments of her life by way of video 
surveillance. There she was, lying on the floor and gasping for air. For more than twenty minutes, 
the guards did not intervene. They were under strict orders from the prison’s management to stay !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%+!Departing from the naming conventions in academic writing, I will be using the given name “Ashley” rather than 
the family name “Smith” when referring to Ashley Smith. By using her given name, I wish to emphasize that Ashley 
was a unique individual with aspirations and ambitions. Out of respect for Ashley, I have chosen to use her given 
name in order to honour her memory.  
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clear of Ashley, whom the higher authorities believed to be seeking attention through her suicidal 
antics. Indeed, the guards were only following orders. These orders eventually became a death 
warrant for a young woman, who at the time of her demise, had been shifted across seventeen 
detention facilities throughout Canada and held in solitary confinement for four years. But on the 
morning of December 19, 2013, “homicide” was the word that weighed heavily on everyone’s 
mind. The delivery of the verdict, which was streamed live over the Internet, rattled the prison 
establishment. That establishment had taken to the courts to prevent the public release of the 
surveillance video showing Ashley’s death in prison. Perhaps whatever happens in prison has to 
remain in prison. Yet the Internet seems to have become the unofficial custodian of Ashley’s 
mediated remains, which comprises the video surveillance footage and other digital traces that 
attest to her existence and death. Nevertheless, the availability of these digital traces on the 
Internet raises an important question: in watching the disturbing footage online or in an 
intermedial performance that attempts to re-enact – and perhaps reinterpret – Ashley’s story and 
her predicament in prison, how might we be implicated in the death of another human being?  
 This concluding chapter is devoted to the discussion of a creative project that uses critical 
techno-dramaturgy as a strategy for influencing the perception of the embodied audience 
members in intermedial performance. Produced in March 2014, this is an original project that 
directly applies the theoretical questions posed in this dissertation in order to examine the 
complicity between digital media (particularly video technology) and the archiving of death as 
mediated remains (i.e., the digital traces that attest to the historical existence of a human being). 
The inspiration for the project stems from a real-life incident of juvenile detention in Canada that 
resulted in the suicide of a young woman named Ashley Smith, whose death was witnessed by 
the prison guards through the mediated gaze of video surveillance. Rendered as an intermedial 
performance directed by Andy Houston, this project entitled, From Solitary to Solidarity: 
! $"#!
Unravelling the Ligatures of Ashley Smith, which will be referred to as S2S from this point 
onwards, interrogates the human perception of incarceration and self-harm in a mediatized world, 
where even instances of death are captured on video. As the media specialist for this project, I 
was responsible for developing the intermedial elements of the performance. Focusing on the 
intermedial design of the performance, this chapter will examine how the conceptual framework 
of critical techno-dramaturgy facilitates the analysis of video technology as a digital memory 
device that archives the mediated remains of death, which include the video surveillance footage 
that immortalizes Ashley’s demise. This harrowing footage has since been uploaded to the 
Internet, and anyone from anywhere can watch the video and share it with whomever they want.   
 In the original incident on which this performance project is based, the prison guards were 
instructed by their superiors to remotely monitor Ashley using video surveillance in order to 
minimize physical contact with her. At the age of fifteen, Ashley was detained for throwing 
crabapples at a mailman outside her home in New Brunswick. Living in solitary confinement 
during her detention meant that her existence in relation to the outside world was constantly 
mediated through video surveillance footage reviewed by correctional service officers. But 
despite the proliferation of digital and non-digital information related to Ashley’s demise during 
the inquiry process, the public can only access the story of her life in mediated form, whether 
through online news and documentary coverage on her case or the surveillance footage of her life 
in prison. The accumulation of these media content on the Internet is akin to what Jacques 
Derrida terms “archive fever” (and this is a point that I will develop later in this chapter). While 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger argues for the “virtues of forgetting” in the digital age by proposing 
that digital media artefacts be allocated a limited shelf life or “expiration date” that ensures their 
deletion from digital archives after a certain period of time (2009: xi), there are significant 
judicial implications pertaining to the elimination of the online digital archive of video clips that 
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attest to the historicity of Ashley’s existence as a human being. Conversely, there are also ethical 
considerations pertaining to the retention of the video surveillance footage that contain the 
mediated traces of her life and death under detention.  
 By juxtaposing the live performative re-enactment of Ashley’s time in solitary 
confinement with the actual archival footage revealing her struggles and eventual suicide in 
prison, S2S confronts the ethical questions concerning the artistic use of material from the digital 
archive that contains the mediated remains – i.e., the digital traces – of Ashley’s death. How 
should these mediated remains be treated in an artistic environment? Building upon Marcel 
O’Gorman’s theory of “necromedia,” which explores the collusion between death and media, as 
well as Rebecca Schneider’s characterization of artistic re-enactment as “performing remains,” I 
argue that the intermedial performance of Ashley’s story constitutes an artistic reworking of the 
mediated remains of death. My contention is that the actual surveillance footage that are 
presented on the stage are complicit in not only the digital archiving of Ashley’s death but also 
the act of reinterpreting her predicament through the interplay between digital media (especially 
video technology) and the theatrical performance of thirteen actors who were not previously 
acquainted with the case. Given how the auditory and visual senses of the audience members 
might be challenged by the intermedial elements employed in the performance of S2S, I will also 
discuss the ways in which this embodied and multi-sensorial experience might affect their 
perception of death in the digital age. Finally, I will conclude this dissertation by taking a brief 
look at some of the issues that have not been addressed in this dissertation, due to the constraint 
of space. In addition, I will be offering an overview of a new creative project that will apply the 
concept of critical techno-dramaturgy in order to investigate the role of embodied labour and the 
perception of time in digital communication.  
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6.1 Of Ligatures and Open Wounds: Unravelling the Path to S2S 
 The Italian dramaturge Eugenio Barba discerns an intimate relationship between the 
embodied suffering that an artist experiences and the creative endeavour that he or she pursues. 
“Often, at the origin of a creative path,” Barba claims, “there is a wound” (2009). This wound 
may take the form of a physical injury, which tends to be obvious to the people with whom the 
artist interacts, or a mental scarring that might escape the scrutiny of onlookers. The wound, in 
both its physical and mental forms, can influence the artist’s craft through a conversation that 
unfolds between the creative work and the embodied experience of the wound’s impact on the 
artist’s physical and mental wellbeing. I should clarify that Barba’s discourse on the influence of 
the wound on creative production applies strictly to the art of theatre and performance. It is not 
the source of all art. “In the exercise of my craft,” Barba goes on to explain, “I have revisited this 
intimate lesion to deny it, question it or simply be near it. It was the cause of my vulnerability 
and the source of my needs.” (2009). For Barba, the seemingly paradoxical quality of the wound 
as the source of one’s insecurity and sustenance provides the artist with the basis upon which a 
creative piece of work can be fleshed out. In this sense, the wound should by no means be taken 
for granted as a trivial experience of suffering. Instead, the artist wrestles with the wound that he 
or she experiences by observing, probing, and challenging it, so as to discover the meaning that 
the wound might hold for his or her creative endeavour. But the act of engaging directly with 
one’s wounds carries with it a certain degree of risk, which is something that some, if not most, 
artists might be reluctant to invest in.  
Commenting on the risks involved in the craft of theatre, the British director Tim Etchells 
makes the point that performance should be conceived as a kind of investment. “Investment,” as 
Etchells asserts, “is what happens when the performers before us seem bound up unspeakably 
with what they’re doing – it seems to matter to them, it appears to hurt them or threatens to 
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pleasure them, it seems to touch them, in some quiet and terrible way” (1999: 48). Performance 
work not only places physical demands on the performer; it also frustrates his or her emotions 
and challenges his or her perceptions of the world, which may lead to the questioning of a wide 
range of issues concerning humans, animals, the environment, and even the use of technology in 
artistic practice. Etchells identifies a certain complicity of the performer with the material that her 
or she is working on. Put differently, performance affects performers as much they affect it. We 
can see the unravelling of this mutual impact between the human performers and the media 
artefacts – both digital and non-digital – that feature in the University of Waterloo Drama 
Department’s production of S2S, as the performers were encouraged to think about a painful 
situation in their lives and consider how that personal situation might relate to the media artefacts 
that attest to Ashley’s predicament during her four-year incarceration and the events that led to 
her tragic demise. By asking the performers to voluntarily divulge a personal aspect of their lives 
and to put that information in conversation with such media artefacts as the print and television 
news reports on the case, documentary interviews with the doctors and nurses who attended to 
Ashley, and declassified video surveillance footage from the correctional service, Andy Houston, 
the director of S2S, exposed the intimate relationship between the human performers and the 
assemblage of digital and non-digital material in the performance.  
For each performer, this intimate encounter with the nonhuman media objects containing 
the personal details of an unfamiliar human “other” originated from an open wound that affected 
his or her life, much like Barba’s characterization of the creative path. While each performer’s 
creative journey in the production of S2S can be traced back to a personal wound in their 
individual lives, the performance itself also originated from an open wound. This wound was 
Ashley’s predicament throughout her four-year incarceration. The creation of S2S began when 
Houston came across the CBC’s The Fifth Estate documentary investigation into Ashley’s 
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demise by the journalist, Hana Gartner.41 Two documentaries on Ashley’s case were produced in 
2010. The first one, “Out of Control”, examined the circumstances that led to her detention in 
solitary confinement, as well as the final moments of her life at the Grand Valley Institution for 
Women in Kitchener. The second episode, “Behind the Wall,” focused on Ashley’s four-month 
stay at the Regional Psychiatric Centre in Saskatoon. This episode also revealed the legal 
wrangling that transpired between the CBC and Correctional Service Canada over the release of 
the video surveillance footage showing the final moments before Ashley’s death by asphyxiation 
in October 2007 at the Grand Valley Institution. The CBC and Ashley’s family lawyers had 
pressured Correctional Service Canada to release the surveillance video to the public (“Behind 
the Wall” 2010). The correctional service, however, refused to accede to the request on grounds 
of confidentiality. Subsequently, the Ontario Divisional Court denied the correctional service’s 
motion to withhold the video footage and documents pertaining to Ashley’s forced restraint 
throughout her four years in solitary confinement and her eventual demise in October 2007 
(“Inquest to See Treatment Videos” 2012). Consequently, these archival materials were made 
available to the coroner’s inquest and the general public, and the video surveillance footage 
showing Ashley’s death was uploaded to YouTube.  
Gartner’s Fifth Estate investigative report also mentioned that Ashley was diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) during her four-year ordeal in solitary confinement. The 
disorder was compounded by her erratic and sometimes violent behaviour (by attacking the 
prison guards with sharp objects, for instance), which made it challenging for the prison guards to 
interact with her without resorting to such suppressive techniques as the use of restraining cuffs 
or sedative drugs to keep her under control (“Out of Control” 2010). For Houston, the Fifth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%"!Since 1975, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has produced the documentary series, The Fifth 
Estate, which offers in-depth analyses into the social, political, and cultural issues that affect Canadian society. 
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Estate documentaries on Ashley’s case revealed a “traumatic wound” that was inflicted by the 
correctional service’s “systemic mismanagement and misunderstanding” of mental health and its 
implication on the welfare of detainees (“S2S Program” 2014). Even though the correctional 
service’s handling of mental health issues in the prison system did not affect him personally, he 
was motivated to create a performance that not only shed light on Ashley’s story, but also 
provided an opportunity for the audience members to reflect on the treatment of mental health in 
a myriad of institutions, including the university system. To this end, Houston mounted a course 
on devised theatre for senior undergraduates in the Waterloo drama department.  
During the Fall 2013 and Winter 2014 terms, around 20 students took part in Houston’s 
course, which required them to watch the Fifth Estate documentary on Ashley’s story and 
consider how they might have been impacted by it. When Houston convened a meeting with the 
students to discuss their reactions to the documentary, the group began to think about Ashley’s 
struggles and eventual demise in prison, as well as the fraught perception of mental illness in the 
broader society. Thereafter, the undergraduates were invited to contribute to the devising process 
by weaving their personal narratives about an open wound in their lives into the guiding narrative 
of the performance, which focused on the prison system’s treatment of Ashley’s mental health 
predicament during her incarceration. Houston’s approach towards the performance of S2S 
involved the deployment of a method known as auto-ethnography. According to the sociologist 
and communications researcher Carolyn Ellis, auto-ethnography refers to the “research, writing, 
story, and method that connect the autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and 
political” (2004: xix). She explains that auto-ethnography, “as a form of ethnography,” is 
understood as “part auto or self and part ethno or culture” (2004: 31). Rejecting the objective and 
detached methods of inquiry employed by social scientists, the auto-ethnographic method pays 
attention to the subjective experiences of the self-observing person who is writing or talking 
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about an aspect in his or her life. Auto-ethnography could therefore be seen as a form 
storytelling, as the practitioners of the auto-ethnographic method tend to follow “the conventions 
of literary writing and expression,” which may include “concrete action, emotion, embodiment, 
self-consciousness, and introspection portrayed in dialogue, scenes, characterization, and plot” 
(2004: xix). But beyond its literary features, Houston explains that the auto-ethnographic method 
“presents self-narrative, or an autobiographical voice, within a particular cultural and political 
context” (“S2S Program” 2014). In the months leading up to the production of S2S in March 
2014, the cultural and political context was embodied by the inquest into Ashley’s demise. Even 
though the inquest was drawing to a close when the students in Houston’s course began to think 
back to a traumatic event in their lives (in essence, an open wound), the auto-ethnographic 
method presented the students with an opportunity to explore the points of convergence between 
their personal stories and the physical and mental stresses that Ashley endured during her four-
year ordeal in solitary confinement.  
 While working with his students on the development of the narrative for the performance, 
Houston discovered how “the institutional comparisons, between a university and a prison, were 
inevitable” (“S2S Program” 2014). Many of the students in the class reported that they too had 
been coping with mental health issues since they entered the university. Apart from relationship 
issues and problems within their own families, many students in Houston’s course – some of 
whom belonged to programs outside of the drama department – also faced a high level of 
academic stress as they struggled to meet the standards required to pursue their chosen majors. I 
had the opportunity to speak with Houston’s students during my involvement in the production of 
S2S. An overwhelming majority of them were afraid of failure, and for this reason, they did not 
want their family members and friends to perceive them as someone who might be considered a 
“failure in life”. This fear of failure resonated with every person involved in S2S, including 
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Houston and myself. As the students began to share more about the open wounds in their lives, 
there appears to be a degree of overlap between their physical and mental struggles at university 
and the oppressive predicament that Ashley endured in prison. But while the prison system 
asserts its control on detainees by confining them to a single cell with no windows for extended 
periods, thereby depriving them of physical activity and exposure to sunlight, the university 
system adopts a subtler approach towards the control of students. By placing a strong emphasis 
on exams and results, as opposed to a more comprehensive assessment of a student’s aptitude and 
attitude in class, it seems as though today’s undergraduates have been corralled into a narrow 
conveyor belt that is designed to mould them into exemplary workers for a variety of industry. I 
acknowledge, however, that there can be no direct comparison between Ashley’s incarceration as 
well as the severe mental health issues that she experienced during her detention and the stress 
experiences of the university students involved in S2S. Unlike Ashley who was deprived of an 
education while she was in prison, the student performers had the means and privilege to attend 
university.  Nevertheless, the common experience of existential stress among the students in 
Houston’s course gestures towards the possibility of forging a sense of solidarity that not only 
binds the students together, but also serves to connect their personal wounds to the plight of 
others – including Ashley – who may have suffered at the hands of various institutions.   
As the artistic director of the production, Houston regarded auto-ethnography “as a way 
of presenting a story through reflections and refractions of multiple selves in contexts that 
transform the authorial ‘I’ to an existential ‘we’” (“S2S Program” 2014). Working with the 
scholar-playwright Melanie Bennett, Houston and his students were able to construct a narrative 
structure for the performance of S2S. Weaving multiple personal narratives into a single 
performance allowed for the movement from the personal experience of solitude – as embodied 
by Ashley’s solitary confinement – to the collective experience of solidarity and a common 
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feeling of existential anxiety among people. This experiential transition from the individual to the 
collective was encapsulated by the title of the performance, From Solitary to Solidarity: 
Unravelling the Ligatures of Ashley Smith. For Houston, the auto-ethnographic approach to 
performance practice “seemed an effective way of exploring how our multiple layers of 
experiencing mental health issues in ourselves and through Ashley’s story might connect us all” 
(“S2S Program” 2014). In an effort to locate the points of convergence that connect the 
performers’ interpretation of Ashley’s physical and psychological struggles in prison to their own 
personal encounters with mental health issues, the students involved in S2S were required to 
congeal their individual narratives about an open wound in their lives into the embodied 
performance of short sketches. Together with the auto-ethnographic narratives that they had 
written beforehand, these embodied sketches provided the basis upon which the actual 
performance could be constructed.  
When I joined the production of S2S in the fall of 2013 as a Media Specialist for the 
project, I had the privilege of watching several of the short sketches performed by Houston’s 
students at various locations across the Waterloo campus. Out of the seven sketches that I 
managed to catch a glimpse of, a few of them left a deep and somewhat painful impression on 
me. Some of these students worked on their own, while others worked in groups of two or three. 
In order to protect the identities of Houston’s students, I will refer to them by the first letter of 
their given names. Performer A, for instance, chose a dark and secluded passageway hidden in 
the basement of the Arts Lecture Hall. Once there, he created a devised sketch that touched on his 
insecurities about life and the pressures he faced in school that were compelling him to take his 
own life. Unlike the frequently traversed passageway that led from the Arts Lecture Hall to the 
South Campus Hall, this relatively unknown passageway led to a dead-end. The similarity 
between the dead-end encountered by Performer A as he performed in the deserted passageway 
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and the hopelessness of Ashley’s predicament in solitary confinement was hard to miss. The 
phenomenological experience of being situated in that dark, narrow, and stuffy passageway, a 
place that was neglected by the university population, mirrored the narrative of academic 
pressure that Performer A was attempting to convey to his audience. The similarities between 
Ashley’s oppressive predicament in prison and the stresses that Houston’s students faced in 
school was reiterated by a group of three performers who chose the staircase at the north end of 
the Modern Languages Building to perform their sketch. Two of these performers performed a 
repetitive but well coordinated hand and foot gesture, slapping their palms and feet together as 
they moved up and down the staircase. The third performer acted as the prison guard who would 
instruct them to either stop their movement or carry on with it. With his aviator glasses on, the 
prison guard harangued the other two performers by slamming his fist against the glass door and 
using intimating language towards them. Taken together, the sketches produced by Performer A 
and the group of three students offered a glimpse into the intersections between the physical and 
psychological stresses experienced by university students and the curtailment of personal 
freedom that Ashley had to contend with in prison.    
 But having spent an entire afternoon watching half a dozen sketches mounted by 
Houston’s students, nothing could have prepared me for the final sketch of the day. Standing on 
the stage in the main theatre of the Modern Languages Building, Performer M presented a 
moving sketch in which she revealed that she had attempted suicide in late 2012 by slashing her 
wrist. Fortunately, a friend discovered her suicide note, and this person went on to alert the 
emergency services. By the time the ambulance arrived, Performer M had made an incision on 
her wrist. As the cut was not too deep, the surgeons were able to suture the cutaneous wound 
without excessive loss of blood. Performer M was nevertheless confined to a single room at the 
hospital for more than 72 hours. During this time, she was placed under “suicide watch”. 
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Nobody, not even a family member or a friend, was permitted to visit her as she remained in a 
sterile confinement room by herself, with periodic visits from doctors, nurses, and the police. The 
hospital staff kept watch on her wellbeing via the video surveillance footage streamed from the 
confinement room to the control office located next door. For 72 hours, she was shut out from the 
world. From the perspective of her family and friends, she existed not in the flesh but in mediated 
form as an image on the video surveillance screen. 
Ligatures and open wounds. Performer M’s experience with the “suicide watch” regime at 
the hospital was reminiscent of Ashley’s predicament in solitary confinement, even though the 
circumstances under which they were confined were vastly different. Whereas Performer M was 
confined to a hospital ward for three days, Ashley was detained in a tiny cell for four years before 
her tragic demise in prison. Furthermore, while Performer M came from a stable family in 
Northern Ontario and was able to attend university, Ashley came from a single-parent home and 
was incarcerated at the young age of 15 for throwing crabapples at a postal worker. Ashley was 
reported to be performing well in school before her incarceration (Gartner 2010). But her 
education was cut short by the decision of the correctional service to extend the term of her 
detention from a few months (as originally mandated by the court) to an eventual period of four 
years. Performer M, on the other hand, had been an aspiring ballet dancer in high school. She 
even passed the auditions to enter the prestigious Royal Winnipeg Ballet. However, due to family 
pressure, she decided to take up Chemistry at the University of Waterloo. Yet she knew all along 
that she was a performer at heart. As such, she chose to do a minor in drama with the drama 
department. Their respective predicaments could not be further removed from one another. 
But despite the vastly different social and economic backgrounds from which Ashley and 
Performer M hailed, they had both experienced – in different ways – a traumatic event that 
affected their lives. Of course, we have to remember that for Ashley, the traumatic event of her 
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prolonged detention in solitary confinement resulted in her death. Performer M, however, was 
fortunate enough to survive her suicide attempt. And in the fall of 2013, while attending 
Houston’s course on devised theatre, Performer M, like all her colleagues in that course, learned 
about Ashley’s incarceration. Sensing a strong correlation between Ashley’s story of prolonged 
detention and the circumstances that compelled her to attempt suicide, Performer M fashioned a 
dance performance that sought to encapsulate the manner in which their lives seemed to have 
spiralled uncontrollably from a moment of serenity and promise to that of chaos and futility. As 
she spun her body around in ever contracting circles, she began to describe the tranquility of her 
childhood in Northern Ontario, which was quickly interrupted by the painful narrative about her 
abusive relationship with her partner, which forced her to consider death as a means of escape. 
This was an open wound with which the performer was contending at that very moment when I 
witnessed her dance on the stage.  
 As I sat in the main theatre of the Modern Languages Building, watching Performer M 
and her delicate movements flow through the air with the gracefulness of a swan, I could not 
imagine how somebody who had experienced such a physically and mentally traumatic event in 
her life could muster the courage to speak about the ordeal in public, let alone to express that 
experience through dance. To say that I was awestruck would be an understatement. However, I 
soon realized the subtle complicity between video surveillance technology and death, as both 
Ashley and Performer M were subjected to the same isolation and remote monitoring that were 
designed to prevent them from harming themselves. In Ashley’s case, the seemingly innocuous 
intention behind the monitoring regime deployed by the prison system was fraught with 
ambiguity, as the prison guards were given strict orders not to intervene when the video 
surveillance footage revealed that Ashley was tying cloth ligatures around her neck. As such, I 
wanted to complicate the auto-ethnographic method that Houston employed as a means of 
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weaving the personal narratives of his student performers with Ashley’s life story. One way to do 
this was to incorporate the video surveillance footage showing Ashley’s demise into the 
performance. In the following section, I will discuss the deployment of Critical Techno-
dramaturgy as a dramaturgical method in the production of S2S. I will also be exploring the ways 
in which the creative project applies the theoretical questions posed in this dissertation, and how 
these questions might be helpful in examining the complicity between video surveillance 
technology and death.  
 
6.2 Applying Critical Techno-Dramaturgy 
 Several months before the opening of the performance on March 18, 2014, I attended a 
production meeting with Houston, his technical director, Gill Lesperance, as well as the drama 
department’s multimedia designer and lecturer, Paul Cegys, to discuss the intermedial aspects of 
the project. Given my research interest in intermedial performance, I was keen to emphasize that 
the use of such media elements as digital projection and video surveillance footage should not be 
conceived as ancillary to the embodied performance delivered by the student performers on the 
stage. Rather, these media elements should become part of the performance, so as to allow the 
actors to interact with these elements as they perform their auto-ethnographic narratives. Hence, I 
proposed a new approach to the integration of digital graphics and video footage into intermedial 
performance. Instead of projecting these visual elements onto a regular two-dimensional screen 
situated at the back of the stage, it might be possible to project them onto a translucent piece of 
fabric wrapped around a box-like structure. The actors could then perform inside the structure 
and behind the images that have been projected onto the piece of fabric. 
Consenting to such an idea, Lesperance developed a digital mock-up of this structure, 
making improvements along the way to ensure that it was technically feasible to construct it as a 
! $#&!
box. After some discussion, Houston and the rest of the creative team decided to name this 
structure the media cube. But Cegys, the multimedia designer for the performance, felt that it was 
necessary for the actors to interact directly with the images that were being projected onto the 
fabric. He suggested that the performers don clinical gowns (much like the white gown that 
Ashley wore while she was in prison), so that the digital images and video surveillance footage 
could then be projected onto the garment. However, everyone on the creative team, including 
Cegys, was cognizant of the technical difficulty of projecting images onto the moving bodies of 
the actors. As such, the team agreed to situate the “media cube” at the middle of the performance 
area, with three separate digital projectors directed at three different faces on the structure. The 
cube would then serve as the interstitial space between the mock-up prison cell at the backstage 
area and the long table at the front of the stage containing reams of paperwork pertaining to 
Ashley’s case. In this way, the actors could take turns to perform inside this cube while digital 
images and video footage were being projected on all three sides of the translucent covering that 
wrapped around the structure (the fourth side was left uncovered in order to allow the actors to 
enter cube and perform inside of it). With beams of white light shining upwards from under the 
floorboard, the movement of each performer’s body inside the “media cube” would cast shadows 
on the translucent fabric. By allowing the shadows cast by the actors’ embodied movements to 
interfere with the digital projections on the covering of the “media cube,” it was hoped that the 
audience members would be reminded that a human being with a unique identity and history lies 
behind every still or moving image showing Ashley’s death in prison and the personal memories 
of the thirteen performers in S2S.   
Once the design of the “media cube” was finalized, the creative team and I turned our 
attention to the dramaturgical aspect of the performance. I shared with them my concept of 
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Critical Techno-Dramaturgy, which was thought to be helpful in addressing the following three 
questions about S2S:  
1) How might the use of digital technology in the intermedial performance of S2S affect 
the audience members’ perception of existential finitude and the technological 
memorialization of human existence beyond death? 
2) What impact might the prosthetic relationship between the human performers and the 
digital tools that are employed in the performance (including digital projection and live 
video surveillance technology) have on the audience members’ understanding of human-
machine relations?  
3) And most significantly, how might digital media – particularly video surveillance 
technology – be complicit in the mediation of death in the digital age?  
I should note that these were speculative questions that guided the dramaturgical design of the 
intermedial performance. Due to the constraint of time, I was not able to obtain ethics clearance 
from the university to conduct interviews with the audience members who attended the 
production of S2S in March 2014. While I have attempted to address some of these speculative 
questions in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this dissertation, being physically involved in the production 
of S2S meant that I could turn the dramaturgical focus of the performance towards all three 
questions that I have identified as pertinent to the subject matter of the play. As other artists were 
responsible for creating the intermedial performances that were examined in the preceding 
chapters of this study, I could only apply the concept of critical techno-dramaturgy as a lens 
through which to analyze the effects of those projects on the audience members’ perception of 
embodiment and existential finitude in human-machine relations. However, S2S presented an 
opportunity for the creative team to experiment with the actual implementation of critical techno-
dramaturgy as a dramaturgical method for designing an intermedial performance. Given the 
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centrality of the “media cube” as the interstitial space within which the digital traces of Ashley’s 
extended incarceration and the auto-ethnographic performances of the thirteen student actors 
converge, the deployment of critical techno-dramaturgy in the production of S2S could also serve 
to shed light on the complicity between video surveillance technology and the mediation of death 
as digital traces that can be rapidly disseminated across the Internet.  
Dramaturgy, as Tim Etchells understands it, is the “art of unfolding […] based on the 
dynamic deployment of pictorial and non-pictorial elements across the surface of a stage, 
building layers, contrasts, echoes, repetitions over duration” (2009: 76). Etchells sees dramaturgy 
as a way of “doing time,” for it entails  “the structured unfolding of text, action and image over 
time,” with each element complementing or challenging the other across the duration of the 
performance (2009: 76). The phrase “doing time” is often used as a euphemistic expression for 
serving a prison sentence, and this is an expression that resonates with the subject matter of S2S, 
which focuses on Ashley’s four-year incarceration and subsequent demise in prison. In fact, the 
expression also resonates with Heidegger’s concept of being and time. The human being, 
according to Heidegger, is aware of time as it stands in anticipation of death (Being and Time 
2010: 397-8). As Heidegger’s student, the philosopher of hermeneutics, Hans-George Gadamer, 
elucidates, the human being is a “thrown projection” that “comes upon itself in the midst of 
things and has to take itself over as it finds itself” (2008: 218). By having an awareness of time, 
the human being as “being-towards-death” is thrown violently into the world and encounters the 
horizon of experience (i.e., time) that anticipates its own death. In this sense, we are all “doing 
time,” as we are all aware of our own finitude. 
While Ashley was “doing time” in prison, she was probably aware of how the passage of 
time anticipates the inevitability of death. Whereas most detainees would serve out their 
sentences for a finite period at a specific location, Ashley was held for a previously undetermined 
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amount of time. Moreover, she was moved across multiple detention facilities in six different 
provinces from the time she was prosecuted in 2003 to the time of her death in October 2007. 
The fragmented duration of her incarceration in all of those facilities meant that the four years 
that she spent in the prison system should not be read as a coherent and linear progression of 
events. Understanding dramaturgy, or what Etchells calls “pure dramaturgy,” as a way of “doing 
time” would help us to appreciate how Ashley’s detention was comprised of multiple sensory 
events (visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic) that unfolded across different time periods and at 
different spaces. Indeed, the juxtaposition of images and video footage from different time 
periods in S2S calls for a dramaturgical strategy that departs from the linear approach to 
performance practice, wherein the visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic elements of the piece tend to 
be subsumed under the narrative structure of the play.   
 In Chapter 2, I offered an overview of what my concept of critical techno-dramaturgy 
entails. As mentioned in that chapter, critical techno-dramaturgy consists of two interrelated 
approaches: (1) Intermediality and De-familiarization; as well as (2) Interactivity and Perceptual 
Engagement. These two approaches are useful not only in terms of analyzing human-machine 
relations in intermedial performance but also for the structuring of different media elements in 
conjunction with the embodied performances delivered by human performers. The first approach, 
which I refer to as “Intermediality and De-familiarization,” involves the deliberate structuring of 
the interplay between the human participants (including the audience members) and the new 
media technologies featured on the intermedial stage in ways that destabilize the audience 
members’ familiarity with how they might be embodied with these technologies. The aim here is 
to challenge the audience members’ perception of how humans relate to media technologies. In 
S2S, the still images and video footage pertaining to Ashley’s story were not delivered in the 
same manner as they would typically appear on the Internet. Instead of simply transplanting these 
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media elements from the Internet to the stage, the digital traces of Ashley’s incarceration and 
eventual demise were interwoven with photographs and video clips drawn from the personal 
history of the thirteen actors in the performance. This juxtaposition of images and videos 
belonging to different individuals unfolded as a series of digital projections on three sides of the 
“media cube” rather than a two-dimensional, multimedia display that one would expect to see on 
a computer monitor. Besides, having human actors perform inside the cube and behind the digital 
projections served to disrupt the audience members’ familiarity with how still images and videos 
are usually consumed as disembodied digital assets in their daily lives. Through the intermedial 
layering of photographs, video footage, auto-ethnographic narratives, and the embodied 
performance of the actors within the interstitial space of the “media cube,” which separated the 
mock-up prison cell at the back of the stage and the long boardroom table at the front, the de-
familiarization of the audience members’ encounter with digital assets in S2S paved the way for 
the second approach in critical techno-dramaturgy to take root. Above all, the performers bring a 
phenomenological sense of physical “presence” to media (photographs, video footage, and even 
Facebook profiles) that do not usually connote presence.  
The second approach in critical techno-dramaturgy, known as “Interactivity and 
Perceptual Engagement,” emphasizes the role of the audience members as active participants in 
the creation of meaning in the intermedial performance. By incorporating the audience members 
as agents who are capable of influencing the action in the representational context of the 
intermedial performance event, the deployment of critical techno-dramaturgy has the potential to 
stimulate the audience’s critical awareness of the ways in which the rapid development and 
ubiquitous usage of new technologies affect the individual and society. However, we should note 
that the experience of interactivity, as Brenda Laurel puts it, is a “thresholdy phenomenon” that is 
“highly context-dependent” (1991: 21). Nevertheless, the critical potential of the dramaturgical 
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concept resides in its capacity to engage with the perceptual modes of the audience members. To 
this end, the creative team for S2S decided to construct an engagement space at the gallery 
outside of the main theatre. The engagement space was designed to introduce the audience 
members to the subject matter of the performance by encouraging them to interact with exhibits 
that bear the strongest relationship to Ashley’s incarceration. As the space remained open from 
9am until the end of each day’s performance at 9pm (the production ran for five days in March 
2014), the audience members could take their time to interact with the exhibits before and after 
the play.     
Certainly, S2S is not the first production in theatre history to incorporate the gallery space 
as part of the overall experience of the performance event. Rarely do theatre performances exist 
in complete isolation from the surrounding social and cultural contexts that may contribute to the 
audience members’ perception of the show. As the theatre scholar Marvin Carlson observes, 
“when we begin to consider the audience experience of the theatrical event, we should soon come 
to realize that the actual performance of the play is only a part (and historically not always the 
most important part) of an entire social and cultural experience” (1990: xiii). From the 
perspective of the audience members, the theatrical event does not necessarily begin at the exact 
moment when the house lights in the auditorium are dimmed, nor does the whole experience 
come to an abrupt end when the actors leave the stage after the final curtain call. Instead, as 
Carlson elucidates, “the physical appearance of the auditorium, the displays in the lobby, the 
information in the program, and countless other parts of the event as a whole are also part of its 
semiotic, and it is a rare production indeed that does not build at least some of these into the 
overall impression it seeks to make upon its audience” (1990: xiii). As such, the creation of an 
engagement space outside of the auditorium, with interactive exhibits on display, appears to be 
consistent with the semiotic practices of the theatrical tradition.         
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Due to the architectural contiguity between the gallery and the main theatre at Waterloo’s 
Modern Languages Building, it was impossible for any audience member to miss the exhibits on 
display at the engagement space. However, the audience members could choose whether or not to 
explore the three exhibits before or after the actual performance. In fact, they could even decide 
not to explore any of the exhibits. The purpose of having the engagement space was not to force 
the audience members to understand the social and cultural circumstances that led to the creation 
of S2S, particularly Ashley’s extended detention and subsequent death in solitary confinement. 
Instead, the three exhibits were designed to: 
1) Give the audience members a sense of the physical and mental torments that Ashley 
had to endure while she was in detention;  
As well as to:  
2) Offer a preliminary indication of how her story might resonate with the personal 
experiences of the thirteen student performers in the show. 
As a result, all three exhibits in the engagement space were dedicated to exploring either one of 
these two points. The first exhibit was called the “Solitary Confinement Cell,” which replicated 
the dimensions (6 feet by 3 feet by 12 feet) of the actual prison cell in which Ashley resided 
before her demise. The audience members could enter this simulated cell in order to experience 
the feeling of being confined to a small area. As the interior walls of the cell were plastered with 
white paper, the audience members could leave their comments or other markings behind. The 
second exhibit was a video loop showing Performer M’s (the actor who attempted suicide in real 
life) solitary dance on the bridge connecting the Waterloo campus and the South Campus parking 
lot along University Avenue. To see the video loop, the audience members had to look through a 
rectangular slit situated at the upper half of a mock-up prison door. This gesture of looking 
through a slit into a prison cell resembled the way in which the prison guards would check on 
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Ashley whenever she called for help. Standing outside and looking in, the guards eschewed all 
physical contact with their charge.  
Finally, we come to the third exhibit known as the “Sound Station”. This exhibit included 
three different audio clips that were edited from the YouTube videos showing scenes from 
Ashley’s detention at the Joliette facility in Quebec and the Grand Valley Institution for Women 
in Kitchener. In creating the audio clips, I chose to generate a cacophonous mash-up of different 
voices belonging to Ashley, the nurses who attended to her, and the prison guards. In one of these 
sound clips, white noise was introduced at regular intervals to disrupt the flow of the 
conversation between Ashley and a female prison guard. In another sound clip, a nurse’s request 
for Ashley to sleep so that she could go home was reconfigured in such a way that the first half of 
the sentence was swapped with the second half, thus creating a repetitive loop that mirrored the 
monotonous rituals of prison life. Deprived of any visual cues, the audience members had to rely 
solely on the voices of the interlocutors in order to get a sense of the conditions under which 
Ashley lived as well as the ways in which she was treated by the prison nurses and guards. 
Perhaps it could be argued that even the nurses and guards themselves were deprived of cues – be 
they visual or auditory – regarding the severity of Ashley’s physical distress. But as long as a 
majority of the nurses and guards remain silent about the reasons for their passive responses to 
Ashley’s physical and psychological struggles (only a few prison officials have spoken briefly 
about the case in public), we can only speculate on the circumstances that prevented them from 
helping Ashley.  
Taken together, the three exhibits in the engagement space were designed to give the 
audience members a sense of the issues that they would encounter in the actual performance. 
Like most art exhibitions, the audience members were invited to walk around the space and 
partake in an embodied interaction with each of the three exhibits. Along with the “media cube,” 
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which de-familiarized the audience members’ encounter with such digital assets as photographs 
and videos belonging to other human individuals, the engagement space represented a key 
component of critical techno-dramaturgy as it engaged directly with the visual, auditory, and 
kinaesthetic senses of every person who visited that space. But apart from de-familiarizing the 
audience’s encounter with digital media and engaging with their perceptual modes, the 
performance of S2S also included archival material such as online news reports, still images, and 
video footage that relate to Ashley’s case. These digital assets complemented the re-enactment of 
Ashley’s story through the weaving of auto-ethnographic narratives written by thirteen 
performers, who discovered a correlation between their personal histories and Ashley’s life in 
prison. Yet the incorporation of digital material pertaining to her incarceration, particularly the 
video surveillance footage showing the final moments of her life, was not without controversy. 
Even though the footage has been available in the public domain for several years, featuring it in 
a public performance presented an ethical challenge concerning the artistic use of material 
showing the actual death of a human being. In the next section, I will examine the role of the 
archive in performances that seek to re-enact past events, so as to understand how the intermedial 
re-enactment of Ashley’s story in S2S might serve as both an archival practice of preserving the 
mediated remains – i.e., the digital traces – of her death and an act of artistic reinterpretation 
based on the interplay between these remains and the embodied, auto-ethnographic performances 
of the thirteen student actors.   
 
6.3 Death on Video: Performing Mediated Remains 
The intermedial performance of Ashley’s story in S2S constitutes an artistic reworking of 
the mediated remains of her death. As the live performative re-enactment of Ashley’s life in 
solitary confinement intersects with the archival footage showing her struggles and eventual 
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suicide in prison, the actors and producers in S2S are confronted with serious ethical questions 
concerning the artistic use of material from the digital archive that contains the mediated remains 
of Ashley’s death. For this reason, I claim that the incorporation of actual surveillance footage 
from the prison cell in which Ashley was held in solitary confinement is complicit in not only the 
archiving of Ashley’s death, but also the act of reinterpreting her predicament through the 
interplay between video technology and the embodied performances of thirteen student actors. 
These actors have contended with various mental health issues, either on a personal level or in 
their interactions with family members and friends who happen to possess a mental disability. 
But while the student actors’ decision to reveal their struggles with mental health could help to 
draw the audience’s attention towards the mental health challenges that Ashley faced throughout 
her time in solitary confinement, it is the juxtaposition between the actors’ physical existence on 
the stage and the video footage showing Ashley’s death by asphyxiation that brings the 
relationship between video technology and death into stark relief.   
 We live in an era where cameras are so commonplace that they can be found in almost all 
digital devices that are currently available on the market. Anyone who wants to take a photograph 
or shoot a video clip of any living or non-living thing can do so at any time of day by turning to 
the camera application on his or her tablet computer or smartphone. As the media philosopher 
Marcel O’Gorman observes, “Today, we are all immortalized on the screen, though that screen 
may not be in a movie theatre” (2015: 12). The relative ease of capturing images in our daily 
lives might have contributed to the proliferation of videos depicting suicides, homicides, car 
accidents, and street-side shooting deaths on a variety of social networking platforms. In July 
2013, a bystander along Dundas Street in Toronto recorded a smartphone video that captured the 
moment in which a police officer fired nine gunshots that killed a pocketknife-wielding teenager 
named Sammy Yatim aboard a streetcar (“Toronto Teen Streetcar Shooting” 2013). The video, 
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which was taken in the small hours of the night and uploaded to YouTube immediately after the 
incident, became the epicentre of a controversy surrounding the use of force by police officers in 
dealing with a lightly armed teenager who appeared to be mentally unstable (“Sammy Yatim 
‘Wasn’t Stable,’ Says Witness” 2013). In Ashley’s case, it was a prison guard, rather than a 
bystander, who captured the video footage of her death. However, the guard did not use a 
smartphone but a digital camcorder to shoot the harrowing footage showing the slow and painful 
death of a young woman who was supposed to be on suicide watch.     
  Several months before her death at the Grand Valley Institution for Women on October 
19, 2007, the prison administrators decided to place Ashley under suicide watch, as she had 
previously attempted to tie cloth ligatures around her neck. Having been instructed to keep watch 
on her behaviour in the cell at all times, the prison guards relied on closed-circuit television 
cameras within the cell and a digital camcorder to record her activities throughout the day. In the 
correctional service’s videos that have been released on YouTube, we can see the digital 
camcorder being employed by the guards whenever they needed to enter Ashley’s cell to keep her 
under control (“Ashley Smith Prison Video” 2011). While the surveillance cameras embedded in 
the ceiling of the cell captured images from a fixed position, the camcorder offered flexibility in 
terms of the angle at which a particular footage can be shot. From a legal standpoint, the footage 
captured by the camcorder would bear witness to the conduct of the guards in the event that their 
interactions with Ashley resulted in a major incident involving injury or death. In this way, the 
combinatory use of the video surveillance cameras and the digital camcorder served the dual, and 
somewhat ironic, role of preventing a catastrophe (the death of a detainee) from happening while 
anticipating the potential occurrence of that catastrophe and its legal implications. Here, video 
technology appears to operate as an exemplar of what O’Gorman has termed necromedia.   
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O’Gorman devised the theory of necromedia as a critical lens through which to analyze 
the relationship or “collusion,” as he calls it, between death and technology (2015: 15). As he 
points out in his recent book, which is aptly entitled, Necromedia, the finitude of the human 
being is intertwined with its technological nature. I say the title is apt because it explicitly 
acknowledges the finitude of the author as a technological being who knows how to harness the 
tools (e.g., language, research methods, and word processing skills) required for the production of 
a book. The book is a medium that exteriorizes and preserves the thoughts and memories of the 
author. And like all technological artefacts forged by the human animal, the book – and this 
entire dissertation, for that matter – would likely outlast its producer. The philosopher David 
Wills notes that if we accept that technology, as André Leroi-Gourhan and Bernard Stiegler have 
demonstrated, is “a matter of exteriorization, of the human reaching outside itself, […] then it is 
also a matter of archivation” (2008: 10). In exteriorizing its memory through the production of 
the technological artefact, the human being, as Wills contends, produces an archive that accounts 
for the past in the present moment while remaining “available for a future retrieval” (2008: 10). 
This understanding of technology as a matter of archivation seems to correspond to O’Gorman’s 
point about the collusion between the finitude of the human being and its technological nature. 
As O’Gorman argues in the opening chapter of his book, “to fully acknowledge human 
finitude is also to acknowledge our own technological being” (2015: 15). He further notes that it 
is not “the first use of a flint to crack a skull,” which is essentially a technological act, “that 
defines the protohuman (and hence prototechnological) moment, but memory of the task, the 
repeated use of the flint to perform the same task (O’Gorman and Stiegler 2010)” (O’Gorman 
2015: 13). Thus, it is the human capacity to invent, and more significantly, reuse the tool that, as 
O’Gorman puts it, “exemplifies the ‘matter of archivation’ to which Wills insists we always look 
back upon as a species (2015: 13). In this way, the mortality of the human animal is inextricably 
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linked to its capacity to produce the technological artefact as an archive. It is on the basis of this 
relationship between the finitude of the human being and its technological nature that O’Gorman 
offers the suggestion that “[a]ll media, […] by pointing at once to both our technicity and 
finitude, are necromedia” (2015: 15). For the prison guards presiding over Ashley’s activities in 
her cell, video technology operated as a means by which to watch out for any signs that their 
charge might be attempting to commit suicide. As the video surveillance cameras and the digital 
camcorder recorded Ashley’s activities and the guards’ interactions with her, these devices 
became complicit in anticipating the finitude of the human subjects (including Ashley and the 
guards) whose images had been immortalized in the footage. 
Indeed, the history of the video camera bears witness to the collusion between death and 
technology that O’Gorman theorizes. In 1882, the French scientist Étienne-Jules Marey invented 
the chronophotographic gun. This device was capable of capturing and storing twelve frames in 
one second and on a single picture. Marey used his invention, which was probably the world’s 
first portable motion picture camera, to shoot images of animals and humans for the purpose of 
analyzing the mechanics of their locomotion (Burns 1997). In the first iteration of this “serial-
shot camera,” Marey relied on “fixed photo glass plates” before turning to “modern celluloid” in 
1888 (Kittler 1999: 124). The chronophotographic gun, a device designed for shooting moving 
images of people, animals, and inanimate things, had appropriated the butt and the barrel of the 
standard rifle and the cylindrical revolving mechanism of the Gatling rapid-fire machine gun. All 
Marey had to do then was to aim his device at a particular thing, be it living or non-living, and he 
could begin filming it by rotating the revolving mechanism. As the German media philosopher 
Friedrich A. Kittler asserts, there is a convergence between the history of the movie camera and 
the history of automatic weapons, as the “transport of pictures only repeats the transport of 
bullets” (1999: 124). “With the chronophotographic gun,” Kittler goes on to explain, 
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“mechanized death was perfected: its transmission coincided with its storage,” for whatever and 
whomever “the machine gun annihilated the camera made immortal” (1999: 124). Drawing upon 
Kittler’s observation on the link between death and media, O’Gorman adds that new media 
technologies, “from the two-way radio to the Internet, often originate in research programs 
guided by a logic of seek and destroy, and hence they are always-already about human death” 
(2015: 42). In light of the chronophotographic gun’s capacity to seek out people, animals, and 
objects and keep a pictorial record of their movement for posterity, the motion picture camera 
joins the gun in becoming a device of death.  
 For the prison guards watching over Ashley through the electronic eyes of the video 
surveillance cameras and the portable camcorder, video technology functioned as a safeguard 
against any potential litigation against their handling of affairs in the prison cell. According to a 
CBC news report, Valentino Burnett, the prison guard who recorded the camcorder video of 
Ashley’s demise, “came under fire for following orders not to intervene when Smith was 
choking” (“Ashley Smith Jurors Watch Video” 2013). As the report elucidates, “Burnett 
acknowledged under questioning [in court] that ‘in a perfect world’ he would have entered the 
cell to save Smith” (“Ashley Smith Jurors Watch Video” 2013). Burnett’s comment is indicative 
of the dominance of visual media in contemporary society, especially in light of the way that he 
and the other prison guards had prioritized the recording of Ashley’s final moments on video 
over the pressing need to save a human being who was asphyxiating right before their eyes. 
Perhaps if a perfect world were to exist, he might have disobeyed the order of non-intervention 
and proceeded to rescue Ashley, who was struggling to breathe. But he and the other prison 
guards were not only compelled to follow the management’s orders for fear of losing their jobs. 
Rather, they insisted on archiving their interactions with Ashley on video because the video 
footage would lend credence to their verbal and written testimonies in court. However, by 
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recording every move and every sound that Ashley made in her cell, the guards had unwittingly 
prefigured her death.  
Long before that fateful October morning on which Ashley tied cloth ligatures around her 
neck and asphyxiated as a result of that, she had already been immortalized as a spectre in 
numerous hours of video footage. Even while she was alive, video technology had turned her into 
the “living dead”. After the tragic incident in the prison cell, members of the public could only 
come to know Ashley through the correctional service’s videos that were released online. Yet 
these videos only offer a glimpse of the complexity of her life. With the exception of people who 
were related to or acquainted with Ashley in a personal capacity, anyone looking at her story 
from afar can only learn of her existence through the video images of her life and death in 
solitary confinement. All of this seems to speak to O’Gorman’s observation on how we live in a 
culture where the recorded images of people, which are constitutive of what he refers to as digital 
assets, “will be disseminated in multiple locations and contexts while they are alive, and will 
remain in databases and media archives long after they die” (2015: 10). The sharing and storing 
of our digital assets on the Internet and on computer servers renders salient the intersection of our 
existential finitude with the media technologies that we produce. As O’Gorman observes in his 
discussion of the collusion between death and video in the film American Beauty, “today we are 
all immortalized on the unforgiving and unforgetful ‘big screen’ of surveillance systems, home 
movies, and incidental amateur footage, whether we like it or not” (2015: 56). Ashley was 
monitored on video for four years against her will, a procedure that continued until her tragic 
demise. As a result, the video footage containing the mediated remains of her death represents 
only a fraction of the captured images of her existence. Nevertheless, the use of this video 
footage in S2S invites a re-examination of what it means to incorporate the mediated remains – 
i.e., the digital traces – of a person’s death into an intermedial performance.  
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The use of archival material in theatre performance is by no means a new phenomenon. 
Dramaturges and directors often rely on archives to research the different dramaturgical 
approaches adopted by other theatre practitioners. For dramas set in a certain historical period, 
the archives provide crucial historical information that would directly influence the narrative 
content, the type of costume, and the set design of the performance. But archives are especially 
pertinent to performances that attempt to re-enact a particular historical event. Consider, for 
example, the amateur performers who gather in large numbers at famous battle sites across the 
United States to re-enact scenes from the American Civil War. Donning nineteenth-century 
military uniforms, with muskets and bayonets in tow, the re-enactors perform what Rebecca 
Schneider calls the “remains” of the American Civil War. I should emphasize that the “remains” 
to which Schneider refers are not human remains in the form of bones or organic matter but the 
nonhuman, artefactual remains that attest to the historicity of the Civil War and its participants.  
As Schneider observes, the Civil War re-enactors turn to such archival evidence as 
witness testimonies, lithographs, and photographs as the basis upon which to re-enact a particular 
battle scene. The aim here is to capture as many details about that event as possible through the 
intersection of historical research and live performance. But besides relying on archival material 
in the re-enactment, Schneider notes that the re-enactors “also engage in this activity as a way of 
accessing what they feel the documentary evidence upon which they rely misses – that is, live 
experience” (2011: 10). “Many fight,” Schneider goes on to explain, “not only to ‘get it right’ as 
it was but to get it right as it will be in the future of the archive to which they see themselves 
contributing” (2011: 10). The Civil War re-enactments are more than a straightforward repetition 
of historical events. Instead, by physically performing the battle scenes and playing the part of 
the already dead, the re-enactors participate in the embodied act of reinterpreting the archival 
evidence that inspire their performances at the very site where the historical events occurred. In 
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the production of S2S, however, the re-enactment of Ashley’s story takes place outside of its 
original context – that is, the solitary confinement cell at the Grand Valley Institution for 
Women. Nevertheless, the performance draws on a range of archival materials – particularly the 
correctional service’s video footage and the various news reports on the case – that have been 
released in the public domain. Whether it is the re-enactment of battle scenes from the Civil War 
or the performance of Ashley’s story in S2S, what Schneider refers to as “performing remains” 
entails the simultaneous archiving and reinterpretation of historical events through embodied 
performance. In this way, the present moment of embodied action folds into the historicity of the 
archive. At the same time, the performance of these “mediated remains,” as I call it, stands in 
anticipation of future reinterpretations of the archive in question.  
 The archive houses a past that resists closure. The past, according to Schneider, “is never 
complete, never completely finished, but incomplete: cast into the future as a matter for ritual 
negotiation and as yet undecided interpretive acts of reworking” (2011: 33). The embodied 
actions and the speeches that the re-enactors deliver in performance could serve to renegotiate the 
meaning of the archival materials that attest – albeit partially – to the veracity of an event that 
occurred in the past. “In this way,” Schneider elucidates, “events are given to be past, or to 
become past, by virtue of both their ongoingness and their partialness, their incompleteness in the 
present” (2011: 33). Because the past is always already incomplete in the present, any attempt to 
re-enact the past is therefore a performance of remains. Schneider believes that the performance 
of remains coheres with the logic of the archive, whereby “what is given to the archive is that 
which is recognized as constituting a remain, that which can have been documented or has 
become document [emphasis in the original]” (2011: 98). This “remain” which can or has been 
documented in the archive exists as a medium (be it a speech, a written account, a photograph, or 
a video clip) that mediates the relationship between the apparent immateriality of the people and 
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events of the past and the physical existence of the re-enactors in the immediacy of the live 
performance. However, the logic of the archive seems to demand a degree of originality among 
the remains that are housed within it. As Jacques Derrida informs us, the word “archive” – or 
arkhe in Greek – “names at once the commencement and the commandment” (1996: 1). The 
archive refers simultaneously to the place where documents are stored, and to the figure of 
authority – traditionally the archon or local magistrate in ancient Greece – who commands the 
place of the archive. As such, the archive commences at a particular place and under the 
command of an authority, such that the originality of the archive rests on its role as the 
authoritative source that lends credence to all documents placed under its care.   
 In Ashley’s case, the archival materials pertaining to her incarceration and death in prison 
were originally restricted to the confines of the institutional archives of the correctional service. 
Placed under the command of the service’s director, the entire archive, which includes the video 
footage showing Ashley’s final moments in her cell, was housed in the government’s database. If 
the superior court in Ontario did not issue an order demanding that the release of all video 
footage pertaining to Ashley’s time in prison, the archive would remain hidden from public 
scrutiny. This movement of the archive from the private domain of the prison system to the 
public sphere mirrors the transfer of power from one custodian to the next – i.e., from the 
government to the judiciary. However, as Derrida explains, whether the archive exists in private 
or in public, it always takes place in a dwelling, or what he refers to as “house arrest” (1996: 2). 
“The dwelling,” he elaborates, “this place where they dwell permanently, marks this institutional 
passage from the private to the public, which does not always mean from the secret to the 
nonsecret” (1996: 2). Within the archive lies the intersection between the topological (place) and 
the nomological (from the Greek nomos, or the law of the patriarch). Even a publicly accessible 
archive may harbour secrets that remain open to a future disclosure. While the place where the 
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archive is housed may be visible, the authority that commands and shapes its existence may not 
be. Derrida emphasizes that it is the authority, which is based on a social mandate, that decides 
what should remain or disappear, and it does not matter whether that which is nominated to 
remain or disappear is discursive or performative (1996: 3).  
In the production of S2S, the performance of mediated remains in the form of the video 
footage showing Ashley’s asphyxiation in her cell undermines the archival authority of the 
correctional service, as the footage enters into a dialogue with the auto-ethnographic stories 
performed by the student performers in the show. Rather than allowing the correctional service to 
define the way that the surveillance footage should be understood, the juxtaposition between the 
photographs and videos drawn from the personal histories of the thirteen performers and the 
video footage from Ashley’s cell reveal the common experience that the performers and Ashley 
share as human beings with ambitions and aspirations. As these images are projected onto the 
three covered faces of the “media cube,” the performers take turns to stand inside the illuminated 
cube and perform their stories. Standing behind the montage of video footage showing Ashley’s 
death and the momentous events (birthdays, graduation ceremonies, family outings etc.) in their 
own lives, the performers’ embodied performances in the “media cube” demonstrate the material 
basis upon which the images are rendered as archival records of human existence. Whether it is 
the video surveillance footage that captured the final moments of Ashley’s life or the home 
videos that belong to the performers, the moving figures recorded in these visual archives allude 
to the materiality of human bodies. Even though these bodies may no longer be in existence by 
the time an embodied audience member encounters the visual archive in question (as is the case 
with Ashley), the fact remains that the figures recorded in the video footage exist as traces that 
mark the material existence of actual human beings, including those who have passed on.  
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 As Rebecca Schneider notes, the archive is ironic in the way that it anticipates the return 
of the body (especially the body of a person who encounters the archive at a later time) while 
emphasizing the ephemerality and disappearance of the body (or bodies) that it preserves as 
disembodied linguistic, visual, or auditory traces. Indeed, we would do well to remember that 
one’s encounter with the archive is always an embodied affair. The archive, as Derrida reminds 
us, calls into question the coming of the future, for “[a]s much as and more than a thing of the 
past, before such a thing, the archive should call into question the coming of the future” (1996: 
33-4). “The question of the archive,” he goes on to emphasize, “is not, we repeat, a question of 
the past,” but rather “a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a 
response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow” (1996: 36). The archive holds out a 
promise for a future interpretation that is to come. In this sense, the archive is not simply a 
storage facility for artefacts and traces that attest to the existence of human and nonhuman bodies 
of the past. Instead, in pointing back towards the historical past, it is always already looking 
forward to the return of the body through an embodied encounter between the object that has 
been preserved and the living person who comes before it. 
S2S is more than just a straightforward attempt at documenting and archiving Ashley’s 
story. By weaving the video footage showing the final moments of Ashley’s life into a montage 
comprising of photographs and videos drawn from the performers’ personal lives, the 
performance offers a reinterpretation of the circumstances that led to her demise in prison. The 
suggestion here is that it is all too convenient to fault the prison guards whom the coroner’s 
inquest allege are complicit in Ashley’s death, as they did not intervene to save her when she was 
seen choking and gasping for air. Instead, there is a need to interrogate the apparently inadequate 
understanding of mental health issues among the officials in the prison system. But rather than 
creating a documentary drama that seeks to uncover the “truth” behind Ashley’s death in prison, 
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the performance of S2S explores the ways in which technology influences the audience members’ 
interpretation of Ashley’s story. “Technology,” as the director Andy Houston explains, “makes 
viewing the lives of others a ubiquitous activity in our contemporary world and the very 
proliferation of this viewing suggests to me that we are experiencing an ever-growing crisis about 
the truth of what we see” (“S2S Program” 2014). Some audience members might have come 
across the numerous news reports on Ashley’s case before they even heard about the performance 
of S2S. Some of them might also have watched the video footage showing Ashley’s death by 
asphyxiation, which has been available on YouTube since the latter half of 2010. Having seen the 
harrowing footage online, these audience members might have formed their own opinions about 
the circumstances that led to Ashley’s demise. Hence, the incorporation of the video footage into 
the auto-ethnographic performances delivered by the thirteen student performers in S2S serves to 
problematize the viewing of what is essentially the mediated remains of Ashley’s death. 
As Houston elucidates, the juxtaposition of the actual video showing Ashley’s 
predicament in the final moments of her life with the embodied performances of the student 
performers as well as the photographs and videos drawn from their personal lives “may address 
the need to question this act of viewing [the visual traces of someone else’s life], and to 
appreciate that now viewers are witnesses and therefore co-creators of ‘truth’” (“S2S Program” 
2014). Bearing witness to the interplay between the video footage showing Ashley’s death and 
the images drawn from the personal histories of the performers as they deliver their auto-
ethnographic performances in the illuminated “media cube,” the audience members are able to 
establish alternative interpretations of Ashley’s story that depart from the narratives offered by 
the correctional service, the coroner’s inquest, as well as the press. As co-creators of the “truth” 
surrounding Ashley’s plight in prison, particularly the inadequate treatment of her mental health 
issues that culminated in a policy of non-intervention among the prison guards, the audience 
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members encounter an intermedial archive consisting of the mediated remains of Ashley’s death. 
Such an encounter with the mediated remains of someone’s death (as captured by the video 
surveillance footage in Ashley’s case) prompts a re-examination of how death might be perceived 
in the digital age, as the traces (blogs, photographs, and videos, for example) of one’s material 
existence can be conveniently preserved in various forms of digital storage media and 
disseminated quickly and widely across the Internet. What follows is an examination of the ways 
in which the use of video surveillance footage and audio clips that attest to Ashley’s incarceration 
and subsequent demise might affect the audience members’ perception of death. 
 
6.4 Spectral Encounters and the Embodied Perception of Death 
 Before the commencement of S2S in the main theatre of the Modern Languages Building, 
the audience members were offered the opportunity to interact with the three exhibits that 
comprised the Engagement Space at the theatre’s gallery. The exhibits consisted of a mock cell 
that reproduced the dimensions of the actual cell in which Ashley resided before her death, a 
replica cell door with a slit through which a video projection of Performer M’s swirling dance 
performance could be seen, as well as a set of audio clips that contained the voices of Ashley and 
the prison guards and nurses who attended to her at the Grand Valley Institution for Women and 
another detention facility in Joliette, Quebec. While I was involved in the design and creation of 
the Engagement Space, I did not participate in the actual construction of the mock cell and the 
replica cell door. Nevertheless, I was responsible for creating the audio clips at the Sound Station. 
These audio clips featured the verbal exchanges between Ashley and the prison officials (nurses 
and guards) who attended to her at the Grand Valley Institution for Women in Kitchener and the 
Joliette detention facility in Quebec. The original audio tracks that contained the verbal 
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exchanges were extracted from two separate videos that the correctional service had released to 
the public at request of the Ontario Divisional Court.   
In the first video, a conversation transpired between Ashley and a group of nurses at 
Joliette who were persuading her to go to sleep, despite the fact that sunlight was streaming in 
through the window in her cell. Even though the nurses had threatened to use sedatives on her, 
Ashley insisted on staying awake.42 For several minutes, the nurses harangued her with pleas for 
her to go to sleep, but she refused to acquiesce. Towards the end of the video, one of the nurses 
declared, in a somewhat patronizing voice, that Ashley should go to sleep, so that the nursing 
staff may take their leave. “If you sleep, I can go home,” said the nurse. The poignancy of this 
sentence was hard to miss. Having attended to Ashley for a few hours that day, the nurse and her 
colleagues desired some form of respite. However, the thought of compelling a person to go to 
sleep against her will made the nurse’s plea sound unreasonable and self-serving. The sentence 
that she uttered struck at the heart of the problem that contributed to Ashley’s demise, which was 
the inadequate level of care offered by the prison system in response to the mental health issues 
that she had been grappling with throughout her four-year incarceration. As such, I felt that this 
sentence had to be featured in the audio clips created for the Engagement Space. But instead of 
using the sentence as it stood, I decided to invert the first and second clauses in the sentence, so 
as to produce a new version that sounded like this: “I can go home, if you sleep.” This new 
sentence was sutured to the original sentence uttered by the nurse at the Joliette detention facility. 
As a result, the coupling of the original sentence and the inverted version of it produced a cyclical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%#!Looking at this first video, which reveals Ashley’s conversation with the nurses at the Joliette detention facility in 
Quebec, it is clear that Ashley was an intelligent young woman who knew how to reason with her custodians for 
better and fairer treatment.  !
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effect that reflected the repetitive quality of Ashley’s prolonged detention, as she was moved 
seventeen times across different detention facilities throughout Canada.  
Once the first audio clip had been completed, I turned my attention to the next audio clip 
that focused on Ashley’s detention at a prison in Kitchener. Looking at the second video released 
by the correctional service, I came across a sentence that encapsulated the attitude of some of the 
prison guards who attended to Ashley at the Grand Valley Institution for Women, the location 
where she spent the last days of her life. In the video, a female guard was seen peering through 
the slit of a cell door in order to monitor Ashley’s behaviour. Looking in from outside the cell, 
the guard revealed her intention to induce a sense of discomfort in her charge. “I am standing 
here, looking at you, making you feel uncomfortable,” the guard informed Ashley, who had 
requested to be left alone. While it could be argued that the guard was simply doing her job to 
ensure that her charge was not attempting suicide, a task that had already been delegated to the 
video surveillance cameras in the cell, her words seemed to express the sentiment of a bully 
rather than a custodian. Picking up on the unsettling quality of the phrase, I decided to invite 
three of Houston’s performers to re-enact the conversation between Ashley and the prison guard. 
Speaking into a condenser microphone, one actor repeated the disturbing phrase uttered by the 
prison guard, while the other two actors took turns to articulate the stress that Ashley would 
likely have experienced as a result of the guard’s scrutinizing gaze. Subsequently, these 
recordings were integrated into the audio track containing the prison guard’s intimidating phrase, 
thereby creating a mash-up that alternated between the actual recording of the guard’s verbal 
interaction with Ashley and the actors’ re-enactment of that conversation. This second audio clip 
was placed alongside the first clip that featured the Joliette nurse’s plea for Ashley to go to sleep.  
While a discerning listener might have noticed the contrast between the sanitized studio 
recording (sanitized as a result of digital audio editing tools that shut out ambient noises) of the 
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actors’ re-enactment of Ashley’s conversations with the prison officials and the crackly audio 
tracks derived from the original correctional service videos, there was a spectral quality to the 
cacophony of voices belonging to Ashley, the Joliette nurse, the Grand Valley prison guard, and 
Houston’s actors. As auditory archives that attest to the existence of these individuals in time, the 
recordings of their voices would live on even when they are no longer alive. Indeed, the audio 
clips at the Engagement Space, if properly preserved, would continue to exist in their absence. 
The fleeting existence of the human voice as it is spoken renders it susceptible to distortion and 
misremembering by those who hear it. As long as the echoic memory of the voice is not 
preserved by means of various audio storage media, it runs the risk of being forgotten over time. 
In A Lover’s Discourse, Roland Barthes explains the ephemeral nature of the voice and how it is 
intertwined with the prospect of death: “It is characteristic of the voice to die. What constitutes 
the voice is what, within it, lacerates me by dint of having to die, as if it were at once and never 
could be anything but a memory” (1978: 114). The ephemerality of the voice is analogous to the 
temporality of life, as once the voice and the person who speaks it have come to pass, they can 
only exist as nothing more than a memory trace. “This phantom being of the voice,” as Barthes 
describes it, “is what is dying out, it is that sonorous texture which disintegrates and disappears” 
(1978: 114). The “phantom being of the voice” that Barthes alludes to finds its expression in the 
way that human speech is always open to distortion, revision, and misremembering on the part of 
the listener. Such is the “fleeting nature of the spoken word,” which, as O’Gorman elucidates, “is 
subject to a resampling by the receiver of the message, whose subjective interpretation ensures 
the impossibility of any stable meaning or subject” (2015: 13-4). In light of the temporal 
character of the voice, or what Barthes refers to as its “phantom being” that, in turn, calls to mind 
the spectre of death, the experience of the voice appears to be marked by its very absence. It is, in 
essence, a spectral encounter.    
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 In examining the spectral quality of Brian Eno and David Byrne’s 1981 album My Life in 
the Bush of Ghosts, Cary Wolfe observes that the sampling of voices from a wide range of 
commercial and private sources foregrounds the way that the recorded memory traces of life can 
outlive the death of the human individual. Eno and Byrne’s album conveys a ghostly impression 
because the voices that feature in the recordings belong to people – the Arabic singers and the 
radio disc jockeys, for instance – who will continue to exist as auditory traces despite their 
physical absence in the world. As Wolfe notes, “what makes the voice the voice is not that it is 
presence […] but that it is spectral” (2010: 297). The spectral existence of the voice lends itself to 
a future iterability that transcends the physical limitations of human finitude. In other words, the 
recorded voice will live on, even when the human person to whom the voice belongs is absent. 
But one could argue, as Wolfe points out, that the spectral quality of the spoken word might be 
undermined by the “permanence of the recorded voice” (2010: 297). Yet Wolfe maintains that it 
is precisely the “repeatability and iterability” of the “recorded voice” that “[testify] all the more 
to the radical absence of ‘every empirically determinable subject’ (to use Derrida’s phrase), to the 
becoming-ghost of its origin in a bush of virtuality that its own ability to be sampled feeds and 
populates” (2010: 297). What this means is that the voice is always already open to the 
possibility of repetition and iterative resampling, thereby transforming the voice into a ghostly 
spectre that lingers on even in the absence of its originator.  
The voices that have been preserved in the audio clips at the Engagement Space for S2S 
also convey a ghostly impression, as the audience members encounter the recorded traces of 
Ashley’s voice with the knowledge of her death at the Grand Valley Institution for Women in 
October 2007. Hearing the recorded voice of a young woman who is physically absent, the 
audience members confront the spectre of Ashley’s existence at the Joliette detention facility and 
the Grand Valley Institution where she lived out the final moments of her life. This spectral 
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encounter with the vocal recordings that attest to the historical existence of a person who is no 
longer alive serves to remind the audience members of the intersection between the ephemerality 
of the spoken word and the temporality of life. And the spectrality of Ashley’s voice also applies 
to the voices of the Joliette nurse who wanted her to sleep and the Grand Valley prison guard 
who was determined to make her feel uncomfortable. Once their conversations with Ashley had 
been preserved on an auditory storage device, the ephemeral voices of the nurse and the prison 
guard were instantaneously transformed into spectres that would linger on in their absence.   
Even before their deaths, Ashley, the Joliette nurse, as well as the Grand Valley prison 
guard were already haunted by the spectrality of their voices, which, when recorded on an 
auditory storage device, marked their future disappearance in advance. In this sense, the audience 
members’ spectral encounter with their recorded voices in the audio clips at the Engagement 
Space constitutes a mediated experience of death that inevitably emphasizes the prospect of their 
own absence in the future. Standing at the Sound Station with an MP3 player in their hands and a 
set of headphones plugged into their ears, the audience members’ embodied interactions with the 
recorded voices of three people whom they have not met could potentially influence their 
perception of death as an inevitability that leaves its imprint in the form of memorial traces. And 
it is these memorial traces (writings, vocal recordings, video footage etc.) that attest to the 
historical existence of human individuals such as Ashley. Yet I must emphasize that the audio 
clips at the Engagement Space were designed to provide the audience members with a sense of 
what the actual performance in the main auditorium entails, and especially to prepare them for 
the appearance of the video images showing the final moments of Ashley’s life. As such, the 
spectrality of the recorded voices in the audio clips at the Engagement Space is supplemented by 
the visual spectres that emerge during the actual performance. But as it will become clear in a 
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moment, these visual spectres did not only originate from the harrowing video footage of 
Ashley’s death.     
  Halfway through the re-enactment of Ashley’s story in S2S, the thirteen student 
performers turned the focus of the performance towards their own struggles with mental health 
issues. In order to deliver a series of auto-ethnographic performances based on their life 
experiences at home and in school, the performers took turns to situate themselves behind the 
three covered faces of the “media cube” on which photographs and videos drawn from their 
childhood were woven into a montage. As a result, there was always a human body standing 
behind the projection of photographs and videos on the three faces of the “media cube.” But the 
point of situating the performers in the “media cube” was not only for them to perform their 
stories about the mental stresses that they faced. As they told their stories, the performers were 
gradually shedding their civilian clothes for the sterility of a white hospital gown. Stripping down 
to their underwear, the actors exposed their bodies to the scrutiny of the audience members, who 
could only see them through the montage of photographs and videos that occupied the covered 
faces of the “media cube”. Nevertheless, the change of clothes marked the transition of the 
performers from university students with unique identities to the anonymity of prison detainees.  
As each performer completed his or her performance in the “media cube,” Performer AL, 
who played the role of prison guard throughout the show, would enter the cube and drag the actor 
off the stage. For a brief moment, there was no indication as to where the performer was being 
led. Then, video images would appear on the screens of the “media cube”. Every time this video 
footage emerged, Performer AL could be seen pushing a new actor who had been dragged off the 
stage into a mock cell situated at the backstage area. As the footage was shot from a high angle, it 
was possible to see the full profile of the “imprisoned” actor. Some of the actors sat quietly on 
the rickety bed, which was the only object in the cell, while others made abusive gestures at the 
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surveillance camera that watched over them from above. I should add that this was the only time 
in S2S that the actors were featured in a live video feed. Once the “imprisoned” actor had spent a 
few minutes in the mock cell, Performer AL would enter the mock cell and drag the actor back 
towards the stage. Returning from their brief confinement, the actors formed a single file behind 
the “media cube”. The montage of photographs and videos drawn from their personal lives could 
still be seen on the three covered faces of the “media cube”. But none of the actors entered the 
cube for a second time. It was at this moment that the actual video surveillance footage showing 
Ashley’s death by asphyxiation began to appear on the screens of the “media cube”. 
With each passing second, the audience members witnessed how a young woman 
struggled to breathe as she took a bunch of cloth ligatures and looped them around her neck. The 
clock ticked while the grip of the ligatures became tighter. Ashley was gasping for air, but the 
guards, who were keeping taps on her from another room, did not intervene. They were told not 
to. Minutes passed, and it became obvious that Ashley’s life was ebbing away. With her face 
pressed against the floor, she stared directly at the surveillance camera that was hanging from the 
ceiling. From the perspective of the audience members in the main auditorium in which the 
performance of S2S unfolded, it felt as though Ashley was staring intently at every audience 
member, as her gaze seemed to have pierced right through the flat projection surfaces of the 
“media cube”. And then the final moment, that very second that separated life and death, arrived. 
She ceased to struggle, and her eyes remained wide open. Sensing that the audience members 
might be overwhelmed by the content of the video footage, the video designer for S2S, Paul 
Cegys, decided to stop the projection of that scene. As the performance came to a close, the 
thirteen performers gathered in front of the “media cube”. Using a bunch of cloth ligatures, they 
created a lengthy cord that symbolized their solidarity with Ashley’s predicament during her 
four-year incarceration.  
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In a gesture of solidarity with Ashley’s spectral existence in the video footage showing 
the final moments of her life, the thirteen student performers in S2S placed themselves under the 
watchful gaze of the video surveillance camera in the mock cell at the backstage area. This 
juxtaposition between the immediacy of their physical presence on the stage and the mediating 
capacity of video surveillance technology collapses the distinction between what Maaike Bleeker 
describes as the “theatrical gaze” and the “cinematic gaze.” In her study of visual practices in the 
theatre, Bleeker suggests that the theatrical gaze differs from the cinematic gaze, as the former 
does not “necessarily capitalize on voyeuristic pleasures” that might otherwise objectify the 
bodies that appear in the performance. Instead, contemporary stage performers often enjoy a 
“direct and explicit relationship with the audience that contributes to the intensity of the theatre as 
a “live” experience, directly present and visible over there” (2011: 133). Because the performers 
are supposed to be “live” and present on the stage, they are able to “look back at the audience” 
and challenge them “to make a distinction between the act of showing and what is actually there 
to be seen” (2011: 133). This feedback loop between the stage performer and the audience seems 
to be absent from the cinematic gaze, as it is difficult, if not impossible, for the actors in a film to 
engage with and respond to the audience members directly. Bleeker’s characterization of the 
theatrical gaze assumes that the notion of presence is what sets the theatrical experience apart 
from its cinematic counterpart. But as each of the thirteen performers in S2S entered the mock 
cell at the backstage area, the immediacy of their physical presence on the stage was undermined 
by the live video feed from the mock cell that transformed their existence into visual spectres. 
Appearing as images on the video feed, the performers were not simply present in the sense of 
“being there” on the projection surfaces of the “media cube,” nor were they absent just because 
they had left the physical confines of the stage. Instead, the video images of the performers’ 
confinement in the mock cell foregrounded the spectrality of their existence in the performance.  
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Commenting on the visuality of spectres, Derrida notes that in the technology of the 
image, the notion of the “living present” is spectral. Once the camera has captured our image, he 
goes on to explain, “this image will be reproducible in our absence” (2002: 117). And because we 
are aware of the reproducibility of our image, “because we know this already, we are,” as Derrida 
observes, “already haunted by this future, which brings our death” (2002: 117). Like the recorded 
voice, the recorded image of the human being anticipates the future disappearance of that being. 
“Our disappearance,” as Derrida reminds us, “is already here,” for “[we] are spectralized by the 
shot, captured or possessed by the spectrality in advance” (2002: 117). In other words, the spectre 
is always already there in the living present. When the student performers in S2S were dragged 
off the stage and pushed into the mock cell at the backstage area, the immediacy of their physical 
presence on the stage was temporarily suspended. The audience members could no longer verify 
the existence of each performer by tracing their gaze through the performance space. Instead, a 
live video feed from the mock cell at the backstage area provided the only substantive 
verification of the performers’ existence as living beings. Just as the scene of Ashley’s 
asphyxiation was captured by the video surveillance cameras in her cell and preserved as spectres 
that linger on in her absence, the live video feed in the mock cell transformed the physical 
presence of the performers into spectres that marked their future disappearance in advance. “A 
spectre,” as Derrida understands it “is both visible and invisible, both phenomenal and 
nonphenomenal” (2002: 117). Suspended between the ephemerality of the living present and the 
materiality of the recorded image that preserves the fleeting moment for posterity, the spectre 
becomes “a trace that marks the present with its absence in advance” (2002: 117).  
As spectres in a live video feed projected on the “media cube,” the performers were both 
present and absent at the same time. While the audience members could perceive the performers’ 
mediated presence through the real-time surveillance footage on the projection screen, the 
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conspicuous absence of these actors from the immediacy of the stage was reinforced by the 
spectral quality of the video images showing their brief confinement in the mock cell. When the 
performers finally returned to the stage, the audience members were confronted with the video 
footage showing Ashley’s death. In turn, the spectrality of Ashley’s image in the archival footage 
began to intersect the rendering of the performers’ confinement in the mock cell as visual 
spectres in the live video feed projected on the “media cube”. Sitting at the back of the 
auditorium during the opening performance of S2S, I saw several audience members shifting 
queasily in their seats as they witnessed the juxtaposition between the archival footage showing 
the final moments of Ashley’s life and the video images of the performers’ layover in the mock 
cell. Confined to their seats in a darkened auditorium, the audience members had to grapple with 
the morbid visual details of Ashley’s death by asphyxiation while attempting to make sense of 
how the live video feed from the mock cell could have marked the performers’ future 
disappearance in advance.  
Despite their physical presence alongside the harrowing footage featuring the scene of 
Ashley’s demise, the performers were already standing in anticipation of the inevitability of 
death, as the video images of their confinement in the mock cell would likely live on in their 
absence. For the audience members, their spectral encounter with the recorded images of 
Ashley’s death and the temporary confinement of the student performers in the mock cell might 
have affected their perception of death in a world that has been subjected to round-the-clock 
video surveillance. Whereas instances of death were once related by way of spoken and written 
narratives, video technology has opened up a different way of perceiving the existential finitude 
of human beings. In a single shot, the video camera is capable of immortalizing the life and death 
of the human individual as spectres preserved in the materiality of storage media. And with the 
aid of the Internet and other digital technologies that facilitate the rapid transfer of data, it is now 
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possible to access these spectres from any location in the world and at any time of day. At the end 
of the performance of S2S, when the audience members decided to depart the auditorium, they 
too had become spectres, as video surveillance cameras situated above the theatre’s entrances 
began capturing and recording images of their faces. I should note that the production team did 
not install these cameras for the show. Instead, the surveillance cameras, which were being 
monitored by the university’s security service, were already there in the first place. Perhaps at 
some point in the future, the moving images captured by the cameras would resurface in the 
absence of those audience members who might have been oblivious to the presence of the 
surveillance device above their heads as they left the auditorium.  
 
Conclusion: Next Steps  
Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the ways in which intermedial performance 
might affect the audience members’ perception of human-machine interactions. All seven of the 
intermedial performances that have been analyzed in this study involve the live interplay between 
the human participants in the performance event and different forms of technology, ranging from 
a simple bicycle to such sophisticated technological implements as cellphones, handheld 
computers, digital video, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Drawing upon the 
theoretical perspectives espoused by scholars working in new media, performance studies, and 
the philosophy of technology, I have argued that intermedial performance artists reinvigorate the 
role of the human body by deploying a critical techno-dramaturgy that mobilizes embodiment as 
a strategy for shaping the audience members’ perception of how humans relate to technology. As 
I have discussed in chapters 3 and 4, some intermedial performances, such as Blast Theory’s 
Rider Spoke and Susan Broadhurst’s Blue Bloodshot Flowers, incorporate the audience members 
as participants who contribute to the creative process through their interactions with the digital 
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and analogue technologies featured in the performance event. In Rider Spoke, the audience 
members take on a performative role by traversing the cityscape on bicycles in order to discover 
recorded stories hidden at specific places in the city. Using the locative technology known as 
“Wi-Fi Fingerprinting” and a handheld computer that has been mounted on the handle bar of a 
bicycle, the audience members can choose to record their personal stories and store them at the 
places that they have visited. By suggesting an alternate use of the handheld computer as a 
platform for sharing stories with strangers, Rider Spoke frustrates the audience members’ 
familiarity with the conventional functions of the technological devices that they encounter in 
their daily lives, and also the ways in which they might be embodied with these technologies. 
Such an effect on the audience members’ perception of technology, as I have endeavoured to 
demonstrate in this study, could potentially augment their critical awareness of the ways in which 
the relationship between humans and technology is impacted by the rapid development and use of 
new technologies in contemporary society. 
In light of the creative engagements between human beings and various technological 
devices within the same performance event, intermedial performance artists are able to develop 
dramaturgical strategies that challenge the audience members’ perception of how these 
technologies relate to their own bodies and the surrounding world. In an effort to understand the 
ways in which intermedial performance might potentially affect the audience members’ 
perception of the relationship between humans and technology, I have focused my analysis of the 
seven performance projects featured in this study on addressing the following three issues: the 
interplay between embodiment, technology, and space in urban performances such as Rider 
Spoke, the intersection of performance and techno-anxiety, as well as the influence of the 
transhumanist rhetoric of disembodiment on cyborg performance and the staging of disability. 
All of these issues were explored in chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively. In the final chapter, I 
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looked at the relationship between video technology and death by examining a creative 
performance project that experimented with my concept of critical techno-dramaturgy as a 
dramaturgical strategy for influencing the audience members’ perception of the interface between 
humans and technology. As I have noted in the introduction to this dissertation, the issues that 
have been explored in the study are by no means an exhaustive list of the substantive and stylistic 
qualities of intermedial performance. Instead, the factor that unifies them is the primacy of the 
body in the audience members’ interactions with the human performers and the technological 
devices featured in the intermedial performance event. But due to the constraint of space, there 
are issues concerning the social, cultural, and economic implications of intermedial performance 
that I have not been able to address in this dissertation. Chief among these issues are questions 
pertaining to the effects of human-machine interaction on the human perception of time, as well 
as the ways in which the technological devices that facilitate the virtual exchange of information 
between people in contemporary society might be complicit in obfuscating the role of embodied 
labour in digital communication.    
 Over the past few decades, communication between human beings have shifted from 
traditional mail and landline-based telephony to wireless mobile telephony, emails, and other 
types of Internet-based communication. As a result of this massive transition to digital 
communication across the world, the time taken for the exchange of information between people 
located far away from each other in different time zones has been significantly reduced. Whereas 
a letter sent by traditional mail would have taken weeks to arrive and a phone call made on a 
landline telephone would require the intervention of a switchboard operator, the use of emails, 
cellphones, and text messaging systems has made it possible to communicate simultaneously 
with multiple people without expending too much time. But while the time taken for the 
exchange of information has been reduced, it seems that the digital communication methods (the 
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sending of emails and text messages, for instance) that we employ in our daily lives might have 
obscured the role of the body and the labour that it performs in digital communication. 
As the human participants in the so-called “digital economy” turn to sophisticated new 
media technologies (such as smartphones and mobile computers with wireless Internet access as 
well as smart watches with computing and email functions) to perform a variety of leisure or 
work-related tasks, more time is also being devoted to the use of these digital devices for the 
purpose of communication. Digital communication tends to take place round the clock, with no 
apparent starting and ending points. A piece of digital communication sent by a superior at the 
workplace, a friend, or even a family member would often necessitate the delivery of a quick 
response. Sometimes, the subject of the piece of communication might be a matter of great 
import, and the pressure to respond to it in the shortest time possible might be justified. At other 
times, however, the impetus to respond quickly to a piece of digital communication seems to be a 
compulsive behaviour engendered by the fast pace lifestyle of our contemporary technoculture. 
What gives in this round-the-clock engagement with digital communication is the amount of time 
we spend on rest and recuperation, as the state of sleeplessness becomes ever more pervasive in 
our lives.  
The issue of sleeplessness in relation to digital communication is pertinent to the topic of 
my dissertation, which examines the ways in which intermedial performance might influence the 
audience members’ perception of human-machine interaction. As intermedial performance artists 
turn to digital technology in order to fashion performances that foreground the relationship 
between human beings and the digital media tools (emails, text messages etc.) that facilitate 
round-the-clock communication between individuals located in different places and time zones, 
the role that the body plays in these digital communicative acts has become an important point of 
contention. How is the body involved in the communicative practices that transpire between 
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individuals on the Internet and across a myriad of text messaging platforms? What pressures 
might the body face as it participates in digital communication throughout the 24-hour day, with 
little time left for sleep? What does it mean to live in a state of sleeplessness, where the time 
spent on embodied labour seems to be encroaching on the time required for the body to rest and 
recuperate? Throughout the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have explored the ways in 
which the mobilization of embodied experience in intermedial performance might affect the 
audience members’ perception of human-machine interaction. Moving forward, I am interested in 
understanding how the body and the embodied labour that it performs in digital communication 
could potentially influence the human perception of time. To this end, I plan to devise a new 
intermedial performance project that will examine the intersection of embodied labour and digital 
communication in a public performance that takes place throughout the night, as the human body 
enters into a state of sleeplessness that is partly induced by our decision to participate in round-
the-clock communication through the digital devices that are constitutive of our contemporary 
technocultural existence. But before I expand on what my new creative endeavour might entail, I 
would like to explore the idea of sleeplessness and its potential effects on the human experience 
of time.     
 In his treatment of sleeplessness and the intensified experience of time in the world of 
24/7 connectivity, Jonathan Crary asserts that in the “non-stop life-world of twenty-first-century 
capitalism,” there appears to be “a generalized inscription of human life into duration without 
breaks, defined by a principle of continuous functioning. It is a time that no longer passes, 
beyond clock time” (2013: 8). The clock, particularly the 24-hour digital clock, has come to 
condition our perception of time as a continuous flow that appears to be commensurate with the 
seemingly endless series of activities that we fashion for ourselves. Whereas our forebears would 
conform to the strictures of a familiar routine, waking, working, and sleeping at designated times 
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in the day, most of us are now willing to stay awake in the middle of the night to check our email 
accounts for incoming mail, or to send a piece of digital communication to someone located 
miles away. The distinction between day and night has been distorted by the irregularity of our 
sleep patterns and the extension of our productivity into the depths of night. Whether we are 
required to work in the day or to tend to the night shift, most of us seem to be plagued by a 
perpetual state of sleeplessness as we elect to remain connected to the technological means of 
digital communication.  
“Sleeplessness,” as Crary explains it, “is the state in which producing, consuming, and 
discarding occur without pause, hastening the exhaustion of life and the depletion of resources” 
(2013: 17). He believes that our world has been conditioned by the 24/7 cycle of production and 
consumption, whereby the technological devices that are sold on the market are designed to 
solicit the labour and attention of the people who use them in their quotidian lives. Put 
differently, it appears that our contemporary technoculture is perpetuating the condition of 
sleeplessness. Crary believes that we are complicit in this condition of sleeplessness, as we invest 
a substantial amount of our time and energy in communicative acts that take place virtually on 
our digital devices. His contention is that this intensified experience of time as continuous and 
brimming with activities would have a significant impact on the embodied labour of human 
beings who engage in digital communication. He argues that the “only consistent factor 
connecting the otherwise desultory succession of consumer products and services” in our 
contemporary technoculture “is the intensifying integration of one’s time and activity into the 
parameters of electronic exchange” (2013: 40). As more of our leisure and work-related activities 
are shifted to a digital environment, the intensification of our experience of time and the 
perpetuation of the state of sleeplessness would be rendered salient.   
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Crary observes that corporations and government entities like the military are trying to 
discover new ways to minimize the time needed to make decisions, so as to speed up the process 
of economic productivity. But more significantly, he claims that such research endeavours are 
poised “to eliminate the useless time of reflection and contemplation” (2013: 40). He asserts that 
this is “the form of contemporary progress” that is characterized by “the relentless capture and 
control of time and experience” (2013: 40). Crary might be overstating his point here by 
suggesting that we have ceded all control of our experience of time to an economic regime that 
seeks to increase productivity, and therefore the economic value of labour, by technological 
means. But rather than dismissing his observation as alarmist, I plan to use my concept of critical 
techno-dramaturgy as a dramaturgical strategy for devising an intermedial performance that 
investigates the impact of digital communication on the human perception of time and the ways 
in which embodied labour is understood in relation to human-machine interactions.  
Gesturing towards the future by way of a new creative endeavour, I will be working with 
the director of the Critical Media Lab at the University of Waterloo, Marcel O’Gorman, on the 
development of a performative endurance project entitled, “The Burden of Communication”. This 
is an intermedial project that will take place in the near future. Turning the focus of computer-
mediated communication back onto the body, the project will explore the ways in which digital 
communication methods disguise the role of embodied labour in our communicative acts online. 
In an age where emails and text messages are exchanged 24/7, with people communicating round 
the clock and through the night like labourers tending to the “graveyard” shift, this performance 
seeks to reveal how the efficiency of digital communication systems obscures the body’s 
participation in the construction and exchange of messages in the virtual environment. In essence, 
this is a performance about the burden of communication. By situating the performance at a 
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public park in Kitchener, the project seeks to gradually unravel the guise of disembodiment that 
shrouds the digital communicative acts – emails, text messages etc. – that pervade our lives. 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of critical techno-dramaturgy consists of two inter-
related approaches. The first approach, “Intermediality and De-familiarization,” entails the 
interplay of different media technologies in the same performance event. It is hoped that the 
audience members will be de-familiarized by the juxtaposition of these media technologies and 
the different technological affordances that they bring to bear on the performance, The second 
approach, “Interactivity and Perceptual Engagement,” aims to engage with the perceptual modes 
of the audience members through their embodied participation in the intermedial performance. 
Combining these two approaches, the plan is to have a group of audience members (each wearing 
a headlamp and a high visibility vest) take turns to tow wagons around the Victoria Park loop 
adjacent to the Kitchener Clock Tower. For each email message, text message, or other digital 
communication received by the performer, he or she must place a brick into the wagon. Bricks 
will be located at the foot of the clock tower, and will be added after each loop around the track. 
An LED “read-out” display at the side of each wagon will count the number of bricks that have 
been loaded onto the wagon. With the clock tower serving as the core around which the 
procession of brick-laden wagons revolves, the correlation between the flow of time and the 
physical burden of communication will be rendered salient. For amid the flurry of communicative 
activities that transpire between people on the Internet and various information sharing platforms, 
perhaps we should consider the burden that is being placed on our body as we engage in digital 
communicative acts that could potentially alter our perception of time.  
“The Burden of Communication” embodies some of the key ideas developed in this 
dissertation, such as the production of social space through the performative use of mobile 
technology (the focus of chapter 3) and the mobilization of embodied relations between the 
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human body and prosthetic devices (as discussed in chapter 5). By holding the performance in a 
public park, where audience members will be invited to haul brick-laden wagons all through the 
night, this performative endurance project aims to foreground the body’s performance of 
embodied labour in digital communication, as more bricks will be added to the pile whenever a 
new piece of communication (email or text message) is received on a smartphone or a mobile 
tablet. These digital devices that the audience members employ in the performance will serve as 
prosthetic extensions that facilitate the sending and receipt of communication with people located 
in various places and time zones across the world. But rather than discounting the role of the 
body in the digital communicative acts that transpire between individuals through the exchange 
of emails or text messages, the project will emphasize the physicality of the body’s interaction 
with such digital communicational prostheses as smartphones and mobile tablets by establishing 
a connection between the exchange of digital communication on digital devices and the embodied 
labour involved in hauling brick-laden wagons.  
As the audience members participate in a procession of brick-laden wagons around a 
clock tower situated in a public park, the purpose of deploying a critical techno-dramaturgy in 
“The Burden of Communication” is to encourage the audience members to critically reflect on 
the ways in which the body’s performance of embodied labour in digital communication might 
affect the human perception of time. With intermedial performance artists turning to an ever-
increasing range of sophisticated technological devices in the production of intermedial 
performance, we would do well to recall David Wills’ advice on the importance of “[reserving] 
the right to hold back” and “not presume that every technology is an advance” (2008: 6). Wills’ 
recommendation is instructive, for it behoves us to guard against the tendency to fully invest 
ourselves in the alluring prospect of unrestrained technological progress without paying due 
attention to the impact of digital technology on the human condition. It is here that a critical 
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techno-dramaturgical performance might be suitably poised to foster critical reflection among the 
audience members on the potential perceptual and socio-cultural effects of human-machine 
interaction. For no matter how technologically elaborate an intermedial performance might 
appear to be, the value of a critical techno-dramaturgical approach to the production of theatre 
performance resides in its capacity to set the audience members thinking about the philosophical 
and practical complexities that shape the relationship between human beings and technology. 
Thinking back even as we move forward, our embodied performances with technology unfold an 
opportunity to strive towards a clearer understanding of how the human body might be entwined 
with the very machines that it creates.   
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